M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is by the Estate officer, University of Agricultural sciences, Hebbal, Bangalore. The prayer in the writ petition is for quashing the communication at Annexures a, B, and C and for a further direction to the 1st respondent Karnataka Government Insurance Department to make payment to the claimants in m. V. C. Cases Nos. 248 and 249 of 1976 as awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) , ( 2 ) IT is necessary to state that Annexures A, B, and C are letters written by the Special Tahsildar for PUC and miscellaneous Recoveries, Bangalore, demanding payment from the petitioner in respect of the two aforementoined M. V. C. Cases wherein he was one ot the respondents. ( 3 ) THE facts leading to this writ petition may be briefly stated as follows: the petitioner University vehicle bearing Registration No. 9789 registered as Omni bus in the State of karnataka met with an accident, as a result of which M. V. C. Cases Nos. 284 and 249 of 1976 came to be filed by certain claimants before the Tribunal. The two cases were disposed of by a common judgment by the Tribunal. It will be appropriate to quote the relevant passage with which alone we are concerned in order to determine the issues raised in this writ petition;"respondent No. 1 is admittedly the owner of the bus in question and the said bus has been insured in the name of R1, R2 was driving the bus in question. Hence, all the three respondents are liable to pay the said compensation to the petitioner. "between the two cases, the total amount of compensation awarded amounts to Rs. 93,000 plus Rs. 51,060 rs. 1,44,060 with interest at 6 percent per annum from date of petition till date of realisation. The successful petitioners obtained the necessary certificate under S. 110e of the Motor Vehicles act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sought to realise the compensation awarded from the 1st respondent in accordance with the provisions of the said section as if the compensation awarded was arrears of land revenue. It is in that circumstance, that the 3rd respondent-Special tahsilar issued the letters at Annexures A, B and C demanding from the petitioner the balance sum due to the claimants having received Rs. It is in that circumstance, that the 3rd respondent-Special tahsilar issued the letters at Annexures A, B and C demanding from the petitioner the balance sum due to the claimants having received Rs. 50,000 from the Insurer, the 1st Respondent herein. It will suffice to extract the letter at Annexure-C which is the last of them and it is as follows:"we are in receipt of your letter bearing No. ECT. 9769/1980-81 dated 28. 10. 80. This office is short staffed office and cannot enter into prolonged and unnecessary correspondence. The K. L. R. Act 1964 does not encourage such prolonged correspondence. Hence, this will be the last letter that this office will write in this matter. Coming to the point: your Omni-buses are arranged "in pursuance of a contract of employment". Hence the liability of the k. G. I. D. is limited to Rs. 50,000. 2. One cannot be sure that the opinion of the law Department will come within a week or two. And this office cannot wait indefinitely till the opinion comes, as this office has to submit progress report every month. 3. Hence, it is suggested that University of Agricultural Sciences may make payment now, and if the Government opinion is in its favour the university of Agricultural Sciences may ask KGID for reimbursement. 4. If Government opinion is in favour of K. G. I. D. the University of Agricultural Sciences will save considerable amount by way of interest by paying the amount immediately. Hence it is in the interest of all concerned that the payment be made immediately. There is no scope tor further correspondence. If payment is not made within 15 days the cars belonging to the University of Agricultural Sciences, will be distrained without further notice. "it is in the light of this letter, the action taken by the 3rd respondent should be considered by this Court. ( 4 ) IT is unnecessary to refer to the correspondence between the 1st respondent and the petitioner. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The karnataka Government Insurance Department now nationalised forming part of the General Insurance Corporation has taken shelter apparently behind the provisions contained in sec. 95 (2) (b) of the Act. ( 4 ) IT is unnecessary to refer to the correspondence between the 1st respondent and the petitioner. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The karnataka Government Insurance Department now nationalised forming part of the General Insurance Corporation has taken shelter apparently behind the provisions contained in sec. 95 (2) (b) of the Act. (2) Subject to the proviso to subsection (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely:- (A) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit (fifty) thousand rupees in all including the liabilties, if any arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver) rot exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle.) (B) Where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, - (i) in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all: (ii) in respect of passengers, - (1) a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry not more than thirty passengers; (2) a limit of seventy-five thousand rupees in all where the vehicle is registered to carry more than thirty but not more than sixty passengers; (3) a limit of one lakh rupees in all where the vehicle is registered tc carry more than sixty passengers; and (4) subject to the limits aforesaid, ten thousand rupees for each individual passenger where the vehicle is a motor cab, and five thousand-rupees for each individual passenger in any other case; (C) save as provided in clause (d), where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the amount of liabilityincurred; (D) irrespective of the class ot the vehicle, a limit of rupees two thousand in all in respect of damage to any property of a third party. "the facts of the present case apparently are covered by sub clause (b) above. "the facts of the present case apparently are covered by sub clause (b) above. ( 5 ) AS against this Shri P. Viswanatha shetty, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended that having regard to the Judgment of the Tribunal which has not apportioned the liability among the respondents before it, the entire liability is on the insurer having regard to Sec. 96 (1) of the act. . To appreciates this contention, it is necessary to set out the provision. Sec. 96 (1) of the Act which is as follows:"96 (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under subsection (4) of section 95, in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwith standing that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured pay thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, togther with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest of judgments. " ( 6 ) TO methe plain language of the section indicates that it is declaratory in nature and does no more than declare that the insurer's liability is absolute notwithstanding the fact that the insured has escaped or failed to perform the obligations under the contract between the insurer and the insured in respect of a particular contract. I need not say more than this, as this writ petition is liable to be rejected for reapons which will follow. ( 7 ) I have pointed out that proceeding before the Tribunal are special proceedings under the Act in terms of sec. 110 thereof. The whole procedure, commencing with the presentation of a petition to the Tribunal and ending with an award being made and a certificate being issued under Sec. 110-E of the Act, is self-contained. ( 7 ) I have pointed out that proceeding before the Tribunal are special proceedings under the Act in terms of sec. 110 thereof. The whole procedure, commencing with the presentation of a petition to the Tribunal and ending with an award being made and a certificate being issued under Sec. 110-E of the Act, is self-contained. Under Sec. 110 D of the Act, an appeal is provided to the High Court against the judgment and awardi of the Tribunal. I have already extracted part of the operative portion of the common judgment of the Tribunal wherein the liability to pay the compensation amount is fairly and squarely fixed on respondents 1, 2 and 3 before the Tribunal. Tf the petitioner-University was of the view that it had no liability of its own to pay the compensation awarder by the Tribunal, it should have asked the Tribunal to adjudicate that tion. From the reading o{ the Tiibu- nal's judgment it iu ^lear that the total liability of the Insurance Department was one of the issues (see issue no. 4 in para 8 of the judgment of the tribunal.) Respondent-1 and his driver respondent-2 before the Tribunal weie arrayed in those proceedings as owner and driver. Merely because the vehicle was insured either comprehensively or for third party risk, the liability of the owner does not cease. In any event, if they were aggrieved with the liability fastened by the Tribunal, the University should have appealed to the High court under Sec. 110-D of the Act and agitated its grievance there. I am informed from the Bar that an appeal was indeed filed in regard to the quantum awarded and the same was subsequently dismissed by this Court. Having not done that, it is now not open to the University to frustrate the successful claimants before the Tribunal from realising the fruits of the decree by invoking the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 8 ) I have already pointed out that in none of the three letters written by the Special Tahsildar has he adjudicated or apportioned the liability between the petitioner and the 1st respondent. All that he has said is that Rs. 50,000 has been paid by the Insurance Department and balance of the claim amount is liable to be recovered from the University. All that he has said is that Rs. 50,000 has been paid by the Insurance Department and balance of the claim amount is liable to be recovered from the University. I have pointed out that in terms of the judgment, the liablity being joint and several, as I have understood it, the university cannot make a complaint that the balance of the amount is being demanded from them. In my view, claimants have a right to recover the whole of the amount from any one of the respondents. It is impossible to quash the Annexures A, B, and C which are mere correspondence and not quasi- judicial decisions or even administrative orders, having the force of quasi judicial orders. Nor is it possible to issue a writ of mandamus to the 1st quesrespondent to pay the entire amount as long as the judgment of the Tribunal remains as it is without any modification. ( 9 ) IN the result, this writ petition is dismissed without rule being issued. ( 10 ) I must notice that the claimants have made applications to implead themselves as parties in these proceedings apparently because amounts due to them have not been paid and has been delayed. In view of the conclusions reached by me, i do not think it is necessary to make them parties to these proceedings. If I do so, I will be compelled to saddle the petitioner with further burden of the costs of these proceedings. There will be no order as to costs the learned Government Pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today. --- *** --- .