JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J.- This second appeal has come up before this court at the instance of the plaintiff, who having got the decree in the trial court, lost in the lower appellate court. 2. The suit filed by the plaintiff was based briefly on the facts that the plaintiff and his brother Sher Singh constituted a joint Hindu family and they possessed substantial agricultural property which was their Sir and Khudkasht Sher Singh died in the night 16/17 March 1938 leaving behind him his widow Smt. Harpyari, who is respondent No. 1 in this appeal. On the death of Sher Singh, the Patwari of the village reported to the revenue authorities that the name of Smt. Harpyari be recorded in place of Sher Singh to which an objection was filed by the plaintiff. It appears that due to the intervention of the well wisher a compromise was arrived at and the land in suit was given to the respondent No. 1 in lieu of maintenance. A registered agreement was also got executed setting out the terms under which the land was settled in favour of respondent No. 1. It is dated 3rd January 1939. On 12-2-1971, it appears that Smt. Harpyari executed a gift deed in favour of her two daughters who are respondents No. 2 and 3 in this appeal. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the action of the respondents filed the present suit for relief of cancellation of the gift deed by respondent No. 1 in favour of respondents No. 2 and 3 on 12-2-1971. Alternatively possession was also claimed on the land in suit. 3. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents was that Section 90-A of the Evidence Act did not apply to those certified copies of the registered documents which were the basis of the suit or defence or were relied upon in the pleadings of the parties. Agreement dated 3-1-1939 being the very foundation of the plaintiff's claim must be deemed to be a document on which the plaint is based or at least a document which is relied upon in the plaint. In these circumstance, it was urged that the certified copy of the agreement dated 3-1-1939 cannot be looked into. Agreement dated 3-1-1939 being the very foundation of the plaintiff's claim must be deemed to be a document on which the plaint is based or at least a document which is relied upon in the plaint. In these circumstance, it was urged that the certified copy of the agreement dated 3-1-1939 cannot be looked into. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that, firstly ; the document in question is not the basis of the suit nor relied upon as such in the plaint and, therefore Section 90-A (2) of the Evidence Act will not be attracted. Secondly ; his submission was that even if the document may not be admissible in view of Section 90-A (2) yet it would be directly admissible under Section 90 (2) of the Act and as such it will not matter whether or not the document was the basis of the suit or had been relied upon by the plaintiff in his plaint. "Where any document purporting or proved to be thirty years old (20 years in U.P.) is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the signature and every, other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by person by whom it purports to be executed and attested." "Sub-section (2) (Added in U.P.) : (2) Where any such document as is referred to in sub-section (1) was registered in accordance with the law relating to registration of documents and a duly certified copy thereof is produced, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting, and in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed or attested." Explanation...................................." Sub-sections (1) and (2) of this section apply in respect of any document which is more than 20 years old or if it is registered and is more than 20 years old or a copy of such a registered document which was more than 20 years old would be admissible in evidence and certain presumptions as are raised in this sub-section could be raised by the court. 4. Coming now to the provisions contained in Section 90-A (as added in U.P.) we find that it applies only in respect of registered document and their certified copies without any qualification attached as to whether document was more than 20 years old. Section 90-A read as under : 1. Where any registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of the record of a court of justice, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case, considers proper, the court may presume that the original was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed. 2. This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. 3. 2. This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement. 3. The explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 90 will also apply to the section. 5. A reading of this section, therefore, shows that it applies to every registered document, be it more than 20 years old or not, while Section 90 (2) applies specifically to those documents which are more than 20 years old and are also registered or certified copies thereof. Clearly part of the provision of Section 90 (2) and Section 90-A overlap. Section 90-A applies in respect of those documents also which are more than 20 years old and are also registered as also to those documents which, though less than 20 years old are registered or certified copies thereof. Therefore, Section 90 (2) and Section 90-A both apply in a small area which is common to both. The common field where both these sections apply is in respect of those registered documents or certified copies thereof which had been executed more than 20 years before. The question arises as to whether to such a document Section 90-A (2) would apply and thus limit the scope of Section 90 (2) ? According to Section 90 (2) if any document, whether unregistered or registered, including certified copy of the registered document, provided it is more than 20 years old and has been produced from a proper custody, certain presumptions as are mentioned in Section 90 (2) can be raised by the court. These rights would get significantly curtailed if Section 90-A (2) also were to apply to them, for, in that case, the court would be precluded from raising a presumption in respect of those documents which were either the basis of the suit or defence or were relied upon by the parties in their pleadings. The result will be that on the one hand the document would be admissible under Section 90(2) yet in respect of those cases which are also covered by Section 90-A (2), such a document will not be presumed to have been duly executed and will have to be proved. This would lead to an anamolous situation. 6. The result will be that on the one hand the document would be admissible under Section 90(2) yet in respect of those cases which are also covered by Section 90-A (2), such a document will not be presumed to have been duly executed and will have to be proved. This would lead to an anamolous situation. 6. The provisions contained in Section 90 and 90-A are both enabling in nature and when under one provision a particular document can be presumed to have been duly executed another provision in the same Act can not take away the effect of such a presumption and limit the right of the court to raise a presumption as would happen if Section 90-A (2) was also to apply in such a case. In my opinion, Section 90 (2) is applicable only to a specified class of documents i.e., those which are more than 20 years old, while Section 90-A (1) is the general provision which carries under its wings "any registered, document. Section 90-A (1) is subject to some restrictions as are laid down in sub-section (2) and there are no clear words therein which may indicate that it applies to those documents also which come under Section 90 (2) of the Act. Therefore, any registered document whether it be 20 years old or not, though, may also be covered by the provisions contained in Section 90-A, yet, it would not be regulated by sub-section (2) of this section if the document is one to which Section 90 (2) also applies Section 90 (2) is applicable to a limited class of documents i.e., only those registered documents which are more than 20 years old and to that extent it is a special provision. It is a well established principle of interpretation of statutes that where there is a general provision and also a special provision, the special provision has to prevail over the general provision. The provisions of Section 90 (2) therefore, cannot be held to be controlled or guided by Section 90-A (2). As the provisions contained in Sections 79 onwards upto Section 90-A of the Evidence Act are all of an enabling nature, they should be construed in a manner so as to advance their purpose rather than to hamper their objective. The provisions of Section 90 (2) therefore, cannot be held to be controlled or guided by Section 90-A (2). As the provisions contained in Sections 79 onwards upto Section 90-A of the Evidence Act are all of an enabling nature, they should be construed in a manner so as to advance their purpose rather than to hamper their objective. The reason why certain presumptions of fact are raised is to reduce the burden of a party in proving certain things which normally tends to occur in a particular way in given circumstances and sometimes to deem as duly done certain functions of the public bodies as a matter of public policy. It a document is registered, normally it should ordinarily be presumed that it must have been duly executed by the executant and must have been registered after following the various formalities. The presumption may become stronger in case of registered document of more than 20 years old. It is so because such a document had remained unchallenged for a sufficiently long time and as a matter of public policy it is though desirable that such a document should be presumed to have been executed by the person who purports to have executed it. If in every case, the court were to insist that the execution, even of such a document, although registered, has to be proved by producing some direct evidence or in the absence of the same by other collateral evidence, it will unnecessarily increase the burden of recording evidence and also increase expenses of the litigants and sometimes even lead to denial of justice if such witnesses were not available due to lapse of time. It is for this reason that the period of 30 years had been reduced to 20 years, so that the document may be presumed to have been executed by the person executing the same. If any other view is to be taken the result would be farcical and in that event a document which is not registered but is more than 20 years old and though it be basis of the suit, such as a will, it would be admissible under Section 90 (1) and presumption about its due execution may be raised by the court, yet if the same document was registered the said presumptions can not be raised in view of Section 90-A (2). It would be defeating the very purpose of getting a document like this registered and to create a circumstance in which an ordinary unregistered document would have far greater evidentiary value than if the same document were registered. Such could not have been the intention in framing Section 90-A (2), and therefore, I am of the view that all those cases in which a document is covered under Section 90 (2) the rigour of Section 90-A (2) shall not apply. 7. There is another aspect of the matter. The lower appellate court has held that the original document has not been proved to have been lost. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court in this respect is absolutely erroneous, and is based on misreading of evidence. This is so. The lower appellate court has mentioned that no F.I.R. was lodged at the police station by the plaintiff in respect of the loss of the document. However, a perusal of the statement shows that in the examination-in-chief the plaintiff has clearly stated that the original document was not traceable and, therefore, certified copy was being filed. It was elicited in cross-examination that a theft had taken place and a report of the same was lodged by him at the police Station. When questioned as to whether the loss of this particular document had been mentioned in the F.I.R. the plaintiff stated in negative. From this, the lower appellate court has inferred that no report was lodged, which is factually incorrect. The court below also failed to take notice of this fact that when report of theft is lodged it is not necessary that a person may be able to know each and every thing or document that was likely to have been stolen by the thieves. At that time it is not possible that a person may remember about a document which has been lost, but later on when a search is made when needed it may come upon him that probably the document had been stolen. At that time it is not possible that a person may remember about a document which has been lost, but later on when a search is made when needed it may come upon him that probably the document had been stolen. Therefore, merely on the basis that a mention of the loss of the document had not been made in the F.I.R. could not have lead the court to believe that the plaintiff's version was incorrect, particularly when neither the plaintiff stood to gain anything by suppressing the original document nor there was any evidence from the side of the defendants to prove the contrary. The document had been mentioned in the plaint. If a execution was not denied, by defendant No 1. though it was stated that the execution had taken place under undue influence. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt about the factum of execution of this document and existence thereof. Even slight evidence therefore, to show that the original had been lost would be sufficient to entitle to the court to presume the loss of the document and to proceed to consider the certified copy as secondary evidence in the case. I am, therefore, not satisfied about the objection initially raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. 8. Coming now to the consideration of merits in the appeal, the suit was resisted by the respondents who filed a common written statement. It was stated that respondent No. 1 was the owner of the land in question and after the enforcement of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act fresh rights were acquired by her, that she was entitled to transfer the property by way of gift or otherwise. It was also stated that the agreement dated 3.1.39. had been got executed by putting undue influence on her. It was further stated that the plaintiff was estopped from questioning the title of the respondent No. 1 as she had earlier also mortgaged the land to the knowledge of the plaintiff and had been dealing with it as its full owner. Lastly it was stated that the plaintiff has not been in possession within 12 years prior to the filing of the suit and on that ground too the suit was said to be not maintainable. 9. Lastly it was stated that the plaintiff has not been in possession within 12 years prior to the filing of the suit and on that ground too the suit was said to be not maintainable. 9. The learned court, which tried the suit framed an issue as to whether Smt. Harpyari had only life interest in the plots in suit and had no right to transfer the plots. It came to the conclusion that the rights bestowed on Smt Harpyari under the deed dated 3.1.39 were only limited rights and that she was not entitled to make a transfer of the same. On this finding the suit was decreed. 10. Respondents then filed an appeal and on a consideration of the legal position the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the Bhumidhari rights acquired by the defendant No. 1 were new rights and also even if the rights were limited rights even then they became converted into ful ownership rights on the enforcement of Hindu Succession Act. Thus the lower appellate court was of the view that although initially the rights of respondent No. 1 may have been that of a limited owner yet she became entitled to transfer the same on the coming into force of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. It, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, Aggrieved, the plaintiff has come up before this Court in second appeal. 11. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has proceeded on the basis that on the death of Sher Singh the Sir and khudkasht rights, which were proprietory rights and not the tenancy rights in the land, devolved on the widow but those rights were limited rights of a Hindu widow. In fact, prior to 1937, a widow was not entitled to claim any right in the property left by her husband in the joint family, but after the enforcement of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 she was given the same rights as were possessed by her late husband. Thus the rights acquired by Smt. Harpyari were similar to those as could be acquired by a widow as widow's estate. There was, however, an additional power given under the Act to such women i.e., to claim partition as could be claimed by her husband also. Thus the rights acquired by Smt. Harpyari were similar to those as could be acquired by a widow as widow's estate. There was, however, an additional power given under the Act to such women i.e., to claim partition as could be claimed by her husband also. These limited rights, however, were further modified by mutual agreement between the parties under the agreement dated 3.1.39. Under the terms of this agreement the widow of Sher Singh surrendered her interest as widow and instead she only opted for the rights of maintenance from the profits derived from the land which was got recorded in her name by virtue of the agreement dated 3.1.39. The argument, therefore, is that respondent No. 1 possessed lights of a widow in lieu of the maintenance in the Sir and khudkasht on the date immediately before the date of vesting under the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 and as such instead of acquiring Bhumidhari rights on the coming into force of the Act she only acquired rights of an Asami. This, however, does not appear to be correct. When Sher Singh died, Smt Har Pyari, respondent No. 1 as his widow had acquired the same rights which her husband possessed in the 'Sir and khudkasht land. Admittedly, those rights were proprietory and merely tenancy rights and therefore, succession to these rights would be governed by the personal law and not by the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act which was then applicable in U.P. The life interest which she had so acquired in the land left by Sher Singh was a proprietory right. By agreement dated 3.1.39 these rights were not destroyed nor the rights had been, in any way, surrendered by her. The preface of the agreement it is stated that objections against the mutation of her name had been pending and it was likely to result in unnecessary litigation and, therefore, some persons were appointed arbitrators and they had decided the dispute in an amicable manner. The main term of the agreement was that respondent No 1 would continue to remain in possession for her life on the estate left by Sher Singh but she would have no right to transfer. Her name will be recorded on this land as she has no other means of maintenance and this has been done in order to ensure her proper maintenance. Her name will be recorded on this land as she has no other means of maintenance and this has been done in order to ensure her proper maintenance. After the death of respondent No 1 the property was to revert to the plaintiff. After this agreement had been executed between the parties an application was moved before the court for recording the terms on which ultimately order dated 4.1.39., Ex. 3, was passed by the court which was as under :- "Parties have compromised. The objector withdraws his objections and agrees that Smt. Harpyari's name be entered. Mutation case made in favour of Mst. Harpyari. Signed/- 4.1.39. 12. It appears that Smt. Harpyari continued to be recorded as Sir and khudkasht holder on the land in suit right up to the date of vesting. The question therefore, arises whether her name was record on this land as the holder of Sir and khudkasht simpliciter or her name was recorded only in lieu of her maintenance from the land allotted to her. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that it is Section 11 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act which will be applicable to the facts of the present case. Section 11 of the Act reads as under ;- 11 Sir or khudkasht allotted in lieu of maintenance allowance :- Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10 where Sir or khudkasht has been allotted by the Sir or khudkasht holder of person in lieu of maintenance allowance, such person shall be deemed to be the Asami thereof entitled to hold the land for so long as the right of maintenance allowance subsists." 13. The important words in the section are "whether Sir or khudkasht has been allotted by the Sir and khudkasht holder there of a person in lieu of maintenance allowance." A plain reading of this will show that there has to be a Sir and khudkasht holder who allots his land to another in lieu of maintenance allowance, then only the person who is allotted such land will be deemed to be an Asami of the land. However, if that is not the position then Section 11 can have no application at all. In the instant case Mst. However, if that is not the position then Section 11 can have no application at all. In the instant case Mst. Harpyari got this land as Sir and khudkasht of her own not by an allotment from the plaintiff but in her own right as the widow of Sher Singh, who was the original Sir and khudkasht holder. There is thus no question of any allotment being made to her. By the agreement no rights of Sir and khudkasht holder had been granted to Smt. Harpyari but on the contrary these rights which she already possessed in the land by virtue of her being the widow of Sher Singh were merely given due recognition. She had much wider rights which were reduced in amplitude by the agreement. These rights were reduced to mere right to enjoy the profits arising from the land for her maintenance. That, however, cannot effect the true nature of the rights acquired by her. Whatever may have been the curtailment of her rights by agreement dated 3.1.39, her rights again became enlarged on the coming into force of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act when fresh rights were conferred by the State. Under Section 18 of the Act all land in possession of or held or admitted to be held by an intermediary as Sir or khudkasht or an intermediary's grove etc. on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government as Bhumidhar thereof. Admittedly, Smt. Harpyari was recorded as Sir and khudkasht holder of the land in question before the date of vesting and as such she was entitled to be conferred with the rights of Bhumidhar unless her case can be said to have been covered by the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16, 17. We have seen above that the learned counsel for the appellant merely asserted that Section 11 of the Act alone could have been made applicable to the case of the respondent No. 1 and we have also found that the said section in fact did not apply in her case. Under the circumstances, the case of respondent No. 1 does not fall under any of the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17 of the Act. The result of all this discussion would be that Mst. Under the circumstances, the case of respondent No. 1 does not fall under any of the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17 of the Act. The result of all this discussion would be that Mst. Harpyari was Sir and khudkasht holder on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting in respect to the land in dispute and thus she was competent to acquire rights of Bhumidhari under the Z.A. Act. Apart from this, after becoming Bhumidhar she enjoyed the property for pretty long time and during this period consolidation proceeding have also taken place in the village. The land has been recorded in the name of Smt. Harpyari without any objection. Even prior to 1951 she had mortgaged that land and there are documents on record which go to show that the plaintiff was a party to the proceedings in which the land in question was allotted to respondent No. 1. The plaintiff, therefore, could not now question the right of respondent No. 1 as Bhumidhar of the land in question. 14. There is a lot of discussion in the judgment of the lower appellate court regarding applicability of the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. In my opinion, that discussion was meaningless because Hindu Succession Act came into force much after the enforcement of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Once respondent No. 1 had acquired Bhumidhari rights under the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 it hardly matters whether the Hindu Succession Act converts the limited rights into absolute rights or not. It is well known that the rights which have been granted under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act are entirely new rights which have been conferred by the State and, therefore, if a new right as a Bhumidhar had been conferred on Smt. Harpyari and the said rights were proprietory and are transferable she was quite competent to execute the deed dated 12.2.71. 15. In view of the discussion made above, in my opinion, the decision of the lower appellate court was legally correct. I, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.