S. G. DODDAKALE GOWDA, J. ( 1 ) ON Preliminary Hearing the petitioner, in this writ petition, has sought for quashing of Annexures A and C. ( 2 ) ANNEXURE-A is a letter dated 11-12-1980 addressed to the Sub-Inspector of Police to give protection to the tenant for the reasons mentioned therein. Annexure-C is an endorsement issued by the sub-Inspector of Police informing the petitioner not to cause any interference with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property by the tenant. ( 3 ) BY this writ petition, the petitioner intends to achieve what he could not secure or incapable of obtaining it by means of interlocutory application in WP no. 9289 of 1980. The matter arises in this form. The petitioner is the owner of S. Nos. 445/1 and 446/2 of Malalur village, Chickmagalur Taluk. On the application filed by the third respondent in form No. 7 for conferment of occupancy right, the Tribunal after holding an enquiry, recorded a finding that he was a tenant in occupation of these survey numbers as on 1 3-1974. Accordingly, it conferred occupancy right. It appears in WP No. 9289 of 1980 wherein the order of the Tribunal is challenged, the ex parfe interim order of stay obtained by the petitioner stood vacated at the instance of the tenant. The resultant position being that there is no interim order in one form or the other in favour of the petitioner. Under S. 45 of the Land Reforms act the occupancy right is conferred in favour of a permanent tenant, protected or any other tenant, who was found to be in possession of the property before the date of vesting and has been cultivating it personally. ( 4 ) SRI Veerabhadrappa, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is in possession of these two items continuously despite the order of the tribunal and the vacation of stay order by this Court, and the authorities have no power to issue the impugned notice. The contention that he still continues to be in possession of the property cannot be countenanced after the vacation of the stay. ( 5 ) NEXTLY, relying on Ss. 41, 129 and 130 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, he submitted that it is open to the tenant to apply for restoration of possession if he has been dispossessed. The contention that he still continues to be in possession of the property cannot be countenanced after the vacation of the stay. ( 5 ) NEXTLY, relying on Ss. 41, 129 and 130 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, he submitted that it is open to the tenant to apply for restoration of possession if he has been dispossessed. To the question put by the Court as to whether it is a case of dispossession, he stuck to his submission that it was a case of continuous possession and not a case of dispossession of respondent. The sections referred to above will have no application unless it was a case of dispossession of the tenant. These are enabling provisions for the tenant to get restitution. Moreover after vesting, the relationship of landlord and t'enant is extinguished. On conferment of occupancy right the respondent cannot invoke the aid of these sections. ( 6 ) MUCH emphasis was laid on the contents of the complaint made by the tenant to the Sub-Inspector. No doubt, importance could have been given to the contents of the complaint if it is a case of dispossession. As already indicated, this is not a case of dispossession. Some latitude must be given to the layman's complaint just as construing moffusil pleading. In this view also, I am not willing to attach much importance to the form of the complaint. In reply to the Court question as to why an independent petition is filed without filing interlocutory application, it was submitted that as the Tahsildar and the Sub Inspector are not parties to WP No. 9289 of 1980, hence a separate writ petition is filed. If there was any adverse interim order, respondent was bound by it and he could not have sought the help of the officers to give protection. I need not delve too much upon this. Since I have come to the conclusion that the third reepondent is deemed to be in possession as tenant, the authorities were well within their rights in extending necessary protection. Relying on the decision in Siddalingaiah v. Spl. Tahsildar and Secretary, Land Tribunal, Tumkur (1) it was submitted by Sri Veera- bhadrappa that the Tahsildar is not competent to give such protection. Relying on the decision in Siddalingaiah v. Spl. Tahsildar and Secretary, Land Tribunal, Tumkur (1) it was submitted by Sri Veera- bhadrappa that the Tahsildar is not competent to give such protection. In the said case the Tahsildar in the guise of exercising power conferred on a Tribunal to grant interim relief under S. 48-C of the act purported to exercise that power during the pendency of the proceedings. It is only in that context, this Court held that the Tahsildar had no power to give such direction. In the instant case, the position is altogether different. The tenant has derived some right to continue in possession and his possession is reinforced by vacation of stay order in WP no. 9289 of 1980. ( 7 ) IT is true as pointed out by Sri veerabhadrappa, there is no specific provision in the Act conferring power either on the Tahsildar to direct the police to extend protection or for the police itself to provide such facility. In Manoharlal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (2) dealing with the power of the Court to grant injunction de- hors Or. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 of CPC, the Supreme Court observed thus :- "it is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reasbn that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them". The Karnataka Land Reforms Act intends to implement agrarian reforms. It had to encounter so many hurdles in its implementation. It is impossible in the nature of things to anticipate the manifold difficulties and inconvenience and to make appropriate provisions in the Act or the rules. It is true that the Legislature having conferred power on the Tribunal to confer occupancy right has not specifically conferred power for effective implementation of the orders of the Tribunal. Implementation of the order is incidental to the power of making an order. It clothes the person who has obtained an order with certain rights. Court should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefit of the order (Rayapati Andemma v. Pothinam Narasimham (3) and Jaishi v. Salig Ram (4 ). Aggrieved party himself can approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction or to exercise the right which he has derived. Court should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefit of the order (Rayapati Andemma v. Pothinam Narasimham (3) and Jaishi v. Salig Ram (4 ). Aggrieved party himself can approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction or to exercise the right which he has derived. If the authorities have adopted a procedure which would aid the Tribunals in the implementation of their order and which would meet the ends of justice or which would prevent the abuse of the powers of the Court, this court is not justified in interfering under art. 226 of the Constitution. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this writ petition is rejected. --- *** --- .