ORDER This application under Article 226 of the Constitution is by seven petitioners challenging the orders of compulsory retirement under Rule 2046 of the Railway Fundamental Rules ; Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume II. The petitioners in this combined application challenge the seven different orders passed in respect of seven different petitioners. There is no dispute that the petitioners were employees who are covered by the said Rule 2046 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. Clause (a) of Rule 2046 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Volume II provides that except as otherwise provided in the said rule every railway servant should retire on the date he attains the age of 58 years. Clause (h) of Rule 2046 provides as follows :– (h) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the appointing authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so have the absolute right to retire any railway servant giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. (i) if he is in Class I or Class II service or post and had entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty-five years, after he has attained the age of fifty years. (ii) in any other case after he has attained the age of fifty-five years." 2. The petitioners, however, in paragraph 2 of the petition stated that they wanted to give certain particulars of their service. Unfortunately, however, the said particulars are blank. This is an unfortunate state of affairs of pleadings in this Court which is most undesirable. We have repeatedly called attention to the fact of the careless manner in which the petitions are drafted involving vital questions. Time has now come for the Courts to exercise stricter vigilance on this aspect though we have been reluctant out of the consideration of the rights of the citizens involved to dismiss petitions on these grounds. Speaking for myself I think this permissiveness has gone enough to cause irreparable damage to the administration of justice and perhaps time has come to cry halt to this latitude on our part. 3. It, however, appears that the petitioner no. 1 was the Driver Grade 'C', Eastern Railway, Asansol. Similar is the position of the petitioners nos. 2, 3 & 4. Nothing very particular is known about the petitioners nos. 3. It, however, appears that the petitioner no. 1 was the Driver Grade 'C', Eastern Railway, Asansol. Similar is the position of the petitioners nos. 2, 3 & 4. Nothing very particular is known about the petitioners nos. 5 and 7 though petitioner no. 6 seems to be Driver Grade 'C, Eastern Railway, Asansol. The petitioner no. 1 was born, according to the service record on 7th of February, 1928. His date of appointment was 25th of May, 1949, Petitioner no. 2 was born on 6th of October, 1928. His date of appointment was 25th of April, 1949. Petitioner no. 3, Santosh Chandra Dutta was born on 7th of November, 1926 and his date of appointment was 13th of November, 1950. Petitioner no. 4 was born on 17th of August, 1924 and his date of appointment was 18th of August, 1943, Petitioner no. 5 was born on 26th of June, 1931. He joined the Government service on 27th of June, 1950. Petitioner no. 6 was born on 5th of May, 1926 and he joined Government employment on 7th of May, 1949 and petitioner no. 7 was born on 4th of July, 1932 and he joined the Government service on 6th of July, 1980. The impugned orders were passed in case of petitioner no. 1 on 9th of February, 1981, in case of petitioner no. 2 on 7th of February 1981, in case of petitioner no. 3 on the 9th of February, 1981, in case of petitioner no. 4 on 4th of February, 1981, in case of petitioner no. 5 on 4th of February, 1981, in case of petitioner no. 6 on 4th of February, 1981 and in case of petitioner no. 7 on 9th of February, 1981. All these orders as I have mentioned before were passed under Rule 2046 as 1 have indicated before. All the petitioners are indisputably governed by the said rules. The petitioners state they had very good service record and they had a ever indulged in any illegal acts or activities and the service records of the petitioners were all throughout very clean, unblemished and the petitioners had never joined any illegal strike at any point of time. They assert there was an agitation of the loco running staff from 29th of January, 1981 to 24th of February, 1981 and according to the petitioners pursuant to the said agitation. They assert there was an agitation of the loco running staff from 29th of January, 1981 to 24th of February, 1981 and according to the petitioners pursuant to the said agitation. "the petitioners could not discharge" their duties and functions in the usual manner. The petitioners contend that invocation of Rule 2046 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Volume II in their case was without complying with the conditions precedent mentioned in the said rules. Now, in this connection it may be appropriate to refer to the first order impugned in this case. The other orders were more or less with modifications on identical terms. The order in case of petitioner no. 1 is as follows :– WHEREAS the Sr. Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P) Eastern Railway Asansol (Appropriate authority) is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so ; NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 2046 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. II/Para 2(2) of S. 1 of the Railway Ministry's letter No. E 48CPC/208 dated 8.7.1950, Sr. Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P), Eastern Railway, Asansol hereby retires Shri K. C. Sarkar, Driver Gr. 'G' under Loco Foreman, E. Railway, Andal with immediate effect, he having completed 30 years service on Shri K.C. Sarkar shall be paid a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for a period of three months calculated at the rate at which he was drawing them immediately before his retirement." 4. The order was passed by the Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P). He was the appointing authority. The petitioners state that as the petitioners had completed the qualifying service period the respondents took advantage of the agitation of the loco staff and issued orders under Rule 2046 compulsorily retiring the petitioners. The petitioners, however, contend that there was no application of mind that retirement was necessary in the public interest and there was no formation of opinion by the appointing authority for invoking the rule. There was no proper consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioners, however, contend that there was no application of mind that retirement was necessary in the public interest and there was no formation of opinion by the appointing authority for invoking the rule. There was no proper consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioners also contend that the requirement of three months pay and allowance was not complied as in all the cases, the orders of retirement were intended to come into effect immediately upon the service of the notice, The petitioners contend that the impugned orders were passed in whimsical manner and to penalise the petitioners or victimise the petitioners on account of alleged participation in the loco running staff agitation. In this connection I shall presently refer to the relevant circulars and notifications issued by the Railway Board indicating the guidelines for the exercise of the powers in this case. There was no review of the need for retirement of the petitioners after the expiry of the period mentioned in the rule according to the petitioners. There was no consideration of the entire service records of the petitioners before invoking the provisions of the said rule. The impugned orders had been passed for collateral purposes not relevant or germane for the exercise of the said power. The reasons for passing the impugned orders in case of the petitioners, according to the petitioners, were not communicated to the petitioners. The petitioners, further, state that the said orders were passed for mala fide purpose and in this connection the petitioners sought to refer to certain circulars issued by the Higher Executive Authorities in wake of the agitation by the loco running staff as to invocation of the said rule instead of all proceedings during the disciplinary proceeding or by involving Rule 14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. The amount required to be tendered as I have mentioned before was not tendered. There was no formation of opinion of the others who had also reached the age and completed that period of service that petitioners were chosen out of the many to victimise the petitioners. It may incidentally be pointed out that the petitioner no. 2 namely, Durga Proshad had received the order of retirement along with the cash of Rs. 2,878/-. There was an acknowledgment receipt signed by him. It may incidentally be pointed out that the petitioner no. 2 namely, Durga Proshad had received the order of retirement along with the cash of Rs. 2,878/-. There was an acknowledgment receipt signed by him. It was contended that many of the petitioners had reached the age or completed the period of service long before the impugned orders were passed yet no action was taken against them until the loco running staff agitation. For instance, the petitioner no. 2 completed the qualifying period of 19th January 1980 and the petitioner no. 4 completed the qualifying period on 17th of August, 1979, the petitioner no. 5 completed the qualifying period on the 27th June, 1980 petitioner no. 6 on 17th of May, 1979 and petitioner no. 7 on 6th of July, 1980. Each of the petitioners made their representations against the impugned orders to the Divisional Railway Manager but no action was taken in respect of the same. 5. In order to appreciate the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners at this stage it would be appropriate to refer to certain guidelines issued by the Railway Administration for the exercise of the powers under Rule 2046. My attention was drawn to certain portion of the contents of the copy or the Railway Board's confidential letter No. E(P&A) 1-77/RT-53 dated 15th of November, 1979 addressed to the General Manager All Indian Railways and others. The said letter stipulated that with a view to improve efficiency and strengthning administrative machinery at all levels, Government have the absolute powers under Rule 2046 B-II and para (2) of S. I of Railway Ministry's letter no. E 48-CPO/200 dated 8.7.50 incorporated as para 620 of the Manual of Railway Pension Rules II to retire a railway servant in public interest before his normal date of retirement or on attaining a specified age or on completing a specific length of service. The letter further went on to observe that in order to ensure that the power conferred on the authorities empowering to retire a railway employee prematurely is exercised fairly and impartially and not arbitrarily, instructions had been issued from time to time laying down the criteria and procedure to be followed before a railway employee is retired prematurely. Then, certain guidelines were indicated and great reliance was placed on Item II being criteria, procedure and guidelines. Then, certain guidelines were indicated and great reliance was placed on Item II being criteria, procedure and guidelines. It would be better in view of the contentions involved to refer to the same. "II. Criteria, Procedure and Guidelines.–In order to ensure that the powers vested in the appropriate authority are exercised fully and impartially and not arbitrarily, it has been decided to lay down the procedure and guidelines for reviewing the cases of railway employees covered under the various aforesaid rules as mentioned below :– (1) The cases of railway servants covered by Rule 2046(h)-R. II or Rule 2046(k)-R. II or para 2(2) of Section 1 of Railway Ministry's letter No. E. 48CPC/200 dt. 8.7.50 incorporated as para 620 of the Manual of Railway Pension Rules 1950, should be reviewed six months before they attain the age of 50/55 years or complete 30 years service/30 years of qualifying service, whichever occurs earlier. (2) Committee shall be constituted for each Department on each Zonal Railway Administration as shown in Annexure 1 to which all such cases shall be referred for recommendation as to whether the officer concerned should be retired from service in the Public interest or whether he should be retained in service. (3) The criteria to be followed by the Committee in making their recommendations would be as follows : – (a) Railway employees whose integrity is doubtful, will be retired. (b) Railway employees who are found to be ineffective will also be retired. The basic consideration in identifying such employee should be the fitness/competence of the employee to continue in the post which he is holding. If he is not found fit to continue in his present post, his fitness/ competence to continue in the lower post, from where he had been previously promoted, should be considered. (c) While the entire service record of an officer should be considered at the time of review, no employee should ordinarily be retired on grounds of ineffectiveness if his service during the preceding 5 years or where he has been promoted to a higher post during that 5 years period, his service in the higher post has been found satisfactory. (d) No employee should ordinarily be retired on ground of ineffectiveness, if, in any event, he would be retiring on superannuation within a period of one year from the date of consideration of his case. (d) No employee should ordinarily be retired on ground of ineffectiveness, if, in any event, he would be retiring on superannuation within a period of one year from the date of consideration of his case. (4) The appropriate authority shall take further action on the recommendations of the Committee. In every case, where it is proposed to retire a railway servant in execise of the power conferred by the said rule (s), the appropriate authority should record in the file that it has formed its opinion that it is necessary to retire the railway servant in pursuance of the aforesaid rule(s) in the public interest. In the case of Union of India v. J. N. Sinha, the Supreme Court had observed that "the appropriate authority should bona fide form an opinion that it is in public interest to retire the officer in exercise of the powers conferred by that provisions and this decision should not be an arbitrary decision or should not be based on collateral grounds." (5) The rules relating to premature retirement should not be used; (a) to retire a railway servant on grounds of specific acts of misconduct, as a short-cut to initiating formal disciplinary proceedings; or (b) for reduction of surplus staff or as a measure of effecting general economy without following the rules and instructions relating to retrenchment. (6)(i) In case, the appropriate authority, after relevant review, comes to the conclusion that the officer is not fit for being retained in the present post, but could be retained in the next lower post from which he was promoted, a notice in the prescribed form should be served in such a case of the employee retiring him from service in pursuance of the provisions of the relevant rules. Simultaneously, it may be explained to him in a covering letter that his continuance in service beyond the age of 50/55 years or after the completion of 30 years of service, as the case may be, could be considered, if he is willing to revert to the lower post held by him previously. Simultaneously, it may be explained to him in a covering letter that his continuance in service beyond the age of 50/55 years or after the completion of 30 years of service, as the case may be, could be considered, if he is willing to revert to the lower post held by him previously. In case, he indicates his willingness to work in the lower post and gives a written request for being so reverted, the notice may be withdrawn and he may be reverted and continued in the lower post.” Clause 8 provided inter alia as follows : – "(8) When the appropriate authority has come to the conclusion that a railway employee may be prematurely retired, the three months' notice, referred to in Rule 2046(h)-R-II and Rule 2046(k) R. II may be given before that railway servant attains the specified age or has completed 30 years of service, as the case may be. But, the retirement should take place after the railway servant has attained the relevant age or has completed 30 years of service as the case may be. In this connection, attention is invited to Note 2 under Rule 2046-R-II. Accordingly, a notice even longer than three months or before the railway servant attains the age of 50-55 years/completes 30 yeas service could be given; but the date from which he is required to retire as specified in the notice should not be before be attains the age of 50/55 years, or completes 30 years service, as the case may be. Similarly, in cases of retirement under para 2(2) of S. 1 of Railway Ministry's letter No. E48CPC /200 dated 8.7.50 while the notice of such retirement could be given before that the railway servant actually completes 30 years of service qualifying for pension, the date of expiry of the notice on which the railway servant's retirement should be effective, should be one falling on or after the date of his completing 30 years' of service, qualifying for pension. Orders requiring a railway employee to retire after completing 30 years' qualifying service should, be as a rule, not be issued until after the fact that the railway employee his indeed completed, or would be completing on the date of retirement qualifying service of 30 years, has been verified, in consultation with the Accounts Officer concerned. Orders requiring a railway employee to retire after completing 30 years' qualifying service should, be as a rule, not be issued until after the fact that the railway employee his indeed completed, or would be completing on the date of retirement qualifying service of 30 years, has been verified, in consultation with the Accounts Officer concerned. Clause 10(ii) stipulated as follows : – "(ii) In a case where a railway employee refuses to accept his service of notice of retirement or order of retirement along with cheque/cash equivalent to three months' pay and allowances, it should be ensured that the 'refusal' of the railway employee is witnessed by two gazetted officers. In such a case, a copy of the notice/order of retirement may be sent under registered post with acknowledgment due to the individual concerned at the last officially known address, with a covering letter, stating that the original notice/order of retirement was taken by such and such for delivery to him/her on such and such date and that he/she refused to accept the same and in the circumstances its copy is being sent by registered post for his/her record. In such a case, the date of effect of the notice of retirement order would be from the forenoon of the date following the date of refusal by the individual (witnessed by two gazetted officers). Where the person concerned has refused to accept the cheque/ cash equivalent to three months' pay and allowances, the same procedure that is followed in case where a railway employee has failed to accept his/her dues from railway may be followed, in so far as its disbursement is concerned." 6. Then, there is procedure for consideration of representations. Then there is also elaborate procedure for the constitution of the committees to consider representation to ensure that there was fair representation so that there may be proper consideration. 7. While on this point before I deal with the points raised in the affidavit-in-opposition and the other legal issues I may mention that my attention was drawn to a Xerox copy of a notice purported to have been issued by the Emergency Officer at Gomoh which reads as follows : – "All Loco running staff who are absenting are hereby informed that those staff who have completed 55 yrs. of age/30 yrs. of age/30 yrs. of service will be retired from service with immediate effect in case they do not join their duty by 20.00 hrs. on date. This is as per the directive received from Railway Board. Sd/-Illegible, Emergency Officer at Gomoh Copy to all the staff concerned as per list enclosed. LF, TF(R), Loco and Traction Inspectors. The running staff and their families should be suitably advised. Sd/- Illegible, Emergency Officer at Gomoh. 8. The Manual of Railway Pension Rules, 1980 was also placed before me in order to draw attention to the provisions of Rules 620, Clause 2 whereof provides that the authority competent to remove the railway servant from service might require him to retire any time after he has completed 30 year qualifying service provided that the authority should give in this behalf a notice in writing to the railway servant at least three months before the date on which be was required to retire or three months pay and allowance in lieu of such notice should be paid to him. 9. In the affidavit in opposition in this case on behalf of the respondents who are five in numbers, namely. Union of India, General Manager, Eastern Railway, Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Railway, Chief Operating Superintendent, Eastern Railway and Senior Divisional Mechanical Engineer (P). The affidavit-in-opposition has been affirmed by one A.K.P. Sinha who is the Senior Divisional Mechanical Engineer (Power) Eastern Railway, Asansol being the respondent no. 5 herein. He has affirmed the affidavit on behalf of him as well as on behalf of the other respondents. In the said affidavit he has mentioned about the agitation in the Loco Running Staff Association. The allegations in respect of which are more or less similar to the allegations raised on behalf of the respondents in C.R. 1388(W) of 1981 (Joyonta Kumar Roy v. Union of India) (since reported in 1981(2) CHN 358) in which I have just delivered judgment. It is, therefore, not necessary to recapitulate the said statements. In this case the respondents' case was that as the petitioners had either attained the age of 55 or completed 30 years service they could be retired under Rule 2046 of the Railway Establishment Code on tile basis of the recommendation of the Review Committee consisting of two Heads of Department and accordingly action was taken against the petitioners. In this case the respondents' case was that as the petitioners had either attained the age of 55 or completed 30 years service they could be retired under Rule 2046 of the Railway Establishment Code on tile basis of the recommendation of the Review Committee consisting of two Heads of Department and accordingly action was taken against the petitioners. Allegations were made that the persons against whom including the petitioners action under the said rules had been taken were persons who had indulged in violent and disruptive work and illegal activities intimidating loyal workers during the agitation or strike by the Loco Running Staff Association. In this context having regard to the background of the service record if was asserted that the Review Committee passed the order against the petitioners. It appears that on or about 8th February 1981 Chief Personnel Officer wrote a letter to the Divisional Railway Manager, Eastern Railway stating that the cases sent to the Head Office had been reviewed by the Committee of two heads of the department and they had recommended the six employees mentioned in the said letter to be unfit for continued retention in service. The remaining three employees might be retained in service which was mentioned. Therefore, it was highlighted on behalf of the respondents that as appeared that cases of nine persons had been sent but after application of mind the respondents found that the three others need not be retired compulsorily at that time. Their names are also mentioned in the said letter. It appears that on the 7th February, 1981 the Divisional Railway Manager, Asansol by his confidential letters had sent to the Review Committee the cases of nine employees of Class III staff and the recommendation was received on the 8th of February, 1981. The special report sent for the consideration was also annexed. It appears, therefore, that so far as petitioner no. 1 was concerned against his integrity it was noted that nothing adverse was known, about his initiative it was stated that it was poor, about his drive it was indicated that it was poor. His intelligence was marked as average and he was considered physically fit and against the column 'Keenness' it was noted nil. General assessment was marked as unsatisfactory. Against the column 'whether his working in the present post is considered' it was indicated it was poor. Adverse remarks were enclosed. His intelligence was marked as average and he was considered physically fit and against the column 'Keenness' it was noted nil. General assessment was marked as unsatisfactory. Against the column 'whether his working in the present post is considered' it was indicated it was poor. Adverse remarks were enclosed. Now, the adverse remark appears to be dated 7th February, 1981 which stated as follows : "He participated in the illegal strike in 1960 and again in 1974 and he was removed from service. His increments have been stopped on several occasions. He is active to disrupt the train movement. He abuses toe superiors by filthy languages. In the present agitation of the loco running staff, he has mobilised some workers and is trying to disrupt the train movement. He intimidates and threatens other loyal staff to abstain from work so that his aim in paralysing the train movement may be successful." 10. My attention was also drawn to the case of Sri Santosh Chandra Dutta which was more or less of the same nature. It is not necessary to reiterate the same. The remark about Sri S.S. Singh being the petitioner no. 7 was also more or less similar. There was another communication which is dated 2nd of February, 1981 which deal with the cases of several persons of which eight persons were directed by the Review Committee as unfit for retention while seven others were considered fit for retention. Those who were considered to be unfit for retention the remarks against them are more or less the same. On behalf of the petitioners my attention was drawn to the fact that in case of none of these petitioners there was any remark about the integrity of the persons concerned or any remarks indicating that the employees concerned had become old and incapable of discharging their duties as a Government employee of Railway Service. In most of the cases the maximum adverse remark about them was either keenness was not alert or physically not very apt. On behalf of the petitioners it was also contended that the so called adverse remarks supposed to have been sent forward to the Review Committee were also not forwarded to the petitioner. In most of the cases the maximum adverse remark about them was either keenness was not alert or physically not very apt. On behalf of the petitioners it was also contended that the so called adverse remarks supposed to have been sent forward to the Review Committee were also not forwarded to the petitioner. It was also highlighted that the guidelines indicated that about the retention there should be a review within or after certain period of time if the railway servant concerned had either attained the age of 55 years or had reached the qualifying period. But long thereafter and that, according to the petitioners indicated that they were after they had reached the qualifying period or had attained the age of 55 years as the case may be they had not been considered to be unfit for rentention by a proper review or appraisement of their conduct in the Government but the so called review had been done hastily with ulterior motive of taking action against them as an alternative to the disciplinary proceeding or for action under Rule 14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules in order to victimise the petitioners. In the affidavit-in-reply which is affirmed by one Kamalesh Chandra Sarkar, the petitioner No. 1 he has generally denied these allegations and he has also denied the points taken about the maintainability of the application about which the respondents had contended. He has also denied that they took part in any illegal or violent activities as alleged or at all. He had also reiterated that no copies of the adverse remarks were forwarded to the petitioners. It was also stressed that the respondents did not tender the amount of money required to be tendered according to the rules and along with the notices of termination and in the premises the alleged notices of termination were therefore illegal, void, bad and ineffective. It was reiterated that there was no application of mind by the appropriate authorities as to the period when the petitioners cases were required to be reviewed under the rules and there was no proper application of mind by the appropriate authorities. They have also annexed a communication marked as 'secret' issued from the office of the Chief Personnel Officer, Garden Reach which reads as follows :– “S. E. RAILWAY A. Sen C.P.O. SECRET Office of the Chief Personnel Officer, Gardenreach, Calcutta – 43. They have also annexed a communication marked as 'secret' issued from the office of the Chief Personnel Officer, Garden Reach which reads as follows :– “S. E. RAILWAY A. Sen C.P.O. SECRET Office of the Chief Personnel Officer, Gardenreach, Calcutta – 43. No. SE/P/U/Poly Dated, the 10th February, 81. To All HOD'S AND DRMS Instructions received from the Board which are reproduced below have already been transmitted to you through 'Emergency'. "Further to the Instructions contained in Wireless message of even number sent yesterday regarding emergency offices and reemployment of persons in the present context following further instructions are issued. The services of staff who have already attained 55 years of age and are continuing in service could be terminated in terms of the review of their service records for premature retirement without resorting to S. 14(ii) of the D & A Rule wherever activities of staff are considered prejudicial to smooth working of the Railways and it is desirable to terminate their service ;" Kindly act accordingly. Yours sincerely, Sd/-(A Sen)" 11. Rule 2046 as clarified by the said circulars enjoins that six months before the appropriate date there should be a review about the desirability of retention of the Government servant concerned in the background of public interest. The circulars made it clear that the exercise of the power should not be a substitute for disciplinary proceedings. It was, further, clear from the guidelines issued that those who are weak or unworthy and who are incapable of properly discharging their particular job should only be compulsorily retired in the manner and these question, it was stressed should be objectively applied. There must be application of mind in a proper manner. On behalf of the parties in support of the rival contentions about the ambit and the scope for the exercise of the power several authorities were cited at the bar. Out of deference to the arguments advanced it would be necessary to refer to some of those authorities. 12. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of State of U. P. v. Chandra Mohan AIR 1977 SC Page 2411 where the Supreme Court was dealing with All India Services (Death cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules 958, Rule 16(3) which are more or less in similar terms with the present rule. 12. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of State of U. P. v. Chandra Mohan AIR 1977 SC Page 2411 where the Supreme Court was dealing with All India Services (Death cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules 958, Rule 16(3) which are more or less in similar terms with the present rule. In respect of the exercise of the powers certain instructions had been issued regarding the procedure to be followed by the Ministry of home Affairs. In this connection Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 16(3) being rigorous vis-a-vis a Government servant not himself willing to retire under the rule, the rule should in proper case be invoked in a fair and reasonable manner. Since rule 16(3) did not contain, according to the Supreme Court, any guidelines, directions or criteria the instructions issued by the Government furnish an essential and salutary procedure for the purpose of securing uniformity in application of the rule. These instructions really fill up the gaps in the provisions and were embodied in the conditions of service. These were binding on the Government and could not be violated to the prejucice of the Government servants. The Supreme Court felt that one condition was absolutely imperative in the instructions and that was the Review Committee, had considered the case of an employee and the Central Government did not decide on the report of the Committee endorsed by the State Government to take any prejudicial action against the officer after receipt of the report of the Committee endorsed by the State Government. There was no warrant for a second Review Committee under the scheme of rule 16(3) read with the instructions to reassess his case on the same materials unless exceptional circumstances emerge in the meantime or when the next stage arrived. However, when integrity of an officer was in question that would be an exceptional circumstance for which orders might be passed in respect of such a person under rule 16(3) at any time if other conditions of that rule were fulfilled apart from the choice of disciplinary action which also was open to the Government. The Supreme Court reiterated that the pleasure doctrine under Article 310 was in no way unoffending resurrected with appropriate vigour towards the tail end of the career of a Government servant under rule 16(3) in public interest. The Supreme Court reiterated that the pleasure doctrine under Article 310 was in no way unoffending resurrected with appropriate vigour towards the tail end of the career of a Government servant under rule 16(3) in public interest. Compulsory retirement under the service rules was not by way of a punishment as understood in service jurisprudence. however unsavory it might be otherwise. During the entire tenure of Government servants from the date of temporary or probationary appointment till termination or retirements as the case may be there was an undoubted security, according to the Supreme Court, for them against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank except in the manner laid down in Article 311(2) read with the relevant laws or rules made under Article 309. Where an order of compulsory retirement was challenged as arbitrary or mala fide by making clear and specific allegations it would be necessary for the Government to produce all the necessary materials to rebut such pleas to satisfy the Court by voluntarily producing such documents as would be a complete answer. It would be for the Government also to decide whether at that stage privilege should be claimed with regard to any particular document. I am, however, not concerned with this aspect of the matter. 13. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Baldev Raj v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC page 70 : 1980(4) SC Cases 321. There the Supreme Court was dealing with the Fundamental Rules 56(j)(i) and the expression 'public interest'. The appellant before the Supreme Court was an Accounts Officer compulsorily retired under rule 56(j)(i) of the Fundamental Rules. Reliance was placed on the observations of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer at pages 72 and 73 of the report. The learned Judge observed as follows :– "8. This takes us to the meat of the matter, viz., whether the appellant was retired because and only because it was necessary in the public interest so to do. It is an affirmative action, not a negative disposition, a positive conclusion, not a neutral attitude. It is a terminal step to justify in which the onus is on the Administration, not a matter where the victim must make out the contrary. Security of tenure is the condition of efficiency of service. The Administration, to be competent, must have servants who are not plagued by uncertainty about tomorrow. It is a terminal step to justify in which the onus is on the Administration, not a matter where the victim must make out the contrary. Security of tenure is the condition of efficiency of service. The Administration, to be competent, must have servants who are not plagued by uncertainty about tomorrow. At the age of 50 when you have family responsibility and the somber problems of one's own life's evening, your experience, accomplishments and fullness of fitness become an asset to the Administration, if and only if you are not harried or worried by 'what will happen to me and my family ?' 'Where will I go if cashiered ?' 'How will I survive when I am too old to be newly employed and too young to be superannuated?' These considerations become all the more important in departments where functional independence, fearless scrutiny and freedom to expose evil or error in high places is the task. And the Ombudsmanic tasks of the office of audit vested in the C & AG. and the entire army of monitors and minions under him are too strategic for the nation’s financial health and discipline that immunity from subde threats and oblique over-aweing is very much in public interest. So it is that we must emphatically state that under the guise of ‘public interest’ if unlimited discretion is regarded acceptable for making an order of premature retirement, it will be the surest menace to public interest and must fail for unreasonableness, arbitrariness and disguised dismissal. To constitutionalise the rule, we must so read it as to free it from the potential for the mischiefs we have just projected. The exercise of power must be bona fide and promote public interest. There is no demonstrable ground to infer mala fides here and the only infirmity alleged which deserves serious notice as to whether the order has been made in public interest. When an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest the state must disclose the material so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of 'public interest' justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved from the minimal review well settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well known and we are confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest. 9. We will consider this question to the extent disclosed by the record and in the light of the submissions made by both the panics. The whole purpose of the rule is to weed out the worthless without the punitive extremes covered by Art. 311 of the Constitution. After all, administration, to be efficient, must not be manned by drones, do-nothings, incompetents and unworthies. They may not be delinquent who must be punished but may be a burden on the Administration if by insensitive, insouciant, unintelligent or dubious conduct impede the flow or promote stagnation, in a country where speed, sensitivity, probity, and non-irritative public relations and enthusiastic creativity are urgently needed but paper-logged process and callous cadres are the besetting sin of the Administration. It is in public interest to retire a never-do-well, but to juggle with confidential reports when a man's career is at stake is a confidence trick contrary to public interest. Moreover, confidential reports are often subjective. Impressionistatic and must receive sedulous checking as basis for decision making. The appropriate authority, not the court, makes the decision, but even so, a caveat is necessary to avoid misuse." 14. In the case of S. R. Venkataraman v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC page 49 the Supreme Court was again considering the exercise of the power under rule 56(j)(i) of the Fundamental Rules in making the order of compulsory retirement. After referring to the facts the Supreme Court reiterated that the power should not be utilised for collateral purposes but must be exercised in accordance with the guidelines indicated for the exercise of the discretion. After referring to the facts the Supreme Court reiterated that the power should not be utilised for collateral purposes but must be exercised in accordance with the guidelines indicated for the exercise of the discretion. The Supreme Court referred to several English authorities and reiterated that if people who have to exercise the public duty by exercising their discretion take into account the matter which the Courts consider not be proper for the guidelines of their discretion then in the eye of law they should be considered to have not exercised the discretion at all and this passage was relied in support of the plea that admittedly in this case the power of compulsory retirement had been exercised for the alleged partipation of the petitioners in the agitation connected with loco staff agitation. The service records of the petitioners were not considered whether the petitioners were fit for discharging public functions in future or their physical and mental capacities were such in which they could discharge the functions in accordance with law were not at all taken into consideration. 15. For the proposition that uncommunicated adverse remarks could not be taken into consideration on behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on the observations of the Division Bench of this court in the case of T. K. Das v. Union of India 1980 Labour & Industrial Cases page 130 : 1980 SLR 416 where the Division Bench reversed a decision of mine sitting singly in which case the question was concerned with the application of the rule 16(3) of All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules 1958 read with All India Services (Confidential Rolls) Rules, 1970. Though in that case I had referred to the adverse remarks and was of the view that having regard to the present climate in the country the adverse remarks were not such as to merit compulsory retirement at that time, I had held that even though adverse remarks were enjoined to be communicated to the party concerned non-communication of such adverse remarks would not disentitle the Government to take into consideration those remarks in passing the impugned order such adverse remarks. These views were not upheld by the Division Bench of this court. These views were not upheld by the Division Bench of this court. On behalf of the respondents learned advocate submitted that Division Bench was in error in view of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M. E. Reddy AIR 1980 SC page 563 where the Supreme Court held that that the confidential character report could certainly be considered by the appointing authority in passing any order of retirement under Rule 16(3) of All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1958. The Supreme Court reiterated that in any event the report of the Review Committee is not binding. But before passing an order of retirement there should be an examination of the history of the entire period of service of the person concerned. A stray entry here and there in the adverse report cannot be taken into consideration. The Government should take an over all picture of the person concerned during his years of service. The Supreme Court, further, reiterated that efficiency or dedication should be properly judged. The purpose was to eliminate deadwood; the purpose was to find out that because of the long period of service standard of efficiency or initiative of the person concerned has been affected or not. 16. In this connection my attention was drawn to the decision in the case of A. C. Bose v. Union of India 1974 CLJ page 8 where the Division Bench of this court to which I was a party held that Government instructions could not supplant the statutory rules, these might supplement the rules as these might make provisions for matters about which the rules were silent. Therefore, in determining whether the order of compulsory retirement, was justified in that case it was necessary to consider whether the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56(j)(i) but also the directions, instructions and notifications issued from time to time by Government to supplement the rule on matters on which the rule was silent. There we were concerned with an order of retirement passed under Rule 56(j)(i) of the Fundamental Rules. We, further, held that since Fundamental Rule 56(j) provide for formation or the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority and not by the court, the sufficiency of the ground or the material was not justiciable. There we were concerned with an order of retirement passed under Rule 56(j)(i) of the Fundamental Rules. We, further, held that since Fundamental Rule 56(j) provide for formation or the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority and not by the court, the sufficiency of the ground or the material was not justiciable. But some ground or material germane to the issue should exist and it was open to the court to examine whether such ground or material existed or not. Before an order for compulsory retirement was made the appropriate authority should form an opinion that it was in the public interest to make the order. The opinion could not be formed arbitrarily, it could not be based on collateral grounds. It should be dependent on some ground's or materials germane to the issue of compulsory retirement and when an order for compulsory retirement was challenged in a court of law the court had the right to examine whether some grounds or materials germane to the issue existed although the court was not interested in the sufficiency of these materials. In the Post aid Telegraph Department Notification dated 8th September, 1970 it was laid down that he Government servants whose integrity was doubtful should be retired and in locating others who are ineffective the basic consideration should be fitness or competence of the employee to continue in the post which he was holding at the time of review. We, further, held that in that case the integrity of the officer concerned was not doubtful. We further found that the fitness and /or competence at the time of review was not the basic consideration. Hence the instruction had not been followed. In the circumstances, we quashed the order on the ground that the materials germane were not disclosed and secondly, that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the record of performance of the officer concerned up to the time of review. 17. It was next contended that in the facts and the circumstances of the case, in any event, there was non-compliance with the rules in as much as the amount required to be tendered along with the notice of termination was not tendered. Therefore the impugned order was invalid. In this connection my attention was drawn to a decision in the case of The Workmen of Ms. Mcleod & Co. Ltd v. M/s. Mcleod & Co. Therefore the impugned order was invalid. In this connection my attention was drawn to a decision in the case of The Workmen of Ms. Mcleod & Co. Ltd v. M/s. Mcleod & Co. Ltd. & Ors 1980(1) Calcutta High Court Notes Page 229 where the Court was concerned with the termination of service of a workman under S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 25F of the said Act enjoins that if a workman was proposed to be retrenched he should be given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the workman should be paid one month's wages if his services were to be terminated without notice in lieu of such notice. The Section further stipulated that no workman should be retrenched unless the workmen had been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which should be equivalent to 15 days average pay and the section further enjoins that no workman should be retrenched until notice in the prescribed manner was served on the appropriate Government. Construing the said provisions the Tribunal held that retrenchment in both the cases was justified and the workmen were not entitled to retrenchment compensation. In the hearing of the application under Article 226 of the Constitution it was contended that payment having been made to the workman at the time of retrenchment as provided by S. 25F of the Act and asking them to collect their dues from the office were not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act. It was held in that case that the provisions of the Act though mandatory must be given reasonable interpretation of the unconditioned offer to the employee concerned to collect the amount due before termination came into effect amounted to due compliance with the provisions of the Act. 18. On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on sub-paragraphs (c) and (e) of paragraph 6 of the affidavit-in-Opposition to indicate that the unquivocal stand of the respondents was that action had been taken against the petitioners for compulsory retirement on the ground of the alleged participation by the petitioners in the said agitation of the loco running staff, It was, further, asserted on behalf of the respondents that action taken against the petitioners had salutary effect. In the premises, it was emphasised on behalf of the petitioners that it was abundantly clear that in the facts and circumstances of the case action against the petitioners had been taken because of the agitation in the loco running staff and not because they were considered objectively to be unfit for retention in the Government service in the public interest having regard to the guidelines indicated which I have referred to hereinbefore. 19. On behalf of the respondents, however, it was stressed that compulsory retirement was not punishment. It was a termination in terms of the employment, a government servant or a railway servant in this case is governed by the rules and the rules specifically give the Government or the appropriate authority to compulsorily retire its employees on fulfilment of certain conditions and those conditions indisputedly in this case had been fulfilled. It was not a punishment. No stigma was attached. In this connection my attention was drawn to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC page 1428 where the Supreme Court was dealing with the Punjab Civil service Rules, Vol. 2. Rule 55E in respect of retirement of servant after 55 years. It was more or less in similar terms as the present rule which gave Government power to retire a Government servant on attainment of age of 55 years after giving notice of three months or by tendering three months salary in lieu thereof. There the Supreme Court reiterated that tendering the amount of three months salary in lieu of notice did not put the Government servant in any disadvantageous position. I am really not concerned with this aspect of the matter. Strong reliance, however, was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court on behalf of the respondents in the case of Union of India v. J. N. Sinha AIR 1971 SC page 40 which is one of the first cases which decided the ambit and amplitude of the power of compulsory retirement under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules which as I have mentioned before is in identical terms with the present rule. There the Court held that in that case as the rule provided for tendering the amount there was no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not hearing the Government servants or not giving the Government servant an opportunity to make representation against the order of compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court reiterated that rules of natural justice were not embodied rules nor they were elevated to the position of the fundamental rights. Their aim was to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules could only operate in areas not covered by any law validly made. This did not supplant the law but supplemented these. If a statutory provision could be read consistently with the principles of natural justice the courts should do so. But if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excluded the application of any rules then it was not necessary to induct the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court reiterated that where an appropriate authority bona fide formed opinion that the Government servant be retired in the public interest it could pass the order of compulsory retirement. That opinion could not be challenged, nor Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules require that opportunity to show cause against compulsory retirement should be given. Order of compulsory retirement could be challenged only ground that either the requisite opinion was not formed or that the order was passed arbitrarily or on collateral grounds. The Supreme Court was further of the opinion that Fundamental Rule 56(j) held the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of public. While a minimum service was guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest, Compulsory retirement involved no civil consequences. Rule 56(j) was not intended for taking any penal action against the Government servant. The rule merely embodied one of the facts of the 'pleasure doctrine' embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. 20. It was, further, emphasised that in this case there has been substantial compliance with the guidelines. It was emphasised that public interest was an expression of wide amplitude. The rule merely embodied one of the facts of the 'pleasure doctrine' embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. 20. It was, further, emphasised that in this case there has been substantial compliance with the guidelines. It was emphasised that public interest was an expression of wide amplitude. If a government servant after he had reached the qualifying period is enjoined by the rules by his conduct was thought to be unfit for further retention by the appropriate authority then an action could be taken against him even though disciplinary proceedings might also be taken against him. It was sought to be urged that these two proceedings were not mutually exclusive. It was emphasised that in this case both C. P. O. and S. P. O. considered the matter and a large number of cases were sent to the Review Committee but all were not considered unfit for retention and it was emphasised that the fact that some were retained indicated that there was application of mind. The conduct of the Government servant concerned at a particular moment in the Government Administration is a relevant factor to take into consideration the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the said Government servant. If this material was properly considered by the appropriate authority, as emphasised it was done in this case then the sufficiency of the material or the correctness of the decision is not a matter for judicial review. To highlight this point attention was drawn to the averments made in paragraphs 23 and 24 of the affidavit-in-opposition. It was, then, emphasised that the petitioners being Class III employees there was no question of any confidential remarks being maintained against them regularly. As such the fact that the confidential adverse remarks had not been communicated to the petitioners did not violate the norms or the procedure. In case of the petitioners special reports were made and on the basis of the special report as the petitioners had reached the qualifying period it was thought prudent to terminate the petitioners' services. As such the fact that the confidential adverse remarks had not been communicated to the petitioners did not violate the norms or the procedure. In case of the petitioners special reports were made and on the basis of the special report as the petitioners had reached the qualifying period it was thought prudent to terminate the petitioners' services. In this connection it was contended that mere non-communication of contents of any adverse remarks by itself does not vitiate the action taken on the basis of such adverse remark and the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of T. K Das v. Union of India, 1980 Labour and Industrial Cases 136 could not be considered good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M. E. Reddy, AIR 1980 SC page 563 paragraph 27. 21. My attention was drawn to pages 31, 32, 35 and 36 of the petition to state that the petitioners were tendered the amount and the letters communicating the termination were accompanied by the amounts of the money as required by the rule. In case of one of the petitioners as I have mentioned before namely, Durga Prashad being petitioner no. 2 he has already accepted the amount. So far as the others registered covers which had come back 'refused' or 'could not be traced' were also produced before me and I must keep on record that on 23rd of July, 1981 during the hearing of this application a letter written to K. C. Sarkar was opened. In this connection it would be better to refer to the minutes of the court of that date. The said minutes read as follows. "A letter being No. SC/790/LRSA/11/R dated 11th February 1981 addressed to Sri K. C. Sarker has been opened in court and kept on record. This has also been shown to the otherside. A cheque bearing No. A 109228 dated 10.2.81 for a sum of Rs. 2743/50 issued in favour of Sri K. C. Sarkar has been sent to him by a letter no. S/C-16/ASN/751 dated 12.2.81 has also been produced in court and shown to the otherside. But the cheque has been returned to the Railway authorities in court. 22. A cheque bearing No. A 109228 dated 10.2.81 for a sum of Rs. 2743/50 issued in favour of Sri K. C. Sarkar has been sent to him by a letter no. S/C-16/ASN/751 dated 12.2.81 has also been produced in court and shown to the otherside. But the cheque has been returned to the Railway authorities in court. 22. In this connection reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of R. L. Butail v. Union of India & Ors 1971 (2) SC Reports page 55 where the Supreme Court at pages 62 and 63 of the report observed as follows :– "These rules abundantly show that a confidential report is intended to be a general assessment of work performed by a Government servant subordinate to the reporting authority, that such reports are maintained for the purpose of serving as date of comparative merit when questions of promotion, confirmation etc. arise. The also show that such reports are not ordinarily to contain specific incidents upon which assessments are made except in cases where as a result of any specific incident a censure or a warning is issued and when such warning is by an order to be kept in the personal file of the Government servant. In such a case the officer making the order his to give a reasonable opportunity to the Government servant to present his case. The contention, therefore, that the adverse remarks did not contain specific instances and were, therefore, contrary to the rules, cannot be sustained. Equally unsustainable is the corollary that because of that omission the appellant could not make an adequate representation and that therefore the confidential reports are vitiated. Further, the rules do not provide for nor require an opportunity to be heard before any adverse entry is made. The contention that an enquiry would be necessary before the adverse entry is made suffers from a misapprehension that such an entry amounts to the penalty of censure set out in r. 11 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The entry is made under the Office Order of 1961 set out above by way of an annual assessment of the work done by the Government servant and not by way of a penalty under the said Central Civil Services Rules. The entry is made under the Office Order of 1961 set out above by way of an annual assessment of the work done by the Government servant and not by way of a penalty under the said Central Civil Services Rules. True it is that such remarks would be taken into consideration when a question such as that of promotion arises and when comparative merits of persons eligible for promotion are considered. But then, whenever a Government servant aggrieved by an adverse entry he has an opportunity of making a representation. But a representation would be considered by a higher authority who, if satisfied, would either amend, correct or even expunge a wrong entry, so that it is not as if an aggrieved Government servant is without remedy. Making of an adverse entry is thus not equivalent to imposition of a penalty which would necessitate an enquiry or the giving of a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the concerned Government servant. This part of the appellant's grievance, therefore has to be rejected." 23. It was, further, contended that though the review was not done after the expiry of the qualifying period, the fact that in the guidelines there were sufficient indication that no action should be taken against the railway servant concerned who has only one year to retire in the normal course indicated that review could be made at any time and it need not be made just before the six months prior to the attainment of the qualifying period. In this connection reliance was placed on the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition to indicate that there was sufficient materials to come to the conclusion that the petitioners were ineffective so far as further retention was concerned. On behalf of the petitioners, however, it was highlighted that the harmonious construction of Rule 2046 and the other provisions governing the discipline and condition of service would only lead to the conclusion that this was a special provision intended to be used in case of particular government servants who had become deadwoods and whose further retention in the Government would not produce any public good. The expression 'public interest' must be in the context of these rules judged in a proper perspective. 24. It was contended that the conditions of tendering money should be strictly complied with. The expression 'public interest' must be in the context of these rules judged in a proper perspective. 24. It was contended that the conditions of tendering money should be strictly complied with. In this connection reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of R.B. B. A. Mills v. Labour Court Nagpur AIR 1972 SC page 451 to emphasise that payment of allowance in lieu of notice was a mandatory provision and should be strictly complied and in this case as no attempt has been made to serve the notice along with the money properly the purported termination was ineffective. 26. In the background of the aforesaid facts and circumstances I have to determine firstly, whether in this case the exercise of the power has been made on the materials properly and objectively in accordance with the object of the rule. Secondly, I have to determine whether the power has been exercised in accordance with the procedure laid down and lastly, I have to consider whether the notice of termination have become effective in terms of the rule. 27. Having regard in this case to the ground indicated it appears to me that in the case of the petitioners in applying Rule 2046 the basic consideration had not whether they were physically fit and mentally alert and competent at the time of retirement. The basic requirement of the rule as I have mentioned before was to weed out the deadwoods or who have become after certain period of service ineffective for any initiative of any kind of proper action in the government, It is true that indisciplined mind or indisciplined conduct is also an indication of ineffectiveness in continuance of the government service. But it bas been clearly laid down in the guidelines that Rule 2046 was no substitute for disciplinary action in appropriate case under Rule 14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, even assuming that petitioners being Driver. But it bas been clearly laid down in the guidelines that Rule 2046 was no substitute for disciplinary action in appropriate case under Rule 14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, even assuming that petitioners being Driver. Grade 'C' no confidential character rolls were required to be maintained of them as 'contended for by the respondents, even though as I have indicated before that before taking action under Rule 2046 it was not mandatory to communicate adverse remarks, if any made on this occasion, it appears to me that the basic consideration was the very improper and irresponsible attitude and conduct of the petitioners at the time of the loco agitation strike or loco agitation movement. The officers of such type and conduct if true, and the materials upon which these allegations are made, it appears to me as such that these government servants are not to be retained, but that does not entitle the government to take resort to the rule of compulsory retirement as enjoined by Rule 2046 as explained by the instructions. The integrity of none of the petitioners had been doubted. The entire service records of the petitioners upto the date of the passing of the orders had not been reviewed though in the affidavit in opposition it had been stated that the petitioners had in the past conducted themselves in certain manner as to running of the train etc, it appear, reading the entire order in the case of several petitioners, that the predominant object of the impugned action was to take disciplinary action for the conduct of the petitioners during the loco agitation strike. Public interest is a word of importance and of very great significance. If what the respondents alleged that the petitioners were of the type of he officers that in respect of the running of the essential services the petitioners look a violent attitude and conducted themselves in such manner which not only made them abstain from duty and thereby causing disruption of the running of the essential services but also prevented others by intimidation of physical violence of these officers should have been terminated and the public revenue should not have been made liable to bear the burden of paying pensions to these persons simply because they had either attained the age of 55 years or had completed 30 years of service. It is, therefore, apparent that the respondents had not objectively and correctly applied their minds to the main object and purpose of Rule 2046 as explained by the guidelines from time to time issued. If rule 2046 is read as an additional power on certain condition for the purposes mentioned in Rule 14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules then a question of discrimination would arise. Therefore, a harmonious construction of Rule 2046 with Rule 14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules should be made to prevent Rule 2046 immune from attack under Article 14 of the constitution. When two construction are possible, one which will make the provision constitutionally valid and the other which will make the provisions constitutionally doubtful the former should be preferred to the latter. As the grounds mentioned in support of the impugned orders are grounds which could be validly taken for passing necessary orders under Rule14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, in my opinion, in the facts and in the circumstances of the case, these orders cannot be sustained. The orders therefore must quashed. 28. I am, however, unable to accept the petitioners contention that simply because review had not been done at the first opportunity after their attainment of age of 55 years or completion of 30 years of service the respondents were precluded from reviewing at any time thereafter. In my opinion they were entitled to do so provided they keep the guidelines in mind. I further make it quite clear that this order will not preclude the respondents from considering the cases of the petitioners either under Rule 14(ii) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules of any appropriate rules or under Rule 2046 afresh in the light of the observations made and in accordance with the rules and the guidelines issued and to arrive at such decisions as they consider fit and proper in accordance with the law. 29. In the view I have taken it is not necessary to decide whether there has been actual compliance with rule by tendering money but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case it appears to me that when the money was sent by registered post in these cases there have been substantial compliance with the rule. Had it been necessary for me to decide this controversy I would have held in favour of the respondents. 30. Had it been necessary for me to decide this controversy I would have held in favour of the respondents. 30. With these observations these rules are made absolute. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties will pay and bear their own costs. Orders quashed. Rule made absolute.