M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition the petitioner has challenged the Constitutional validity of regulation (1) of the revised Regulations for short term course in Modern Medicine (Emergency Medicine) of the Bangalore university. He has also challenged the constitutional validity of the R. 2 of the rules framed by the Government of Karnataka by its order No. HMA 443 PIM 76 dated 30th June, 1977 (Annexure-E to the petition ). The latter mentioned rules are executive in character. The Rules merely provide for mode of selection for the course which is regulated by the University in respect of which the degree is awarded by the University. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this petition may be briefly stated as follows : the petitioner is a graduate possessing the Bachelor of Ayurveda Medicine and surgery degree of the Andhra University. It is asserted by him that the Bachelor of ayurveda Medicine and Surgery degree obtained by him is equivalent to BSAM degree conferred by the University of bangalore for a corresponding course. He supports this assertion by stating the fact that he secured admission to the Post-Graduate course in Ayurveda Medicine of the University of Bangalore and has passed the same. For the academic year 1981-82, the petitioner applied to the short term course in Modern Medicine provided for the graduates of the Universities in Karnataka by the Regulations of the University, Reg. (1) of which is challenged in this writ petition. He was not even called for interview by the Selection committee constituted under the Rules. But, he learnt on enquiry that he was not called for interview nor selected for the short term course in Modern Medicine at the Government Ayurvedic Medical college at Bangalore solely on the ground that he does not fulfil the eligibility requirements under the relevant Regulation as well as the Rule. Aggrieved by the. same, he has approached this Court under art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the Constitutional validity of the said Regulation and Rule as violative of arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution ( 3 ) THE impugned regulation (1) reads as follows :"1. Aggrieved by the. same, he has approached this Court under art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the Constitutional validity of the said Regulation and Rule as violative of arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution ( 3 ) THE impugned regulation (1) reads as follows :"1. Eligibility for Admission to the course : No student shall be admitted to the BAMS Course unless he has passed BSAM Degree Course of Bangalore and Karnataka Universties and university of Mysore and has completed the compulsory internship prescribed for the course". R. 2 of the Rule made by the executive order is as follows:-"2. Eligibility :-No person who does not possess the BSAM Degree awarded by any of the Universities in the State shall be eligible for admission". ( 4 ) IT is convenient to state that sub-rule (2) of R. 1 of the Rule indicates that the Short term Modern Medicine Course leads to BAMS Degree in the Government college of Indian Medicine, Bangalore. ( 5 ) SRI Visweshwara learned counsel appearing for the petitioner attacks the impugned regulation and the impugned rule on the short ground that the regulation and the rule are violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution. It is his argument that the petitioner though a domicile of Karnataka since the last five years and though he has a Ph. D. degree from the University of Bangalore in the same system of Medicine, namely, ayurveda and though he is a citizen of india, he has been discriminated solely on the ground that he does not possess BSAM degree awarded by one of the Universities in the State of Karnataka. The thrust of the argument is that the graduates of other universities than that of the State's Universities are made ineligible though they possess the requisite qualification to take a special course or training leading to another degree of the Bangalore University, i. e. , BAM6 in Modern Medicine. His further argument is that such total bar offends Art. 14 as well as Art. 15 of the constitution. ( 6 ) THE State (respondent 1), has entered appearence and filed its objections. His further argument is that such total bar offends Art. 14 as well as Art. 15 of the constitution. ( 6 ) THE State (respondent 1), has entered appearence and filed its objections. It is stated therein that in the State of Karnataka, the Medical Education in the subject of Ayurveda Medicine is being imparted to the candidates with a view to provide medical aid, especially to the people in rural areas of the State. The candidates after getting the necessary training in the subject referred to above would be given a degree in Ayurvedic Medicine (BSAM ). It is further stated that the object of the course above mentioned was to provide indigenous medical practitioners to the rural areas of the State where they would be of considerable assistance to the poor. But it was found by experience that such graduates could not meet many emergency situations in rural areas and therefore, after protracted negotiation with the government of India, it was decided to start a Course in Modern Medicine, for these graduates, in order to equip them to meet emergencies which otherwise they could not meet. Therefore, it is contended for the State that the impugned regulation or the rule should be read more as prescribing the eligibility of domicile for those who have studied in Karnataka and who are likely to settle down in Karnataka to serve her people and not as mere academic eligibility. According to respondents 1, 2 and 3 on whose behalf a common statement of objections is filed, the regulation impugned or the rule impugned does not suffer from the vice of discrimination as asserted by the petitioner. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Jagdish Satan v. Union of India (1 ). In that case decided under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioner was a medical graduate from the Madras University and his father was an officer under the Central Government transferred to Delhi. The petitioner therein desirous of taking of post graduate degree in Dermatology applied for admission to the University of Delhi which offered that course. He took common entrance test and secured enough marks to qualify for admission but was turned down because of the rule reserving 708 of tae seats, at post graduate level, to the graduates of the Delhi University. He took common entrance test and secured enough marks to qualify for admission but was turned down because of the rule reserving 708 of tae seats, at post graduate level, to the graduates of the Delhi University. The challenge, therefore, was to the reservation made on the basis of the University from which the applicants had passed out. Dealing with the contentions of the petitioner therein, the Supreme Court held, that the blanket ban which was the indirect result of a wholesale reservation was constitutional heresy. It further held that there should be substantial social justice as raison d'etre for a high percentage of alumni reservation. If quality of opportunity for every person in the country was the constitutional guarantee, a candidate, it further held, who got more marks than another was entitled to preference for admission. Merit must be the test when choosing the best, according to the rule of equal chance for equal marks. It also held that in advanced medicine and other critical departments of higher knowledge, crucial to material progress, the people of india should not be denied the best the nation's talent lying latent can produce. In that view, they came to the conclusion that the rationale of reservation must be in the case of medical students, removal of regional or class inadequacy or like disadvantage. The quantum of reservation, it held, should not be excessive or socially injurious measured by over all competency of the end product. ( 8 ) IN the ruling as above, ultimately the Supreme Court also observed that the court was disturbed by the tendency to wall off each University as an insulated island of education, mindless of the integrated unity and equal opportunity which are inalienable part of our constitutional value system. Though the petitioner did not succeed therein, the observations of the Supreme Court referred to above are useful to be noticed with the utmost respect. ( 9 ) LEARNED counsel has further relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Charles K. Skaria v. Dr C. Mathew (2) wherein again the Supreme court was concerned with the reservation of 2% only in favour of applicants from outside Kerala State in medicine and the remaining 98% was reserved for the graduates of the two Universities in Kerala itself for the post-graduate course in opthalmology. In that case it was held by Krishna Iyer, J. as he then was, speaking for the Bench, as follows :"the scheme of reservation of a paltry 2% for candidates in ,the whole country outside the two Universities of the State has not bee substantiated as a sufficient fulfilment of Arts. 14 and 15, fundamental rights of candidates do not depend on the grace of Governments and Indians are not ahens in their own motherland when asking for seats on the score of equal opportunity. A host of good reasons may weigh with the state in formulating preferences, reservation and other cases of choice, provided they do not outrage Arts. 14 and 15, or, indeed, as suggested by this court in the Thomas case (1976) 2 SCC 310 : AIR 1976 SC 490 ) may promote the process of equalisation as a dynamic phase of equality. What is paramount is equal opportunity for each". ( 10 ) FROM the above ruling, it is clear that fundamental rights of citizens are raised far above the needs of regional promotion however laudable that may be. In the instant case, it is not denied that the petitioner is an Indian citizen. It is not denied that a degree obtained by him from the Andhra University is equivalent to the corresponding degree of the Universities in the State of Karnataka. It is also not denied that his degree was recognised as of enough equivalence leading him to Ph. D. Course provided by the University of bangalore (Respt. 4 ). Therefore, it becomes difficult to understand the argument advanced by Sri V. C. Brahmarayappa, learned Government Advocate that the regulation which shuts out all others who have not obtained the BSAM degree from one of the Universities in Karnataka, cannot be held to be discriminatory in as much as it was meant for those who had studied in Karnataka and who are likely to set up their practice in the rural areas of Karnataka. He has derived support for this proposition from the decision of the Supreme Court rendered by a Constitution Bench in D. P. Joshi v. State of m. B. (3 ). He specially drew my attention to para 14 and para 15 of the judgment of the Supreme Court (per majority) as reported in the All India Reporter. He has derived support for this proposition from the decision of the Supreme Court rendered by a Constitution Bench in D. P. Joshi v. State of m. B. (3 ). He specially drew my attention to para 14 and para 15 of the judgment of the Supreme Court (per majority) as reported in the All India Reporter. The decision of the Supreme Court in Joshi's case was relied upon by a Division Bench of this Court in Arun Narayan v. State of karnataka (4 ). But in both the cases decided by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, the Courts were concerned with a specific rule on domicile that did not bar the citizens of India as long as they qualified in respect of domicile in the state. ( 11 ) IN Joshi's case the attack was on the preferential treatment given to a domicile of Madhya Bharath (Madhya Pradesh) in the matter of exemption from payment of Capitation fee if he joined the Medical college, while that exemption was denied to non domiciles of State of Madhya bharat as it then was. It was held in joshi's case that it was reasonable classification to apply the rule of domicile hoping that the domiciles settled down in the state to practise medicine and the State with enormous expenses provided medical education in the State and therefore, it had an obligation to provide that without insisting upon a capitation fee. Similarly, in Arun Narayan's case, the Division Bench of this Court was essentially concerned with a specific rule of domicile prescribing ten years stay in the State of Karnataka by any citizen of India for entitling him to apply for a seat in the Medical College. In other words, as long as aa Indian citizen satisfies the prescribed domicile qualification he was entitled to apply for a seat and compete with all those who are similarly placed on an equal footing. I, therefore, do not see much substance in the argument of the learned Government advocate that total shutting out of other indian citizens who do not have a particular degree conferred by the Universities of Karnataka would not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. I, therefore, do not see much substance in the argument of the learned Government advocate that total shutting out of other indian citizens who do not have a particular degree conferred by the Universities of Karnataka would not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 12 ) THE flaw in the argument of the learned Government Advocate is that a person not hailing from Karnataka but from another State of Indian Union can acquire the degree prescribed by the regulation in the State of Karnataka from one of its Universities and yet be eligible for admission under the impugned regulation, though he may have the least intention of settling down in the State of Karnataka ultimately. The result could be, an Indian citizen, irrespective of his State, in a given circumstance be eligible while others possessing identical qualifications are shut out by the method adopted by the impugned regulation and rule. ( 13 ) THE argument of the learned government Advocate that the rule should be read as well as the regulation as prescribing domicile is without force. The plain language of the rule or the regulation does not permit such a construction. If that was the intention of the University or the State nothing else would have been simpler than to frame yet another rule or regulation specifically regarding domicile to achieve the laudable objects so ably projected in the return filed on behalf of the State. ( 14 ) THIS case, in my view, falls more clearly within the observations made by the Supreme Court in Churls K. Skaria's (2) case as well as Dr. Jagdish Saran's (1) case, to which I have already referred, than joshi's case. ( 15 ) THE attempt made by the learned government Advocate placing reliance upon the following observation of the supreme Court in Dr. Jagdish Saran's (1) case in my view is totally unjustified on the facts of this case. The observations relied upon are as follows :-"flowing from the same stream of equalism is another limitation. The basic medical needs of a region or the preferential push justified for a handicapped group cannot prevail in the same measure at the highest scales of speciality where the best skill or talent, must be handpicked by selecting according to capability. At the level of Ph. The basic medical needs of a region or the preferential push justified for a handicapped group cannot prevail in the same measure at the highest scales of speciality where the best skill or talent, must be handpicked by selecting according to capability. At the level of Ph. D. , M. D. , or levels of higher proficiency where international measure of talent is made, where losing one great scientist or technologist in-the-making is a national loss, the considerations we have expanded upon as important lose their potency. Here equality, measured by matching excellence, has more meaning and cannot be diluted much without grave risk". ( 16 ) THE language is very clear. In the light of what has been said earlier by their lordships, it is observed that there may be cases where sheer excellence and necessity may permit avoidance of reservation in the interest of nation. That does not mean that without resorting to reservation the State could make a regulation or rule which has the effect of shutting out equal opportunity to others who are equally qualified as in the instant case. Once it is recognised that the degree from the Andhra university is equivalent to the degree given by the Universities in the State of karnataka for other purposes, it cannot be said for the purpose of giving admission to the Course in Modern Medicine contemplated in the impugned regulation, it should be restricted only to those who obtained degrees from the Universities in the State of Karnataka. It is clearly impermissible and is in gross violation of art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 17 ) IN the result, the rule and the regulation are liable to be struck down and they are so struck down. The question is what other relief this Court can give at this stage. The course has commenced from June, 1981. Though an interim order was passed earlier to reserve a seat in favour of the petitioner for the Course, it is submitted by the learned Government advocate that the order was belated in as much as all the 100 seats had been filled up. In the circumstances, all that can be done by (his Court is to direct the respon. dents to reserve a seat for the petitioner for the academic year 1982 83, if he applied for the same and if the course is available. In the circumstances, all that can be done by (his Court is to direct the respon. dents to reserve a seat for the petitioner for the academic year 1982 83, if he applied for the same and if the course is available. ( 18 ) I must also place on record with regret that the University -though served and represented has been of no assistance in that the Counsel even did not address arguments and no statement of objections or return was filed. ( 19 ) IN these circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to costs. Advocate's fee is Rs. 250. ( 20 ) THE Government Advocate is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today if he has not already done so. --- *** --- .