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1981 DIGILAW 341 (BOM)

Punja Chindhu and another v. State of Maharashtra and others

1981-12-23

M.S.JAMDAR

body1981
JUDGMENT - Jamdar M.S. J.-This is a strange case in which the tenants of an agri-cultural land seek to quash the order passed in their favour by the Agricul-tural Lands Tribunal in a suo motu proceedings under section 46 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Vidarbha Tenancy Act). 2. By the impugned order, which is dated 31–7-1971, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Bhandara held that the petitioners were found to be in law- ful possession of the land on tiller's day i.e. 1–4-1961 and hence the land stood transferred and vested in them by virtue of section 46 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act and proceeded to determine the statutory purchase price as contemplated by section 47 of the above referred enactment. It appears that as the petitioners failed to deposit the purchase price, even though called upon to do so, recovery proceedings contemplated by section 49 read with section 43 (9) have been commenced against the petitioners for recovering the purchase price. The petitioners seek to quash these proceedings also. 3. The land, in respect of which statutory ownership is conferred on the petitioners, belong to Rameshwar Deosthan of Jamb. Admittedly pre- sently the land is in possession of the Deosthan and it is the case of the peti- tioners that they were never tenants of the land in question, thatthey never appeared before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal; that they were not entitled to the ownership of the land in question and hence the order passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal fixing the purchase price is wrong and illegal. The record of the case, which I have perused, shows that in pursuance to the notices issued to the petitioners, petitioner No. 2 Gunjya who appeared before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, stated that he and his brother Punjya had cultivated the land in question and that they were dispossessed without any order from the Tahsildar and offered to purchase the land. It is, there- fore, difficult to question the impugned order on the ground that petitioners never claimed to be the tenants of the land. The record shows that the petitioners were tenants of the land on 1–4-1961 and that it is nobody's case that they were dispossessed in pursuance to a valid surrender or in execution of any valid order passed by the Tahsildar. The record shows that the petitioners were tenants of the land on 1–4-1961 and that it is nobody's case that they were dispossessed in pursuance to a valid surrender or in execution of any valid order passed by the Tahsildar. The Additional Tahsildar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, therefore, was justified in passing the impugned order and also in taking steps for recovery of the purchase price. It is true that if the purchase price cannot be recovered in the manner stated in section 43 (9), the purchase of the land would be ineffective and the peti-tioners will be deemed to have surrendered the land in favour of respondent No. 3 by virtue of section 43 (14-A) of the VidarBha Tenancy Act. But that does not mean that the recovery proceedings are incompetent. The position is not changed simply because the petitioners now chose to say that they were not the tenants of the land and that they do not want to purchase it. 4. Shri N. S. Kherdekar, the learned Advocate for the petitioners, however, challenged the jurisdiction of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to pass the impugned order on another ground, which goes to the root of the matter. It appears that the impugned order was passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal on 31–7-1971 after re-opening by an order dated 13–4-1971, the proceedings, which were already dropped. The record shows that the suo motu proceedings were commenced in the year 1964–65 and were dropped on 21–8-1967 by an order which was based on the report of the patwari that the petitioners were not in possession of the land in the year 1964–65, that they were not the tenants and hence there was no question of fixing the purchase price. The proceedings were re-opened on 13–4-1971 as per Govern- ment instructions and on the ground that the petitioners were in possession of the land on the tiller's day and that no proper enquiry was made in the case. It is rightly urged by Shri Kherdekar that there is no provision in the Vidarbha Tenancy Act which empowers the State Government to revive either generally or particularly any judicial orders passed by the authorities* who are competent to pass such orders under the provisions of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. It is rightly urged by Shri Kherdekar that there is no provision in the Vidarbha Tenancy Act which empowers the State Government to revive either generally or particularly any judicial orders passed by the authorities* who are competent to pass such orders under the provisions of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. It is true that section 126 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act lays down that in all matters connected with this Act, the State Government and the Commissioner shall have the same authority and control over the Tahsil-dars and the Collectors acting under this Act as they have and exercise over them in the general and revenue administration. This administrative control would not empower the State Government to issue direction to the Tahsildar or the Collector to revise a judicial order passed by him. As held by the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Chagla C. J. and Gajendragadkar J. in C. A. No. 274/1951 decided on 6–12–1951 in which the scope of analogous provision contained in section 86 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was considered, the provision deals with the administrative control of the State Government over Tahsildars and Collectors but the State Government cannot control their decisions given under the provisions of the Act. 5. By the Vidarbha Tenancy Act, powers of revision are conferred on only two authorities. Section 110 confers revisional powers on the Collector, while section 111 deals with the revisional powers of the Revenue Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of section 110 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act lays down that where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it, the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the Commissioner or the State Government at any time,- (a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Tahsildar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of, such Tahsildar or Tribunal as the case may be, and (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit: Proviso to sub- section (1) however, puts limitation on exercise of this power. It lays down that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of such Tahsildar or Tribunal shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard. There is nothing on record to show that the order directing that the proceedings should be dropped was revised by the Collector. The proceedings were resurrected by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal itself and that too after the expiry of the statutory period mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 110 on the strength of some general instructions issued by the Govt. in exercise of the administrative control contemplated by section 126 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act. It is clear to me that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal acted without jurisdiction in revising the earlier order dropping the proceedings. The impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside. Consequently the petition is allowed. Rule made absolute and the order in question is quashed. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. ----