( 1 ) THE present revision petition is directed against an order dated April 8, 1980 of Shri V. K. Malhotra, Sub-Judge I Class, Delhi rejecting an application for amendment of plaint filed by the present petitioners under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code ). ( 2 ) ONE Smt. Gulab Devi was owner of property No. 1055 situated in Gali Heera Nand Maliwara, Delhi. The present petitioners purchased the said property from Gulab Devi on February 2, 1971. Chhote Lal, father of respondents 1, 2 and 4 and husband of respondent No. 3 was a tenant in a portion of the aforesaid property. The petitioners sent a notice dated 18th September 1973 to Chhote Lal terminating tenancy of the latter. 2a. On 27th September, 1973 petitioners filed a suit No. 1022 of 1973 against Chhote Lal to the effect that the latter had trespassed upon and had forcibly occupied a Barsati on the 3rd floor with terrace in front and a Kothri on the ground floor, that the said portion was not included in his tenancy and that therefore, decree for recovery of possession be passed in favour of the former and against the latter in respect of that portion. ( 3 ) ON 14th July, 1975 Chhote Lal died and was substituted by the present respondents in the aforesaid suit. On 31st August, 1977 that suit was decreed by a Sub Judge. Respondents went in appeal which was decided on 24 November, 1978 by an Additional District Judge, Delhi who held that Barsati and the terrace in front of the same was comprised in the tenancy of Chhote Lal, that therefore, suit for recovery of possession on account of trespass regarding the same was not maintainable, but that there was trespass in respect of the Kothri on the ground floor. Accordingly the learned Additional District Judge maintained decree of recovery of possession of Kothri and dismissed the remaining suit. ( 4 ) THE suit out of which the present revision petition has arisen was filed by the petitioners on October 21. 1975 for recovery of possession of the portion which according to the petitioners was comprised in the tenancy of Chhote Lal on the ground that on the demise of Chhote Lal the tenancy rights did not pass to the respondents and they are liable to be dispossessed. 1975 for recovery of possession of the portion which according to the petitioners was comprised in the tenancy of Chhote Lal on the ground that on the demise of Chhote Lal the tenancy rights did not pass to the respondents and they are liable to be dispossessed. The room (which is described as Siaban by the respondents) and open terrace on the third floor which was subject matter of the previously instituted suit was not included in the subject matter of the suit Out of which the present revision petition has arisen. That was obviously so because already suit for recovery of possession of that room and the terrace in front on third floor was already pending. ( 5 ) ON account of the adverse decision Of the learned Additional District Judge in respect of the aforesaid room and terrace in front of the same on third floor in the previously filed suit the petitioners wanted to include that portion also in the subject matter of the present suit. They, therefore, brought an application for amendment of the plaint on October 16, 1979. for allowing them to include receipt of recovery of possession in respect of the aforesaid room and the terrace on the third floor. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid application was contested by the respondents. The learned Sub Judge rejected application on two grounds, namely, that the application was delayed having been filed about a year after judgment of the additional District Judge in the previously instituted suit and secondly there would be change of nature of the suit, if amendment were allowed. ( 7 ) PETITIONERS filed an affidavit of Gian Chand petitioner dated 28th August, 1980. In that affidavit it has been explained as to how application for amendment of the plaint was filed about a year after the order aforesaid of the learned Additional District Judge. It is stated in the application that the petitioners filed regular second appeal No. 105 of 1979 against the order of learned District Judge but the same was dismissed by Hon ble Mr. It is stated in the application that the petitioners filed regular second appeal No. 105 of 1979 against the order of learned District Judge but the same was dismissed by Hon ble Mr. Justice Avadh Behari on July 19, 1980, that the petitioner consulted some senior advocates as to the desirability and possibility of filing a review petition or appeal in the Supreme Court, that they were advised that it will be no use to file such a petition or appeal and that therefore, then they filed the application for amendment of the plaint. The aforesaid explanation is very sound. Therefore, ground of delay for dismissing application falls to the ground. ( 8 ) EVEN otherwise it is well settled law that an amendment cannot be refused on the ground of delay alone unless on account of delay some right has accrued to the other party, for instance, under the law of limitation etc. , In Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 following law was laid down, which is in para 5 of the judgment:- "rules of procedure are intended to be handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. " It is apparent that howsoever late the proposed amendment is the same must be allowed if it can b. e without injustice to the other side. In the present case, there could not be any injustice because already petitioners seek possession of the portion comprised in the tenancy of Chhote Lal on the ground of termination Of tenancy during his lifetime, thereby making him statutory tenant and not making respondents as heirs of those tenancy rights and what the petitioners want is merely to specify as to what tenancy premises were. ( 9 ) THERE is no question of adding any new cause of action, or setting up a new case by the petitioners by way of proposed amendment. Cause of action on which petitioners rely is that tenancy of Chhote Lal was terminated, that he died as statutory tenant and that therefore, his rights cannot be inherited by the respondents. Once that cause of action is established petitioners, become entitled to recover possession of the entire premises comprised in the tenancy of Chhote Lal. What the petitioners now want is proper defining of those tenancy premises. It is very important to note that it is admitted by the respondents themselves that the room and terrace on the third floor were comprised in tenancy of Chhote Lal. Hence proposed amendment is in line with already existing plaint of the petitioners. ( 10 ) SUPREME Court in Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484 went a step further and held that even defective pleadings may be permitted to be cured so as to constitute a cause of action where there is none. Following was laid down in this respect:- "even very defective pleadings may be permitted to be cured, so as to constitute a cause of action where there was none, provided necessary conditions, such as payment of either any additional court fees, which may be payable, or, of costs of the other side are complied with. It is only if lapse of time has barred the remedy on a newly constituted cause of action that the courts should, ordinarily, refuse prayers for amendment of pleadings. " 10a. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon a judgment of Delhi High Court in Batoo Mal v. Rameshwar Nath, AIR 1971 Delhi 98 in which following law was laid down:- "normally, it is in the discretion of the tribunal to which the application for amendment is made to allow or reject the same. High Court will not interfere with the discretion unless it was exercised illegally or inequitably. " The learned counsel urged that normally discretion exercised by the Sub Judge should not be interfered with and therefore, present revision petition be rejected. But it is apparent from what I have discussed above that the exercise of discretion by the learned Sub Judge was illegal because it was against the law laid down by the Supreme Court. " The learned counsel urged that normally discretion exercised by the Sub Judge should not be interfered with and therefore, present revision petition be rejected. But it is apparent from what I have discussed above that the exercise of discretion by the learned Sub Judge was illegal because it was against the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Under these circumstances the order passed by the learned Sub Judge cannot be allowed to stand, even in accordance with what was laid down by this court in the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. ( 11 ) I, therefore, accept the revision petition. The amendment sought by the petitioners is allowed subject to payment of Rs. 200. 00 as costs. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 25th February 1981 on which date costs will be paid and also amended plaint will be filed. In case amended plaint is not filed on that date trial court will be at liberty to give further time for the said purpose. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 25th February, 1981. File of the lower court be sent immediately along with copy of the detailed order. Revision allowed.