G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals by the plaintiffs are directed against the common judgment and decrees dated 4. 3. 74 passed by the Civil Judge, bellary in R. A. Nos. 115 and 116 of 1972 on his file, dismissing the appeals of the plaintiffs, on confirming the common judgment and, decree 23. 10. 72 passed by the munsiff, Bellary in O. S. Nos. 93 and 94 of 1969 on his file. ( 2 ) THE suits were instituted by the plaintiffs on similargrounds against theagricultural Producemarket committee, Bellary and thechief marketing Officer. The suitsarein substance and effect for declaration and injunction. In O. S. No. 93|69 this is what the plaintiffs prayed:"the plantiffs therefore, pray that the Honourable Court may be pleased to pass a decree against the defendant-committee. (a) from enforcing,levyingor collecting any fee,under S. 65 of the Actreadwith Bye-law No. 12 (1)of thebye-lawsframed b the defendantcommittee,much less at 30 paise per cent adrvalorem on the purchasesof groundnuts or kerneleither by themselvesor through commissionagents. (b) Topass adecree for future damages in addition to such injunction by way of a mandatory injunctionforrefundof feesso collected fromthe plaintiffs during the pendency of theproceedings in thecivilcourt as damages consequential to prayer (a) above; (c) to pass such appropriate order as to preventthe defendamcommittee fromlevying or collectingthe samethrough its commission agents as per Section 78 of the new Act read with Bye-law No. 12 (2) ofthebye-lawsof the defendant-committee, asancilliary to prayer (a)above: (d) for costs of the suit; and (e) for grantofsuch other relief or reliefsasthe Honourable court woulddeemfit and proper, in the circumstances of the case. Earlier in the plaint it is averred in para 43 against the second defendant thus: -"the second defendant is the chief Marketing Officer for the entire State. The Market Committees of Notified Areas in Mysore state are under his control and supervision. He is also entitled under Sec. 150 of the Act to direct market Committees in the State to make suitable Bye-laws or amend the Bye-laws and also is entitled to frame bye-laws for the first time in respect of any Market committee constituted under the act. No effective relief can be secured to the Plaintiffs under the act without the presence of the 2nd defendant, in view of the unique position he occupies under the scheme of the Act and the powers he could exercise under the Act. No effective relief can be secured to the Plaintiffs under the act without the presence of the 2nd defendant, in view of the unique position he occupies under the scheme of the Act and the powers he could exercise under the Act. Hence, he is added as a party to the suit. Earlier, they have challenged the validity of the Bye-law to levy feds etc. ( 3 ) THE other suit is similar. Thus, it is obvious that though in the prayer column the plaintiffs have prayed for injunction and for damages, the suits are in substance and effect for declaration and for consequential reliefs, for injunction and damages. ( 4 ) INTHESE suits preliminary objections were taken by the defendants contending that notice under' s. 137of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce marketing (Regulation) Act,1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was necessary to be issued against the first defendant before fling the suit and further that it was necessary to issue notice under S. 80 CPC against the second defendant he being a public Officer, before instituting the suit against the second defendant. According, these two issues were set down as preliminary issues in the two suits. The trial Court on hearing arguments upheld the preliminary objections so raised and in that view dismissed the two suits by a common judgment dated 23-10-72. Aggrieved by the said, judgment and decrees dated 23. 10. 72. The plaintiffs went upon appeal before the learned civil Judge, bellary, in R. A. Nos. 115 and 116 of 1972. ( 5 ) THE learned civil judge, in the course of his judgment raised the following points as arising for his consideration; (1)Whether the suits are bad for want of notices under S. 137 of the act and Section 80c. P. C. ? (2) What, order? ( 6 ) ON appreciating the arguments addressed before him, the learned civil Judge held that the notices were necessary before instituting the suits both unders. 137 of the act as also under S. 80 C. P. C. and in that view he dismissed the appeals, on confirming the common judgment and decrees passed by the trial court. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs have come up with the, above second appeals before this court. 137 of the act as also under S. 80 C. P. C. and in that view he dismissed the appeals, on confirming the common judgment and decrees passed by the trial court. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs have come up with the, above second appeals before this court. ( 7 ) THELEARNEDADVOCATESRI d. L. N. RAOAPPEARING for the appellants strenuously urged before me that the courts below were not justified incoming to the conclusion that the notices, under s. 137 of the act as also under S. 80 C. P. C. were necessary before instituting the suits. He submitted that the scope of s. 137 was limited to suits for compensation for tortious acts done by the market committee defendant no. 1. He further submitted that no relief was sought against defendant no. 2 and as such no notice was necessary to be issued to him under S. 80 CPC. In that view he submitted that the appeals are entitled to succeed. As against that, the learned Advocate sri gopal appearing for the first defendant respondent argued supporting the judgment and decrees passed by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court. Similarly, the Government advocate argued supporting the" finding of the courts below that notice was necessary to be issued under S. 80cpc before instituting the suits against the second defendant in the two suits. Similarly, the Government advocate argued supporting the" finding of the courts below that notice was necessary to be issued under S. 80cpc before instituting the suits against the second defendant in the two suits. ( 8 ) THESOLE point, therefore, that arises for my consideration in these two appeals is: Whether the courts below were justified indismissing the suits sincenonotice was issued against the first defendant-Market committee under S. 137 of the Act and no notice was issued against the second defendant the Chief Marketing Officer under S. 80 C. P. C. ( 9 ) SECTION 137 of the Act reads:"bar of suit or other legal pro ceeding in absence of notice.-No suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against any market committee or the Board or any member, officer or servant thereof or any person acting under the direction of any such market corn mittee, Board member, officer or servant for anything done or purporting to be done in good faith as such member, officer, servant or person under this Act, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing, stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims has been in the case of a market committee or the board delivered or left at its office, and in the case of such member, officer servant, or person as aforesaid delivered to him or left at his office or usual place of abode, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left: provided that nothing in this section shall be applicable to any suit or other legal proceeding by the State Government, the Chief marketing Officer, the marke committee or the Board against any member, officer, servant or other person. Thus, it is obvious that no suit arainst the Market Committee of the Board can be entertained for anything done or purporting to be done in good faith unless and until a notice is issued to the Board or such member, or officer setting out the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims in the notice. Further, the suit shall not be instituted until the expiry of two months after the notice is served on hecommittee, Board, member or officer in the manner provided for, in the Section. ( 10 ) THE wordings ofs. 137 are in pari materiawiththe wordingsof s. 80 CPC except that S. 137 further adds after thewords "anything done or purporting to bedone", the words "ingoodfaith" as suchmember, officer, servant orpersonunder this act. " The section is mandatory. ( 11 ) SPEAKING about S. 80 CPCand the necessityforissuance of prior notice undersection80 CPC before institutingany suit againstthe government, the Supremecourt of india in thecase of Swamisinqhai nirmal Chand, v. Unionof India (1) at page 1071in para 13 of the judgment has observed thus:"it will be recalled that prior to the decision of the Privy council in Bhatachand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State, 54 Tnd. App 388 there was a sharp difference of opinion among the Indian High courts on the Question 95 to whether S. 80 applied to suits where iniunction was claimed. The privv Council held that S. 80 applied 'to all forms of suits and whatever the relief sought. including a suit for an iniunction. In dealing with the question about the construction of S. 80, the privv Council took notice of the fact that some of the decisions which attempted to exelude from. the purview of S. 80 suits for iniunction were influenced by the "assumption as to the practice objects with which, it was framed". They also proceeded on the bases that S. 80was a rule of procedure and that any construction which may lead to injustice is one which ought not to be adopted, since it would be repugnant to the notion of Justice. Having noticed these grounds on which an attempt was judicially made to except from the provisions of section 80 suits, for instance suits in which injunction was claimed. Viscount Sunnier, who spoke for the Privy Council, observed that "the Act, albeit a procedure Code, must be read in accordance with the natural meaning of its words and he added, that "section 80 is express, explicit, and mandatory, and it admits of no implications or exceptions". Viscount Sunnier, who spoke for the Privy Council, observed that "the Act, albeit a procedure Code, must be read in accordance with the natural meaning of its words and he added, that "section 80 is express, explicit, and mandatory, and it admits of no implications or exceptions". That is why it was held that a suit in which an injunction is prayed, is still a suit within the words of the section and to read any qualification into it is an encroachment on the function of legislation"thus, it is settled law that S. 80 c. P. C. applies even to the suits for injunction. That is why in the amending Act 1976 C. P. C. sub- clause (2) is added to S. 80 CPC to enable the parties to file a suit for injunction with the special leave of the Court to obtain, an urgent or immediate relief. 11. Similarly, the High Court of andhara Pradesh in the case of state of Madras v. Chitturi Venkata durga Prasada Rao (2) by a Division Bench decision has held; section 80 as it stands ' applies to all suits whether the suits are for declaration or suits for injunction, mandatory orprohibitory, and suits for damages. The expression 'act purporting to bo done' takes in past acts as well as future acts. The expression 'in respect of is of very wide amplitude as the contemplated suit may be for any relief which flowed from the allegations in the plaint, but the suit must have relation to or must have reference to an act purporting to be done by a public officer in his official capacity. If the allegations in the -plaint relate to acts purporting to be done by such public officer, whatever the relief may be that is prayed, the section is attracted and the notice is mandatory. If the allegations in the -plaint relate to acts purporting to be done by such public officer, whatever the relief may be that is prayed, the section is attracted and the notice is mandatory. In the case of a threatened injury which is sought to be restrained by an injunction, it is difficult to imagine a plaint which does not contain allegations on which the fear of the threat complained of could be justified Hence, in 3 suit where there is a prayer for declaration and for injunction, a notice under S. 80 is necessary, (vide para 10 of the judgment) ( 12 ) I have therefore no hesitation to hold that when the suit is against the Market Committee or the Board, it would be necessary to issue prior notice under S. 137 of the. Act, as s. 137 as observed above is similar to S. 80 C. P. C. ( 13 ) THE Supreme Court of India explaining the purpose of notice under S. 80 CPC in the case of the state of Madras v. C. P. Agencies (3)has observed: "s. 80 is express, explicit and mandatory and admits of no implications or exceptions. The object of the section is mainly to give the Government or the the public Officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to be brought, against it or him so that it or he may consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted. 5resisted. In order to enable the Government or the public officer to arrive at a decision it is necessary that it or he should be informed of the. nature of the nut proposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise reliefs asked for. ( 14 ) SIMILARLY, the Supreme Court of india in the case of Raghunath Dass v, union of India (4) has observed:"the object of notice contemplated by S. 80 is to give to the concerned Governments and public officers opportunity to reconsider the legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if so advised without litigation so that public time and money may not be wasted. The provisions in S. 80 civil Procedure Code are not intended to be used as body-traps against ignorant and illiterate persons, (vide para 8 of the judgment ). The object is put tersely by his Lordship Krishna Iyer, J in the case of state of Punjab v . M|s Geeta Iron and brass Works (5) thus:"a statutory notice of the proposed action under S. 80, CPC is intended to alert the State to negotiate a just settlement or at least have the courtesy to tell the potential outsider why the claim is beingresisted. . . . . Litigative policy for the State involves settlement of governmental disputes with citizens in a sense of conciliation rather than in a righting mood. Indeed, it should be a directive on the part of the State to empower its law officer to take steps to compose disputes rather than continue them in court. . . . (vide para 4 of the judgment) ( 15 ) THESE observations made with regard to the object of. S. 80 CPC apply with equal force to S. 137 of the Act. It is obviously, the intention of the legislature that just differences must be settled by the committee or the board or its officers without dragging the parties to court involving avoidable expenditure and time. The language of S. 137 is express, explicit, clear and mandatory and admits of no exceptions. No suit shall lie without a notice contemplated under S. 137 of the Act. ( 16 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the appellants, however, invited my attention to S. 156 of the Madras local Boards Act 1884, S. 107 of the madras Village Panchayats and District municipalities act,1950. Interpreting these provisions, the High court of Madras by Full Bench decisions has held that the notice contemplated under the provisions pertain only to suits for compensation and not to other suits. It is obviously so because of the specific words of those sections. They contemplate only suits for compensation. It is true that even earlier to the introduction of the words 'amount of compensation claimed, 'the High court of Madras pointed out relying on comparable statutes in england that in the case of Local Boards, the prior notice contemplated for instituting suits pertains only to suits for compensation and that view of the high court was incorporated in the statute by an amendment effected subsequently. Therefore, the provisions in the Madras Local Boards Act and madras Village Panchayats and District Municipalities act would not be of any assistance while interpreting the provisions of S. 137 of the Act. ( 17 ) IN fact, in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in panchayat Board v. Western India matches Co. (6), his Lordship Leach c. ,t. has observed inter alia, thus;" in all the Acts, since the Act of 1884, the Section required statutory notice to state the amount of compensation claimed. Thus, it is obvious that the proviso was interpreted on the basis of the specific wording in the sections. But as pointed out by me above, the wordings in S. 137 of the Act are comparable with the wordings of S. 80 CPC and the decisions rendered under S. 80 C. P. C. shed light on the interpretation of S. 137 of the Act. Thai. is what the courts below have held and i agree with them. ( 18 ) IN the result, therefore, I am of the considered view that the present suits are not tenable against defendant no. 1 because the notice contemplated under S. 137 of the Act was not issued by the plaintiffs in the two suits. ( 19 ) AS quoted by me from the plain above, the plaintiffs have stated in specific terms that the suits are not maintainable without adding the Chief marketing Officer as defendant No. 2. They have also further averred that the Chief Marketing Officer is responsible in directing the bye-laws to be framed and in approving the bye- laws. Since the relief claimed in the suits necessarily involves the consideration of the validity or otherwise of the bye-laws framed by the Committee, defendant No. 2 becomes a necessary party and since for giving relief in the suits it would be necessary to consider the validity or otherwise of the bye- laws concerned it was necessary to is sue notice under S. 80 CPC to defendant No. 2 in the two suits before instituting the suits against him for the reliefs claimed. Hence, the courts below were justified in holding that the suits against him also not tenable, because, the notice as contemplated under S. 80 C. P. C. was not issued. ( 20 ) INTHERESULT, therefore, the appeals fail and are dismissed. --- *** --- .