JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This second appeal by the Union of India and the Commandant, C. O. D., Chheoki. is directed against the decree dated 9th February, 1976 of the court of Additional Civil Judge, Allahabad, declaring the plaintiff-respondent's dismissal from service by an order dated 39th December, 1967 to be void and that the plaintiff shall be deemed to have been continuing in service without any break. 2. The decree was passed on appeal from the decree dated 28th February 1974 of the Court of the 1st Additional Munsif Allahabad dismissing the plaintiffs suit No. 729 of 1970. 3. The plaintiff was a Book Binder, or a civilian employee of the Central Ordnance D, pot, Chheoki. He was suspended from service on 29th October, 1963 by the Commandant, who is appellant No. 2. An enquiry was instituted against the plaintiff on the basis of a charge-sheet dated 3/8th October, 1964 under Rule 15 of the Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952. The charge -was that the plaintiff, whilst employed as a Book Binder in C. O. D., Chheoki during the period June, 63 to October, 63 abetted Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Pd. in connivance with Storeman Pyare Lal in the commission of theft from C. O. D., Chheoki and dishonestly received the stolen Government property from the said Sepoy Drivers and disposed of the same in the market and made wrongful gains. The allegations of fact on which the said charge was based a e to be found in three statements of :(l) Captain Harbhajan Singh made on 23rd October, 1963 :(2) Sepoy Driver P.C. Laxman made on 11th October, 1963; and (3) Sepoy Driver Ram Prasad made on 11th October, 1963. These statements were made in the enquiry proceedings against the said Sepoy Drivers. The plaintiff had appeared as a witness in the said inquiry proceedings; and in reply to the memorandum of charge, he stated his defence vide letter dated 9th December, 1964. These statements were made in the enquiry proceedings against the said Sepoy Drivers. The plaintiff had appeared as a witness in the said inquiry proceedings; and in reply to the memorandum of charge, he stated his defence vide letter dated 9th December, 1964. He stated that his duty was of a Book Binder and he has no concern with any stores of the department that the charge against him has been made on the basis of the statement of the two Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad, who named him in their statements before the court of enquiry as being a party to their dealings with a purchaser of the stolen Government stores. He denied the allegation, and submitted that he was in no way connected with the theft or disposal of stores which these sepoy drivers used to take out from C.O.D. Chheoki, ana stated that one thing which is proved was that the two Sepoy Drivers declined to cross-examine him before the court of enquiry when he appeared as a witness. According to the plaintiff, if there bad been any truth in their statements, they would have at least cross-examined him before the court of enquiry. It was further stated by the plaintiff that the two Sepoy Drivers were directly responsible for the alleged theft as they confessed the same before the court of enquiry and that except for their false statements that the plaintiff was also a party to their dealings, their statements nowhere showed that he had a hand in either the removal of stores from the department or in their disposal to the purchaser. It was added that the purchaser had even denied that he had any concern with the plaintiff in those transactions and Sepoy Driver Ram Prasad had even confessed that he himself handed over the stores to the purchaser and in view of his direct dealing with the purchaser, the plaintiff did not come into the picture at all. In the end, the plaintiff pleaded not guilty and requested that justice may kindly be done to him. By a letter dated 30th January, 1965 Major I. P. Datta was detailed to conduct an oral enquiry into the case along with that against Pyare Lal. 10th February 1965 was fixed for the enquiry. In the end, the plaintiff pleaded not guilty and requested that justice may kindly be done to him. By a letter dated 30th January, 1965 Major I. P. Datta was detailed to conduct an oral enquiry into the case along with that against Pyare Lal. 10th February 1965 was fixed for the enquiry. By a letter dated 5th February 1965, the plaintiff was thereafter asked by the Commandant in reply to the plaintiffs statement of defence dated 9th December, 1964 that he was required to report on 10th February 1965 before the oral enquiry scheduled to be held in connection with the case against him. It was added that since the plaintiff had not stated in his defence statement dated 9th December, 1964 that he desired to the heard in person and to interrogate any of the witnesses, no arrangement for detailing such witnesses, been initiated by the Central Ordnance Depot. It appears that the oral enquiry actually commenced on 16th February, 1965 on which date the case of Pyare Lal was taken up and his statement was recorded. The oral enquiry was then Sen up again on 19th February, 1965. On that date Pyare Lal was again examined and thereafter Triloki Nath was called, who stated before - the Enauiry Officer that unless and until the witnesses asked for by him vide letter dated 19th February, 1965 are made available for his cross-examination he was not in a position to give any evidence before the Fnnuiry Officer. There was a further enquiry on 24th May, 1965 against Pyare Lal. The enquiry against the plaintiff was also taken up again on 24th May 1965 by the Enquiry Officer when the plaintiff prayed before him that he should be allowed to give his statement the next day. On 29th May 1965 the plaintiff appeared before the Enquiry Officer and mated that until the witnesses asked for by him previously were made available for cross-examination he was not prepared to say anything further- and that during these four months, the Depot authorities have not produced any Govt, witness in connection with oral enquiry who has said anything adverse against the plaintiff. According to the Enquiry Officer the plaintiff refused to say anything further and also refused the statement. This is followed by the Enquiry Officer s opinion. According to the Enquiry Officer the plaintiff refused to say anything further and also refused the statement. This is followed by the Enquiry Officer s opinion. According to him both Pyare Lal and Triloki Nath, the plaintiff ``seem to be seasoned culprits and have been active participants in the regular and systematic theft of Govt. Stores from Traffic Branch and their subsequent disposal to Harish Chander Sahu the Kabari. 4. There was again a lull of almost two years before the plaintiff was nerved a show-cause notice by the Commandant under Rule 15(4) (i) of the Central Civil Services (C. C. A.) Rules, 1965. By the show-cause retire the plaintiff was told that on a careful consideration of the enquiry report the Commandant agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and held that the articles of charges have been proved against him and that he had provisionally come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not a fit person to be retained in service and so he proposes to impose the penalty of dismissal from service with immediate effect. The plaintiff was by the show-cause notice, given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry. The time allowed for doing so was 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. By his reply dated 19th September 1967 the plaintiff asked for two documents. That was refused by the Commandant's letter dated 29th September 1967 on the ground that the plaintiffs representation had to be based on the evidence given during the enquiry. The plaintiff thereupon submitted his representation dated 26th October, 1967, and ultimately, by the impugned order dated 10th December 1967, the Commandant ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff from service with effect from that date. The plaintiff filed an dated 10th January 1968 to the Director of Ordnance Service. The appeal appears to have been forwarded to the Commandant/C. O. D. Chheoki by the Army Headquarter with the letter dated 29th December 1969 and the Commandant C. O. D. Chheoki communicated the dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal by his letter dated 9th January, 1970. Thereafter the plaintiff served a notice dated 11th July, 1970 under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Thereafter the plaintiff served a notice dated 11th July, 1970 under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. In the suit which was filed by the plaintiff thereafter on 12th October, 1970 he relied on his letter dated 11th February, 1965 whereby he had demanded the production of Major Har Bhajan Singh, Sri Harish Chandra Sahu (KLabadi), Sepoy Driver P. K. Laxman and Seopy Driver Ram Prasad during the enquiry; and that by a letter dated 12th April, 1965, he was informed that it would not be possible to make available -any of the servicemen and that Harish Chandra Sahu could not be produced because he was not a prosecution witness; and by another letter dated 25th May, 1965 be was informed that the request made in his letter dated 11th February, 1965 could not be conceded. The main ground on which the plaintiff claimed that the order dismissing him from service was illegal and void, was that he was not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and of showing cause as contemplated by the Civilians in Defence Services (C. C. A ) Rules, 1952 and Central Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules 1965. 6. The defence was that the suit was bad for want of notice ; that the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was bad; that the suit was under-valued; that Major Harbhajan Singh and the Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad could not be produced for cross-examination as they were not available and Harish Chandra Sahu was not a witness against the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff was asked to submit interrogatories and questions which could be put to Major Harbhajan Singh and Ram Prasad so that their replies may be obtained for the plaintiff but he did not submit the same. It was then stated that the plaintiff did not produce any evidence in defence and the matter having been concluded more by documentary evidence than oral evidence; the enquiry was concluded and the report was submitted followed by the show-cause notice and the order of dismissal. 7. The issues on which the parties went to trial were : (ii) Whether the order of dismissal of the plaintiff dated 9-12-1967 and appellate order dated 9-1-70 are void and illegal as alleged in paras 13, 14 and 18 of the plaint ? 7. The issues on which the parties went to trial were : (ii) Whether the order of dismissal of the plaintiff dated 9-12-1967 and appellate order dated 9-1-70 are void and illegal as alleged in paras 13, 14 and 18 of the plaint ? (ii) Whether notice u/s 80 C. P. C. has been served on defendant? (iii) Whether the suit is under-valued and court-fees paid is insufficient ? (iv) Relief. Issues Nos. 2 and 3 were answered in favour of the plaintiff; and on the only substantial issue raised before it, namely, issue No. 1, the trial court held that every reasonable opportunity of being heard and of showing cause as contemplated under the law was afforded to the plaintiff and the impugned order did not suffer from any illegality or irregularity. 8. The lower appellate court, has, however, taken a contrary view. From the judgment of the lower appellate court, it appears that the argument before it was based on Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (C. C. A.) Rules, 1965. A contention also appears to have been raised before the lower appellate court that Indrajeet and Pyare Lal were not named as witnesses against the plaintiff in the charge-sheet and reliance was placed before the lower appellate court on a decision in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 S. C. 395 for the purposes that principles of natural justice could not be ignored in conducting an enquiry. However, the main contention for the plaintiff before the lower appellate court was that no witnesses were examined before the Enquiry Officer after the framing of the charge-sheet and he had no opportunity to cross-examine them in order to prove his innocence and he was not heard against the show-cause notice after he had submitted his explanation, and that this amounted to a contravention of the principles of natural .justice. The lower appellate court then examined the Central Civil Services (C. C. A.) Rules 1955. It held that Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P.K. Laxman and Ram Prasad were not present in person before the Innuiry Officer and were not produced for being cross-examined in spite of the plaintiff's request for the same. The lower appellate court then examined the Central Civil Services (C. C. A.) Rules 1955. It held that Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P.K. Laxman and Ram Prasad were not present in person before the Innuiry Officer and were not produced for being cross-examined in spite of the plaintiff's request for the same. The evidence recorded m another proceedings could not have been used against the plaintiff in view of the Rule 14 (14) of the Central Civil Services (C C.A.) Rules 1965 and that the witnesses ought to have been produced for cross-examination by and on behalf of the plaintiff. Further, according to the lower appellate court the reliance or testimony of accomplices without affording any chance to the plaintiff to cross-examine them was in violation of the said rules and the principles of natural justice; and indeed no inquiry at all was held within the meaning of the said Rule 14 (14). Under these circumstances, the lower appellate court held that the plaintiff was denied a reasonable opportunity of defending himself at the inquiry, and consequently the subsequent show-cause notice and the penalty of dismissal imposed on him were vitiated. 9. Mr R S Dhawan, learned Counsel for the appellants contended before me that Article 311 of the Constitution will not apply to defence services and even civilians in defence services, vide Lekh Raj Khurana v. Union of India MU 1971 S. C. 2111, consequently, the concept of reasonable opportunity or the principle of natural justice developed by the courts in the context of Article 311 of the Constitution were out of way. Under Article 310 a member of defence services held his post during the pleasure of the President, which was controlled only by the statutory rules made under Article 309. The statutory rules winch governed the enquiry up to the stage of the Enquiry Officer's report, which was dated 2nd June, 1965, were the Civilians m Defence Services (C C. A.) Rules 1952 These rules were repealed by the Central Civil Services (C C A) Rules 1965 which came into force on 1st December, 1965, by Rule 34- thereof the relevant portion of which reads as under : - "34 Repeal and Saving-Subject to the provisions of Rule 33,. the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1957, and the Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1952, and any notification or orders issued thereunder insofar as they are inconsistent with these rules, are hereby repealed : Provided that : (a) such repeal shall not affect the previous operation of the said rules, or any notification or order made, or anything done, or any action taken, thereunder : (p) any proceedings under the said rules, pending at the commencement of these rules shall be continued and disposed of as far as may be, in accordance with the provisions of these rules, as if such proceedings were proceedings under these rules." According to this rule the proceedings up to the stage of the Enquiry Officer's report w re conducted under the Civilians in Defence Services (C. C. A.) Rules 1952 and since the proceedings were pending on 1st December, 1965, they had ta be continued thereafter under the relevant provisions of the Central Civil Services (CCA.) Rules, 1965 and that is what was precisely done in the present case. The enquiry was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15 of 1952 Rules which reads as under : "Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction shall be passed on a member of a service (other than an order based on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a court-martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged, together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held. At that enquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the enquiry may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. On completion of the enquiry after the authority empowered to impose the penalty has considered the defence and arrived at a provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the person charged shall, if the penalty is dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or re-reduction, be called upon to show-cause within a reasonable time, not ordinarily exceeding a fortnight, against the particular penalty to be imposed. Any representation submitted by the person charged shall be duly taken into consideration before final orders are passed. "This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule may, in exceptional cases for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing be waived, where there is a difficulty in observing exactly the requirements of the rule and those requirements can be waived without injustice to the person charged." According to the learned counsel there was no violation of the provisions of this rule and the lower appellate court was in error in having considered the case in the light of the requirement of Rule 14(14) of 1965 Rules. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, on the other hand, besides repeating the contentions raised before the lower appellate court relied on Ram Harakh Tewari v. Union of India, I.L R (1968) 2 All 8-16, Sham Lal v. Director Military Farms, Army Headquarters, Hew Delhi (A.I.R. 1968 Punj 312).- (F.B.) and Central Bank of India v. Prakash Chandra, 11969) 2 Lab L. J. 377. 11. 11. I have examined the facts of this case in the light of the contentions raised by the learned counsel and the cases cited by them. At the outset it must be observed that no oral evidence was led at the trial in this case and the only evidence available on the record is the record of enquiry proceedings and the correspondence filed by the defendants, formal proof of which was waived In brief the plaintiff's case was that the Government did not lead any evidence to prove the charge before the enquiry officer and there was nothing for him to rebut as there was no evidence in support of the charge. Now, a departmental enquiry of the kind that was instituted against the plaintiff, who was a civilian in defence services and held his post at the pleasure of the President, is a quasi judicial proceeding but not a judicial trial. The Commandant C.O D. had information before him in the form of the statements of Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P. K Laxman and Ram Prasad that the plaintiff was one of the persons involved in the theft and sale of military stores from the Central Ordnance Depot. The Commandant appears to have suspended the plaintiff from service with immediate effect by his order dated 29th October, 1963 as soon as he received information of the plaintiff's guilt, on the ground that an enquiry into his conduct was contemplated. After the usual delay, which is to be regretted, the charge-sheet dated 3/8th October, 1964 was served on the plaintiff as required under the Civilians in Defence Services (C. C. A.) Rules, 1952. The necessary extracts from the statements of Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad, on which the charge against the plaintiff was based were annexed to the charge-sheet. By his reply dated 9th December, 1964 the plaintiff did not allege that the record of the statements of Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad was in any way incorrect. He admitted having been a witness at the court of enquiry in the course of which these statements were recorded. By his reply dated 9th December, 1964 the plaintiff did not allege that the record of the statements of Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad was in any way incorrect. He admitted having been a witness at the court of enquiry in the course of which these statements were recorded. A perusal of these statements shows that while the statement of Major Harbhajan Singh is not direct evidence inasmuch as it contains the result of his investigations into the matter, but it does say that the Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad were found guilty and tried and punished by summary court-martial. The statements of Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad contain direct evidence and the involvement of the plaintiff in the disposal of the stolen property. These are statements of accomplices inasmuch as the two Sepoy Drivers admitted candidly and in detail the parts played by them respectively in the removal of military stores from C. O D. Chheoki for disposal in the City for wrongful gain These statements have a ring of truth about them and, but for any technical rules of law, are worthy of being acted upon without demur for holding that the plaintiff did participate in the act of removal and disposal of military stores from C. O. D. Chheoki for sale in the City for wrongful gain. Under section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The rules of the evidence as prescribed by the Indian Evidence Act do not strictly apply to a departmental proceedings, like the one in question. Suffice it to say that on being served with the copies of these statements along with the charge-sheet, the plaintiff took a big risk in not leading evidence in rebuttal, depending entirely as he did on the technical rules followed injudicial trials. This is not to say that the Enquiry Officer was not required to act judicially but then the enquiry which he conducted was not a judicial trial and the rules of procedure applicable to judicial trials could not be imported for contending that the plaintiff was required to rebut nothing as no oral evidence had been led in support of the charge against him. 12. 12. The matter was governed entirely by Rule 15 of the Civilians in Defence Services (C. C. A ) Rules, 1952 which has already been quoted above. The rule requires that before an order of dismissal may be passed in respect of such an employee, he must be informed in writing of the ground on which it is proposed to take action. That was clearly done in the present case. The next stage is that he should be afforded adequate opportunity of defending himself. Whether that was done is the question. For giving to an employee an adequate opportunity of defending himself, the rule requires that the should be required (sic) serving the charge-sheet, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desired to be heard in person. That too was clearly done by the memo of charge dated 3/th October, 1964. that was served on the plaintiff. The plaintiff did submit his defence in writing. He did not, however, say in his reply that he desired to be heard in person, in spite of having been required to say whether he desired to be heard in person. The authority was not bound to hold an oral enquiry for, the rule requires the authority to hold an oral enquiry only if the Government servant charged desires to be heard in person. Even so the Enquiry Officer was appointed and the oral enquiry was held. At the oral enquiry evidence has to be heard on such of the allegations as are not admitted. But in the present case the plaintiff refused to answer any questions. The result was that the Enquiry Officer was not in a position to Know which of the allegations made in the statement of Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P K. Laxman and Ram Prasad were admitted. The written statement of defence submitted by the plaintiff only said that he was not connected with the disposal of the stolen goo Is. Even so the Enquiry Officer appears to have proceeded without examining the oral evidence in support of the charge thinking that the statement recorded at the court of enquiry were good evidence in the departmental proceedings against the plaintiff. The question is whether they are so. Even so the Enquiry Officer appears to have proceeded without examining the oral evidence in support of the charge thinking that the statement recorded at the court of enquiry were good evidence in the departmental proceedings against the plaintiff. The question is whether they are so. The rule does not say that a document must be proved in the manner in which documents are required to be proved before they are read in evidence by courts of law governed by the Indian Evidence Act. I do not think that there is anything in the rule which prevented the Enquiry Officer from reading the statements of Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad as evidence against the plaintiff in the departmental enquiry held against him. It was, however, urged that the evidence recorded in another proceeding in which the plaintiff had no opportunity to cross-examine the persons whose statement were so recorded are not admissible in evidence without affording the plaintiff an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses. That undoubtedly is the position in a matter governed by the Evidence Act, but the question is whether this rule of evidence is so inexorable as to rule out the statement of Majo. Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad in the present case. From letters dated 12th April, 1965 and 25th May, 1965 from the Commandant to the plaintiff it appears that the plaintiff was told that it was not possible to produce Sepoy Drivers because they were no longer in C.O.D , Chheoki and it was not possible to make available any of the servicemen, but if desired the plaintiff could submit by 22nd April, 1965 the question which he wanted to put to Major Harbhajan Singh and Ram Prasad and they will be forwarded to them for reply. Since the plaintiff did not respond by giving the interrogatories for the cross-examination of these two persons, the Commandant by his letter dated 25th May, 1965 told the plaintiff that sufficient opportunity to examine the witnesses in his defence at the court of enquiry stage was already given to him and the copy of the statements on which the charge was based was also given to him, vide memorandum of charge, and since he did not give ; the name of any of the witnesses for examination in his defence statements dated December, 1964, he had no ground to demand production of the persons mentioned in his letter dated 11th February 1965. It was added that the oral enquiry had been ordered with tie view to allow further opportunity to the plaintiff to furnish such evidence as he wanted to adduce in his defence and as he declined to avail of it he was directed to be present before the enquiry Officer on 28th May, 1965. 13. The last mentioned letter dated 25th May, 1965 clearly stated that sufficient opportunity had been afforded to the plaintiff to examine witnesses in his defence had cross-examine other at the court of enquiry stage. The statement of Major Harbhajan Singh and Sepoy Drivers P K. Laxman and Ram Prasad were those receded at the court of enquiry. In the absence of any evidence to contradict the statement made in this letter to the effect that the plaintiff had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses at the court of enquiry stage, and the plaintiffs own case that the Sepoy Drivers did not cross-examine him there, it is impossible to say that that the plaintiff did not have an opportunity to cross-examine them, and their statements recorded at that stage cannot, therefore, be used as evidence in the departmental proceedings against him The result is that although no oral evidence was examined at the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer had before him the evidence of Major Harbhaian Singh and Sepoy Drivers P. K. Laxman and Ram Prasad recorded at the stage of the court of enquiry whom the plaintiff had an opportunity to cross-examine at that stage. The admissibility of this evidence could not thus be said to be barred by any rule of law. As observed above, the evidence clearly indicts the plaintiff. The admissibility of this evidence could not thus be said to be barred by any rule of law. As observed above, the evidence clearly indicts the plaintiff. Under the circumstances it cannot be said that the finding of guilt against the plaintiff at the departmental enquiry was based on no evidence. It cannot also be said that Rule 15 of the Civilians in Defence Services (C.C.A.) Rules, 195?, was in any manner violated. 14. Of the cases cited for the plaintiff-respondent the case of Central Bank of India v. Prakash Chandra (1969) 2 Lab LJ 377) is a case of an industrial dispute and is no authority for holding that a departmental enquiry in the case of civilians in defence services could be vitiated by anything said therein. The case of Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 395) was a case under Article 311 of the Constitution ; and the cases of enquiry under Article 311 of the Constitution have no relevance in the context of the facts of the present case and the rule under which the enquiry was conducted. In Sham Lal v. Director, Military Farms, Army Headquarters, New Delhi (A.I.R. 1968 Punj 312) (F. B.) which was a case of enquiry under Rule 15 of the Civilians in Defence Services (C. C. A) Rules, 1952, copies of statements of witnesses recorded at the trial stage and the copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was not furnished. This is not the case here. In Ram Harakh Tewari v. Union of India (I.L.R. (1968) 2 All 846) adequate opportunity in an enquiry under Rule 15 of the Civilians in Defence Services (C. C. A.) Rules, 1952 was not afforded by denying the civilian employee in that case, the assistance of a `friend' to assist him at the enquiry. The correspondence in the present case shows that the plaintiff was competent to defend himself and did no suffer from any such want of opportunity as in Ram Harakh Tewari's case. 15. In the result this appeal must succeed and is allowed with costs. The decree under appeal is set aside. The plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed with costs throughout. 16. 15. In the result this appeal must succeed and is allowed with costs. The decree under appeal is set aside. The plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed with costs throughout. 16. The amounts deposited under the interim order of this Court shall be refunded to the appellant and in case any amount has been paid over to the plaintiff out of the same, it shall be recovered from him and paid over to the appellants.