SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. ( 1 ) IN this reference, under Section 256 (1) of the I. T. Act, 1961, the following questions have been referred to this court :"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the issue of disallowance under Section 40 (a) (v) was not the subject-matter of an order by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and hence the Commissioner of Income-tax had the jurisdiction under Section 263 on this issue ? ( 2 ) WHETHER, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that even if the second part of Section 40 (a) (v) was not mentioned by the Commissioner of Income-tax in the notice under Section 263 specifically, it was not precluded from considering the whole of the section ? ( 3 ) WHETHER, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the Commissioner of Income-tax was justified in setting aside the order of the Income-tax Officer on the issue of disallowance under Section 40 (a) (v) ?"2. In order to appreciate the questions, it would be necessary to refer to the order of the ITO for the relevant assessment year, being the assessment year 1970-71, which was passed on the 24th March, 1973. In that order, the ITO observed, on the question of depreciation, as follows : "4. In all the past assessments depreciation on bungalows are being allowed @ 21/2% only while the assessee has been claiming @ WDV for bungalow for the assessment year -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rs. Year 1969-70 1,93,89,649 Less : Rs. Dep. allowed @ 2% 4,78,955 W. D. V. for 1970-71 1,89,10,694 Dep. admissible @ 2% on above 4,72,766 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------Amount claimed @ 5% as per details furnished in statement under Section 40 (a) (v) is Rs. 7,88,109 ; balance inadmissible is Rs. 3,15,343. "3. As appearing from the order of the ITO, the assessee had claimed depreciation on the bungalows at 5 per cent. but was allowed depreciation at 21/2 per cent. But the ITO had noticed that the amount claimed was 5 per cent. as per details. Therefore, the amount inadmissible under Section 40 (a) (v) would be Rs. 3,15,343 calculating on the basis of depreciation allowed at 5 per cent. ( 4 ) THERE was an appeal before the AAC. but was allowed depreciation at 21/2 per cent. But the ITO had noticed that the amount claimed was 5 per cent. as per details. Therefore, the amount inadmissible under Section 40 (a) (v) would be Rs. 3,15,343 calculating on the basis of depreciation allowed at 5 per cent. ( 4 ) THERE was an appeal before the AAC. In the appeal before the AAC, the contention was that the allowance of depreciation on bungalows at 21/2 per cent. as against 5 per cent. claimed by the assessee was not proper. The AAC noted the contentions urged on behalf of the assessee and it was observed that the same point had been urged for the assessment year 1964-65, when it was held that the buildings in question were second class buildings and depreciation was to be allowed at 5 per cent. He further noted that the representative of the assessee had contended before the ITO that the ITO had not given the correct details of the written down value in the assessment order and it was not known how the disallowance of Rs. 3,15,343 had been arrived at by the ITO. Therefore, in those circumstances it was contended that the ITO should be directed to work out the correct written down value of those buildings in the light of the previous appellate order and allow depreciation at 5 per cent. on such written down value. Dealing with these contentions and submissions, the AAC observed, inter alia, as follows :"7. The next contention relates to an alternative ground, ground No. 6, where the rate of depreciation is disputed. Here it is contended that the Income-tax Officer was not justified in disallowing Rs. 9,74,788 by taking the allowance of the depreciation at 5% as claimed by the appellant. It is contended that the Income-tax Officer has allowed depreciation @ 21/2% only and the same rates should be taken for disallowance under Section 40 (a) (v) taking the depreciation in that manner. " ( 5 ) AFTER the appeal has been preferred before the AAC, which was disposed of on 3rd April, 1974, it appears, the Commissioner issued a notice dated 5th March, 1975, under Section 263 of the I. T. Act, 1961, in respect of the said assessment year. " ( 5 ) AFTER the appeal has been preferred before the AAC, which was disposed of on 3rd April, 1974, it appears, the Commissioner issued a notice dated 5th March, 1975, under Section 263 of the I. T. Act, 1961, in respect of the said assessment year. In the said notice, it was stated as follows :"the records of your case were called for and examined by me with reference to the proceedings for the assessment year 1970-71. It seems that the assessment for the year 1970-71 was completed under Section 143 (3) on 24th March, 1973. " ( 6 ) IN the said notice, in paras. 3 and 4, it was further stated :"3. In view of what has been stated in the preceding paragraph the order of Income-tax Officer under Section 143 (3) dated 24th March, 1973, appears to be erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. 4. I, therefore, propose to pass an order setting aside the Income-tax Officer's order dated 24th March, 1973, in so far as it relates to the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,44,540 and directing him to make a fresh assessment according to law. " ( 7 ) THE Commissioner thereafter fixed the date for hearing and asked the assessee to show cause. Thereafter the Commissioner, on the 18th March, 1975, passed the order wherein he noted the contentions of the assessee as well as the Revenue. It was contended before him on behalf of the assessee that the allowance and disallowance of depreciation as well as the quantum thereof were the subject-matters of appeal before the AAC. Before the AAC, however, this aspect was not stressed either by the assessee or on behalf of the Revenue, nor did the AAC give any direction in respect of this aspect. But this order of the ITO having been merged in the order of the AAC on the question of allowability of depreciation, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass any order of revision under Section 263 of the I. T. Act, 1961. But this order of the ITO having been merged in the order of the AAC on the question of allowability of depreciation, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass any order of revision under Section 263 of the I. T. Act, 1961. It was secondly contended that the notice given in this case was vague and misleading because Section 40 (a) (v) so far as material for our present purpose provides as follows :" (v) any expenditure which results directly or indirectly in the provision of any benefit or amenity or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, to an employee (including any sum paid by the assessee in respect of any obligation which but for such payment would have been payable by such employee) or any expenditure or allowance in respect of any assets of the assessee used by such employee either wholly or partly for his own purposes or benefit, to the extent such expenditure or allowance exceeds one-fifth of the amount of salary payable to the employee, or an amount calculated at the rate of one thousand rupees for each month or part thereof comprised in the period of his employment during the previous year, whichever is less. " ( 8 ) THEREFORE, it appears that there are two limbs, according to the assessee, upon which amounts could not be deducted, that is to say, it might be an expenditure which resulted, directly or indirectly, in the provision of any benefit or amenity or perquisite whether convertible into money or not to an employee or any expenditure or allowance in respect of any assets of the assessee used by the employee either wholly or partly for its own purpose or benefit, to the extent such expenditure or allowance exceeds one-fifth of the amount of salary payable to the employee, or an amount calculated at the rate of one thousand rupees for each month or part thereof comprised in the period of his employment during the previous year, whichever was less. ( 9 ) THESE are, according to the assessee, two different basis upon which certain amounts could not be permitted to be deducted. In the notice issued in this case, according to the assessee, only the first part was indicated, but the order that had been passed dealt with the second limb of Section 40 (a) (v) of the Act. ( 9 ) THESE are, according to the assessee, two different basis upon which certain amounts could not be permitted to be deducted. In the notice issued in this case, according to the assessee, only the first part was indicated, but the order that had been passed dealt with the second limb of Section 40 (a) (v) of the Act. In that view of the matter it was submitted that the notice was vague or was misleading and as such the assessee did not have any proper Opportunity and in the order the authority had no jurisdiction to go into that aspect. The Commissioner on the other hand rejected this contention. There was an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal was of the view on the first aspect, viz. , whether, after the AAC had passed the order, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to issue any notice under Section 263 of the Act. The Tribunal was of the view that this aspect, viz. , whether 11 months' depreciation or 12 months' depreciation should be allowed or not because of the fact that the employee was in occupation for one month was not the aspect of the appeal before the AAC. Therefore, according to the Tribunal, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to go into this question and the Tribunal found that the Commissioner had properly exercised his jurisdiction. On the second aspect of the matter, viz. , that the notice was vague and misleading, the Tribunal was of the view that inasmuch as the notice was given and action was intended to be taken for certain aspects of calculation under Section 40 (a) (v) on the second limb, a reference was made in the notice to the first limb of that clause, which did not make the notice imperfect or vague and the Commissioner had jurisdiction and the assessee had been given proper opportunity. In that view of the matter the Tribunal, upholding the order of the Commissioner, and also holding on the merits, proposed that this aspect required investigation by the ITO. The Tribunal referred to a decision of the Delhi High Court which we shall presently note. ( 10 ) UPON this the three questions as mentioned hereinbefore have been referred to this court. The Tribunal referred to a decision of the Delhi High Court which we shall presently note. ( 10 ) UPON this the three questions as mentioned hereinbefore have been referred to this court. The first question is directed to the aspect whether after the appellate order was passed by the AAC or an appeal had been preferred, the Commissioner had jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of this case under Section 263 of the Act. Now, it is well settled that before an appeal before the AAC certain orders are appealable. It is also well settled that in an appeal preferred before the AAC the whole assessment is open for review by the AAC. He is both the appellate as well as the adjudicating authority. But his jurisdiction is limited to the appeal preferred before him. There are certain orders which are not appealable before the AAC but certain types of allegations can be taken up in an appeal by separate appeals. Apart from those two cases if an assessment is the subject-matter of appeal then any ground which was held in favour of the assessee can also be held against him though the appeal was preferred by the assessee. This jurisdiction of the AAC is indisputable. In this case the question is whether the quantum of allowance or disallowance or depreciation was the subject-matter of appeal or not. It is true that whether depreciation should be calculated on the basis of 12 months or it should be calculated on the basis of 11 months was not a specific aspect which was agitated before the AAC nor did he give any direction on this aspect of the matter but he had this aspect kept open for adjudication by him even though not taken by the assessee. Then, on that, he could have allowed 5% or 21/2% depreciation and should have directed the ITO to compute the same on such basis as he considered fit and proper, namely, 11 months or 12 months on the view that the employee of the assessee was on leave for one month and as such could not be said to be entitled to this accommodation. If that is the position, then, in our opinion, once the appeal has been preferred before the AAC on any aspect of the quantum of depreciation, the Commissioner cannot assume jurisdiction, otherwise an anomalous position would arise. If that is the position, then, in our opinion, once the appeal has been preferred before the AAC on any aspect of the quantum of depreciation, the Commissioner cannot assume jurisdiction, otherwise an anomalous position would arise. The ITO has been directed by the AAC to fix depreciation at a certain percentage, indicated by the AAC, without any further direction that it should be confined to 11 months or 12 months. But, now, if further consideration is superimposed by the Commissioner by rectification made by the ITO as a result of the order passed by the Commissioner under Section 263 then that would be in conflict with the direction given by the AAC in his appellate order. Therefore, where an appeal is preferred and the subject-matter of appeal, particularly raised, is the subject-matter before the AAC, then that order, in our opinion, cannot be the subject-matter of an order of revision by the Commissioner. This principle, however, comes where the appeal does not lie from the order of the ITO and before the AAC where different kinds of appeal are provided for in the scheme of the I. T. Act. This principle was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. . This was also reiterated in the decision in the case of Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT and the decision in the case of Premchand Sitanath Roy v. Addl. CIT. The Allahabad High Court reiterated the same principle in the case of J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Addl. CIT. Therefore, it appears to us that as the quantum of depreciation was the subject-matter of appeal the Commissioner had no jurisdiction, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to issue the notice under Section 263 and to pass any order on this aspect of the matter. Question No. 1 therefore, in our opinion, must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. ( 11 ) THE second question deals with the vagueness of the notice. It is true that the second aspect of the matter is on the question whether the notice was proper in this case. It has to be borne in mind that Section 263 of the I. T. Act, 1961, or Section 33b of the previous Indian I. T. Act, 1922, it does not require that any specific notice is to be given. It has to be borne in mind that Section 263 of the I. T. Act, 1961, or Section 33b of the previous Indian I. T. Act, 1922, it does not require that any specific notice is to be given. All that is required is that reasonable opportunity should be given. In this case, it was emphasised on behalf of the assessee that the opportunity to be reasonable must be an effective and real opportunity. In this connection reliance was placed on the observation of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Electro House v. CIT [1968] 70 ITR 421 (Cal), where, at p. 425, the Division Bench referred to the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Khem Chand v. Union of India [1958] SCR 1080. In that case, the proposition was, an opportunity must be a reasonable one and the person concerned should be informed of the charge or charges levelled against him. This observation, however, was made in the context of disciplinary proceedings. The Division Bench held that whether it was a disciplinary proceeding or taxing proceeding the measure of opportunity should be the same. In this case, though this decision ;ultimately went to the Supreme Court (CIT v. Electro House ) and the Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Electro House v. CIT [1968] 70 ITR 421, on the ground that unlike Section 34, Section 33b did not require any notice to be issued by the Commissioner, the Division Bench held that a notice was the very foundation of assumption of jurisdiction. But the question whether reasonable opportunity was given or not depended on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for consideration of that aspect of the matter. Here the learned advocate for the assessee, however, contended that in this case if a general notice had been given invoking Section 40 (a) (v) then perhaps it could be said that on all aspects within that section the assessee should have been ready to answer. But, in this case, only the first limb was indicated. Here the learned advocate for the assessee, however, contended that in this case if a general notice had been given invoking Section 40 (a) (v) then perhaps it could be said that on all aspects within that section the assessee should have been ready to answer. But, in this case, only the first limb was indicated. Therefore, from one point of view the assessee contended that the notice was not only vague but it was also misleading when the Commissioner gave notice in respect of the first limb of Clause (a) (v) of Section 40 of the Act. Though we are inclined to think that there is a good deal of substance in the contention of the assessee, it appears to us, that in view of the fact that the assessee was heard and in view of the fact that the first aspect of the question, we have already held that the assumption of jurisdiction of the Commissioner in this proceeding was wrong, it is not necessary for us to answer this question. We, therefore, decline to answer this question. This will be of academic interest. If the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction then the order passed by the Commissioner is without jurisdiction and question No. 3 must, therefore, on this ground be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. ( 12 ) BEFORE we conclude we must note that the learned advocate for the defendant drew our attention to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Gee Vee Enterprises v. Addl. CIT , the decision upon which the Tribunal had also relied. He drew our attention to certain observations at pp. 384 onwards. These observations dealt with the question whether before taking action under Section 263, the Commissioner was required to make any enquiry or investigation as such, and come to a definite finding. We are not concerned with this aspect of the matter. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that this decision is not of much assistance on the question involved before us. ( 13 ) IN the premises, question No. I is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. We decline to answer question No. 2 in the view we have taken. Question No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The parties would pay and bear their own costs. ( 13 ) IN the premises, question No. I is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. We decline to answer question No. 2 in the view we have taken. Question No. 3 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The parties would pay and bear their own costs. C. K. Banerji, J. ( 14 ) I agree. (5) A licence granted to an owner of a husking mill before the coming into force of the Rice-Milling Industry (Regulation) (W. B. Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 (W. B. Ordn. XIV of 1974), shall lapse- (i) if the owner does not apply for a fresh licence within the time specified under Sub-section (1), (ii) on the issue of a fresh licence by the licensing officer under Sub-section (3), or (ill) if a fresh licence under the provisions of this section is not granted, (6) Matters which have not been provided for in this section, but which are provided elsewhere in this Act or in the rules framed thereunder shall mutatis mutandis apply to a licence granted under this section. Explanation.-- A "husking Mill" is a rice mill which undertakes rice-milling operation on customer's account only. "4. Section 6a was omitted from tha Rice-Milling Act with retrospective effect by the West Bengal Ordinance No. 15 of 1977 which was replaced by the Rice-Mining Industry (Regulation) (W. B. Amendment) Act, 1977, hereinafter referred to as the W. B. Amendment Act of 1977. Sections 3 and 4 of the W. B. Amendment Act of 1977 are as follows:--"3. Omission of Section 6a of Act 21 of 1958-- Section 6a of the said Act shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been omitted. 4. Savings-- Omission of Section 6a of the said Act by Section 3 shall not affect the validity of any act done or omitted to be done under the said Section 6a and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for any act done or omitted to be done under the said Section 6 A. "5. The appellant is the owner of a husking mill and he has been operating the same without any licence. The appellant is the owner of a husking mill and he has been operating the same without any licence. The contention of the appellant is that the provision of Section 6a introduced into the Rice-Milling Act by the W. B. Amendment Act of 1974 was repugnant to and inconsistent with the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rice-Milling Act and that, accordingly, after the introduction of S. 6a the said provisions of the Rice-Milling Act became void and did not revive after the omission of S, 6a by the W. B. Amendment Act of 1977. Alternatively, it is contended that Section 6a impliedly repealed the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 and the omission of Section 6a did not revive the said provisions. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that in view of the fact that Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rice-Milling Act stand abrogated or repealed, there is no law which prohibits a person from carrying on rice-milling operations in a husking mill. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to carry on rice-milling operations without any permit or licence as required under Sections 5 and 6 of the Rice-Milling Act, the said provisions not being in existence. 6. The first question we have to consider is, whether Section 6a is repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of Ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rice-Milling Act. Section 6a is a provision for grant of a licence for a husking mill which is a rice mill under the explanation to the section. Section 5 of the Rice-Milling Act, on the other hand, is the provision for grant of a permit for the establishment of a new rice mill or for recommencing rice-milling operation in a defunct rice mill. The scheme of the Rice-Milling Act is that no one can establish a new rice mill or recommence rice-milling operation in a defunct rice mill without a permit and after the establishment of a new rice mill a licence has to be obtained for rice milling operations. Section 6a relates only to the grant of licence for rice-milling operations. So there is no inconsistency between the provision of Section 5 and Section 6a, each dealing with a different matter, namely, Section 5 deals with grant of permits and Section 6a for the grant of licences for rice-milling operations. 7. Section 6a relates only to the grant of licence for rice-milling operations. So there is no inconsistency between the provision of Section 5 and Section 6a, each dealing with a different matter, namely, Section 5 deals with grant of permits and Section 6a for the grant of licences for rice-milling operations. 7. Section 6 (1) of the Rice-Milling Act provides for the grant of licence for rice-milling operations in an existing rice mill or a rice mill in respect of which a permit has been granted under Section 5. Section 6 (1) cannot, therefore, be said to be contrary to or inconsistent with Section 6a which also requires that a licence has to be obtained for rice-milling operation. Sub-sec, (2) of Section 6 requires that an application under Sub-section (1) shall be made in the prescribed form and shall contain certain particulars as may be prescribed. The application which has to be made under Sub-section (2) of Section 6a has also to be made in such form containing such particulars as may be specified by the State Government. The particulars which have been prescribed under Sub-section (2) of Section 6 and those specified by the State Government under Sub-section (2) of Section 6a are more or less the same. There is, therefore, no in consistency between Sub-section (2) of Section 6 and Sub-section (2) of Section 6a. 8. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 lays down the conditions of grant of licence. On the other hand, under Sub-section (3) of Section 6a, the conditions that are required to be fulfilled are completely different from the conditions that are laid down in Sub-section (3) of Section 6. In this connection, we may refer to Sub-section (6) of Section 6a which provides that matters which have not been provided for in Section 6a, but which are provided elsewhere in the Rice-Milling Act or in the rules framed thereunder shall mutatis mutandis apply to a licence granted under Section 6a. The combined effect of Sub-section (3) and Sub-section (6) of Section 6a is that in addition to the conditions required to be fulfilled under Sub-section (3) of Section 6, the conditions mentioned in Sub-section (3) of Section 6a have also to be fulfilled, Considered from this point of view, it is difficult to say that Sub-section (3) of Section 6a is repugnant to Sub-section (3) of Section 6. Sub-section (4) of Section 6 provides for the renewal of a licence. None of the sub-sections of Section 6-A provides for the renewal of a licence. In view of Sub-section (6) of Section 6a, sub-section (4) of Section 6 will apply mutatis mutandis. Thus we find that Section 6a is not repugnant to or inconsistent with Section 6. If Section 6 is not repugnant to Section 6a, there is no question of repugnancy between Section 6a on the one hand and Sections 7 and 8 on the other. Therefore, the basis of the contention of the appellant is gone. 9. Our attention has been drawn on behalf of the appellant to Sub-section (5) of Section 6a which, inter alia, provides that the licence granted under the Rice-Milling Act before the W. B. Ordinance No. 1'4 of 1974 shall lapse under certain circumstances as specified in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Sub-section (5 ). It is submitted that as Sub-section (5) cancels the licenses issued under the Rice-Milling Act before the introduction of Section 6a, Section 6a should be held to be repugnant to the provision of Section 6 of the Rice-Milling Act under which such licenses were granted. We are unable to accept the contention. The object of Sub-section (5) is quite in accordance with the grant of a licence under Sub-section (3) of Section 6a. After a licence under Sub-section (3) is granted or if no such licence is granted or no application for the grant of such a licence is made, the licence granted under Section 6 of the Rice-Milling Act will lapse. Sub-section (5), in our opinion, is an addition to Section 6 and not contrary to or inconsistent with that section. If a State Act makes certain additions to a Central Act, the State Act having been passed in accordance with Article 254 (2) of the Constitution, and such additions providing for compliance with certain conditions, there can be no question of repugnancy or inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Act. The discussions which we have made above show that Section 6a has, in effect, made certain additions to the Rice-Milling Act relating to the grant of licence, and on this ground also we hold that there is no repugnancy between Section 6a and the other provisions of the Rice-Milling Act. 10. The discussions which we have made above show that Section 6a has, in effect, made certain additions to the Rice-Milling Act relating to the grant of licence, and on this ground also we hold that there is no repugnancy between Section 6a and the other provisions of the Rice-Milling Act. 10. As much arguments have been made as to the interpretation of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution and as to the question of implied repeal, we may proceed on the assumption that Section 6a is repugnant to the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8. On this assumption, the question which we are to consider is whether there was an implied repeal of the said provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 by Section 6a and whether after the omission of Section 6a by the W. B. Amendment Act of 1977 with retrospective effect, there has been revival of the repealed provisions. 11. Mr. Somendra Chandra Bose, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that after the introduction of Section 6a, the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Central Act, that is, the Rice-Milling Act, became void. Article 254 of the Constitution is as follows:"254. (1) If any provisions of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of Clause (2) the law made by Parliament whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State * * * with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. " it is not disputed that Section 6a was enacted under Item 33 of the Concurrent List with the assent of the President of India in accordance with Article 254 (2) of the Constitution. On the assumption that Section 6a is repugnant to the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rice-Milling Act passed by Parliament, it is apparent that as Section 6a was passed in accordance with Art. 254 (2), Section 6a will preva in the State of West Bengal to the extern of the repugnancy. Article 254 (2) does not sayj that the Central Act will become void The position, therefore, in our opinion, is that Section 6a will prevail and the provisions of the Rice-Milling Act which are repugnant to Section 6a will not be enforceable in the State of West Bengal. Under Clause (1) of Article 254, the State Act, if it is repugnant to the Central Act, will be void, but under Clause (2) of Art, 254, the word "void" is absent. All that has been provided in Clause (2) is that the State Act will prevail to the extent of the repugnancy in that State. It is, therefore, obvious that it is not the intention of Parliament that when a law is passed by a State under Article 254 (2) which is repugnant to the law passed by Parliament, the latter will be 'void' to the extent of the repugnancy. When a law is said to be void, it may be regarded as still born or is wiped out from the Statute Book. When a law is said to be void, it may be regarded as still born or is wiped out from the Statute Book. Such a situation, in our opinion, cannot arise under Article 254 (2), for, though in the State concerned the State law will prevail to the extent of the repugnancy, the law passed by Parliament will remain operative in other States. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, has placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, where Fazal AH J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 898):--"1. Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy. 2. Where, however, a law passed by the State comes into collusion with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with Clause (2) of Article 254. 3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential. 4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254 (2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature tinder the proviso to Article 254. "13. Para. 2 of the said observation has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that the provisions of the Central Act would become void. If we confine ourselves only to para, 2 of the said observation, it must be said that the said observation supports the contention of the learned counsel. But in para. 4 of the said observation, it is not stated that the provisions of the law passed by Parliament would become void. We do not think that in using the word 'void' in para. 2 of the observation the Supreme Court meant the same in the strict literal or legal sense of the word. Reading paras. 2 and 4 together, what was meant by the Supreme Court was that the provisions of law made by Parliament would be unenforceable in the State concerned. The said decision of the Supreme Court is, therefore, of no help to the appellant. 14. Next, we may consider the question of implied repeal of the provision of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 by Section 6a of the Rice-Milling Act. In our opinion, it is doubtful whether one provision of a statute can be said to repeal by implication another provision of the same statute. It is the golden rule of construction that the Court should try to reconcile two provisions of a statute which are apparently inconsistent with each other. We have already held that Section 6a is not inconsistent with any of the said provisions of the Rice-Milling Act and, as such, the question of implied repeal does not arise. It is the golden rule of construction that the Court should try to reconcile two provisions of a statute which are apparently inconsistent with each other. We have already held that Section 6a is not inconsistent with any of the said provisions of the Rice-Milling Act and, as such, the question of implied repeal does not arise. But even assuming that there has been an implied repeal of the said provisions by Section 6a, let us consider whether the repealed provisions have revived after the omission of Section 6a from the Rice-Milling Act, In this connection, it will be profitable to refer to the following statement of the law in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn,, pp. 19-20;"where an Act is repealed and the repealing enactment is then repealed by another, which manifests no intention that the original Act shall continue repealed, the common law rule was that the repeal of the second Act revived the first ab initio. . . . . . The common law on the point was altered in 1'850, by a provision now to be found in Section 11 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889: Where an Act passed after 1850 "repeals a repealing enactment, it shall not be construed as reviving any enactment previously repealed, unless words are added reviving that enactment. "thus it appears that under the common law rule, in the absence of any intention that original Act shall continue repealed, the repeal of the repealing Act would revive the original Act. The W. B. Amendment Act of 1974 which amended the Rice-Milling Act and introduced S. 6a thereto did not express any intention that the repealed provisions of Sections 5, 6. 7 and 8 (assuming that these provisions were impliedly repealed) would continue repealed. If it is taken that the principles of law contained in Section 11 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 is also applicable to our country, we are of the view that the W. B. Amendment Act of 1977, which omitted Section 6a with retrospective effect, by necessary implication contains an intention that the repealed provisions of the Rice-Milling Act (if those have been repealed at all) would revive. It has been noticed that Section 3 of the W. B. Amendment Act of 1977 provides that Section 6a of the Rice-Milling Act shall be, and shall bo deemed always to have been, omitted. It has been noticed that Section 3 of the W. B. Amendment Act of 1977 provides that Section 6a of the Rice-Milling Act shall be, and shall bo deemed always to have been, omitted. If the intention of the legislature was that the repealed provisions would continue to be repealed, in that case, it was not necessary for the legislature to omit Section 6a with retrospective effect. The fact that Section 6a has been omitted with retrospective effect, that is to say, from the date of its enactment, clearly evinces an intention of the legislature that the said provisions of the Rice-Milling Act would revive. In the circumstances, we hold that-even assuming that Section 6a had repealed the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Rice-Milling Act, after the omission of Section 6a from the Rice-Milling Act with retrospective effect, revived the said provisions. As already stated, the question of repeal does not arise in view of our finding that Section 6a was not repugnant to any other provision of the Rice-Milling Act. ( 15 ) IN this connection, we may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, where one of the questions that was considered by the Supreme Court was whether Section 6 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which contained a non obstante clause, had repealed the preexisting laws, Section 6 was as follows:--"any order made under Section 3 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. " In that case, Mahajan C. J. observed as follows (at p, 469):--"in our opinion the construction placed on Section 6 by the High Court is not right. Section 6 does not either expressly or by implication repeal any of the provisions of the pre-existing laws; neither does it abrogate them. Those laws remain untouched and unaffected so far as the statute book is concerned. The repeal of a statute means as if the repealed statute was never on the statute book. It is wiped out from the statute book. The effect of Section 6 certainly is not to repeal any one of these laws or abrogate them. Those laws remain untouched and unaffected so far as the statute book is concerned. The repeal of a statute means as if the repealed statute was never on the statute book. It is wiped out from the statute book. The effect of Section 6 certainly is not to repeal any one of these laws or abrogate them. Its object is simply to by-pass them where they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, or the orders made thereunder. In other words, the orders made under Section 3 would be operative in regard to the essential commodity covered by the Textile Central Order wherever there is repugnancy in this Order with the existing laws and to that extent the existing laws with regard to these commodities will not operate, Bypassing a certain law does not necessarily amount to repeal or abrogation of that law. That law remains unrepealed but during the continuance of the Order made under Section 3 it does not operate in that field for the time being. The ambit of its operation is thus limited without there being any repeal of any one of its provisions. " ( 16 ) THE above principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court will also apply to the instant case. Even if Section 6a Is repugnant to the said provisions of the Rice-Milling Act, it does not repeal those provisions, but it merely by-passes them. During the continuance of Section 6a, these provisions remained inoperative and became operative and enforceable after the omission of Section 6a. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellant. ( 17 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of Basak J. is affirmed and this appeal is dismissed. In view, however, of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. ( 18 ) THE operation of this judgment will remain stayed in respect of the appellant only for a period of three weeks from dates as prayed for on behalf of the appellant.