JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, Member. - In this revision, the petitioners want to get the order dated 22-3-1974 passed by the Collector, Unnao, set aside. 2. The fact of the case is that certain leases were executed in favour of the petitioners on 16-7-1970 and were got registered on 8-10-1970. These leases were executed with the prior permission of the S.D.O concerned and the names of the lease were also mutated. On 9-1-1972. Kali Din gave an a application for cancellation of the leases and on 21-1-1972 on the S.D.O. submitted a report. This report was pending in the office of the Collector Unnao decided to take sue moto action. On 22-3-1974, the revisionist filed an objection against the Collector's order alleging that the proceeding was time barred, but no the same day the learned Collector. Shri Nripendra Misra rejected the objection of the petitions. 3. The petitioners filed a revision in the court of the Commissioner and the revision was decided by Sri G.S. Seth, learned Additional Commissioner, who on 17-8-1974, made a reference to this court for dismissing the revision petitioner. 4. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in 1974 the Collector had no power to take suo moto action and that this power vested in the S.D.O. concerned. He has also argued that suo moto action could be taken at that time only within six months of the date of the lease. Both these contentions are incorrect. By section 14 of Act IV of 1969 in sub-section (2) of section 198 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act the word "Collector" was substituted in place of the Assistant Collector Incharge of the Sub-Division' and so the Collector had power to take suo moto action since 1969. Appendix III of the U.P.Z.A and L.R. Rules mentions at serial no. 24 that suo moto action for setting aside an order of the Gaon Sabha about allotment of land will be taken within a period of 3 years and the time from which this period will begin to run starts at the time when the Collector first knew of the irregular allotment of the land. So, both the contention of the learned counsel for the applicants are without substance and are hereby rejected. So, both the contention of the learned counsel for the applicants are without substance and are hereby rejected. The Collector on U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act to take suo moto action and the period of limitation at that time was three years and that period was to begin from the date of knowledge of the irregular allotment. 5. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no reason was communicated to the petitioners for taking suo moto action. In support of this contention, he has cited A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1045, in which an interpretation of section 30 of Mines and Minerals (Regulation of Development) Act (1957) was involved and in that context it was held that "where the appellant had not been informed at any stage that Central Government proposed to exercise its suo moto power and was not asked to show cause against exercise of such power, the failure of the Central Government to do so vitiated the order". This ruling does not apply because this case is not one under Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, and also because in that case the Central Government purported to act under Rules 54 and 54 of Minerals concession Rules, 1960 and had never showed any intention to take suo moto action against the appellant in that case, and also because in that case the appellant had not been asked to show cause against exercise of that power at any stage, but in the present case the revisionists fully knew that the Collector was going to take suo moto action for cancellation of the patta and he had preferred and objection before the Collector. The learned counsel relied on 1972 R.D. page 43, H.C., in which Shri N.B. Misra, Judge, relying on the ruling A.I.R. 1971 H.C. 1045, supra, held that under section 48 of the U.P.C.H. Act giving of notice to the petitioners before exercising suo moto power was necessary. In that case, the Deputy Director of Consolidation had not given any reason as to why he felt necessary to exercise suo moto powers. In that context, it was held that giving of notice before exercising suo moto power was necessary. 6. In that case, the Deputy Director of Consolidation had not given any reason as to why he felt necessary to exercise suo moto powers. In that context, it was held that giving of notice before exercising suo moto power was necessary. 6. Section 198 U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, does not lay down anywhere that before exercising suo moto power under sub-section 2(4) the Collector is required to given any prior notice to the person going to be affected Rule 178-A, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules, lays down that "where settlement of land made by the land Management Committee, as approved by the Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division is challenged under sub-section (4) of section 198 by any person aggrieved or where the Collector intends to take suo moto action, the Collector may pass suitable interim orders by way of stay of proceedings or otherwise". Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 178-A, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules, lays down that where the Collector alone an enquiry under sub-section (4) of section 198, the Land Management Committee and the allottee of land shall be made parties and given an opportunity of being heard before final orders are passed". This Rule prescribes the procedure to be adopted by the Collector when he takes suo moto action for cancellation of the lease and initiates proceeding. It is nowhere required that before taking action, he shall state reasons for taking suo moto action or proceeding and shall serve a notice on the allottee, showing the reasons which had compelled him to take suo moto action against the allotment. It sometime become very baffling when an observation of the Supreme Court given in the context of other Acts is taken out and thrust upon a court, which is going to interpret another Act. The Supreme Court in the ruling referred to above was interpreting Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (1957) and it was dealing with an order of the Central Government which acted under rules 54 and 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The Central Government in that case had acted in the exercise of its suo moto powers, but at the time of argument it was passed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that such power vested in the Central Government was not tenable under Rules 54 and 55 of the Minerals Concession Rules. The Central Government in that case had acted in the exercise of its suo moto powers, but at the time of argument it was passed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that such power vested in the Central Government was not tenable under Rules 54 and 55 of the Minerals Concession Rules. it was tenable in view of the fat that the Central Government had the existing power to act suo moto. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed". We agree that if the exercise of a power can be traced to an existing power even though that power was not purported to have been exercised, under certain circumstances, the exercise of the power can be upheld on the strength of an undisclosed, but undoubted power. But in this case the difficulty is that at no stage the Central Government intimated to the appellant that it was exercising its suo moto power. At all stages, it purported to act under Rules 54 and 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. If the Central Government wanted to exercise its suo moto power it should have intimated that fact as well as the grounds on which it proposed to exercise that power to the appellant and given him an opportunity to show cause against the exercise of suo moto power as well as against the grounds on which it wanted to exercise its powers". In that background the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Central Government which had not given any intimation to the appellant that it was going to act in the exercise of its suo moto power and had not mentioned the grounds on which it was so going to exercise its power, it could not be allowed to exercise that undisclosed but undoubted suo moto power. In that case, an authority can had ostensibly acted under certain other provision, which water later on found as not tenable, and it was thereafter urged before the highest court of India that because that authority had also inherent power to act suo moto it should be taken that though it purported to act under other provision of law, it really acted in the exercise of its suo moto power. That plea was negative by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the grounds mentioned above. That plea was negative by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the grounds mentioned above. One of the main grounds for rejecting that plea was that the Central Government had never shown any intention to exercise suo moto power and more importantly it had never given any opportunity to the appellant of that case to show that suo moto action could not be taken against him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court never said that in any case where a person acts under suo moto power it has necessarily to set out the reasons for doing so and must serve a notice of that reason on persons against whom that power is going to be exercised. That observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was lifted and place in the decision of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, 1972 R.D. 43, Supra. The case in the Hon'ble High Court, was under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and as the full facts are not before me, it is not possible to determine as to whether the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court intended to hold that in all cases arising out of any Act prior mention of the reasoning for taking suo moto action was necessary. 7. The ruling do not apply. At this stage, it would be pertinent to observe what Earl Halsbury L.C. in Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) A.C 495 said: "Now before discussing the case of Allah v. Flood, (1889) A.C. 1. and what was decided therein there are two observations of a general character, which I wish to make and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what is actually decided. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. The other is that a case is only an authority for what is actually decided. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Allahabad High Court in the rulings, referred to above, were made in context of other Acts and, therefore, they will not be applicable to this case which is governed by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, which prescribes a full and complete procedure for trial of cases." As I have observed, Rule 178 A of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules prescribes a complete procedure and lays down that when the Collector takes suo moto action he will implead the Land Management Committee and allottee and give them an opportunity of being heard before final orders are passed. In the present case, when the Collector took suo moto powers, he passed an order on 19-1-1974 of follows:- "I have gone through the report of the S.D.O. Purwa dated 21-1-1972 and on being satisfied I hereby order suo moto action under section 198 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act against Yasodanandan and others of Kalu Khera pergana Maurawan." After notice was sent to the parties, on 22-3-1974 the revisionist, Yasodanandan and others, filed an objection before the Collector. Even before that on 3-6-1982 the revisionists had filed an objection in the its had filed an objection in the court of the Collector against the report of the S.D.O., who had recommended that the patta in favour of the revisionists be cancelled. The revisionist had full knowledge of the facts of the case and about the report of the S.D.O. on which the Collector had decided to take suo moto action against them. The grounds on which the pattas were recommended to be cancelled were known to the revisionist and they had filed an objection against the recommendation of the S.D.O. They were also given notice of the fact that on the recommendation of the S.D.O. the Collector was going to take suo moto action for cancellation of the pattas. As the revisionists knew that the Collector was going to take suo moto action on the recommendation of the S.D.O., they were in full know of the grounds on which the Collector purported to act suo moto. As the revisionists knew that the Collector was going to take suo moto action on the recommendation of the S.D.O., they were in full know of the grounds on which the Collector purported to act suo moto. According to Rule 178-A (2) of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Rules, the allottees (revisionist) where made parties to the proceedings and enquiry was to be held in their presence, and they will have ample opportunity of being heard and contesting the case on points of fact also on points of law. 8. I hold that before taking suo moto action under section 198 (4), U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act the Collector is not required to mention the grounds on which he proposes to exercise that power, It follows that no notice is required to be given to the allottee mentioning the grounds in which the Collector intends to take suo moto action. I hold further that in this case the grounds on which the Collector decided to take suo moto action were existent and were known to the lessee. The proceedings has not yet started and it is obvious that according to Rule 178-A (2) of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules the allottee (Revisionists) will be given opportunity to contest the case. 9. It was argued before me that on 9-1-1972 the O.P. Kali Din had given an application for cancellation of the lease and, therefore, on that date the S.D.O. had knowledge about the alleged irregular allotment of the patta and therefore the period of limitation will being to run from 9-1-1972. He has further argued that though the Collector was in the know of these facts, it would be deemed that he had also notice of the irregular pattas and the learned counsel has relied on 1979 R.D. 142, H.C. in which Mr. Justice U.C. Srivastava held that "Even if one department of the State was a party to the proceedings it meant that the State itself was a party and not that one of its departments alone would be treated to be a party and not the State". This ruling was given in the context of Forest Act. Justice U.C. Srivastava held that "Even if one department of the State was a party to the proceedings it meant that the State itself was a party and not that one of its departments alone would be treated to be a party and not the State". This ruling was given in the context of Forest Act. It is not necessary to deal with it because in any case as far as this revision is concerned the initiation of proceedings under Section 198(4) by the Collector in the exercise of his suo moto power as within time because it has been started within three years of 9-1-1972, the date on which Kali Din had given his application for cancellation of the lease, 10. There is no force in this revision petition and hence it is dismissed with costs and counsel's fees.