JUDGMENT Sukumaran, J. 1. These four writ petitions concern the affairs of the Pattiyam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the society') after 28th January 1980, the date on which elections to the Board of Directors had been scheduled, but could not be held due to extraordinary and lamentable reasons. The writ petitions, O.P. Nos. 411 and 2138 of 1980, are by the person who was the President of the Society until 31st January 1980, O.P. No. 2827 of 1980 is by a member, and O.P. No. 3910 of 1980 is by a member whose nomination for election scheduled on 28th January 1980 had been accepted. 2. The basic and substantial grievance in those petitions relates to the appointment of an Administrator under an order dated 30th January 1980 of the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Cannanore. Copy of the order is produced as Ext. P-2 in O.P. 411 and Ext. P-3 in O.P. 3910 of 1980. The main arguments were addressed in O.P. No. 3910 of 1980. The Advocate General appeared on behalf of the State and addressed arguments on the question relating to the constitutional validity of S.33 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 (for short 'the Act'). 3. The society had had its last election in the year 1976. The term of the office bearers was to expire on 30th September 1979. One would have wished that elections to the Cooperative Societies are held in time and that the elected committees do not overstay in their office, regard being had to the fact that Cooperative Societies are democratic institutions at the grass-root level and constitute a movement of great importance, given its due pride of place in our constitution. However, for a variety of reasons, which it is not necessary to detail here but the unfortunate existence of which cannot be wished away, elections do not take place on the due date. In this society too, elections were not held before the expiry of the term of the then Board. The term was extended upto 31st December 1979. Even within the extended period the elections could not be conducted. This necessitated a further extension of the term of the Board to 31st January 1980. The Deputy Registrar passed orders on 17th December 1979 relating to the conduct of the elections, and arrangements were made to conduct the elections on 28th January 1980. Even within the extended period the elections could not be conducted. This necessitated a further extension of the term of the Board to 31st January 1980. The Deputy Registrar passed orders on 17th December 1979 relating to the conduct of the elections, and arrangements were made to conduct the elections on 28th January 1980. In accordance with the provisions contained in R.35 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules, various steps were taken for the conduct of elections. A notice dated 28th December 1979 (Ext. P-1 in O.P. No. 3918 of 1980) was published by the Society under R.35(3)(a). The number of seats, the date of nomination, the date for withdrawal, the date of publication of the final list of candidates and the date of polling were all given in that notice. The Special Sale Officer III of the Office of the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Kuthuparamba was appointed as the Returning Officer for the conduct of the elections. However, on the date of election, in the course of his journey to the polling booth, he was intercepted by an unruly mob near the Society's Office and the ballot papers and the election files with him were forcibly taken away. The Returning Officer immediately sent a report to the Deputy Registrar, detailing the 'unforeseen circumstances' under which the election could not be conducted. The Returning Officer passed proceedings dated 28th November 1980 (Ext. P-1 in O.P. No. 411 and Ext. P-2 in O.P. No. 3910 of 1980) stopping the elections, exercising his power conferred under R.35(3)(a). He also submitted a report on 28th January 1980 to the Deputy Registrar who considered the matter in detail and passed the proceedings dated 30th January 1980, appointing the Unit Inspector, Mattannur as Part-time Administrator of the Society for a period of three months or until the new Board was constituted whichever was earlier. In the mean time, the Board of the Society had met on 29th January 1980 and requested for an extension of their term, pointing out that such a course was permissible under R.39 of the rules. As is obvious from the proceedings dated 30th January 1980, this request of the Board was not acceded to by the Deputy Registrar. 4. In the mean time, the Board of the Society had met on 29th January 1980 and requested for an extension of their term, pointing out that such a course was permissible under R.39 of the rules. As is obvious from the proceedings dated 30th January 1980, this request of the Board was not acceded to by the Deputy Registrar. 4. Counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 3910 of 1980 put forward two important contentions: (i) S.33 of the Act which empowers the Registrar in the contingencies mentioned in that section, to appoint an Administrator or committee to manage the affairs of the Society, is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution inasmuch as the powers conferred on the Registrar are unguided and unregulated and (ii) In any view of the matter, the exercise of the power under S.33 of the Act as disclosed under the proceedings dated 30th January 1980 is mala fide and arbitrary. 5. Elaborating the arguments on the first question, it was pointed out that the provisions of the Act had to be read along with Rules framed under the rule-making power conferred under S.109 of the Act. R.39 of the Rules covers a contingency when election could not be held for any reason. Under that rule, it is open for the Registrar to extend the term of the earlier elected committee. The extension of a term of an elected committee is more in consonance with a democratic functioning in a Society. The bureaucratic set up which will emerge on the appointment of an Administrator, is undesirable and improper, viewed from the correct perspectives of the role and functioning of a Cooperative Society. A less rigorous remedial measure in a contingency where elections could not be held is thus contemplated under R.39. On the other hand, S.33 enables the same Registrar to appoint an official of the Department as an Administrator. This Administrator is conferred with all the powers of the Committee. Whether in a given case an autocratic Administrator should be in charge of the powers of the Society, or whether the term of office of a duly elected earlier committee could be extended, is, according to counsel for the petitioner, left to the sweet will and pleasure or the whim and fancy of the Registrar, without any guidelines to modulate his action. He holds in the hollow of his hand, as it were, the future working of the Society, and if he is so inclined, can impose on the Society an official of the Department, even when the elected members, though their term had already expired, are ready and willing to continue to function in the impass created by the postponement of the elections. Such being the unguided nature of the power, S.33 of the Act is liable to be declared as unconstitutional - So contended counsel for the petitioner. In support of such contentions, various decision including the one reported in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay ( AIR 1974 SC 2009 ) were cited at the Bar. 6. The learned Advocate General contended that there was no such unguided or unbridled powers on the Registrar. He also submitted that a duality in procedure cannot be posited on the basis of an enabling provision in the subordinate legislation, when, under the main S.the power to appoint an Administrator had been specifically conferred. According to him, when the Act conferred such a power, a reference to the Rules to trace a power to take a less drastic action as regards the affairs of a Society confronting a stalemate in its management, was uncalled for. 7. The question has to be tackled with reference to Art.14 of the Constitution and the principles crystallised in relation to the aspect of unguided powers. 8. It is now well settled that a statute will not be hit by Art.14 of the Constitution, if necessary guidelines can be inferred from the provisions of the statute themselves. Such guidelines could be gleaned even from the preamble and surrounding circumstances. Explanation and amplifications by affidavit can also be relied on in the quest for guidelines. A mere possibility of abuse of the power is no ground for invalidating a statutory provision. These principles are laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court relied on by counsel for the petitioner also see Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. ( AIR 1974 SC 2009 ) This decision has been referred to and discussed, along with other decisions in Commissioner of Sales tax, Madhya Pradesh and others v. Radhakrishnan and others ( AIR 1979 SC 1588 ). ( AIR 1974 SC 2009 ) This decision has been referred to and discussed, along with other decisions in Commissioner of Sales tax, Madhya Pradesh and others v. Radhakrishnan and others ( AIR 1979 SC 1588 ). As observed in para 15 at p. 1593 of the latter judgment: "In considering the validity of a statute the presumption is in favour of its constitutionality and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of constitutional principles. For sustaining the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived. It must always be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that discrimination, if any, is based on adequate grounds". The Advocate General, according to me, is correct in contending that what the Act provides for in a contingency in which election could not be held or a new committee could not be appointed, is the action under S.33. Various courses are permissible under this section. One is the appointment of an Administrator. Another is the appointment of a committee, of not more than three members. The power is given on the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Under the scheme of the Act, he is the principal functionary and at the apex of administration set up. Appointed under S.3 of the Act, he is closely associated with all its activities, not merely from the 'cradle to the grave', but even anterior to the 'cradle' and beyond 'the grave'. A corporate life is infused by the act of registration granted by the Registrar under S.7 of the Act. And before such registration is granted, an application is to be made to the Registrar, conforming to the requirements made mention of in S.6 of the Act. He is associated with the change of name, amendment of the byelaws, and amalgamation or transfer of the assets and liabilities of the Society (see S.10, 12 and 14 of the Act). Under S.29 of the Act the Registrar "shall have the right to attend the committee or general body meeting of any Society. He is empowered under S.30(2) to call a special general body meeting of the Society. Under S.29 of the Act the Registrar "shall have the right to attend the committee or general body meeting of any Society. He is empowered under S.30(2) to call a special general body meeting of the Society. A power of supersession of a committee in specified contingencies is conferred on the Registrar under S.32 of the Act. The Registrar exercises certain powers as regards the investment of funds of, and restrictions on loans by, a society. The Registrar is the repository of the very wide and sweeping process of audit of the accounts, inquiry into the working, supervision and the inspection of the affairs of a society, as provided in S.63, 65 and 66 of the Act. The Registrar is the referee of the disputes dealt with in S.69 of the Act. The winding-up process of a society is also within his power, and is sometimes made his duty, under S.69, and the cancellation of the registration of the society-the last rites as it were-is also to be done by him under the Act. S.77 and 98 of the Act confer on the Registrar some of the powers exercisable by a civil court, in the situations delineated in those sections. He is a revisional authority as regards matters referred to in S.87 of the Act. The previous sanction of the Registrar is a condition precedent for the cognisance of offences under the Act. S.108 obligates every Police Officer to assist the Registrar reasonably demanding the aid of the police for the lawful exercise of his powers. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that he holds a pivotal position in the governance of the society. 9. His experience in the Department, his intimacy with the working of the various societies in the State and the high position in the official hierarchy all normally ' ensure a proper and objective exercise of the discretion conferred under S.33 of the Act. The power under S.33 is given not to an agency or official entirely outside the Department but on a very responsible and experienced official of the Cooperative Department itself. The scheme of the Act gives him sufficient guidelines as to how he should act in a particular situation. The power under S.33 is given not to an agency or official entirely outside the Department but on a very responsible and experienced official of the Cooperative Department itself. The scheme of the Act gives him sufficient guidelines as to how he should act in a particular situation. If for example, the antecedents of the situation or the pattern of functioning of a particular set of office bearers is such that there is no certainty that a fair or proper selection would be held within time, that may justify him to appoint an Administrator. The fact that extension of the term already granted had not been properly utilised for a prompt conduct of the election may be one such circumstance which could be taken note of by him in the choice of his action. On the other hand, if he bona fide and objectively feels that there is no harm in entrusting the earlier committee or some members thereof with the conduct of the elections, he may choose to do so by extending the term of the Board or appointing a committee constituted of members. It may be difficult to predicate with certainty or with any amount of rigidity, factors that should guide him to take one course or the other. Having regard to the purpose for which the societies are formed, the pattern of their functioning, the control and supervision which the Registrar exercises over the societies and the position which he occupies vis-a-vis the administration and working of the societies, I feel that the discretion which has been given to the Registrar has got sufficient guidelines from the statutory scheme. It is not unguided as contended for by the petitioner. I, therefore, repel the contention of the petitioner that the Section is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. 10. This court had occasion to consider a similar attack on S.32 of the Act (dealing with supersession of committee), more or less on similar grounds of there being an arbitrary and uncanalised power on the Registrar under that section. On an analysis of the statutory scheme, this court repelled the contention and upheld the constitutional validity of the section. 10. This court had occasion to consider a similar attack on S.32 of the Act (dealing with supersession of committee), more or less on similar grounds of there being an arbitrary and uncanalised power on the Registrar under that section. On an analysis of the statutory scheme, this court repelled the contention and upheld the constitutional validity of the section. Eradi, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed as follows: "No doubt the decision as to whether the power is to be exercised or not has been left to the subjective opinion of the Registrar but it has to be remembered that the power under the S.is intended to be used in cases of extreme urgency and necessarily some officer has to be invested with authority to take a decision as to whether there are circumstances warranting the exercise of the power and the legislature having chosen to confer the said power on a responsible officers, namely the Registrar it cannot be said that S.32(3) suffer from the vice of arbitrariness". [Vide Balakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala and others, ILR 1973 (2) Kerala 511 at p. 517]. I am in respectful agreement with the view so expressed. The reasoning, to a large extent, is applicable for a consideration of the constitutional invalidity of S.33 as well. On this ground as well, I feel that S.33 is immune from attack on the alleged ground of infraction of Art.14 of the Constitution. 11. The contention of the petitioner that there exists two procedures, one rigorous and another less rigorous, does not also bear scrutiny. It is not possible for the petitioner to pose a dichotomy of remedies and conflict between them, merely because a rule, which is a piece of subsidiary legislation, confers some enabling powers on the Registrar. The rule cannot override the provision in the Act. A fortiorari, the existence of a particular remedial measure under the Rules cannot be put forward to contend that two different procedures are available under the Act, in the situation of a stalemate in the affairs of a society, and that in such situation the action of the Registrar is unguided. The proper approach, I think, is to view the power of the Registrar from the point of view of the provision in the Act and as enacted in S.33. The proper approach, I think, is to view the power of the Registrar from the point of view of the provision in the Act and as enacted in S.33. The fact that under the subordinate legislation another course is open to the Registrar will not denude him of his power and authority conferred under a section which is enacted by the legislature. The validity of "a provision in an Act, in a situation like the present cannot be tested with reference to the provisions in the subordinate legislation, for otherwise it would mean that the validity of a section in an Act is dependent upon the way in which a delegate of the statutory powers under that Act chooses to frame the subordinate legislation. 12. Even on the basis that the Registrar has two such alternatives before him, as stated earlier, the Registrar is the proper Judge for deciding as to what course should be resorted to by him having regard to the situation which confronts a particular society. The conferment of such discretionary powers does not necessarily lead to discriminatory results. The discretion is given to the Registrar to resort to one of the two remedies as the facts of the case may require. As stated earlier, in grave cases or where extension of the term of the existing Board is found undesirable from the point of view of the interests of the society, the Registrar may appoint an Administrator. The section cannot be held unconstitutional though, in a given case any arbitrary exercise of the power thereunder may be open to judicial scrutiny. 13. Whether the exercise of the power under S.33 of the Act in the present case is of such an arbitrary nature as is liable to be invalidated is the, next question which arises for consideration. The facts which are admitted and established have been already indicated above. However, at the risk of the repetition, such of them as are relevant for the consideration of this question may be recapitulated. They are: the period for which the then existing Board had been elected expired on 30th September 1979. Its term was initially extended for three months upto 31st December 1979. Even within this extended period no elections could be conducted for constituting the new Board. They are: the period for which the then existing Board had been elected expired on 30th September 1979. Its term was initially extended for three months upto 31st December 1979. Even within this extended period no elections could be conducted for constituting the new Board. A further extension was necessitated in such circumstances and this period was to enure Jill and end on 31st January 1980. Arrangements were made for the conduct of the election on 28th January 1980. The atmosphere was indeed a tense one. This is borne out by the admissions (as for example these contained in O. P. No. 411 of 1980), where it is stated in ground No. 1: "Police aid for the purpose of conducting the election was given. Escort was also sanctioned............". The reason for frustration of the attempts at having an election are given in the report of the Returning Officer and the proceedings in Ext. P-1. In Ext. P-1 it is stated: "On the day of election, the voting could not be commenced as the ballot papers and election files were forcibly taken away from me on the way, to the polling station at about 7.20 a.m. by a crowd of people near the Pattiyam Service Cooperative Bank". The elections had to be stopped and they were actually stopped by the Returning Officer under Ext. P-1. 14. The then existing Board of Directors, of course, promptly met on 29th January 1980 itself and passed resolution seeking an extension of the term of that Board by a period of three months. 15. It was in the above background and reckoning the realities of the situation that a decision had to be taken by the Deputy Registrar as to the future course of management. An experienced officer like the Deputy Registrar can certainly draw up on his expertise in the study of men and matters and behavioural pattern of those connected with the administration of the Society. If a decision is honestly and bona fide taken by such a person, the mere fact that another person, exercising the same power, in an equally honest manner, would have come to a different decision is no ground for invalidation of the order passed by the Deputy Registrar. If a decision is honestly and bona fide taken by such a person, the mere fact that another person, exercising the same power, in an equally honest manner, would have come to a different decision is no ground for invalidation of the order passed by the Deputy Registrar. It is not necessary to refer to or adjudicate upon the rival contentions between the parties throwing the blame for the failure to conduct the elections on the scheduled day. Whether it was a device of those already saddled in power to cling on to office, or whether there was a sinister attempt of others to wrest the control of the Society from the group already in power by resorting to means, fair or foul, is not a matter to be decided in these proceedings. The entire factual situation had been taken note of by the statutory official and he felt that in the above circumstances it was better that the affairs of the Society should be entrusted with an administrator. If, having regard to the situation then prevailing and the facts before him the Deputy Registrar took the decision to have an Administrator for the Society and for a brief period, it cannot be in any way characterised as arbitrary or perverse. 16. Though certain general allegations have been made about extraneous factors influencing the Deputy Registrar to appoint an Administrator, there is no merit or substance in such allegations, the general allegations of mala fides having not been established by any material whatever. I, therefore, hold that the order dated 30th January 1980 appointing an Administrator for the Society is not liable to be quashed in these proceedings. 17. Counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 3910 of 1980 contended that in the counter affidavit filed in that case, there had not been specific reference to the factors influencing a decision for the appointment of the Administrator. A mere repetition in the counter affidavit of the term "unforeseen circumstances" referred to in the impugned order is Hot sufficient reason justifying the action, according to the petitioner. May be, the counter affidavit could have given in a more cogent and coherent manner", all the factual details under which the decision for the appointment of the Administrator had been taken. May be, the counter affidavit could have given in a more cogent and coherent manner", all the factual details under which the decision for the appointment of the Administrator had been taken. However, a deficiency in the counter affidavit, the criticism of counsel in respect of which is to some extent justified, is no reason for the court to interfere with the action of a statutory functionary, when the court is satisfied that relevant and cogent factors existed for the exercise of his action and that such factors fully justified the exercise of the power. 18. I may also observe that as regards the petitioner in O.P. No. 3910 of 1980, the attack on the order appointing the Administrator is highly belated. That writ petition was filed only on 22nd October 1980 complaining of the proceedings dated 30th January 1980. No satisfactory explanation is given to justify the belated approach to this court going by the period for filling a writ petition. 19. The Administrator was initially to be in charge of the Society only for a brief period of three months. This is yet another ground, which will disentitle the petitioner for relief against the impugned order, as it was one of a very limited duration and consequently, persons like the petitioner could not have any serious prejudice or grievance. As for the petitioner in O.P. No. 411 of 1980 he had had more than his full term in office. He could not legitimately aspire for more, unless re-elected to that office. As regards the petitioner in O.P. No. 3910 of 1980 he had no direct injury, the only grievance he could put forward being a delay in the prospects (which, by very nature could only be uncertain) of his being elected to the Board. Such a delay in the holding of elections, for a short period in the background of extraordinary circumstances referred to, cannot be held to be a very serious infraction on a substantial legal right of the petitioner. On this ground too, exercise of the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution and interference with the impugned order is eminently unjusted. The mere fact that due to subsequent developments, the election could not be held within three months as originally proposed is of no consequence on this aspect of the case. 20. On this ground too, exercise of the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution and interference with the impugned order is eminently unjusted. The mere fact that due to subsequent developments, the election could not be held within three months as originally proposed is of no consequence on this aspect of the case. 20. A court exercising the powers under Art.226 is also entitled to take note of the subsequent events, while moulding the reliefs or considering the exercise of the discretionary power under that Article. The fact that an election has already been conducted and a new set up of office bearers has assumed charge, is yet another reason for my declining to interfere with the impugned order. Thus, considered from all aspects I feel that the order, dated 30th January 1980 by which Administrator had been appointed for the Society does not call for any interference from this court. I hold that Ext. P-3 is not vitiated by any extraneous considerations or patent errors of law. 21. The writ petition - O.P. No. 2138 of 1980 - as stated earlier, was filed by the former President of the Board. It sought to challenge the proceedings of the Deputy Registrar on 20th April 1980 (Ext. P-2) sanctioning the increase in the authorised share capital of the Society and directing the Administrator to 'take resolution' and 'submit his proposal for the amendment of the bye laws'. This direction was carried out by the Administrator by Ext. P-3 resolution, dated 29th April 1980 suggesting the amendment of the bye laws for effecting the increase in share capital. It appears that the Board (which functioned till 31st January 1980, had enrolled 329 members beyond the limit of the authorised share capital. This was reported by the 2nd respondent by letter, dated 8th February 1980 with a recommendation to the 1st respondent to enhance the authorised share capital. By Ext. P-1, dated 8th April 1980, the Deputy Registrar pointed out that those newly enrolled 329 members were not eligible to vote in the election of the Board of Directors. It was subsequent to this that Ext. P-2 proceedings were issued and Ext. P-3 resolution was passed. By Ext. P-1, dated 8th April 1980, the Deputy Registrar pointed out that those newly enrolled 329 members were not eligible to vote in the election of the Board of Directors. It was subsequent to this that Ext. P-2 proceedings were issued and Ext. P-3 resolution was passed. The main contention against Exts P-2 and P-3 is that they are vitiated by mala fides and that the requirements of S.12(5) of the Act have not been satisfied before the issue of the proceedings and the passing of the resolution. In answer to this, the 1st respondent has stated in his counter affidavit as follows: "Enhancement of share capital of the Bank was found necessary for implementing the various schemes sponsored by Government through the Cooperative Societies like the third respondent, Bank". The 1st respondent has denied the allegation that his action was due to extraneous pressures and considerations. I do not find any reason for not accepting the averments on this point by respondent No. 1. The facts and materials on record clearly establish that the requirements of S.12(5) of the Act are satisfied in the case. The above challenge in the writ petition must also fail. It may also be noted that subsequently, the Administrator passed Ext. R-1 resolution on 6th May 1980 for amending the bye laws as directed in Ext. P-2 and that the bye laws were amended in a duly convened general body of the Society on 16th August 1980 by a unanimous resolution, and the amendment was approved on 3rd September 1980. In these circumstances, there is little justification in interfering with Exts. P-2 and P-3 at the instance of the petitioner. 22. The writ petition - O.P. No. 2827 of 1980, as stated earlier, is by an ordinary member of the Society challenging the appointment of the Administrator and the proposal for the amendment of the bye laws. This writ petition also fails, as the contentions, similar to those already discussed above, are devoid of force. 23. A similar contention raised in O.P. No. 3910 of 1980 relating to the validity of the proceedings, dated 20th April 1980 (Ext. P-5) relating to the amendment of bye laws has also to fail for the reasons already mentioned above. The only other contention urged before me relates to the validity of the election of the new Board proposed under Ext. P-7 notice. P-5) relating to the amendment of bye laws has also to fail for the reasons already mentioned above. The only other contention urged before me relates to the validity of the election of the new Board proposed under Ext. P-7 notice. The reasons for the attack on Ext. P-7 are given in grounds D and F. The general allegations of mala fides are not substantiated by the petitioner. Mr. Manhu, appearing for respondents 8 to 12 and 14 referred me to the various steps taken fur the conduct of the elections and the interim orders passed by this court including the one, dated 20th October 1980 permitting the conduct of the elections on 26th October 1980, and the order, dated 10th August, 1981 permitting the declaration of the results, observing that "in counting the votes only those who were on the rolls before 28th January 1980 will be considered to have validly voted". I am also told that the results have been declared in compliance with the above directions of this court and that the new Board has already assumed office. The petitioners cannot have any grievance in the matter, particularly in the light of the direction to reckon only those who were voters on. 28th January 1980 for the purpose of declaring the results of the election. With respect, I agree with my learned brother, Chandrasekhara Menon, J., that the results of the election should be declared on the basis of the electoral roll as on 28th January, 1980, for the reason that the election held on 26th October, 1980 was in truth and substance that which was proposed on 28th January, 1980 but had to be stopped due to unforeseen circumstances. 24. In the result, all the original petitions fail and they are accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.