JUDGMENT V. Khalid, J. 1. The petitioner is a postgraduate degree holder in Ophthalmology in the Directorate of Health Services, Kerala. He joined service on 16th September, 1965. He was sent for compulsory military service in 1966 where he served from 21st March, 1966 to 2nd December, 1969. He acquired Diploma (D.O.) in 1972 and postgraduate degree of N. S. in Ophthalmology in 1974. He was posted to E.S.I. Hospital, Pavithreswaram and Pappinisseri (1965-66) and Health Centre, Muhamma (1969-71) as an Eye Specialist in the Taluk Hospital, Shertallai from 7th November, 1973 to 16th February, 1977 and in the Taluk Hospital, Pathanamthitta from 17th February, 1977 to 31st May, 1980. Then he was transferred to the District Hospital, Trichur, as a Senior Ophthalmologist. This was his first District Hospital posting. He had an unblemished record of service to his credit. According to the norms of transfer of Government Medical Officers, he could have continued in the District Hospital, Trichur, at least for two years more. But he was transferred by an order, dated 20th May, 1981 served on him on 26th May, 1981 evidenced by Ext. P-1 to Perumbavoor. Out of ever 30 Doctors in the District Hospital, Trichur, only three including the petitioner were transferred from Trichur, the petitioner before completing three years of service. There were other Doctors who had completed over 10 years of service in the District Hospital. The petitioner avers that this transfer was apparently to provide for the 3rd respondent. 2. The 3rd respondent joined regular service on 24th September, 1973 and has only completed less than eight years of service. He is ranked as No. 2060 in the gradation list, as against Rank No. 598 assigned to the petitioner, of Assistant Surgeons. He is only a Postgraduate Diploma holder and has no military service to his credit. The petitioner had to wait for about 15 years for a District Hospital posting. The 3rd respondent gets such a posting before completion of 10 years of service. The petitioner has 46 points in his favour for being given independent unit charge whereas the 3rd respondent had only 26 such points which is not sufficient ordinarily for a unit charge or a District Hospital posting. The petitioner's case, therefore, is that his transfer was in violation of the norms, governing transfers, without any extraordinary circumstance justifying such transfer and only to accommodate the 3rd respondent. The petitioner's case, therefore, is that his transfer was in violation of the norms, governing transfers, without any extraordinary circumstance justifying such transfer and only to accommodate the 3rd respondent. In this petition petitioner prays that Ext.P-1 order be set aside as being violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution and also prays for other consequential reliefs. The grounds urged are that Ext.P-1 order of transfer is in violation of all known norms and ascertainable principles of conduct set up by the Government, that it is vitiated by extraneous considerations, unrelated to exigencies of administration and hence is vitiated by mala fides in law. In C.M.P. No. 9391 of 1981 this Court directed interim stay if the 3rd respondent had not taken charge in the Trichur Hospital. Thereafter, he filed C.M.P. No. 12025 of 1981 for an interim direction whereupon this Court directed the 2nd respondent to post the petitioner in the next available vacancy in the District Hospital, Trichur, pending disposal of the Original Petition. The petitioner again filed C.M.P. No. 16315 of 1981 to give directions to respondents 1 and 2 to post the petitioner back to the Trichur District Hospital where he had been working. No orders were passed on that. He again filed C.M.P. No. 19383 of 1981 for the same direction. There also no orders were passed. I understand that he has now been posted to Trichur but not to a place befitting his seniority, qualification and specialisation. 3. In the counter filed by the 1st respondent State, the case of the petitioner is met as follows: The transfer of the petitioner as per Ext. P-1 order is in public interest, not actuated by mala fides and hence not liable to be quashed. The petitioner's case that he can be transferred from the District Hospital only after completion of three years as per the norms for transfer, is denied. The norms only stipulate that in the normal course an officer need be transferred only after completion of a term of three years. This condition does not fetter the hands of the Government to transfer and post any officer at any time in the interest of service. The 3rd respondent is a junior hand when compared to the petitioner. The norms only stipulate that in the normal course an officer need be transferred only after completion of a term of three years. This condition does not fetter the hands of the Government to transfer and post any officer at any time in the interest of service. The 3rd respondent is a junior hand when compared to the petitioner. He had been holding charge of an Eye unit in Government Hospital, Chittoor for the last two years and he is eligible to be posted to any unit in the speciality. Though there are norms prescribed for transfer, the Government have reserved the right to transfer any officer in public interest even if it is not in accordance with the general guidelines prescribed by them. It is a fact that officers shall not ordinarily be transferred before completion of three years. It is correct that Government desire to give preference in the matter of posting those who have served in the Army. But this is only optional and no one can claim it as a matter of right. The nature of preference to be given has to be decided by Government and not by individual, who is expected to receive it. The contention of the petitioner that being a senior specialist he can be allowed to continue in the District Hospital, Trichur, even after three years and his replacement could only be another specialist is an interpretation given by him to suit his convenience. It is not correct to say that a senior specialist can be replaced only by another Medical Officer of equal or more service and with equal or higher qualification. The only obligation in this regard is that a specialist is replaced by another specialist, if available, in the interest of service. In this case the transfer was made in good faith and in public interest. Ext.P-1 order is not discriminatory and not violative of Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The order of transfer is not in violation of accepted standard or principle. It was issued in public interest and is not vitiated by any mala fides. The petitioner has already been relieved from the District Hospital, Trichur, and the 3rd respondent has joined duty in his place and therefore the transfer order has thus come into effect. The order of transfer is not in violation of accepted standard or principle. It was issued in public interest and is not vitiated by any mala fides. The petitioner has already been relieved from the District Hospital, Trichur, and the 3rd respondent has joined duty in his place and therefore the transfer order has thus come into effect. The allegation that the petitioner's transfer is the result of the hostility of the Minister for Public Health against the Kerala Government Medical Officers' Association is denied. 4. I thought it useful to refer to the averments in the counter affidavit filed by the State only to show how the case of the petitioner was met by the first respondent and in justification of the submission made by the petitioner's learned counsel that the case set up in the petition finds substantial support in the counter affidavit. In other words, according to the petitioner's counsel, the averments in the petition are not seriously controverted in the counter affidavit, thus making the petitioner's task to persuade this court to quash Ext. P-1 easier. 5. Before considering the question involved in this petition and examining the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction in similar matters, it would be profitable to refer to certain Government Orders made available to me which lay down the norms to be adopted in transferring Government employees. In G.O. Rt. 1920/77/RD., dated 18th May 1977, clauses (2), (17), (19) and (20) read as follows: "(2) No employees will be transferred before completion of 3 years unless there are compelling reasons. * * * (17) Transfer of Medical Officers will also be governed by the above principles. But a Medical Officer who has completed 8 years of service in the same institution will be compulsorily transferred to another institution. * * * (19) Medical Officers who have served 3 years in a rural areas/one year in difficult assignments (orders specifying difficult assignments will be issued/separately) and who have completed compulsory army service will get preferential treatment for purpose of transfer. (20) Specialist doctors will be posted to the specialities concerned only, to the extent possible. * * *" In G.O. Rt. 836/79/HD., dated 14th March, 1979: "1. (20) Specialist doctors will be posted to the specialities concerned only, to the extent possible. * * *" In G.O. Rt. 836/79/HD., dated 14th March, 1979: "1. (i) Medical Officers who have completed 3 years or more of service in a particular institution will invariably be transferred from that institution provided they are not entitled for exemption from transfer as laid down in other clauses of this G.O." In G.O. Rt. 3442/79/HD., dated 11th December 1979, the relevant portion reads as follows: "Medical Officers who have completed 3 years or more of services in a particular institution are liable to be transferred from that institution provided they are not entitled for exemption from transfer as laid down in other clauses of this G.O. However Senior Medical Officers and Postgraduates will be allowed to continue irrespectively of the tenure in an institution provided there are no requests for transfer to that institution. The vacancies of Senior Medical Officers and Specialists in such institutions will be filled up only by posting Senior Medical Officers or Specialists as the case may be." And G. O. Rt. 1426/80/HD., dated 22nd May, 1980 reads as follows: "* * * " Irrespective of the norms prescribed persons who are irregular in attendance and indifferent to their duties will be transferred any time of the year and those who discharge their duties sincerely and commendably will be given transfer to the stations of their choice." 6. Let me at the outset outline the jurisdiction of this Court in matters of this kind. Orders of transfer are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Government. Very sparingly would this court exercise its jurisdiction under Art.226 to interfere with orders of transfer. The Government as the employer have a right to effect transfers of employees under their service. Government is the best judge to decide about the administrative convenience, exigencies of service and public interest. If transfers are lightly interfered with by courts, this would move the smooth functioning of the Governmental machinery. Courts of law have consistently leaned in favour of the Government in matters of transfer and have been extremely slow to interfere with such orders. Government is the best judge to decide about the administrative convenience, exigencies of service and public interest. If transfers are lightly interfered with by courts, this would move the smooth functioning of the Governmental machinery. Courts of law have consistently leaned in favour of the Government in matters of transfer and have been extremely slow to interfere with such orders. From what I have stated above, it should not be assumed that the court's powers have been taken away in interfering with orders of transfer when the court is satisfied that the orders of transfer were passed under the guise of administrative reasons and ostensibly due to exigencies of service but in reality to achieve oblique motives. A capricious and mala fide exercise of power even for transfer should alert the courts of law to scrutinise the grounds on which the order of transfer is subjected to challenge, and if the court is satisfied that the transfer in question has not been in public interest or for other administrative reasons, in rare cases, the court will step in to fault such transfers. The question which falls for consideration in this case is whether the materials available in the records would justify any interference with the order of transfer. 7. The learned Government Pleader placed strong reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court and reported in Shanthi Kumari v. Regional Deputy Director, Health Services Patna (1981 (11) LLJ 312). In that case, an auxiliary nurse midwife at Bowstead Zanana Hospital at Barch moved the Patna High Court challenging her transfer from Brach to the Urban Family Welfare Centre, Danpur. Her petition was dismissed in limine by the High Court with a direction to file a representation to the Government for a transfer to place in her home district except Brach and directing the Government to consider such a representation. She moved the Supreme Court by special leave. Observed the Supreme Court as follows: "Transfer of a Government servant may be due to exigencies of service or due to administrative reasons. The courts cannot interfere in such matters. Shri. Grover, Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the impugned order was in breach of the Government instructions with regard to transfers in the Health Department. Observed the Supreme Court as follows: "Transfer of a Government servant may be due to exigencies of service or due to administrative reasons. The courts cannot interfere in such matters. Shri. Grover, Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the impugned order was in breach of the Government instructions with regard to transfers in the Health Department. If that be so, the authorities will look into the matter and redress the grievance of the appellant." The Appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court settling the law as extracted above but hopping and trusting that the said Government will sympathetically deal with the representation made by the appellant in the matter of transfer. In that case the petitioner was continuing by virtue of an ad interim order and she was allowed to continue in that post until she was given the posting order. Thus the settlement of law by the Supreme Court is in accord with what I have indicated in the preceding paragraph. In the short judgment of the Supreme Court the background of the transfer is not evident. The principle decided by the Supreme Court cannot be extended to completely take away the right of the High Court in considering orders of transfer. What the Supreme Court has laid down in the above decision is the general rule. In given cases this general rule can be departed from, the orders of transfer can be interfered with. 8. In Naravan v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1977 SC 183 at Page 195) the Supreme Court had occasion in another context to consider the repeated mention in the counter affidavits by the States of the expression 'public interest and administrative convenience' whenever arbitrary exercise of power is assailed in courts of law. In that case the invocation of S.17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was assailed. The stand taken in support of invoking S.17(4) was that it was in public interest. The Supreme Court observed in Para.39 as follows: "...... And, the particulars of what is obviously to be done in public interest need not be concealed when its validity is questioned in a court of Justice ................. * * * * 41. The stand taken in support of invoking S.17(4) was that it was in public interest. The Supreme Court observed in Para.39 as follows: "...... And, the particulars of what is obviously to be done in public interest need not be concealed when its validity is questioned in a court of Justice ................. * * * * 41. Again, the uniform and set recital of a formula, like a ritual or mantra, apparently applied mechanically to every case, itself indicated that the mind of the Commissioner concerned was only applied to the question whether the land was waste or arable and whether its acquisition is urgently needed. Nothing beyond that seems to have been considered ..........." I thought it useful to refer to these observations only to highlight the fact that a repeated recital of public interest and administrative exigencies in the counter affidavits without supporting materials to satisfy the Court that public interest was really involved, would not dissuade a Court from exercising its jurisdiction if it is satisfied that the exercise of power is arbitrary or capricious. In Jaisinghani v. Union of India ( AIR 1967 SC 1427 ) the Supreme Court has cautioned against the exercise of arbitrary power strongly as follows: "(14) In this context it is important to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey - 'Law of the Constitution' - Tenth Edn., Introduction ex). 'Law has reached its finest moments', stated Doughas, J. in United States v. Munderlich, [1951 (342) US 98], 'when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler. ...... Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered'. It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. 'Law has reached its finest moments', stated Doughas, J. in United States v. Munderlich, [1951 (342) US 98], 'when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler. ...... Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered'. It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes, 1770 (4) Burr 2528 at p. 2539 means sound discretion guided by law'. It must be governed by rule, not by humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful." With these guidelines it would be useful to refer to the facts of this case. The learned counsel for the petitioner read the counter affidavit in extense and stated that his arguments were contained in the counter affidavit itself. The petitioner's counsel has enough justification in making this submission. The relative positions of the petitioner and the third respondent have been more or less clearly projected in the counter affidavit. The averments in the counter affidavit clearly disclose that the petitioner was under no circumstance liable to be transferred at the time the impugned order in question was passed. The counter affidavit is replete with sentences that the transfer is made in good faith and in public interest. The third respondent was in the Government Hospital, Chittur for only two years. He may be eligible to be posted to a unit in the speciality. If there was some material to satisfy me that the Trichur hospital needed the service of the 3rd respondent more than the petitioner which necessitated his transfer before completing the normal three years I would have unhesitatingly rejected the petitioner's prayer. The counter affidavit states that the norms laid down need be respected only in normal cases. I have no quarrel with this statement. But what was the public interest involved in displacing a far more competent man with higher qualification from Trichur where he had not served for the normal span of three years to accommodate the third respondent. Common sense dictates that the public interest would be better served by retaining a specialist, a more competent man, a man with longer experience at Trichur than by displacing him. None of the norms, reference of which had been made above, have been adhered to by the authorities in the case. Common sense dictates that the public interest would be better served by retaining a specialist, a more competent man, a man with longer experience at Trichur than by displacing him. None of the norms, reference of which had been made above, have been adhered to by the authorities in the case. There is no explanation to justify the unjustifiable departure from the norms in this case. If, at least, the respondents had made out a feeble case of the petitioner having been irregular in attendance or indifferent to his duties which would have justified a transfer irrespective of the norms prescribed as laid down in G.O. Rt. 1426/80/HD, dated 22nd May 1980, I would have without much a discussion dismissed the petition. Even such an averment is absent in the petition. 9. Chandrasekhara Menon, J. in his judgment in Dr. P. Padmanabhan v. State of Kerala (ILR 1983 (1) Ker. 143) upheld this Court's power to interfere with orders of transfer in appropriate cases. With great respect, I endorse the view, which is consistent with the view taken by me in this judgment that an appropriate cases the orders of transfer can be interfered with by this Court. 10. To recapitulate, the petitioner is senior in service. He is better qualified. He got charge of the District Hospital as Senior Ophthalmologist only recently. He could have continued in the Hospital for two years more. The 3rd respondent is junior, less qualified, less experienced and had not served for the normal span of three years at Chittur. The petitioner has a case that he was President of the Trichur branch of the Kerala Medical Officers Association for 1980 and a representative of the Association to the Coordination Committee for 1981 and that he was an active worker of the Association in Quilon and Trichur. There was a token strike for 42 hours at Trichur. The then Minister for Health had declared his hostility to the Association. The transfer order in question is a vindictive one for the petitioner's active participation in the activities of the Association. I do not propose to rest my decision on this statement in the petition since it is strongly denied in Para.8 of the counter affidavit. This statement may or may not be correct. But the fact remains that the transfer in question was not to promote public interest. I do not propose to rest my decision on this statement in the petition since it is strongly denied in Para.8 of the counter affidavit. This statement may or may not be correct. But the fact remains that the transfer in question was not to promote public interest. It was not for administrative convenience nor were exigencies of service involved in this transfer. This order of transfer amounts to a capricious and arbitrary exercise of power in gross violation of the norms laid down and repeated in the Government orders. The petitioner could normally be at Trichur for three years. He had army service, and rural service, two circumstances in his favour. As a person with higher qualification public interest would have been better served by retaining him at Trichur than by displacing him. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that Ext. P-1 order is liable to be quashed since it had been passed in violation of the norms and need to promote public interest. I quash Ext. P-1 and allow this petition. 11. It was faintly submitted before me that the petitioner's grievance should be deemed to have been got over since he has now been posted to Trichur pursuant to a direction by this Court. This submission cannot be accepted at its face value. The petitioner is not given the unit charge which he is entitled to. He has to work in an inconsequential section. If the petitioner can be directed to work in this inconsequential position nothing prevents the 3rd respondent who is junior to him and who is less experienced and less qualified than he to exchange place with the petitioner. If the 3rd respondent wants only to remain in Trichur that desire would be satisfied if he is posted to the place to which the petitioner is now posted. Anyway that is for the authorities to decide. I cannot make any direction in that behalf in this case. On the strength of this judgment, the petitioner will be restored to the original position that he held prior to Ext. P-1 order. Parties are directed to bear their costs.