JUDGMENT Murlidhar, J. - The controversy in this second appeal is regarding 33 acres southern portion of plot No. 337 total area 1.41 acres which is alleged by the defendant-respondent K.G.K. College to have been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act for the institution. The appeal arises out of a suit by the present appellants filed on 24-8-1961 for a declaration that they are owners in possession of the disputed land notwithstanding the land acquisition proceedings which allegedly did not affect their rights and for a permanent injunction restraining the institution from interference with the plaintiff's possession. By an amendment the relief of possession after demolition of any constructions made by the institution was also added. Both the Courts below have dismissed the suit. 2. The plaintiff's case in short was that they were the owners of plot No. 337 since long prior to abolition of Zamindari, that their father had constructed a temple and a number of quarters and shops in part of the plot and that they had been in possession of the whole plot, that they had learnt for the first time on 25-4-1956 that the land had been acquired for the college playing ground; that there had been no public notice in locality as required by Section 4 (1) Land Acquisition Act and nor did the plaintiff ever receive any notice about the said proceedings, and therefore, the proceedings were void and could not affect their rights. The defence case was that the plaintiff had no title and the land belonged to Gram Samaj the acquisition proceedings were valid and that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court held that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land in suit and the suit was within limitation as 12 years rule was applicable to a suit for possession. On the question of validity of land acquisition proceedings it held that public notice of the substance all notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act had not been given in the locality that individual notices to persons known or believed to be interested had not been served on the plaintiff and hence the proceedings were "fraudulent, illegal and ineffective". The Court also repelled the defendant's plea of estoppel. In first appeal the Civil Judge reversing the finding on the question of title held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their title. The Court also repelled the defendant's plea of estoppel. In first appeal the Civil Judge reversing the finding on the question of title held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their title. On the question of limitation it held that the Collector had given an award on 22-2-1956 and possession of the acquired land had been taken on 25-4-56 and therefore, Article 14 of the Limitation Act prescribing a period of 1 year applied and the suit was barred by limitation. In view of these findings the lower appellate Court did not go to the question whether the land acquisition proceedings were invalid for want of public notice under Section 4 (1) and individual notices under Section 9. In second appeal only the three points of title, limitation, and invalidity of, the proceedings have been canvassed. 3. On the question of title, it is not disputed that initially Budhsen father of the plaintiff held the plot No. 337 and had constructed temple, quarters and shops in the remaining northern portion thereof which part is still in plaintiff's possession. The scale maps attached to the affidavit, counter-affidavit exchanged in second appeal (as the map filed in the trial Court was not traceable on record.) Show that approximately 54 metres northern portion of the plot is still in possession of the plaintiff or their transferees and has quarters, buildings and temples on it with open land also. But the southern approximately 34 metres (the width of both portions is approximately 73 metres) acquired for play ground is vacant. It is also not disputed that in the settlement of 1349 the whole plot was recorded as Abadi in the revenue papers. The lower appellate Court has accepted the defendant's contention that Abadi sites in villages vested in the Gram Samaj unless the same could be regarded as settled with the owner of the building of the site. Since the plaintiffs had admittedly buildings over the larger part of the plot the question would be whether the whole plot would be treated to be settled with them, the vacant southern portion being treated as appurtenant to the buildings or the disputed southern portion of 53 acres should be regarded as having vested in the Gram Samaj as non-appurtenant Abadi site. The lower appellate Court took the view that there was no door opening in the quarters towards the south and the plaintiffs had failed to prove any user of the disputed land which could justify regarding it appurtenant to the buildings. The appellate Court noted the evidence of the plaintiffs that there had been a well in the disputed land which the college authorities got filled up three years ago but did not consider the impact of this on the question of appurtenance. I am unable to agree with the view of the lower appellate Court. In my opinion the broad features suffice to fix the land as appurtenant irrespective of proof of any specific user. These broad features are (1) the plot 337 area 1.41 acres is one unit according to the revenue records and it is not permissible to split it in parts for purposes of settlement under Section 9, Zamindari Abolition Act at any rate when there are constructions over slightly less than ?rd part of it (2) The lower appellate Court admits that the plaintiff has 10 quarters, 4 or 5 shops, 2 kothis and a temple in the northern part. With all these tenements it is legitimate to claim that .53 acres left vacant was appurtenant to these constructions so far as the owner is concerned. (3) The existence of well in this disputed land clearly shows the animus and dominion of the owners and it is not possible to say that on the date of vesting the disputed portion of the land did not get settled under Section 9 with the plaintiff like the remainder. In this connection it is pertinent that under Section 9 wells in Abadi along with appurtenant area are also taken to be settled with the owners. (4) The most important proof of the plaintiffs title is that in their application Ex. 6 dated (sic) for acquisition the plaintiff No. 1 was specifically mentioned as the owner by the college authorities. This admission strongly corroborates the inference that the whole plot was treated as one unit for purposes of title and the possession in this respect did not change after the abolition of Zamindari. 6 dated (sic) for acquisition the plaintiff No. 1 was specifically mentioned as the owner by the college authorities. This admission strongly corroborates the inference that the whole plot was treated as one unit for purposes of title and the possession in this respect did not change after the abolition of Zamindari. The disputed land in this case falls so well within the concept of appurtenant land that it is not necessary to consider whether the theory of the whole plot being appurtenant can hold good in case of all very large plots with a small constructed area or not. I would reverse the finding of the Civil Judge on the question of title and restore that of the trial Court. 4. The next question debated was about limitation. The learned counsel agreed that the whole issue was whether Article 14 which provides limitation of one year was applicable, for in that case the suit would be barred by limitation. If it was not applicable suit would be within limitation whether the residuary Article 120 of the Old Limitation Act or Article 142 providing for 12 years limitation in suits of possession were applied. Now Article 14 provides a limitation of one year to set aside any act or order of an officer of the Government in his official capacity not otherwise expressly provided for. The question then is whether the plaintiff can get the relief of possession without setting aside the land acquisition proceedings the final act of which was the award of the Collector dated 22-2-1956 and possession dated 25-4-1956 in pursuance of the award. The learned counsel for the respondents also conceded that in case the acquisition proceedings and the orders therein could be regarded as a nullity, it would not be necessary to set aside the same and the plaintiff would be entitled to claim possession after vacating the trespass and ignore the proceedings by showing them to be void and without jurisdiction. The crucial question, therefore, is whether absence of public notice under Section 4 (1) or individual notice under Section 9 renders the acquisition a nullity or whether it only makes it irregular and illegal giving a right to attack it in direct proceeding so that the proceedings if not got set aside by such an attack become final and effective. The crucial question, therefore, is whether absence of public notice under Section 4 (1) or individual notice under Section 9 renders the acquisition a nullity or whether it only makes it irregular and illegal giving a right to attack it in direct proceeding so that the proceedings if not got set aside by such an attack become final and effective. The learned counsel for the appellants had strongly relied on Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1967 SC 1074 ). In that case after the notice under Section 6 the party had filed objection questioning the jurisdiction of the authority to proceed with the inquiry but after a while did not participate in the proceedings and an ex parte award was made on 27-6-1960. The proceedings were challenged by a writ petition filed on 26-10-1960 alleging that the party had learned of the award on 15-9-1960. The High Court dismissed the petition. In appeal the Supreme Court, observed that one of the contentions was that the "entire acquisition proceedings were void inasmuch as the mandatory provision of Section 4 of the Act were not complied with." The Supreme Court held that the provision of Section 4 (1) about the public notice in the locality was mandatory, concluding "the statutory intention is therefore, clear namely that the giving of public notice is mandatory. If so, the notification issued under Section 4 without complying with the said mandatory direction would be void and the land acquisition proceeding taken pursuant thereto would be equally void." (Emphasis mine). The Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition restraining enforcement of the award. The learned counsel for the appellants takes his stand on the use of the word 'void' by the Supreme Court in describing the effect of absence all public notice on the acquisition proceeding. Narendra Jit Singh v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1973 SC. 552 ) has also been referred to. In this case the acquisition proceedings had been challenged by a petition dated 5-12-1960 soon after Section 9 notice against the petitioners dated 4-12-1960. It was held that Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act could not be treated as complied with until both the conditions namely publication of a notification in the official gazette and local publication of the substance of the notification in the locality were complied with. It was held that Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act could not be treated as complied with until both the conditions namely publication of a notification in the official gazette and local publication of the substance of the notification in the locality were complied with. The argument of the learned counsel for the institution is that the word 'void' used in the Supreme Court decision (Khub Chand's) has been used merely in the sense of illegal and unsustainable and not in the strict sense of nullity or void ab initio which would lead to the effect that it can be totally ignored in collateral proceedings without any need to have the proceedings set aside. In this connection reliance was placed on Section 16, Land Acquisition Act under which when the Collector has made an award and taken possession of the land, the land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all incumbrances. It is contended that in the face of this provision until the award and possession in pursuance thereof has not been set aside, the acquired land would remain vested in the Government. Reliance has also been placed on Madhavan Pille v. State ( AIR 1966 Ker 212 (FB)) where the distinction between the use of the word 'void' in a flourish of language to describe what is patently illegal and void in the strict sense of void ab initio or nullity has been lucidly explained. It was pointed out that an utterly wrong order or erroneous or illegal order may not be a void order in the strict sense if the court had inherent jurisdiction. In other words it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. If there was no such jurisdiction the judgment became a nullity and could be collaterally impeached by any person interested whenever and wherever it is brought in question. Their Lordships quoted with approval from Black on Judgment II Edition "It is also to be remembered that there is a clear distinction between those facts which involved jurisdiction of the Court over the parties and the subject matter and the quasi jurisdiction facts without allegation of which the court cannot be set in motion and without proof of which a decree could not be pronounced. In the absence of the former, judgment of the court is void and may be attacked in collateral proceedings. In the absence of the former, judgment of the court is void and may be attacked in collateral proceedings. While in respect of the latter it is conclusive and cannot be questioned except on a direct proceeding". Their Lordships also relied on Black to show that not a little absurdity has resulted from the circumstances that terms such as void, voidable, invalid and illegal are often used interchargeably and in different senses. Finally the expression ultra vires likewise which strictly speaking implies an absence of jurisdiction, is even used to imply an absence of competency. Hence the use of the expressions such as void nullity, null and void without jurisdiction and ultra vires in cases where the impugned order is under direct attack as an appeal or revision provides no safeguard for holding that the order is void in the strict sense of the word so that it for all practical purposes is nonest and may be ignored in collateral proceedings and again a thing that is void in the strict sense of the word is a mere nullity and may be ignored even in collateral proceedings as if it never were. Void ab initio is the expression - Courts often use to make it clear that they mean void in the strict sense of the word and yet courts even do use the word and even expressions such as null and void and nullity as an emphatic way of saying that an order is so clearly illegal that it to be readily set aside. Therefore, in the cases where an order is directly attacked the use of such expression even by the highest tribunals is not real indications of the real nature of the order. It might mean no more than that the order is voidable and liable to be set aside. It is urged that the word 'void' in Khub Chand's case has been used in this very sense. Having considered the matter I am inclined to agree with this contention. The public notice under Section 4 is a mere matter of procedure so is the notice under Sec. 9. These are not matters of jurisdiction over parties or subject matter. It is noticeable that in both the cases cited the attack on the acquisition proceedings was by a petition under Article 226 and the effect of the orders was setting aside the proceedings or the impugned orders. These are not matters of jurisdiction over parties or subject matter. It is noticeable that in both the cases cited the attack on the acquisition proceedings was by a petition under Article 226 and the effect of the orders was setting aside the proceedings or the impugned orders. None of the cases can be regarded as laying down that absence of a public notice would justify treating the proceedings as a nullity without the same having been set aside (sic) about five years after the award and possession which under Section 18 have the effect of vesting the property absolutely in the Govt, free from all encumbrances. I therefore, feel bound to hold that on the admitted facts of possession following award dated 22-2-56 and knowledge of the proceedings on 25-4-56 the suit filed on 24-8-61 was barred by limitation in view of Article 14 of the Old Limitation Act. 5. On the third question of compliance of the second part of Section 4 (1) the lower appellate court did not record any finding. I have, however, looked into the evidence. The only documentary evidence on behalf of the respondents was the report of a Chaprasi dated 3-7-52 showing that a copy of the proclamation was affixed on the gate of the college and interquoted in the Tahsil. This report does not mention anything about beat of drum announcement in our near the land in suit. I think the trial court view that the oral evidence of Gopi Swarup and Puran Singh Pradhan about beat of drum announcement could not be believed in the absence of any record of such announcement is not only legitimate but proper. 6. In view of the findings on the question of limitation, I would dismiss the appeal. But in the circumstances I would leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.