JUDGMENT In this Rule, which was issued with the corresponding interim order for maintenance of status quo as on that date, was obtained on 29th August, 1977, against an order dated 11th April, 1977, passed by the learned Additional Collector, Coach Behar, in Misc. Appeal No. 11 of 1966-67. By such determination, an order dated 14th September, 1976 and one dated 5th November, 1976 in Review Case No.4 of 1976 under section 14T(3a) read with 14T(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and Rule 14C of the Rules framed thereunder (hereinafter referred to as the said Rule) and as passed by the initial authority, was affirmed. The other particulars of the orders would appear from the recordings as made hereafter. 2. The petitioner claimed to have owned and possessed 24.22 acres of agricultural land apart from 0.76 acres of non-agricultural lands (these lands will hereafter be referred to as the said lands) and has also claimed to have filed a return in Form 7 A under the said Act on or about 25th April, 1972, for retention of the said lands. It was also claimed that thereafter, on the basis of such return, a proceeding, bearing No. 169 of 1972-73 was initiated and therein, he contended that his family consisted of nine members, viz. he himself, his wife, his mother, his two sons by the first wife, one unmarried daughter, a daughter-in-law, one grand son and a grand-daughter. 3. It has been stated that, considering the number of the members of the family, by an order dated 5th March, 1976, the petitioner was allowed to retain 22.48 acres of lands and as such, an order was made for the vesting of 2.50 acres. Thereafter, such determination was reopened by the Assistant Settlement Officer concerned, by Case No. 169 of 1972-73, with the object and purpose of reviewing the case and as such Review Case No. 4 of 1976, was initiated and notice under section 57 read with section 14T(1) of the said Act, coupled with Rule 14C of the said Rules, was served, informing him to appear on 10th September, 1976. It was the case of the petitioner that he duly appeared on the date as stipulated and then he was informed by the officer concerned that the order passed in Case No. 169 of 1972-73, under section 14T of the said Act, whereby he was allowed to retain the lands as mentioned above, contravened the provisions of section 14K(c) of the said Act, as the family, as defined thereunder, would not include daughter-in-law and grand-son. The petitioner also stated that he was informed that under section 14M of the said Act, he was entitled to retain 7.30 acres of agricultural lands as his family was composed of five members only. It has been stated that then by order dated 14th September, 1976, the officer concerned, directed that 5.18 acres of agricultural lards, out of 22.48 acres, as was allowed to be retained, to be vested in the State and thereafter, by an order dated 5th November, 1976, the particulars of those lands as vested, were given or made known. 4. It was the case of the petitioner that such reopening by way of review, was purported to have been done by the officer concerned, in terms of section 14T(3A) of the said Act, which sub-section was inserted by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act XII of 1976). The petitioner claimed that the said sub-section, has not prescribed any time limit for exercise of the power of review suo motu or for preferring an application for the review and that apart, no Rule has also been framed, prescribing any limitation for initiation of such proceedings suo motu or otherwise and as such, the said sub-section was bad for excessive and unbridled delegation of power to the Executive Authorities and as such was violative of Article 154 and other provisions of the Constitution of India. Since the said Amending Act XII of 1976 bas been placed in Schedule IX, Mr. Matilal, in his usual fairness and following the determinations in the case of (1) Sasanka Sekhar Maity v. Union of India & Ors, , AIR 1981 SC 522 , submitted that he would not be in a position to advance arguments on the constitutional validity of the amendment or the provisions incorporated thereby and in fact, he rightly pointed out that after such determinations, those arguments would no longer be possible or permissible and available. But, he claimed that the power of review, since no time has been stipulated in the said Act, could not be exercised beyond the period of limitation for other remedies, as provided for under the statute. In fact, Mr. Matilal submitted that no time limit having been prescribed for initiation of a proceeding by way of review, suo motu or otherwise, in sub-section 3(a) of section 14T of the said Act or the said Rules, the order as made on review in this case, was bad, void, irregular and without jurisdiction. 5. It was also claimed by the petitioner that the authority concerned misread, misconstrued and misapplied the provisions of section 14K(c) of the said Act, which lay down the tests for construing the "family" in relation to a Raiyat and made a wrong determination in excluding the daughter-in-law and the grand-son from the same. Mr, Matilal, of course, in such fairness, for which he is kwnon, stated that those contentions would be of no avail or assistance, as according to him, the persons or relations as mentioned above, would not come within the definition of "family". Thus, the sole question on which Mr. Matilal rested his arguments, was the question of the exercise of the power of review, after the time as prescribed, not for such review, but for other remedies under the statute and claimed that no time limit having been prescribed for review as claimed earlier, initiation should have been made within the outer limit of time as prescribed for other remedies in or under the statute or at least within such time from the date of getting informations about the circumstances warranting the necessary review. 6. There was also no dispute that from the determinations, dated 14th September, 1976 as mentioned above in the Review Case No.4 of 1976, an appeal was taken, which was registered as Misc. Appeal No. 11 of 1976-77 and by order dated 11th April, 1977, the learned Tribunal, rejected the said Appeal. It has been claimed that such order of rejection was not due, proper and legal, as the submissions regarding the maintainability of the review proceeding, in the light as mentioned above, was not appropriately decided. 7. Even though the Rule was made ready as regards service on 5th August, 1978, and directions regarding filing of affidavits were given on 2nd April, 1981, no return to the Rule was filed. 7. Even though the Rule was made ready as regards service on 5th August, 1978, and directions regarding filing of affidavits were given on 2nd April, 1981, no return to the Rule was filed. Mr. Gupta being assisted by Samajdar, made his submissions on the basis of the records as produced. 8. The return under Form 7A was filed in the instant case on 25th April, 1972 and the order of vesting under section 14T, which incidentally was the first one, was passed on 5th March, 1976. Thereafter, on 1st September, 1976 the review proceeding under section 14T(3a) was initiated and the order thereon, viz. the second order of vesting, was passed on 14th September, 1976. Then on 8th December, 1976, the petitioner preferred the appeal, which was determined on 11th April, 1977. It is also an admitted fact that for review under section 14T(3a), which is in the following terms :- The Revenue Officer may of his own motion and after giving the Raiyat an opportunity of being heard, revise an order made under sub-section (3) and determine afresh the extent of land which is to vest in the State under section 14S and take possession of such land: Provided that applications made to Revenue Officer prior to the commencement of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978 shall be disposed of by the Revenue Officer in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section. There is no period of limitation prescribed or mentioned. This is also to be noted that section 54 of the said Act prescribed the form of appeal and the periods prescribed for such appeal under section 55 would be (a) thirty days when the same lies to the Collector or to the Additional District Magistrate and (b) sixty days when the same lies to the Commissioner of a Division. Mr. Mr. Matilal, in fact, contended that when no period of limitation was prescribed for initiation of a proceeding under section 14T(3a), the period of limitation as prescribed in the other provisions of the said Act as mentioned above will have to be considered in initiating a proceeding under section 14T(3a) or for entertaining the same and in support of such contentions, he relied on Maxwell on 'The Interpretation of Statutes' (12th Edition), dealing with the "Presumption against charges in the Common Law" and more particularly, where it has been observed that it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to make any change in the existing law beyond that which is expressly stated in, or follows by necessary implication from, the language of the statute in question, in terms of the determination amongst others in the case of (2) National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson, (1952) 2 Q. B. 648. Mr. Matilal also relied on the observations that it is thought to be in the highest degree improbable that the Parliament would depart from the general system of law without expressing its intention with irresitible clearness, and to give any such effect to general words merely because this would be their widest, usual, natural or literal meaning would be to place on them a construction other than that which the Parliament must be supposed to have intended. If the arguments on a question of interpretation are "fairly evenly balanced", that interpretation should be chosen which involved the least alteration of the existing law, as observed in terms of the determinations in the case (3) George Weimpey & Co. Ltd., v. B. O. A. C., (1955) AC 169. Mr. Matilal further referred to the observations in (4) Beswick v. Beswick, (1968) AC 58, for the proposition that in the case of a Consolidating Act there is practically a strong presumption that it does not alter the law contained in the statutes which it replaces, as it is invariable practice of Parliament to require from those who have prepared a Consolidation Bill an assurance that it will make no substantial change in the law and to have that checked by a committee. Section 14T(3A) of the said Act, before its amendment and more particularly in 1976 and before the amendment by the Amending Act, of 1978, was in the following terms :- "(3A) The Revenue Officer may, on application being made to him or of his own motion and after giving the raiyat an opportunity of being heard, revise an order made under sub-section (3) and determine afresh the extent of land which is to vest in the State under section 14S and take possession of such land. Provided that applications made to the Revenue Officer prior to commencement of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978 shall be disposed of by the Revenue Officer in accordance with the provisions of this sub-see on, and since that was the law before the concerned amendment, Mr. Matilal sought to draw the sustenance for his submissions as mentioned above and more particularly on the grounds of limitations, on the basis of the citations as referred to hereinbefore. There is certainly a basic difference between sections 14T(3A) and 14T(3a), under the former, the initiation could have been possible by the officer concerned either on an application or of his own motion, but under the later, such initiation is possible and permissible only by or at the instance of the officer concerned. 9. In support of his submissions, Mr. Matilal made further reference to the determinations in the case of (5) M/s. S. B. Grubaksh Singh v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1115 , in which, the provisions of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and the revisional power under section 23(3) therein and if such power was subject to the period of limitation under sections 11(2a) and 11A, were considered. In fact, the .question in the appeal, was whether the exercise of the power of revision under section 20(3) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 as extended to the Union Territory of Delhi, was subject to the period of limitation provided in section 11(2a) or 11A of that Act The appellant in that case was carrying on business of execution of building contract and was assessed to the Sales Tax by the Sales Tax Officer for the year 1955-56. By an order made on 23rd November, 1959, his appeal before the appellate Commissioner succeeded in part. By an order made on 23rd November, 1959, his appeal before the appellate Commissioner succeeded in part. The Commissioner held that assessment for the first and second quarters of the year 1955-56 was invalid, having been made out of time and as such remanded the case to the Sales Tax Officer for a fresh assessment in respect of the third and fourth quarters of the years. The Officer concerned made a fresh assessment on 21st March, 1960 and the Commissioner, however, after notice dated 21st July, 1960 to the appellant, by his order of 29th July, 1960 revised the appellate order, in exercise of his power under section 20(3) holding that no part of the assessment of year 1955-56 was barred and directed a fresh assessment to be made. Accordingly, a fresh assessment for all the four quarters was made by the Sales Tax Officer on 24th September, 1960 against which the appellant filed two writ petitions, challenging the order made in revision by the Commissioner and. the fresh assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer, in pursuance thereof. The writ applications were allowed and consequent thereto, the impugned orders were quashed. The respondents took up the matter in appeal and succeeded wherefrom the Supreme Court was moved on the basis of certificates granted. 10. It was contended that the appellate and the revisional authorities must exercise their respective powers within the period prescribed under section 11 (2A) and if their orders are final orders of assessment, then directly they were exercising powers under section 11 (1) or (2) of the Act and in case their orders are of remand for fresh assessment to the assessing authorities then also they must pass such orders within the periods as prescribed although under the proviso added in 1959, the assessing authorities may have a further period of four years or six years, as a case may be, for passing a fresh assessment, apart from contending that the Commissioner, while exercising his power in revision, cannot overstep and ignore the period of limitation of three years provided in section 11A of the Act and that the authorities as mentioned in sections 11, 11A and 20(3) being the Commissioner, he would be subject to the period of limitation provided in sections 11 and 11A even when exercising the revisional power under section 20(3). In any event, it was contended that the revisional authority should have exercised the power in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time and such power of revision could not be exercised suo motu after a long lapse of time at the sweet will and pleasure of the authority. 11. On such facts, amongst others, it has been observed that it may well be that if the assessing authority itself exercises the power of review it cannot circumscribe the bar of limitation provided in section 11(2a). But it would be unjust, unreasonable and impracticable to say that the said bar of limitation must also continue to run at all stages of the proceedings, viz. appellate, revisional reference, writ or any other stage. 12. Mr. Gupta claimed that the determinations in M/s. S. B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India & Ors. (supra), would not be an authority on the general proposition on limitation on the presumption of time, as was sought to be urged by Mr. Matilal. In fact, he claimed that such determination had no application in this case, the more so when, the power of appeal under sections 54 and 55 of the said Act and the power of review, were different. It was claimed by Mr. Gupta that the power under consideration in the case as cited was different from the power under consideration in this case. He really claimed and contended that since in this case, the review was by the same authority and it was not a case of Review by a superior authority, like the case as cited above, there was no question of trenching on the power of any other authority under section 14T (3a). He claimed, on a reference to the provisions of the said Act that when limitation for review is not prescribed such power of review should be exercised or taken recourse to within a reasonable time and in fact, such power according to him, was exercised in this case, within a reasonable time. According to Mr. Gupta, the only limitation in the matter of exercise of such power, should be that the same should not (1) trench on the power of other authority and (2) the power must be used reasonably or with reasonable and due care. In support of such submissions, Mr. According to Mr. Gupta, the only limitation in the matter of exercise of such power, should be that the same should not (1) trench on the power of other authority and (2) the power must be used reasonably or with reasonable and due care. In support of such submissions, Mr. Gupta referred to the observations in the case of (6) Swastika Oil Mills Ltd. v. H. B. Munshi, etc., AIR 1963 SC 843. This was a case, where the provisions in sections 11A and 22 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 and those of section 31 were construed and it has been laid down that section 22 of the Act of 1946 and section 31 of the Act of 1953 do not lay down any limitation for exercise of the power of revision, by the revisional authority, suo motu and therefore it cannot be said that limitation of reasonable time within which the revisional powers are to be exercised must be implied in the statutes and the only limitations to which the power is subject are that the revisional authority should not trench upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Act or Rules to other authorities and should not ignore the limitations inherent in the exercise of those powers. Where the revisional powers under section 22 are sought to be exercised to correct what appears to• be an incorrect order passed in appeal, and for such a purpose, proceeding could not possibly have been taken under section 11A, in exercising his revisional powers the Revisional Authority is' not encroaching upon the jurisdiction of any other authority specially entrusted with taking such proceedings. It cannot be said that the revisional power is governed by any period of limitation laid down in section 11A, for proceedings for reassessment of escaped turnover. In view of the above, it was also claimed by Mr. Gupta that when no period of limitation has been prescribed in the said Act for review under section 14T (3a), so any period of limitation cannot be imported. 13. It was contended by Mr. In view of the above, it was also claimed by Mr. Gupta that when no period of limitation has been prescribed in the said Act for review under section 14T (3a), so any period of limitation cannot be imported. 13. It was contended by Mr. Gupta, on a reference to the terms and language of section 14T (3a) and more particularly to the words "determine afresh" as used therein, that the officer concerned, was duly authorised and empowered to determine the proceedings afresh or anew on his own motion, so in this case the reopening of the proceeding by review or otherwise, was justified, proper, with jurisdiction, and authority. He claimed that section 14K(a) speaks of or contemplates a ceiling area, provisions in section 14L also refers to such area and specifies that no Raiyat shall hold land in excess of the ceiling area, which in .terms of section 14K (a) as mentioned above, would relate to the extent of land which the Raiyat would be entitled to own and the said term "ceiling area" has also been used in section 14M, where the extent' of the area would be available. It was claimed that such extent of the ceiling area, may vary with the size of the family and the Raiyat, would not admittedly be entitled to hold and retain any area which would be more than the ceiling area and the provisions in section 14S of the said Act, make it clear that lands in excess of the ceiling area of a Raiyat, should vest, on the commencement of Chapter IIB, dealing with ceiling in holdings and anything in excess shall vest in the State free from all incumbrances. The said Chapter IIB, consisting of sections 14J to 14Y, was inserted by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 (President's Act III of 1971), and then by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (West Bengal Act XII of 1972), with retrospective effect from 15th February, 1971, and has been found to be intra vires in the case of Sasanka Sekhar Maity v. Union of India (supra). It was contended by Mr. It was contended by Mr. Gupta that under section 14T(1), it would be the duty of a Raiyat to furnish return, if he holds, lands in excess of ceiling area, in the form as prescribed, containing the particulars as required under the said section and thereafter, under section 14T(3), the officer concerned, may on receipt of such return or of his own motion, determine the extent of land, which is to vest in the State under section 14S and takes possession of such lands. He claimed that the provisions in section 14S lay down the manner, in which excess lands should be dealt with and those in section 14T, lays down the procedure for the same or in short how such manner as mentioned in section 14S, should be put into action or enforced. Thus, Mr. Gupta claimed that the terms of provisions in section 14T(3a) should be read, considered and construed in the context of the said Act, the particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore and the intention behind them or their incorporation. 14. In the background of the above submissions, Mr. Gupta contended that the question in this case, would thus be, whether there has been trenching on the power of the Revenue Officer concerned or he has exercised the necessary power. He claimed that since there was no trenching on the powers of the officer concerned and he took steps "afresh" to determine duly, the exact position and ceiling area, no interference is required, needed or should be made. The fact that many persons were admittedly allowed to compose and constitute the family, of the Raiyat, who could not in fact or in law be allowed to be so under section 14K, according to Mr. Gupta, was one amongst other grounds, which justified the action as taken. He, of course, argued that whether the order as made was reasonable or not, would be a question of fact and this Court should not ordinarily be entitled to probe into the reasonableness or otherwise of an order as made, if the same was found to have been made with jurisdiction, competence and power or unless perversity in the findings, was established. 15. Mr. Motilal, in reply contended that since section 14T(3a) confers power upon the same officer and the position now is different from the time when section 14T(3A) was in force, viz. 15. Mr. Motilal, in reply contended that since section 14T(3a) confers power upon the same officer and the position now is different from the time when section 14T(3A) was in force, viz. it is no longer open to review, revise or reopen on the application of the Raiyat but the same can be done only at the instance of the officer concerned, there should be a limitation on the exercise of such or necessary power and as such, the determinations in the case of Swastika Oil Mills Ltd. v. H. B. Munshi, etc. (supra), would have no application in this case and the theory of trenching on the necessary powers, as was urged, would be of no avail or any assistance. In the cases as mentioned above, the action was not admittedly taken by the initial or the original officer or authority, but such action was proposed or taken by higher authorities. Mr. Motilal also contended that such exercise of power by the same or higher authority and the differences created by such authority, have been noted in the case reported in AIR 1968 SC 843 and if such exercise of power, was done by the same authority, then such determinations would have sealed the fate of this case and his submissions, as recorded hereinbefore, would not have been available. He further referred to section 54(4) of the said Act, laying down that an order passed in appeal shall be final. The appeal referred to by him was certainly one filed in terms of section 54 and subject to the period of limitations as prescribed in section 55. On a reference, to the provisions as above and his submissions as mentioned, it was claimed that if either of the outer limits as prescribed for filing the necessary appeals are not applied in case of exercise of powers under section 14T(3a), then the position, may in some cases be impossible or create such situations, which would not only be embarassing, but would have an adverse effect and will also have great social discremination, and more particularly when after the finality is reached, power under section 14T(3a) is resorted to after a long or unspecified time. In fact, he contended that if no time is imposed or determined in respect of the use of powers under section 14T(3a), there would in fact be no finality, which should be expected to be reached after some time and after the disposal of appeal under section 54(4) of the said Act. 16. It is true that even though for statutory appeals, period of limitations are prescribed, for a review under section 14T(3a), which is now suo motu and not on application by the Raiyat, as was the case under section 14T(3a), no such period is prescribed and in fact the Legislature has not laid down any such period of limitation in express terms, in respect of applications under section 14T(3a). The exercise of powers under sections 14T(3a) and 14T(3A), are certainly and basically different. But in both the cases, the power must be used reasonably or with reasonable and due care and that too of a resonable man and exercise of such power, in either of the cases should not also trench on the power of the authority concerned. The use of the word and expression "determine afresh", as used in section 14T(3a), would certainly authorise or empower the authority concerned, to initiate proceedings for review, subject to the limitation as mentioned above in cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the said Act or irregular and impoper exercise of the powers under the same, apart from the fact, that on reasonable interpretation of the said Act or the provisions therein, considered along with the determinations as mentioned above, such power must or should be exercised by or within the outer limit of time as specified under the said Act, for other appropriate remedies under the same and not beyond that, as otherwise, the rule of finality, which is required or expected to be achieved in all proceedings or actions, would be impossible or frustrated, as even if an order becomes final under section 54(4) of the said Act, proceedings for review, would be initiated and the effect thereof, would perhaps be, to unsettle the once settled fact or proceedings. Such was or could not certainly be expected to be the intention of the Legislature or the purpose of the said Act and that too, in view of the application of the rules of interpretation as mentioned hereinbefore. Even if Mr. Such was or could not certainly be expected to be the intention of the Legislature or the purpose of the said Act and that too, in view of the application of the rules of interpretation as mentioned hereinbefore. Even if Mr. Gupta was right and justified in his contentions, that the limitations in the matter of exercise of power, were firstly not to trench upon the power of the other authority and secondly, the power must be used reasonably or with reasonable and due care and as such, the determinations in the case of M/s. S. B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (supra), do not really and strictly support the petitioner or apply in this case, yet it cannot be denied that if no limitation is prescribed or laid down for the use and exercise of the suo motu power of review, there may be cases, when such power may not be exercised duly, reasonably or with reasonable care, as a result whereof, even when a matter would reach finality, such finality may be sought to be interfered with or the power of review as sought to be resorted to or given effect to and acted upon, may clash with the same. It should be remembered, like the provisions in section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, no limitation has been prescribed for exercise of such power under section 14T(3a) of the said Act. 17. I feel it difficult to hold in agreement with the submissions of Mr. Gupta that all cases and particularly when, no period of limitation is prescribed, any period of limitation on the power of the authorities concerned, would be possible to be evolved and that such construction, would be reasonable, for the reasons as mentioned above. It is true, that following the sequence of events as under the said Act, the authority concerned would have the right and justification to determine afresh, in some given and appropriate cases. But, if such power is not circumscribed by any period of limitation, the use of power and jurisdiction, may create great prejudice and hardship to matter or cases, which as mentioned above, have reached or would reach finality. 18. But, if such power is not circumscribed by any period of limitation, the use of power and jurisdiction, may create great prejudice and hardship to matter or cases, which as mentioned above, have reached or would reach finality. 18. Thus, after hearing the learned Advocates, I consider that even though there is no limitation prescribed, for the exercise of suo motu power under section 14T(3), the Revenue Officer concerned, cannot claim to have an unlimited power or power without any period of limitation for exercising his suo motu power and such power, must be exercised within a time as specified and in the absence of such specification, before a finality is arrived at, of the lis or dispute or such power of review should be resorted to within such period of limitation as mentioned above, to be reckoned from the date of obtaining the necessary informations, requiring a review. 19. In this case, the original order of vesting in Case No. 169 of 1972-73, was initiated prior to 5th March, 1976, proceedings for review under the Old section 14T(3A) was initiated on 1st September, 1976 and on that, the subsequent order of vesting as mentioned above, was made on 14th September, 1976, which order again, was affirmed on 11th April, 1976 in an Appeal, being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 11 of 1976-77, as filed on or about 8th December, 1976. In the concerned grounds of appeal, amongst others, a point was taken that the officer concerned, had acted beyond his competence, in initiating the proceeding suo motu. Thus, admittedly the suo motu proceedings in this case was initiated before the finality was reached in a proceedings under section 54 of the said Act and definitely prior to the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 11 of 1976-77. The initial determinations dated 4th September, 1976, on the basis of the members of the family of the Raiyat, in terms of section 14K(c) of the said Act and as agreed to by Mr. Motilat, were wrong and as such, review of such determinations, by the subsequent proceedings as mentioned hereinbefore, was possible and permissible, subject to the restrictions as mentioned above. If such initiation was made before the finality of the matter then there would have been, in my view, no other way but to make the Rule absolute, for the views as expressed earlier. If such initiation was made before the finality of the matter then there would have been, in my view, no other way but to make the Rule absolute, for the views as expressed earlier. But since the petitioner would not be entitled to have the benefit of initiation after finality is reached and such finality was reached on 11th April, 1977, i. e. long after the initiation or alternatively, such initiation was made long prior to the reaching of finality of the lis, this Rule should be and is, thus, hereby discharged, There will be no order as to costs. Stay of operation of this order, as prayed for, is refused.