Hansaria, J.:- 'Is mercy killing an offence in India? is the merciful question which has fallen for determination in this way side case a jail appeal from a convict under Section 302 I.P.C. The facts are telling and stand almost uncontroverted. The victim was a 3 year old female child of accused Siddheswari. On 26.3.74 at about 9 A.M. when mother of the accused (P.W. 2) was in the cowshed, Pilpili (P.W. 3) and Sumitra (P.W. 4) the two other daughters of the accused, came running to her grand ma and informed that the Nileswari, the child had been killed in their cook shed by their mother with a dao by hacking her on the neck. On Dharmeswar son of P.W. 2 coming from market, he was sent to inform Janiram (P. W. 1), father of the accused, who lodged ejahar at about 1 P.M. of the date of occurrence implicating the accused in the crime. 2. The fact of the death of Nileswari at the hand of the appellant has been testified by none else than her nearest and closed relations noted above. The same cannot therefore be doubted. Autopsy Surgeon (P.W, 6) had found five incised injuries on the person of the deceased, one of which was on the neck and other on the occipital region of the head, which is just over the backside of the neck. As P.WS. 3 and 4 were quite young (aged about 9 years and 7 years at the relevant time,) hacking on back of the head, could have well been taken as on neck. The evidence about killing is thus conclu­sive and clinching. 3. The only point which is urged by Sri Sarma who has appeared as amicus curiae is that Siddheswari had caused the offence due to mental derangement, something about this had been stated by P.W. 4 whose evidence in cross examination was : "My mother is a diseased one. She suffers from mental derangement at times". Our attention has also been invited by Sri Sarma to the evidance of P.W.S. 1 and 2 in this regard. P.W. 1 .had stated that Siddheswari was suffering from illness for about 2 years prior to the occurrence. P.W. 2 has testified that their daughter was ailing. She suffers from mental derangement at times". Our attention has also been invited by Sri Sarma to the evidance of P.W.S. 1 and 2 in this regard. P.W. 1 .had stated that Siddheswari was suffering from illness for about 2 years prior to the occurrence. P.W. 2 has testified that their daughter was ailing. Illness as such is no excuse or exception, though mental derangement would be if the same can be taken care of by section 84 of the penal Code. To get the protection under that section, it is however necessary that the person concerned by reason of unsoundness was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. This requirement under our law is in substance the same as that laid down by the Judges in their answer to the questions put to them at the House of Lords in Me Naughten's case. There is nothing before us to satisfy if mental derangement of Siddhes­wari was of the nature contemplated by section 84. The case therefore does not come within the general notion of insanity. 4. Having known from the confessional statement of the accused which was recorded on 27. 3. 74 (Ext. 5) that the little child had been done to death because she was suffering form illness badly and the accused could not bear the trouble, we thought it fit to examine the question as whether such type of killing, which can be described as mercy killing, is exempt under the Indian Law, if so to what extent. As in framing the Penal Code, inspiration was taken from English Law, the legal position about mercy killing as prevalent under the English Law may first be seen. The principle of 'diminished responsi­bility' as applicable to English Law seems to have taken care of mercy killing in England. As in framing the Penal Code, inspiration was taken from English Law, the legal position about mercy killing as prevalent under the English Law may first be seen. The principle of 'diminished responsi­bility' as applicable to English Law seems to have taken care of mercy killing in England. But this principle is a product of specific provision introduced into English Law by Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act, 1957 which reads : "Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes of induced by disease or injury as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts or omission in doing or being a party to the killing". The result of this defence had been stated thus in Crimi­nal Law (The General Part) by G. Williams, Second Edition Pages 557 and 558 : "The defence of diminished responsibility has consi­derably alleviated the position of defendants charged with mercy killing. This in a sad case where an affectionate father killed his idiot child, who was subject to terr­ible seizures without warning and whose affliction was progressive the defence of diminished responsibility was accepted and the father was sentenced to twelve month's imprisonment - the Court of Criminal Appeal recognising that imprisonment could not be a deterrent in circumstances of this kind. In another tragic case, where devoted husband killed his aged and invalid wife, the Court of Criminal Appeal, granted discharge without punishment. The defence of diminished responsibility thus enables the judge to reduce or extinguish the sentence on merciful grounds, and does not leave the accused entirely to the discretion of the executive. It is perhaps possible, by some stretch, to say that the mind is temporarily unhinged by the stress of grief, but little or no assist­ance is required from the medical experts in cases of this type." 5. Though in English Law mercy killings are treated as manslaughter and this enables the Judge to reduce or extin­guish the sentence, there is no provision in India parallel to Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act, 1957. Though in English Law mercy killings are treated as manslaughter and this enables the Judge to reduce or extin­guish the sentence, there is no provision in India parallel to Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act, 1957. In this country the only provision known to us to take care of insanities what­ever be its type in so far as criminal liability is concerned in section 84 of the Penal Code. Thus mercy killing due to imp­airment of mental facelty is no exception under Indian Law. None the less it is well known that insanities are of many types and the one which could come near mercy killing is what has been described in text books as 'impulsive insanity'. Law relating to this has been stated at pages 169-70 of Ratan lal's Law of Crimes, 21st Edn. as below :- "Impulsive insanity- It is said that on particular occasions men are seized with irrational and irresistible impulses to kill, to steal, or to burn, and that under the influence of such impulses they sometimes commit acts which would otherwise be most atrocious crimes, It would be absurd to deny the possibility that such impulses may occur, or the fact that they have occurred, and have been acted on. Instances are also given in which the impulse was felt and was resisted. The only question which the existence of such impulses can raise in the administration of criminal Justice is, whether the particular impulse was (really) irresistable as well as unresisted. If it were irresistible, the person accused is entitled to be acquitted, because the act was not voluntary and was not properly his act. If the impulse was resistible, the fact that it proceeded from disease is no excuse at all. If a man's nerves were so irritated by a baby's crying that he instantly killed it, his act would be murder. It would not be less than murder if the same irritation and the corresponding desire were pro­duced by some internal disease. The great object of the criminal law is to induce people to control their impu­lse, and there is no reason why, if they can, they should not control insane impulse as well as sane ones. The proof that an impulse was irresistible depends prin­cipally on the circumstances of the particular case. The great object of the criminal law is to induce people to control their impu­lse, and there is no reason why, if they can, they should not control insane impulse as well as sane ones. The proof that an impulse was irresistible depends prin­cipally on the circumstances of the particular case. The commonest, and probably the strongest cases, are those of women who without motive or concealment kill their children after recovery from child bed. Where an act of murder is committed without mot­ive and apparently on some kind of sudden impulse, it cannot fall within this section by reason of the accused not having known the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law. The mere fact that an act of this character is committed on a sudden impulse with no discoverable motive will not, in general afford suffi­cient basis for accepting a plea of insanity." [ Emphasis supplied] 6. This principle has been recognised by Gour also see page 633 of his Penal Code, 9th Edn. Vol. 1. The impulse to kill in such a case is sudden instanteous, unreflected, and incontrolable. The act of homicide is perpetrated without interest, without motive and often on person who are most fondly loved by perpetrators. As to decided case?, the one which could be referred to is that of Mabajjab Bibi vs. Em­peror, AIR 1932 Cal. 658, a Special Bench decision. In this case the accused had killed her daughter 5/6 months old having been driven to desperation on account of starvation. The Special Bench observed : "There is no evidence which can lead us to the con­clusion that at the time she (the accused) committed the deed in question she was insane. She was, no doubt, in a state of desperation but that is very different from saying that she was insane at the time when she com­mitted the deed in question. 7. From what has been stated above, it would be seen that the mental impulse which had led to the commission of the crime has to be irresistible and not only unresisted, to regard the same as 'impulsive insanity'. 7. From what has been stated above, it would be seen that the mental impulse which had led to the commission of the crime has to be irresistible and not only unresisted, to regard the same as 'impulsive insanity'. The mere fact that it was committed on a sudden impulse is not sufficient in this context, In the case before us there is nothing to show that under what circumstances Siddheswari had taken the life of her duaghter, more particularly what was the nature of the illness Nileswari was suffering from and since when. Without knowing these details we cannot order acquittal of the appellant which would be the result, if her action were to be regarded as protected by Sec. 84 of the Penal Code. Had it been permis­sible to us to treat the offence as one of culpable homicide only under Sec. 304 of the Penal Code, we would have perhaps done so as we are satisfied that the appellant having been deserted by her husband, living at her father's house and being mother of three female children in succession must have taken the life of her own flesh and blood due to strong impulse only and would have perhaps, awarded as sentence the im­prisonment already undergone. But that seems to be out of our reach. 8. The result is that we uphold the conviction though with a heavy heart. The punishment being the minimum con­templated by Sec. 302 cannot also be interfered with. The appeal therefore stands dismissed. The appellant is however not without a remedy. We think that this a fit case where the Govt. could exercise its power of remission specially because it is about 7 years that the appellant is in Jail. The decision of the Supreme Court in Manu Ram AIR 1980 SC 2147 would not stand in the way in any case as the conviction was prior to the insertion of Section 433-A in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Lat a copy of this Judgment be sent to the Legal Remembrancer, Assam for his information and to enable him to take such steps in the matter as are deemed fit and proper by him.