JUDGMENT M.M. Dutt J : This Rule has been issued by this Court as the writ petition was referred to the Division Bench by B.C. Ray J. The petitioner, Singell Tea & Agricultural Industries Ltd. which was the owner of a tea garden known as Singell Tea Estate situate at Kurseong, in the district of Darjeeling has prayed for a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents from giving any effect or further effect to and to cancel and withdraw the impugned order contained in the Memo No. 77(15)13/TC/TN dated April 16, 1981. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the impugned memo. There is also a prayer for mandatory injunction directing the respondents to deliver possession of the tea garden to the petitioner if the respondents had, after the affirmation of the writ petition, taken over possession of the garden pursuant to the impugned order. 2. After the enactment of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the petitioner retained and/or was allowed to retain so much of the land comprised in the tea garden as was in the opinion of the State Government required fur the tea garden under sub-s (3) of S. 6 of the Act. Section 42(2) of the Act provides for determination of rent payable by the intermediary retaining possession of a tea garden as a tenant under the State. It appears that in the instant case there was such a determination of rent under S. 42(2) by the Revenue Officer, but there is nothing on record to show the date of such determination. The rent that was determined was Rs. 2,375.94 per year and was entered in the finally published record of rights. It further appears that the Government was not satisfied with the quantum of rent determined by the Revenue Officer. A proceeding under S. 44(2a) of the Act for the revision of the entries in the record of rights in respect of the tea garden was started by the Revenue Officer. In that proceeding, the Revenue Officer by his order dated August 22, 1968 again determined the rent payable by, the petitioner to the Stale Government. This time, the rent that was determined was Rs. 8.769.24 pa year. In that proceeding, the Revenue Officer by his order dated August 22, 1968 again determined the rent payable by, the petitioner to the Stale Government. This time, the rent that was determined was Rs. 8.769.24 pa year. The previous determination of rent was directed by the Revenue Officer to be replaced by the said subsequent determination and the entry in that regard in the record of rights was revised. 3. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said determination of rent under S. 44(2) in a proceeding under S. 44(2a) of the Act preferred two appeals to the Tribunal under sub s. (3) of S.44 of the Act. Both the appeals were dismissed for default by the learned District Judge, Darjeeling, who was the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. The petitioner filed two applications for restoration of the appeals under Order 41, rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but both the applications were dismissed by the learned District Judge, by his orders dated August 16, 1975. Against the said orders of the learned District Judge, the petitioner moved two applications under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Upon the said applications, two rules being Civil Rule No. 3741 of 1975 and Civil Rule No, 3742 of 1975 were issued on October 1, 1975 by a Division Bench of this Court. The Court also granted an interim stay of the operation of the order dated August 22, 1963 of the Revenue Officer fixing the rent payable by the petitioner in respect of the tea garden by it at Rs. 8,76924. 4. While the said two rules were pending in this Court, the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling by his letter dated June 20, 1979 addressed to the Manager of Singell Tea Estate stated, inter alia, that in Spik of repeated reminders, the petitioner had not executed the long term Jesse for 30 years on pre-payment of the requisite number of instalments of rent and cesses. It was directed that if the petitioner would fail to tender payment of Government dues, the following consequences would follow : “(1). Certificate proceedings will be instituted for recovery of Government dues, if not already instituted. (2). The concession of remission of interest on arrear rent and cesses will automatically be withdrawn. (3). It was directed that if the petitioner would fail to tender payment of Government dues, the following consequences would follow : “(1). Certificate proceedings will be instituted for recovery of Government dues, if not already instituted. (2). The concession of remission of interest on arrear rent and cesses will automatically be withdrawn. (3). Credit facilities so far given by the various Banks and other agencies will be advised to be stopped. The said letter of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling was received by the petitioner on August 8, 1979 and it was replied to by the solicitor of the petitioner by his letter dated August 13, 1979. In the said letter, the petitioner's solicitor pointed out the issuance of the said two rules by this Court and the granting of the said interim order and requested the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Darjeeling to stay his hands till the disposal of the said rules. Thereafter, the Collector of Darjeeling served upon the petitioner a notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to determine the tenancy of the petitioner in respect of the tea garden on the expiry of April 14, 1918. The petitioner was requested to make over vacant and peaceful possession of the tea garden to the Junior' Land Reforms Officer or the Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officer of the area or the Executive Magistrate immediately on the expiry of April 14, 1981, failing which, it was directed, the petitioner would be deemed a trespasser and would also be liable to pay mesne profits till the petitioner was evicted in due course of law. The said notice was received by the petitioner on November 15, 1980. In reply to the said notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner’s solicitor by his letter dated December 15, 1980 again pointed out the issuance of the two rules by this Court and the granting of the interim stay and requested the Collector of Darjeeling to stay his hands until further order from this Court. A xerox copy of the certified copy of the order of this Court granting the stay of the operation of the order of the Revenue Officer was also forwarded to the Collector of Darjeeling along with the said letter. 5. Thereafter, the impugned Memo No. 77(15)13/TE/TN dated April 16, 1981 was sent by the Collector, Darjeeling to the petitioner. A xerox copy of the certified copy of the order of this Court granting the stay of the operation of the order of the Revenue Officer was also forwarded to the Collector of Darjeeling along with the said letter. 5. Thereafter, the impugned Memo No. 77(15)13/TE/TN dated April 16, 1981 was sent by the Collector, Darjeeling to the petitioner. The impugned Memo reads as follows : "To The Proprietor/M/S. Singell Tea Estate, P.O. Kurseong, Dist. Darjeeling, I do hereby take over the possession of your tea garden known as Singell Tea Estate with effect from 16th Apri1, 1981 as you have failed to execute Long Term Lease/Summary Lease, by paying the Government dues by 14th April, 1981 as required in the notice served upon you u/s. 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Sd/-Illegible Collector Darjeeling” 6. The petitioner has, in the writ petition, described the impugned memo as containing an order of the Collector to take possession of the tea estate. In the impugned memo, it is recorded that the Collector takes over the possession of the tea garden. According to the petitioner, by the impugned memo the Collector intimated the petitioner that he would take possession of the tea estate. But the impugned memo shows that the Collector had taken possession of the tea estate on April 16, 1981 and he recorded the fact of taking possession of the tea garden in the said memo. It is significant to be noticed that nothing has been stated in the said memo as to how and in what manner the possession of the tea garden was taken by the Collector. It is not also understandable what the Collector meant by saying “I do hereby take over the possession of your tea garden. .....”. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the State respondents nos. 1 to 4 affirmed by Shri Ranjit Guha, the Assistant Secretary, Land & Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal, it has been averred that possession of the tea garden was taken by the Collector on April 16, 1981 as stated in the memo. It is also the case of the respondents that the possession of the tea garden was handed over to the West Bengal Tea Development Corporation Ltd. on April 21, 1981. The said West Bengal Tea Development Corporation Ltd. was added as a party respondent no. It is also the case of the respondents that the possession of the tea garden was handed over to the West Bengal Tea Development Corporation Ltd. on April 21, 1981. The said West Bengal Tea Development Corporation Ltd. was added as a party respondent no. 5 in the present rule at the instance of the petitioner. The respondent no. 5 has also filed an affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Shri Aninda Mohon Bose, the Managing Director of the respondent no 5. In paragraph 4(a) of the said affidavit it is stated that possession of the tea garden was taken by one Shri R.B Subba, Circle Inspector (Land Reforms, Kurseong, L.R. Circle on behalf of the Government on April 21, 1981 and handed over to the said Corporation, the respondent no. 5. The deponent of the affidavit, Shri Aninda Mohan Bose accompanied the said R.B. Subba and was present at the time of taking over possession of the tea garden. Thus it appears that the statement made by the Collector in the Impugned memo dated April 16. 19151 about his taking over possession of the tea garden on that date is untrue. It is not disputed that the tea garden is now in the possession of the West Bengal Tea Development Corporation Ltd., the respondent no. 5, since April 21, 1981. According to the petitioner, the taking of such possession was forcible inasmuch as the possession was not taken with the permission of the Directors of the petitioner who were all staying at Calcutta. The Directors of the petitioner were not aware of the taking over of possession as they were in Calcutta and busy with moving the writ petition before this Court. The writ petition was affirmed on April 23, 1981 and moved before B.C. Ray J. on April 23, 1981. As stated already, the learned Judge referred the writ petition to the Division Bench and on April 27, 1981 the Rule Nisi was issued by this Court and an ad interim injunction was granted restraining the respondents from giving any effect or further effect to the said impugned memo dated April 16, 1981 and from taking possession of the tea garden. The interim injunction was not effective as possession of the tea garden was taken before the writ petition was moved and the order of injunction was issued. 7. The interim injunction was not effective as possession of the tea garden was taken before the writ petition was moved and the order of injunction was issued. 7. The question that arises for our consideration is whether the tenancy of the petitioner in respect of the tea garden could be terminated and possession of the same could be taken over by the Government. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that the State Government may from time to time by notification declare that with effect from the date mentioned in the notification, all estates and the rights of every intermediary in each such estate situated in any district or part of a district specified in the notification, shall vest in the State free from all in cumbrances. Under sub-s. (2) of S. 4, the date of vesting was Baisakh 1, 1362 B.S. corresponding to April 15,1955. Section 5 of the Act lays down the effect of such a notification under S. 4(1). Section 6(1) confers a right on the intermediary to retain lands. Clause (f) of S. 6(1) is as follows : “(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in Ss. 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub-S. (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting – (f) subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2) land comprised in tea gardens, orchards, or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, poultry farming or dairy.” Sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 6 read as follows : “(2). The intermediary which is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-s. (1) shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed and subject to payment of such rent as may be determined under the provisions of this Act and as entered in the record-of-rights finally published under Chapter V except that no rent shall be payable for land referred to in clause (h) or (i) : Provided that if any tank fishery or any land comprised in a tea-garden, orchard, mill, factory, or workshop was held immediately before the date of vesting under a lease, such lease shall be deemed to have been given by the State Government on the same terms and conditions as immediately' before such date subject to such modification therein as the Mate Government may think fit to move. (3). In the case of land comprised in a tea garden, mill, factory, or workshop the intermediary, or where the land is held under a lease, the lessee, shall be entitled to retain only so much of such land as, in the opinion of the State Government, is required for the tea garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be, and a person holding under a lease shall, for the purpose of assessment of compensation, be deemed to be an intermediary. Provided that the State Government may, if it thinks fit so to do after reviewing the circumstances of a case and after giving the intermediary or the lessee, as the case may be, an opportunity of being heard, revise any order made by it under this sub-section specifying the land which the intermediary or the lessee shall be entitled to retain as being required by him for the tea garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be. Explanation – The expression 'land held under a lease’ includes any land held directly under the State under a lease. Exception – In the case of lands allowed to be retained by an intermediary or lessee in respect of a tea garden, such land may include any land comprised in a forest if, in the opinion of the State Government, the land comprised in a forest is required for the tea garden.” 8. Exception – In the case of lands allowed to be retained by an intermediary or lessee in respect of a tea garden, such land may include any land comprised in a forest if, in the opinion of the State Government, the land comprised in a forest is required for the tea garden.” 8. The intermediary is, therefore, entitled to retain a tea garden by virtue of clause (f) of S. 6(1) subject to the provision of sub-s. (3) of S. 6 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of S. 6 provides that such an intermediary who is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-s. (1) shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as tenant subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed and subject to payment of such land as may be determined under the provisions of the Act. The terms and conditions have been prescribed by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules, 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. Clause (A) of rule 4 of the Rules provide that the intermediary shall hold land comprised in a tea garden on the terms and conditions set out in Schedule F appended to the Rules. Paragraph 1 of Schedule F is as follows : “Land comprised in a tea garden retained by an intermediary under sub-s (1), read with sub-s. (3), of S. 6 shall be deemed to be held directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant until a leafed is granted in Form I appended to this Schedule, on such terms and conditions as may be specified by the Collector in a summary settlement, and thereafter, on a lease being granted in Form I appended to this Schedule, on the terms and conditions specified in such lease. There shall be a lease in Form I in respect of each such intermediary, and the same shall be registered and numbered in the office of the Collector.” Under paragraph 2 of the Schedule F, the first lease shall be given from the date of the order under sub-s. (3) of S. 6 or from the date of the determination of the rent under S. 42, whichever is later Form I which is the form of the lease in which the lease has to be granted provides for the grant of a lease for a period of 30 years on terms and conditions as mentioned therein Clause 16(a) of Form I confers the right on the lessee to a renewal of the lease for a further period 30 years and to successive renewals for similar periods, subject to the rules and the terms and conditions of the lease and to such other terms and conditions as the State Government may, from time to time, consider it necessary to impose and include in such renewed lease or leases and subject further to such fem as may then be fixed, provided that such additional terms and conditions shall not be inconsistent with the law regulating such leases and shall not have retrospective effect. 9. In view of paragraph I of Schedule F, so long as a lease is not granted in Form I, the Collector has to make a summary settlement specifying the terms and conditions in respect of the tea garden, After the lease is granted in Form I, the intermediary will hold the tenancy of the tea garden on the terms and conditions specified in the lease. Under paragraph 2 of Schedule F, the lease will be granted from the date of the order under sub-s. (3) of S. 6 or from the date of the determination of the rent under S. 42 whichever is later. 10. In the instant case, the order under sub s. (3) of S. 6 preceded the determination of rent under S. 42. It has been stated already, initially the rent was determined under S. 42(2) of the Act and was fixed at Rs. 2,375.94 per year, but the Government did nut accept such determination and the Revenue Officer purported to determine the rent over again in a proceeding under S. 44(2a). It has been stated already, initially the rent was determined under S. 42(2) of the Act and was fixed at Rs. 2,375.94 per year, but the Government did nut accept such determination and the Revenue Officer purported to determine the rent over again in a proceeding under S. 44(2a). Whether determination of rent can be made in a proceeding under S. 44(2a) of the Act does not fall for our consideration in thus Rule. B that as it may, rent was determined by the Revenue Officer on August 22, 1968 and it was fixed at Rs 8,769.24 per year. Such determination of rent by the Revenue Officer was stayed by this Court by an interim order in the said Civil Rules Nos. 3741 and 3742 of 1975 which are still pending, Although at much later dates, that is. on August 13, 1979 and December 15, 1979 the petitioner informed the Collector of Darjeeling about the issuance of the said Rules and the granting of interim stay of the order of the Revenue Officer determining rent, it will not be unreasonable to presume that the order of this Court must have been served from this Court upon the Collector of Darjeeling who is also a party in the said Rules long before. It is not the case of the respondents that the interim order granting stay of the operation of the order of the Revenue Officer determining rent in respect of the tea garden of tthe petitioner was not served upon them by this Court. Be that as it may, before the impugned notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served upon the petitioner, and the impugned memo dated April 16, 1981 was issued by the Collector of Darjeeling, he was fully aware of the said interim order of this Court. 11. Now under paragraph 2 of Schedule F, a lease cannot be granted so long as the rent is not determined under S. 42(2) of the Act. As the determination of rent was stayed by this Court, the question of the grant or execution of the lease could not arise. 11. Now under paragraph 2 of Schedule F, a lease cannot be granted so long as the rent is not determined under S. 42(2) of the Act. As the determination of rent was stayed by this Court, the question of the grant or execution of the lease could not arise. Possession of the tea garden was sought to be taken by the Collector by the Impugned memo dated April 16, 1981 on the ground that the petitioner had failed to execute a long term lease or summary lease by paying the Government dues by April 14, 1981 as required in the notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act dated October 10, 1980. The notice however, did not state any ground for the termination of the lease. It is not disputed, on the contrary, it has been frankly conceded by Mr. A.P. Chatterjee, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents nos. 1 to 4 including the Collector of Darjeeling that the Collector had not made any summary settlement as required by paragraph I of Schedule F of the Rules. The position, therefore, is that there was no summary settlement specifying the terms and conditions to be fulfilled by the petitioner holding the tea garden as the tenant of the State. The lease could not be granted or executed as the determination of rent under S. 42(2) was stayed by this Court. 12. It is complained by Mr. Ranjit Kumar Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the Collector failed to perform his statutory duty by not granting a summary settlement specifying the terms and conditions of the tenancy of the petitioner under the State and violated the provision of paragraph 1 of Schedule F of the Rules by insisting on the execution of a lease in Form 1 even though the determination of rent under S. 42(2) of the Act was stayed by this Court. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that the Collector had exceeded his authority in serving a notice to quit under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and also in taking possession of the tea garden on April 21, 1981 behind the back of the Directors of the petitioner company On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. Chatterjee that as the tenancy of the petitioner has been terminated by the service of a notice to quit under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner has no legal right to maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is also submitted by him that as the petitioner has not paid any rent and has not complied with the direction of the Collector by getting a lease executed, the petitioner has lost its right of retention of the tea garden and to hold the same as a tenant under the State. 13. There can be no doubt that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it should be established that the party has a right and the said right has been illegally invaded or threatened – See State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1964 SC 685 . It may also be shown that the authority concerned has failed to perform his statutory duty, and that such non-performance of the statutory duty has resulted in an interference with the legal right of the aggrieved party. In the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd v. Sipahi Singh & ors, AIR 1977 SC 2149 , the Supreme Court observed as follows : “There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising pubic functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the Statute to enforce its performance.” 14. Keeping in view the above principles, let us consider whether the actions of the Collector in terminating the tenancy of the petitioner in respect of the tea garden and in taking possession of the same were justified. Keeping in view the above principles, let us consider whether the actions of the Collector in terminating the tenancy of the petitioner in respect of the tea garden and in taking possession of the same were justified. The right of the petitioner to hold the land comprised in the tea garden is derived from the provision of the Act, to be precise, the provision of S. 6(1)(f) read with the provision of S. 6(2) of the Act. So long as the lease is not granted, it is the duty of the Collector to make a summary settlement specifying the terms and conditions on which the intermediary is to hold the land as a tenant of the State as provided in paragraph 1 of Schedule F of the Rules. In the instant case, the Collector did not perform his statutory duty in specifying the terms and conditions by a summary settlement. It does not appear that after the rent payable by the petitioner was for the first time fixed by the Revenue Officer the petitioner was called upon to execute a lease in writing for thirty years. The Collector could not ask the petitioner to execute the lease as the amount of rent that was fixed was not acceptable to the Government which is a apparent from the fact that another proceeding was started for the determination of rent. The second determination of rent was stayed by this Court by an interim order. Still then, the Collector did not make a summary settlement specifying the terms and conditions pending the disposal of the said Rules wherein the interim order was made. No steps were taken by the respondents to get the said Rules heard and disposed of by the said Rules wherein the interim order was made. No steps were taken by the respondents to get the said Rules heard and disposed of by this Court. Curiously enough, it was complained by the Collector that the petitioner was not paying rent and not executing the lease, and this was said long after the interim order was passed by this Court. No steps were taken by the respondents to get the said Rules heard and disposed of by this Court. Curiously enough, it was complained by the Collector that the petitioner was not paying rent and not executing the lease, and this was said long after the interim order was passed by this Court. In our opinion, the Collector having failed and neglected to perform his statutory duty by making a summary settlement was not at all justified to call upon the petitioner to pay rent and execute the lease which could not be granted by the Collector so long as the interim order of this Court staying the determination of rent by the Revenue Officer subsisted. In case there was no such interim order and the petitioner failed and neglected to execute a formal lease, the Collector might recover possession of the tea garden in accordance with law, but during the continuance of the interim order there was no question of execution of lease. 15. It is, however, said on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner should, have paid rent that was initially determined by the Revenue Officer under S. 42(2) of the Act, that is to say, the sum of Rs. 2,375,94 per year. In our opinion, it is futile to argue that the petitioner had failed to payment that was initially determined, for the Government did not accept the same and no demand was made for payment of rent at that rate. Long after the determination of rent for the second time that the demand for payment of rent was made. Obviously, the demand was for payment of rent as determined for the second time, such determination having been stayed by this Court. It is doubtful whether the tenancy can be terminated and possession can be recovered on the ground of non-payment of rent. The petitioner acquired the right of a tenant in respect of the tea garden under the Act and the petitioner has still the legal or the statutory right. Such right of the petitioner can be terminated only in accordance with law and not otherwise. Before such termination, it has got to be shown by the authority concerned that it has performed its duty in accordance with the statute which has conferred the right on the aggrieved party. Such right of the petitioner can be terminated only in accordance with law and not otherwise. Before such termination, it has got to be shown by the authority concerned that it has performed its duty in accordance with the statute which has conferred the right on the aggrieved party. The right of a person to hold land under the State may arise under a contract or under a statute. In case of contractual rights, such rights can be terminated in accordance with the terms of the contract Legal rights or rights conferred by a statute cannot be terminated or interfered with by the Government or any statutory authority except under the provisions of law or in accordance with the provisions of the statute concerned. A statute conferring a right on a person may provide for the discharge of certain obligations by that person in order to keep the right alive. The authority concerned cannot terminate or interfere with such right on the ground of non-compliance by the person of the obligations if it is shown that the same could not be discharged by such person for the failure or neglect of the authority concerned in performing his statutory duty. In the instant case the Collector did not specify the terms and conditions of the tenancy of the petitioner of the tea garden including the amount of rent; it was illegal and unjust on the part of the Collector to call upon the petitioner to pay rent the determination of which has been stayed by this Court or to execute the lease which could not be executed during the continuance of the order of this Court staying the determination of rent by the Revenue Officer. In the circumstances, we hold that the purported termination of the tenancy of the petitioner of the tea garden and the taking of possession of the same on the ground of the petitioner's failure to pay rent or to execute the lease was illegal and without jurisdiction. 16. In the notice to quit, it was stated by the Collector that if the petitioner would fail to deliver possession of the tea garden immediately on the expiry of April 14, 1981, possession would be taken in accordance with law. 16. In the notice to quit, it was stated by the Collector that if the petitioner would fail to deliver possession of the tea garden immediately on the expiry of April 14, 1981, possession would be taken in accordance with law. By the said statement, the Collector gave the petitioner to understand that on the failure of the petitioner to deliver possession, recourse would be taken by him to the institution of a legal action for the purpose of recovery of possession, and that is the simple meaning of the expression “in accordance with law” The Collector, however, took the law into his own hands and took over possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Again, the Collector wanted to keep on record by his memo dated April 16, 1981 that he had taken possession of the tea garden on that date, although it transpires that possession was not taken on that date but on April 21, 1981. We do not approve of all this on the part of a responsible officer like the Collector. 17. Before we part with this case, we may dispose of the contention made on behalf of the respondent no. 5. It is urged by Mr. Amal Dutt, learned Counsel for the respondent no. 5, the West Bengal Tea Development Corporation, that a sum of Rs. 4,92,000/- has been spent by the said respondent for the development of the tea garden since the date of its taking possession of the tea garden on April 21,1981, and, as such the writ petition should fail on that ground. This fact is quite immaterial, for, in our opinion, the possession of the tea garden was taken illegally. The said illegal act is not legalized on mere spending of money by the respondent. Nothing has been said in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent no.5 whether any profit has been earned by it out of the tea garden. The contention of the respondent no. 5 is rejected. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, the Rule succeeds and it is made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. As the possession of the tea garden has already been taken and delivered to the respondent no. The contention of the respondent no. 5 is rejected. 18. For the reasons aforesaid, the Rule succeeds and it is made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. As the possession of the tea garden has already been taken and delivered to the respondent no. 5, the West Bengal Tea Development Corporation, the only writ that we direct to issue is the writ of mandamus commanding the respondents and each of them to deliver possession of the tea garden to the petitioner within a month from date. A.K. Sarkar, J. I agree. Rule made absolute.