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1981 DIGILAW 361 (KAR)

STATE OF KARNATAKA v. M. RAJEEVI BAI

1981-12-04

CHANDRASHEKARAIAH, N.VENKATACHALA

body1981
VPNKATACHALA, J. ( 1 ) WRIT appeal of the State of Karnatvka of 1981, Order on I. A. I. As there was a delay of 283 days in presenting the appeal, an application, IA I was made for condoning such delay. In that application, which is supported by a verified affidavit of the Under Secretary to government, Education and Youth Depaltment, the explanation given for such delay reads :"after the receipt of the certified copy of the order, the office of the Advocate general forwarded the same to the Law department to opine as to the feasibility or otherwise of preferring an appeal against the said order. It is respectfully submitted that some time was consumed in the Law Department, for the purpose of scrutiny and also before taking any decision. The Law Department communicated its opinion to the appellants herein. Having regard to the administrative difficulties it is only after sometime a final decision could be taken. It is in these circumstances there is some delay in preferring the appeal". However, when an objection was raised by the respondents that the above explanation since did not even refer to the causes for the inordinate delay, this Court should not condone such delay, the learned High court Government Pleader, who took time, produced an additional affidavit of the under Secretary concerned. Relevant portions in that affidavit read :"3 ). . . . . . . The certified copy of the order was made available on 19 6 80. Certified copy of the order has been sent to the Law Department on 23-6 80 for the purpose of examining the feasibility of filing the appeal. 4) After the receipt of the certified copy of the order, the matter was examined by the Law Department on 2-7 1980. However, the Law Department wanted view of the Department of personal and Administrative Reforms (DPAR) as to the intendment of R. 209 A (4) of the Karnataka Treasury code. The file was sent to the DPAR on 8-7 80. The matter was examined by the DPAR. The DPAR requested the Law Department to consult the finance Department jn the matter. The file was returned on or about 23-7-1980. The file with the certified copy of the order was sent to the Finance Department on 26-7 80. The Finance Department returned the file on or about 29-12-80. The matter was examined by the DPAR. The DPAR requested the Law Department to consult the finance Department jn the matter. The file was returned on or about 23-7-1980. The file with the certified copy of the order was sent to the Finance Department on 26-7 80. The Finance Department returned the file on or about 29-12-80. The file and the certified copy of the order were mixed up in some other files and the Law Department could not take decision. The file and the certified copy of the order came to be traced on or about 4-4-1981 and on 9-4-1981, a decision was taken to prefer the writ appeal. In this way, there is a delay of about 283 days in preferring the writ appeal. The delay is bona fide and not intentional. The delay is due to inter departmental correspondence and on account of having lost the file during the period from 19 12 80 to 4 4 1981. In these circumstances, it is necessary to condone the delay in preferring the above appeal". ( 2 ) THE learned High Court Government pleader urged that the delay of 283 days in presenting this appeal had been satisfactorily explained in the above excerpted portions of the additional affidavit. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that no satisfactory explanation had been given for the delay which had occurred in the finance Department between 26-7-1980 and 29-12-1980 and the delay between 9 4-1981 and 25 5 1981. He further contended that merely because the appellant is the State Government, it cannot claim any favoured treatment in regard to condonation of delay. ( 4 ) AS long ago as in the year 1964, in state of Mysore v. Laxman Sharanappa (1), a Division Bench of this Court (of which one of us was a member), while considering an application of the State Government under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which is not different from S. 5 of the limitation Act, 1963, had observed thus :"the language of the statute does not - justify any discrimination between the state and the people and the case therefore has to be decided on general principles which apply for the condonation of delay in S. 5 of the Limitation Act". ( 5 ) IN State of W. B, v. The Administrator howrah Municipality (2), the Supreme Court has explained as to how a Court should construe the expression "sufficient cause" in S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, when its benefit is claimed by either a Government or a private party, thus :". . . . . . . . LEARNED Counsel for the first respondent, is certainly well founded in his contention that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party in default is the Government. It is no doubt true that, whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction. But it cannot also be gainsaid that the same consideration that will be shown by Courts to a private party when he claims the protection of S. 5 of the limitation Act should also be available to the State". ( 6 ) THE above decisions make it abundantly clear that it will be necessary for a court to examine in each case, the reasons given by the party seeking condonation of delay to find whether such reasons constitute sufficient cause or not, be such party, government or a private party. ( 7 ) IT is true that in a big organisation like the Government, where files and papers have to pass through several hands before decisions thereon are taken some time is occupied. It is also true that cumbersome procedures of Government machinery, contribute for considerable delays. But when the Government has to deal with cases in which appeals or petitions are to be filed within periods of limitation arescribed therefor bylaw, the tempo of the administrative machinery has to be necessarily geared up so as to make it take quick decisions and carry out follow-up actions within such periods of limitation. Government has to inevitably take such measure, for, it cannot seek extension of periods of limitation by merely saying that papers and files of cases had to pass through several of its Departments and functionaries, and that each Department or each functionary had allowed such papers and files to lie over for weeks and months, un-cared for and unattended to. Government has to inevitably take such measure, for, it cannot seek extension of periods of limitation by merely saying that papers and files of cases had to pass through several of its Departments and functionaries, and that each Department or each functionary had allowed such papers and files to lie over for weeks and months, un-cared for and unattended to. ( 8 ) BEING aware of the cumbersome procedures of the Government machinery, we have been liberal in condoning marginal delays and delays which are not unduly large, on the part of the State in presenting appeals and petitions, wherever we have found such delays to be inevitable. But we consider it wholly unjustifiable to condone the inordinate delay of 283 days in presenting the instant appeal, particularly when the only reason assigned for such delay is the usual dilatoriness of the administrative machinery of the Government. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, the learned High Court government Pleader submitted that this appeal involved interpretation of a service rule and that such interpretation is of general importance to the State in dealing with a large number of claims for dearness allowance by pensioners who take up employment after retirement. Merely because the subject matter of the appeal is of general importance, we cannot be unduly lenient in condoning inordinate delay. If the State Government feels that the interpretation placed by the learned single judge on that service rule, does not carry out the intention of the State Government, it is open to the State Government to amend that rule suitably. ( 10 ) IN the result, we decline to condone the delay in presenting the appeal and dismiss IA No. I. The consequence of not condoning such delay, is that the appeal itself stands dismissed. --- *** --- .