Judgment Satish Chandra, C.J. 1. THE petitioner is the landlord of an accommodation of which respondents 2 to 5 were the tenants. THE petitioner landlord applied for and obtained permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the tenants. This order was confirmed by the Commissioner in revision on 24th September, 1971. THE tenant went up to the State Government in revision but the same was dismissed on the 26th May, 1972. 2. IN 1972, the plaintiff-applicant filed a suit for eviction of the respondents. The suit was decreed on 8th of April, 1976. The defendent tenants filed a revision which was dismissed on 11th February, 1977. They came in revision to the High Court which allowed the revision and remanded the matter to the trial court by an order dated 29th of July, 1978. Thereafter in August, 1978 the petitioner landlord applied for an order of eviction of the tenants under clause (rr) of Section 43 (2) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act) (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This application was dismissed by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that since the suit for ejectment was pending in the regular Civil Court an application under clause (rr) of Section 43 (2) was not maintainable. Aggrieved, the landlord has come to this Court and filed the present writ petition. 3. AT this stage sole question of law is whether an application under clause (rr) of Section 43 (2) of the Act is maintainable even though a suit filed on the basis of the permission under section 3 of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 may be pending disposal in the Civil Court. 3. AT this stage sole question of law is whether an application under clause (rr) of Section 43 (2) of the Act is maintainable even though a suit filed on the basis of the permission under section 3 of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 may be pending disposal in the Civil Court. Clause (rr) reads as follows :- "(rr) where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 21, and has become final either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section, after the commencement of this Act, whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted, the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under Section 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, and it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under section 22." 4. CLAUSE (rr) was not there in the Act as originally enacted by the Legislature. It was introduced by the Amending Act No. 37 of 1972, where the material phrase was "and a suit for the eviction of the tenant has not been instituted." This was a condition precedent to the maintainability of the application under clause (rr). By the Amending Act No. 28 of 1976 the phrase "and a suit for the eviction of the tenant has not been instituted" was repealed and substituted by the phrase "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted. 5. THIS repeal and re-enactment was retrospective since the very beginning of the coming into force of clause (rr). Thus, for all practical purposes the relevant phrase was "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted." After the Amending Act of 1976, it cannot, hence be said that an application under clause (rr) would not be maintainable in case a regular suit for the eviction of the tenant had been instituted. Thus, for all practical purposes the relevant phrase was "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted." After the Amending Act of 1976, it cannot, hence be said that an application under clause (rr) would not be maintainable in case a regular suit for the eviction of the tenant had been instituted. In the present case the Prescribed Authority has expressed the opinion that an application under clause (rr) will not be maintainable until the suit filed in the Civil Court is disposed of. In other words, the pendency of a suit for eviction in the Civil Court has been held to be a bar to the maintainability of an application under clause (rr). The intention of the Legislature, while enacting clause (rr) as it stood prior to its substitution by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 was that an application under clause (rr) will not be maintainable if a suit for the eviction of the tenant had been instituted. It was the institution of the suit which was the material thing. Its pendency or disposal may also be material or relevant. By the Amending Act of 1976 the condition was repealed. Now, an application under clause (rr) would be maintainable whether or not a suit has been instituted. If the institution of the suit is irrelevant for the maintainability of the application under clause (rr), it does not stand to reason that pendency of the suit for eviction would have any effect. The legislative intent in this respect is clear. It has taken a clear departure from the original inention. Now, the intention seems clear that the institution of a civil suit for the eviction of the tenant is immaterial and inspire of a civil suit having been instituted an application under clause (rr) will be maintainable. The Legislature has now provided an alternative relief or remedy to a landlord who has obtained permission under section 3 of the Old Act. It is well known that a suit takes a long time and a decree that may be passed would be subject to appeal and second appeal. The Legislature wanted to short-circuit the delay which is caused in the disposal of suits. We are hence satisfied that the pendency of the civil suit was no bar to the maintainablity of the application. The Legislature wanted to short-circuit the delay which is caused in the disposal of suits. We are hence satisfied that the pendency of the civil suit was no bar to the maintainablity of the application. The Prescribed Authority was, in law not justified in holding that the pendency of the suit in regular Civil Court would operate as bar to the maintainability of the application under section 43 (2) (rr) of the Act. 6. THE Prescribed Authority has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the application or on the question whether other considerations and conditions mentioned ' in clause (rr) stand satisfied. It is hence necessary to remand the case back to the Prescribed Authority. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 7th April, 1979 is set aside and the matter is sent back to the Prescribed Authority concerned for determination of the application in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the parties may bear their own costs. Petition allowed.