JUDGMENT J.M.L. Sinha, J. - The petitioner is a Government owned company which manufactures crystal sugar by vacuum pan process. On 24th of December, 1979, Sri S.D. Misra, opposite party No. 1, Food Inspector, visiting the company had discovered that the company was manufacturing sugar without obtaining any licence. He, therefore, filed a compliant, having obtained prior permission of the Chief Medical Officer, Ghazipur for the prosecution of the petitioner under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner put in appearance through its Manager, Sri Ram Shanker Singh and raised a preliminary objection which was two fold, namely :- (i) that since the petitioner was a Government owned company, it was not necessary for it to obtain a licence for manufacturing sugar, and (ii) that, in any case, no prosecution could be launched against the petitioner without obtaining the sanction under section 197 of the Act. The learned Magistrate rejected both the contentions vide his order dated 15th May, 1980. Aggrieved against it the petitioner filed a revision in the court of Sessions at Ghazipur which resulted in dismissal and hence this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the State and I find that none of the two contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner carry any substance. 3. So far as the first contention is concerned, section 7 of the Act states that no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed except in accordance with the conditions of the licence. R.I. 50 of the Rules framed under the Act, inter alia, states that no person shall manufacture sweetening agents such as sugar, gur or jaggery except under a licence. Section 16 of the Act, inter alia states that if any person whether by himself or by any other persons on his behalf manufactures for sale any article of food in contravention of any provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder, he commits a punishable offence. 4. There is no controversy before me about the fact that the petitioner manufactures sugar and that it does not possess a licence as required by section 7 read with R.I. 50. 4. There is no controversy before me about the fact that the petitioner manufactures sugar and that it does not possess a licence as required by section 7 read with R.I. 50. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me was that the word 'person' occurring in section 16 of the Act and R.I. 50 of the Rules framed thereunder should not be interpreted to include 'State'. Elaborating his argument further learned counsel urged that the State is not supposed to issue a licence to itself for manufacturing sugar and this fact should also lead to the conclusion that the word 'person' occurring in the aforesaid provision does not include 'State'. 5. It is not necessary for me to enter into the controversy whether it is obligatory for the State to issue a licence under section 7 read with R.I. 50 if it undertakes to manufacture sugar by itself, for in the instant case, the petitioner is not State .but a company created under the provisions of the Companies Act. It has a juristic personality distinct and separate from the State, for it can sue and be sued in its own name. The fact that the word 'person' occurring in section 16 will include a company can admit of no doubt in view of the provision contained in section 7 of the Act. The mere fact that the petitioner in the instant case happens to be a company, owned by the State and is not a private limited company cannot, in my opinion, make any difference. Once the legislature has made a law that no person shall manufacture sugar without obtaining a licence, and has made it clear that the word 'person' shall include a company, no company can escape that liability regardless of the fact whether it is a private limited company or a company owned by the State Government. If the legislature had intended to make any exemption in favour of the companies owned by the State Government, it should have said so. In the absence of anything in the Act or the Rules, it cannot be accepted that the petitioner did not require to obtain any licence as required by section 7 read with R.I. 50. The first contention thus stands rejected. 6. Coming to the second contention, in my opinion, it is wholly misconceived. In the absence of anything in the Act or the Rules, it cannot be accepted that the petitioner did not require to obtain any licence as required by section 7 read with R.I. 50. The first contention thus stands rejected. 6. Coming to the second contention, in my opinion, it is wholly misconceived. The prosecution in the instant case has been launched against the company and not against a public servant of the nature specified in section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second contention also is, therefore, rejected. 7. In the result, the petition fails and is, hereby dismissed. The stay order dated 11th December 1980, stands vacated. The learned Magistrate shall r ow proceed to dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible.