K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the memo No. EST. 37. CEE. 78-79 dated 9. 2. 80 (Annexure-A) of the Registrar of Co-operative societies in Karnataka, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Registrar) framing articles of charges and the further order. EST 37 CEE 78-79 dated 11. 11. 80 (Annexure-C) made bv him. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is working as an assistant Registar of Co-operative societies in the Co-operative Department of the government of Karnataka, which is a Class-II post. All appointments to Class-II posts in the state arc made by Govt. The Registrar is the head of the department of the Co-operative Societies in the state. ( 3 ) EVIDENTLY after holding a preliminary enquiry, the Registrar has initiated regular disciplinary proceedings under Rule 11 of the karnataka Civil Services (Classification control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and in his memo dated 9. 2. 80 (An-nexure-A) has framed certain articles of charge against the petitioner. By his order dated 11. 11. 80 the Registrar has appointed the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, OOD K and v. I. Board Bangalore as the Enquiry officer to enquire into the charges framed by him on 9-2-80. In pursuance of the authority conferred on him, the Deputy Registrar by his notice No. DRCS 1545/80-81 dated 9/10-12-1980 (Annexure-D) fixed the date of hearing to hold the enquiry on 22. 12. 80. Before the Deputy registrar could commence the enquiry the petitioner approached this Court challenging the initiation of the disciplinary prooceedings and the order appointing him as the enquiry officer, on 22. 12. 80 this Court issued rule nisi and stayed the proceedings before the Deputy Registrar, with the result, the enquiry has not proceeded and completed. ( 4 ) SRI Subramanya Jois's learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the appointing authority of the petitioner being Government, it is only that authority that can initiate disciplinary proceedings against his client, at any rate, for imposition of major penalties and not the Registrar. In support of his contention Sri Jois strongly relied on a Division Bench ruling of this Court in G. N. Nanjundrah v I. G. of Police (1 ). In support of his contention Sri Jois strongly relied on a Division Bench ruling of this Court in G. N. Nanjundrah v I. G. of Police (1 ). ( 5 ) RULE 9 of the Rules enumerates the various disciplinary authorities that can initiate disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant in the state. Rule 9 (2) (ii) (bb) empowers the heads of departments to impose penalties specified in clauses (ii) (iii) and (iiia) of Rule 8 against an officer holding a class-II post. Sri Jois does not dispute that the Registrar is the head of the Department. As the head of the Department, the Registrar is empowered to inflict at least three penalties against the petitioner. As an authority empowered to inflict at least three penalities specified in clauses (ii) (iii) and (iiia) of Rule 8, it is undoubtedly open to the Registrar to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. On the very language of Rule 9 of the Rules, it was open to the Registrar to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, though he is holding a class-II post, the appointing authority of which is the state Government. On the aforesaid construction of Rule 9, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the rgistrar cannot be said to be unauthorised. ( 6 ) RULE 10-A of the Rules puts the matter beyond any controversy. Rule 10-A in unambiguous terms authorises every one of the disciplinary authorities enumerated in R. 9 to initiate disciplinary proceedings. So far as initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the nature of penalties that can be imposed and the authorities that can impose the penalties, have no relevance. ( 7 ) IN his order initiating disciplinary proceedings, the Registrar has proposed to hold an enquiry in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules which is the procedure contemplated for imposition of major penalties. Any reference to Rule 11 of the Rules in his memo does not impinge on the power conferred on the Registrar to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Any reference to Rule 11 of the Rules in his memo does not impinge on the power conferred on the Registrar to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. ( 8 ) IN examining a similar position arising under the Karnataka State police (Disciplinary Proceedings) rules, 1965, the language of which is somewhat analogous to the Rules, a divisional Bench of this Court in r. B. Tallurmath v. the State of Mysore' (2) has found that it is undoubtedly open to any one of the authorised disciplinary authorities to initiate disciplinary proceedings though the authority that initiates the disciplinary proceeding may itself be not competent to impose the penally that may ultimately be imposed under the Rules. In my view, the principle enunciated in Tallurmath's case applies on all fours to the question that arises for determination in this case. On the other hand the principle enunciated in Nanjundiah's case (1) having regard to the Rules as they then stood, but which have been substantialy amended, does not bear on the point. For all these reasons, I see no merit in this contention of Sri Jois and I reject the same. ( 9 ) SRI Jois next contends that the registrar should have applied his mind to the written statement filed bv the petitioner and then only should have decided to hold an enquiry and not otherwise. Elaborating his contention Sri Jois urged that that position flows from the language of R. 11 (5) of the Rules. ( 10 ) I find it difficult to uphold this contention of Sri Jois. Sub-rule (5) of rule 11 does not require the authority to apply his mind to the, written statement and then only order an enquiry. Sub-rule (5) only provides for an enquiry to be held where the deliquent official does not admit the charge. But, that is not the same thing as saying that there is a legal obligation on the disciplinary authority to apply his mind to the written statement filed by the delinquent official, examine the merits of the same and then only order an enquiry. For these reasons, I see no merit in this contention of Sri Jois and I reject the same. For these reasons, I see no merit in this contention of Sri Jois and I reject the same. ( 11 ) SRI Jois contends that some of the charges framed against the petitioner really touch on the powers exercised by his client by law and the same cannot be the subject matter of an enquiry and that R. 4 of the Rules prohibits the same. ( 12 ) RULE 4 of the Rules protects the rights and privileges that are available to a civil servant under any other law. Rule 4 does not prohibit the disciplinary authority from framing charges even in respect of the powers exercisable by a civil servant under any law, or the law he is administering in the department. In this view, I see no merit in this contention of Sri Jois and I reject the same. ( 13 ) SRI Jois lastly contends that some of the acts referred to in the articles of charge do not constitute misconduct within the meaning of that term occurring in the Karnataka civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966. ( 14 ) ON the basis of the articles of charge it is not possible for me to examine and decide this contention of the petitioner, at any rate, at this stage. In any event, it is open to the petitioner to urge this contention before the enquiry officer, disciplinary and the appellate authorities that are constituted under the Rules. I, therefore, leave open this question. ( 15 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I hold that this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. I, therefore, dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule issued in this case. But, in the circumstances of the case, i direct the parties to bear their own costs. ( 16 ) SRI S. V. Narasimhan, learned high Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance for the respondents within 15 days from this day. --- *** --- .