Order In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution six petitioners in a joint petition challenge six different orders passed in respect of each of the petitioners which are annexed together in Annexure ‘A’ and for further order restraining the respondents from evicting the petitioners from railway quarters No. 1270/4. Bailaspur R.S in Madhya Pradesh in the occupation of the petitioners. The petitioners joined the Railway Administration and were employed in different positions in the Eastern Railway. The petitioners state that there were certain agitation by Loco Running Staff Association and pursuant to the said agitation petitioners were not able to discharge their duties in the usual manner from 29th of January, 1981 upto 24th of February, 1981. That is the case of petitioners in the petition. In the affidavit in-reply, however, petitioners have stated that they were on sick leave during that period. The case of the respondents, is, that the petitioners were staff employed in the Loco Running Section of the Eastern Railway and there was an unauthorised and illegal strike from the 29th of January, 1981 causing great hardship to the people and to the movement of goods and in which the petitioners took leading parts and were parties to various violent and illegal action which resulted in the complete disruption of the Loco Running Section and in view of the nature of the agitation and conduct of the petitioners the case of the respondent's further, is, that they had to be summarily removed from service under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1968 and it was not considered by the disciplinary authority, in view of the circumstances which have been mentioned in the affidavit-in-opposition that it would not be reasonably practicable to hold enquiries into the matter provided under those rules. Therefore, the subject matter of challenge in this application and in several other applications are the several orders of removals under Rule 14(ii) of the aforesaid rules. The petitioners contend that they were loyal staff and the petitioners conduct were not at all illegal. 2. I shall deal with the petitioners’ past record later. In the aforesaid view of the matter the removal orders were, according to the petitioners, in violation of the provision of the rules and without fulfilling the conditions precedent required for the exercise of the powers under the rules. 2. I shall deal with the petitioners’ past record later. In the aforesaid view of the matter the removal orders were, according to the petitioners, in violation of the provision of the rules and without fulfilling the conditions precedent required for the exercise of the powers under the rules. The petitioners contend that in the facts and circumstances of the case the disciplinary authority was not satisfied and/or could not be utislied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiries in the manner provided under those rules. The petitioners further contend that no reasons were recorded in writing and in any event the purported reasons could not be considered to be any reason at all. The petitioners were not heard on any alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioners nor were toe petitioners heard as to the nature of the punishments to be imposed upon the petitioners. The petitioners further contend that there was no satisfaction and there could not have been any satisfaction, in the facts and in the circumstances of the case of the disciplinary authority that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry in the manner provided under the rules. In the premises, it was contended that the mandatory provisions for the application of those rules had not at all been fulfilled. The reasons were not recorded. In any event, the alleged or purported reasons were not reasons at all. There was no application of mind. The reasons were vague clod the orders were passed in arbitrary manner. It was further urged that Rule 14(ii) enjoined exercise of quasi-judicial powers and such powers should be exercised by speaking orders which were not done in the facts and circumstances of the case. The respondents on their other hand, contended otherwise. 3. Therefore, the main and indeed the sole question that requires to be considered, is, whether the conditions precedent as well as the conditions for tile application of the said rule were present and the orders were passed in accordance with the provisions of the said rules. Indeed the question, is, whether the said orders were valid and legal. 3. Therefore, the main and indeed the sole question that requires to be considered, is, whether the conditions precedent as well as the conditions for tile application of the said rule were present and the orders were passed in accordance with the provisions of the said rules. Indeed the question, is, whether the said orders were valid and legal. On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that the alleged grounds mentioned in the orders of dismissal indicated on the face of those that it could not be said that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry in the manner contemplated by the rules. Furthermore, in any event the petitioners contend that the petitioners have good record of service in the past and under the provisions of the said rules the petitioners were entitled at least to be heard, assuming that the said rule could he invoked in the facts and circumstances of this case as to the quantum or nature of punishment required to be imposed in this case. The petitioners, further alleged that it was apparent that the decisions of dismissal were passed to terrorise and victimse the workers of the Railway Administration illegally and without application of mind and the decisions were taken arbitrarily to implement certain policy decisions and not passed on the satisfaction of the proper authority. The petitioners have further contended that there was a policy decision of victimisation taken by the head office at Garden Reach, Calcutta and the said several orders for removals had been passed by the Divisional Manager, Asansol pursuant to the said policy decision. The petitioners, further contended that the orders for removal from service were not passed by the appointing authority. 4. In order to appreciate the contentions raised it would be necessary to refer to the impugned orders. Though as I have mentioned before that there are six different petitioners and these different orders were passed in respect of each of them and the petitioners have annexed the copies of these different orders of removals, though again the petitioners contend that the petitioners never received such orders of removal, but obtained the copies from the notice board, It would be necessary to set out the terms of the said order.1t would be sufficient, in my opinion, to refer to one order that is to say the order in the case of the petitioner no. 1; more or less identical grounds have been mentioned in the orders in respect of the other petitioners. The said order was as follows :– Eastern Railway Notice for Removal from Service Reference Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants’ (D & A) Rules 1968 No. SC/790/81/R Divl. Railway Manager’s Office Asansol, dt. 8th February/81. Whereas Shri J.K. Roy, Fireman under Loco Foreman, E. Rly. Andal is absent from duties and has deliberately failed to perform his legitimate duties in spite of repeated calls and Whereas the said Sri J.K Roy is taking part to mobilise the staff for disruptive work so as to paralayse the running of the trains and Whereas the said Shri J.K. Roy was creating panic among the loyal railway staff by intimidation and thereats of harassment to them as well as to their families and his activities are considered prejudicial to the interest of the Railway Administration and to the general public by causing obstruction for movements of essential commodities and WHEREAS in the interest of the Railway as also of the general public retention of Shri J.K. Roy in the Railway service any further is considered undesirable and WHEREAS it is considered that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided for in the Railway Servants’ (D & A) Rules, 1968. Now therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants’ (D & A) Rules 1968 the undersigned hereby removes the said Sri J.K. Roy, Fireman under Loco Foreman, E Rly Andal from service with effect from 08-2-81. (H Bandopadhyay) Divisional Railway Manager E. Rly. Asansol. 5. It would also be necessary to refer in this connection to the provisions of Rule 14 of the said rules under which the said orders or removal were passed. The said rule is as follows : “14. (H Bandopadhyay) Divisional Railway Manager E. Rly. Asansol. 5. It would also be necessary to refer in this connection to the provisions of Rule 14 of the said rules under which the said orders or removal were passed. The said rule is as follows : “14. Special procedure in certain cases-Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13 : – (i) where any penalty is imposed on a Railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction 00 a criminal charge; or (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; or (iii) where the President is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; The disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit; Provided that the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary, before any orders are made in any case under this rule”. 6. It may be mentioned that Part IV deals with the procedure for imposing penalties on the railway staff. Rules 9 to 13 indicate the manner of conducting the enquiries and the procedure to be followed for imposing penalties upon the railway staff. In substance their rules were that in ordinary cases there should be a chargesheet and then an enquiry into the charges and after the receipt of the report of the enquiring authority by Rule 10 the action on the enquiry report is set out Sub-rule (5) of 10 before it was substituted by Circular No. 194/78 made on 29th of November, 1978 was as follows :– “(5) (i) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 6 should be imposed en the railway servant, it shall. (a) furnish to the Railway servant a copy of the report of the inquiry held by it and its findings on each article of charge, or, where the inquiry has been held by an inquiring authority, appointed by it a copy of the report of such authority and a statement of its findings on each article of charge together with brief reasons of disagreement, if any, with the findings of the inquiring authority. (b) give the Railway servant a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time, ordinarily not exceeding fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice subject to a minimum of seven days, such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under Rule 9. (ii)(a) In every case in which it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry together with a copy of the notice given under cause (i) and the representation made in pursuance of such notice, if any, shall be forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice : (b) The disciplinary authority, shall, after considering the representation, if any made by the Railway Servant, and the advice given by the Commission, determine what penalty, if any, made by the Railway servant in pursuance of the notice given to him under clause (i) and determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on him and make such order as it may deem fit.” As indicated before, sub-rule (5) was substituted by the circulate as aforesaid and present sub rule 5 provides with effect from 29th of November, 1978 as follows :– “(5) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the bases of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clause (v) to (ix) of rule 6 should be imposed on the railway servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the railway servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed : Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission,, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making an order imposing any such penalty on the railway servant.” 7. In this connection it would be necessary to bear in mind the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, because some of the provisions being similar, reliance was placed on certain authorities on Article 311 of the Constitution. The relevant portion of Article 311 of the Constitution before the 42nd amendment was as follows :– 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. The relevant portion of Article 311 of the Constitution before the 42nd amendment was as follows :– 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a :state or holds, a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry. Provided that this clause shall not apply – (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; (b) where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reasons, to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry, or (c) where the President or Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) If in respect of such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.” After the 42nd amendment, however, the relevant portion of Article 311 is as follows :– “311. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry had it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed : Provided further that this clause shall not apply – (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry, or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry, (3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or reduce him in rank shall be final.” This position has not been altered or modified by any subsequent constitutional amendment. 8. On this application being moved on the 13th of March, 1981. I issued a rule nisi and an interim order of injunction restraining the respondents from giving effect to the said orders of removal. I also passed an order restraining the petitioners from going to the railway office including the union office. This interim order and the rule was issued after hearing learned advocates for both the petitioners as well as the respondents. I also passed an order restraining the petitioners from going to the railway office including the union office. This interim order and the rule was issued after hearing learned advocates for both the petitioners as well as the respondents. I gave certain other consequential directions which are not relevant for the present purpose. 9. In order to appreciate the case of the respondents it would be necessary to refer to the background of the passing of the said orders of removals by the respondents as mentioned in the affidavit-in-opposition. It has been asserted that Loco Running Staff Association called a strike with effect from 29th of January, 1981. The said strike, according to the respondents, was an illegal one, unwarranted by law. As a result of such strike, according to the respondents, an extremely grave and dangerous situation had developed. The respondents state that during such strike the position became so acute in the Eastern railway that running of passenger trains and goods trains were seriously affected and in some divisions in the Eastern Railway running of the trains had to be cancelled leading to a serious set back to the economic life of the nation. Hundreds and thousands of passengers could not attend their places of duty in time with consequential loss of daily wages. Apart from the passenger trains a large number of goods trains had to be cancelled, as a result of which supply of coal to the essential steel undertakings, to power stations, movements of food stuffs and other raw materials to the industries were seriously effected. There was impending danger of scarcity of food supply in the rationed area and also in the different deficit areas, difficulties in getting essential supplies, apprehension of darkness at home and at factories due to scarce electric power, hundreds of workers being laid off in the factories all over on account of non receipt of raw materials and these were serious apprehensions justified by the situation then prevailing. The collapse of the supply machinery was imminent. There wag also the danger of serious accidents because of non-repairs of essential running parts. The collapse of the supply machinery was imminent. There wag also the danger of serious accidents because of non-repairs of essential running parts. The respondents state that it was in the background of the emergent situation which had arisen which the respondents described as illegal strike which was striking at the very root of national economy and adding to the sufferings or the common man as well as public at large, it was decided to exercise special powers vested in the administration. I might pause here to point out that on behalf of the petitioners great stress wall laid on the aforesaid averment in the affidavit-in-opposition in support of the plea that the decisions of removals as impugned in the present petition were not passed by application of mind to the facts and circumstances of each case but as a result of some administrative decision taken devoid of the facts of any particular case. The petitioners contend that this was non-application of mind in terms of the Rule. 10. The respondents further alleged that the petitioners along with their associates who were Loco Running Staff of various ranks were not only absenting themselves from work but were indulging in direct activities in intimidating and exercising coercive pressures un the staff not to resume duty and this played a major part in crippling the running of trains with its chain reaction on railway service. In the premises, according to the respondents, the conditions were not at all opportune for following the normal disciplinary procedure by issuing chargesheets, holding enquiries etc. to effect the removals. This was also commented upon by the petitioners that “to effect their removal” meaning thereby the petitioners' removals had been decided without application or adjudication of the facts. The respondent deponent further has stated that apart from the fact that in the highly explosive and turbulent mood of the staff enquiries in the manner contemplated by the rule would have been extremely protracted and time consuming. The petitioners contend that this was a conclusion without any material basis and was me re conjectures. The respondents further alleged that there would hardly have been any staff who would have dared to come out and give evidence and in the mean while the activities of the petitioners would have continued unabated. The petitioners contend that this was a conclusion without any material basis and was me re conjectures. The respondents further alleged that there would hardly have been any staff who would have dared to come out and give evidence and in the mean while the activities of the petitioners would have continued unabated. The respondent deponent state that the situation called for immediate action to create confidence in the minds of the willing workers and to create an impact in their minds that the mischievous action of a section of the staff would not be permitted to hold the country at ransom. It was further stated that out of the total strength of 14, 113 Loco Running Staff only 41 have been removed by the exercise of the special powers under Rule 14. 11. The deponent of the affidavit on behalf of the respondents is the Divisional Railway manager of the Eastern Railway. Asansol and who has himself passed the orders impugned. He has, further, stated that the magnitude and the seriousness of the problem were enough to compel the administration to exercise its special power. He has, further asserted that the admitted facts were that the Loco Running Staff Association called on a strike illegally without any notice on 29th of January, 1981 and pursuant to such strike the present petitioners and their other associates had absented themselves from duty and deliberately refused to accept the calls when the call books were sent to their quarters. He has, further, stated that these persons were inciting and intimidating the co-workers and were attempting to paralyse the entire administration. He has therefore affirmed that he had bona fide belief that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry in the manner contemplated by the Rules and that witness would not have been forthcoming because of intimidations and threats. He has, further, asserted that he had before him and that he had carefully and duly considered the reports submitted by the Additional Divisional Manager (Operating) in respect of the petitioners nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 on several dates and on consideration thereof he had passed the orders as he was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiries in the manner provided in the rules. He has, further asserted that reasons were recorded for not holding such enquiries. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 on several dates and on consideration thereof he had passed the orders as he was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold enquiries in the manner provided in the rules. He has, further asserted that reasons were recorded for not holding such enquiries. He has annexed with his affidavit the said reasons as well as the reports upon the basis of which the impugned orders had been passed. He has further observed that necessary impact of taking disciplinary action under Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1968 wag immediately felt in as much as a large number of Loco Running Staff who had been absenting themselves on account of threat or other wise started reporting for duty. Ultimately the association had to withdraw the agitation of the strike unconditionally by a letter. 12. He has also given the service records and the ranking of the six petitioners. It may be mentioned that tile point that the orders were not passed by the appropriate authorities. was, not urged before me as such it is not necessary to deal with the same. In paragraph 8 of the affidavit of Sri Bandopadhya, he has asserted that it was incorrect to state that the petitioners had unblemished record. Indeed from the avenments made in paragraph 8 it appears that increment was stopped for one year as the punishment in case of petitioner No. 1 in case of petitioner No 2 increment was stopped for two years and he was also removed from service with effect from 11.5.74 and was re-instated thereafter. So far as petitioner no. 3 was concerned he was also removed from service on 11.5.74 and was re-instated thereafter. So far as Petitioner no. 4 was concerned the increment was stopped for one year and he was also removed form service on. 11.5.74 but was re-instated thereafter. The petitioners nos. 2, 3, & 5 were removed during the last railway strike in May, 1974 and was re-instated thereafter. He had also asserted that it was incorrect to state that the petitioners had reported for duty on 6th of February, 1981. 11.5.74 but was re-instated thereafter. The petitioners nos. 2, 3, & 5 were removed during the last railway strike in May, 1974 and was re-instated thereafter. He had also asserted that it was incorrect to state that the petitioners had reported for duty on 6th of February, 1981. According to the deponent, when the call books were sent to the petitioners’ residences on different dates before they were removed they were not found in their quarters Therefore, notices of removal from their services were displayed in the notice board of the respective loco sheds. He has craved leave to refer to the call books at the time of the hearing of the application. He has also denied having received the representation which was contained in Annexure ‘B’ to the petition Now, Annexure ‘B’ was a representation which though addressed to the Divisional Railway Manager, according to the present deponent was not received by him. In the affidavit in reply it has been stated on behalf of the petitioners that the said representation was handed over to the Foreman of the loco shed. The present deponent, however, denies that the said letters were ever sent. The other averments being merely denial of certain allegations made by the petitioners and challenging the jurisdiction of this court being legal submissions it is not necessary to set them out in details. 13. It would, however, be necessary to refer to the materials upon which the Divisional Railway Manager has stated that he has passed the orders and the reasons for passing the said orders. As these are different in case of each of the petitioners these will have to be referred in little detail So far as the orders indicating the decision for removal are concerned I have already set them out hereinbefore. These are more or less in identical terms in respect of the each of the petitioner. Now, so far as he petitioner no. 1 is concerned the materials upon which the respondent authorities had stated that they had acted would be found in the annexures included in R-1. Now, there are several of these. The first one is dated 29th of January, 1981 that is at 8.30 hours. Now, the said reports were made by one Sri S. Misra, Additional Divisional Railway Manager (Operating) Camp at Andal. Now, there are several of these. The first one is dated 29th of January, 1981 that is at 8.30 hours. Now, the said reports were made by one Sri S. Misra, Additional Divisional Railway Manager (Operating) Camp at Andal. I may incidentally point out that he is the person who has made all of the reports in the present application upon the basis of which impugned actions had been taken against the petitioners. It was commented that on 29th of January, 1981 at exactly the same time, that is at 8 30 P.M. there are two different reports by Sri Misra regarding Sri J.K. Roy. The first one appears at page 27 of the petition in Annexure R-1. There Sri Misra stated that ‘I have to report to you that complete terror and panic bad been created amongst the loco running staff at Andal by Sri J.K. Roy, 2nd Fireman Andal in his bid to prevent the loco running staff from joining their normal duties.” Sri Misra has further stated that Sri J.K. Roy had been moving from house to house in colony no. 12 as well as Damodar Colony at Andal and had been threatening the loco running staff and their families with dire consequences, even amounting to severe physical injuries if they did rot desist from their attempts. Sri Misra further alleged that Sri J.K. Roy was telling the said loco running staff that he would see to it that the staff shuttle carrying the staff to their places of duty was not allowed to run and that the said Sri Roy would not even hesitate to resort to physical violence if the loco running staff did not heed to his warnings. The comment upon this on behalf of the petitioners was that Sri Misra had not pledged his oath on the said statements, Further, it was stated that he had not stated that he himself personally had seen anything or had heard anything nor had he mentioned that names of the alleged persons from whom he had gathered the information’s regarding Sri J.K. Roy. In the second report which is also included in the Annexure R-1 and which appears at page 39 of the report and which is headed “Special Report”, which states that Sri Misra had to report the incident which happened round about 8 o’clock when the staff Shuttle carrying the staff to the places of work was about to start. Sri Misra stated that the same was ghoraoed by a body of persons in the new empty yard and the driver, firemen of the staff shuttle as well as the staff who had boarded the shuttle were threatened by the mob which was led by Sri J.K. Roy the petitioner no. 1. He had further to state that Sri Roy was involved in a case of assault on the crew of the 1st chara Pilot, and certain persons had been injured. More or less same comments had been made on this report also. It was further stated that the said Sri J.K. Roy and some of his associates who joined Sri R.A.P. Sharma had even threatened that serious injuries would be caused to those who joined the work and to their families including children if they did not strike work immediately. On the 2nd of February, 1981 another report was made by Sri Sharma wherein the reiterated that on previous occasion he had reported the case of assault by Shri Roy on the crew of 1st Chara Pilot and Sri Sharma reported that Sri roy had been arrested by Andal G.R,P. under Ss. 147, 148 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code and a case had been registered against him. On 7th of February, 1981 where another special report was made against Sri J.K. Roy wherein it was stated that after being released on bail by the chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol Sri Roy had been continuing to create panic among the local staff of Andal threatening them with dire consequences including severe injury. According to Sri Misra Sri Roy had created terror and complete panic amongst the law abiding loyal staff and had been posing a threat to the running of trains and thereby affecting the maintenance of essential services. The next report about the petitioner no.1 is another dated 29th of January, 1981 more or less at the same time and reiterating the same allegations. 14. The next report about the petitioner no.1 is another dated 29th of January, 1981 more or less at the same time and reiterating the same allegations. 14. Upon the basis of these six several reports the Divisional General Manager, the deponent before me in the affidavit in-opposition passed the order on 8th of February, 1981. He has stated in the said order that he had considered the reports submitted by Sri Misra, It would be seen from the said reports that Sri Roy was indulging in violent activities threatening the innocent and loyal members of the staff with the sole object of creating an atmosphere so that the innocent and loyal members of the staff did not report for duty for the fear of their lives. It was, further, seen that Sri Roy had assaulted some members of the staff and Sri Bandopadhyay considered that the activities of Sri Roy were highly prejudicial to the interest of the administration and also to the general public. He goes on further to say “I am satisfied that the conduct of Sri J.K. Roy is such that his further retention in the Government service is prejudical to the Railway Administration as well as to the general public. He thereafter observed as follows :– “I have considered the question of taking suitable disciplinary action against Sri J.K. Roy under the normal rules. But in view of the atmosphere created by Sri J.K. Roy and in view of his present turbulent mood if any normal D & A enquiry is held against him, no staff will dare to depose against him in the said enquiry. I am, therefore, satisfied that the circumstances of the case are such that it is not reasonably practicable to hold any enquiry under the D & A rules, 1968 against Sri J.K. Roy I, therefore, order that Sri J.K. Roy should be removed from service under rules 14(iii) of the D & A rules with immediate effect. The order of removal will be served separately." Thereafter, the notice, the contents whereof have been set out hereinbefore was communicated to the petitioner. 15. So for as the petitioners nos. 2 & 3 are concerned, there are two reports mainly, one at page 32 of the affidavit-in-opposition which is included in annexure RI which stated that the petitioners nos. The order of removal will be served separately." Thereafter, the notice, the contents whereof have been set out hereinbefore was communicated to the petitioner. 15. So for as the petitioners nos. 2 & 3 are concerned, there are two reports mainly, one at page 32 of the affidavit-in-opposition which is included in annexure RI which stated that the petitioners nos. 2 & 3 were standing near the Andal Loca Booking Office and threatening the staff who had come to report for duty with the dire consequences, to go back and join the illegal strike called by the Loco Running Staff Association. It was, further, stated that the two staff were also threatening every body else that anybody who dared to join duty would have to pay heavy consequences which “may amount to physical violence to them and to their families including children.” As a result of the threatening of those two staff a large number of staff had started reporting sick by giving sick reports in small chits of papers. It was, further, stated that these two staff had not taken up their duties when called upon to do so, though they were present in the loco shed. The report was given on the 29th of January, 1981, at 00.15 hours and the report was made by the said Sri Sharma. There was another report dated 28th of January, 1981 which was a day prior to the strike. In that report it was stated that the said Sri Sharma had stationed himself at Andal and had received reports that these two petitioners were threatening staff with dire consequences if they joined duty on 29th of January, 1981. It was, further, stated that Sri Samanta and Sri Biswal moved about in the colonies along with a number of men and they were prepared with dangerous weapons like Bhujalis, lathis etc. with the result that complete panic was prevailing in the midst of staff who wanted to do their normal duties. Upon these reports it appears that the deponent before me has passed an order under Rule 14(ii). In the said report Sri Bandopadhyay bad stated that “on the basis of verbal reports and perusal of reports”, then he mentioned the substance of the reports and concluded that he was satisfied that these two petitioners should be removed from their service. Upon these reports it appears that the deponent before me has passed an order under Rule 14(ii). In the said report Sri Bandopadhyay bad stated that “on the basis of verbal reports and perusal of reports”, then he mentioned the substance of the reports and concluded that he was satisfied that these two petitioners should be removed from their service. He further observed as follows : “Normal D.A proceedings cannot just be followed because in the present atmosphere charged with intimidation and violence whipped up by the above mentioned staff, no evidence is likely to be forthcoming. After fully considering all the circumstances I hereby order that they should be removed from service under Rule 14(ii) of the D.A. Rules.” So far as the petitioner no. 4 is concerned there are also reports, the first one being by Mr. Sharma on 4th of February, 1981 where he had stated that the petitioner no. 4 had been creating serious panic amongst the loyal staff by moving about the staff colony especially colony no. 12 at Damodar Colony with a band of men and threatening them with serious consequences to their lives and properties unless they joined the illegal strike of the Loco Running Staff immediately. There was another report dated 9th of February, 1981 reiterating more or less the same allegations. Another report dated 15th of February, 1981 containing more or less the same allegations. Upon the basis of these reports on the 22nd of February, 1981 the deponent passed the order. It appears that he had called for these reports before passing the impugned order and he had noted the contents of the reports. He had further observed that since despite passage of time and in spite of great patience by the administration the said petitioner no. 4 had not changed his mood of violence and therefore his removal was necessary. He further went on to observe that he was fully satisfied that “in the present atmosphere of tension” it was not possible to hold the normal enquiry as no one would come forward to render evidence. He has observed further that in the meanwhile continued indulgence to the behaviour of Sri Chandra might create complete stalemate at work and threatening the safety of the staff to the running of the trains. He, therefore, invoked the provisions of Rule 14(ii) to remove the said petitioner from the service. 16. He has observed further that in the meanwhile continued indulgence to the behaviour of Sri Chandra might create complete stalemate at work and threatening the safety of the staff to the running of the trains. He, therefore, invoked the provisions of Rule 14(ii) to remove the said petitioner from the service. 16. So far as petitioner no. 5 is concerned in the report dated 29th of January, 1981 regarding Sri J.K. Roy which I have set out hereinbefore his name is also mentioned. His name also appears in another report dated 29th of January, 1981 being part of those who joined Sri J.K. Roy. There is a report separately about him dated 2nd of February, 1981 by Sri Sharma about the said petitioner moving about in the colony no. 2 with a large group of men armed with dangerous weapons like lathis with the sole purpose of intimidating the loyal staff from joining their duties. It was stated that a large number of staff reported to Shri Sharma that the said petitioner accompanied by some of his followers were moving from house to house threatening families of the loyal staff. There is another report dated 5th of February 1981 making more or less the same allegations regarding this petitioner. There was another one dated 9th of February 1981 reiterating more or less the same allegations and upon these reports the order was passed by the deponent on 10th of February, 1981 wherein he staled that Sri R.A.P. Sharma being the petitioner no. 5 was transferred to MIP sometime ago but he had refused to go and still continued to be at Andal. Sri Bandopadhyay had further stated that even though there were two reports on 29th of January, 1981 and one report each of 2nd of February, 1981 and 7th of February 1981, Sri Bandopadhyaya had believed that because the employee being an elderly person he might sober down in his behaviour and not continue to behave violently and to participate in intimidation and threats but he was sorry to see that even on 9th of February, 1981 the said petitioner was carrying on with his acts of intimidation. He observed that he was convinced of the mala fides of the said petitioner. He was also convinced that the atmosphere was so surcharged that evidence would be impossible to elicit. As such normal enquiry could not be held. He observed that he was convinced of the mala fides of the said petitioner. He was also convinced that the atmosphere was so surcharged that evidence would be impossible to elicit. As such normal enquiry could not be held. In the premises, according to the said deponent he should be removed under Rule 14(ii) of the said rules. 16. The next person concerned was the petitioner no. 6. There is a report about him on the 29th of January, 1981 at 2-30 hours where he has been mentioned doing the aforesaid acts of threatening and using abusive languages along others including Sri J.K. Roy and Sri R.A.P. Sharma. There is another one dated 29th of January, 1981 reiterating the same all stations about threats and that he had threatened along with others those loyal staff who joined duties with serious injuries not only to them but to their family members including children. There is another dated 29th of January, 1981 implicating him along with others more or less the same allegations. There is one report dated 4th of February, 1981 that with the passage of time the violent behaviour of Sri Ram Raj Bhagat had been gaining momentum and that he was according to Sri S. Misra determined to create the law and order problem and was threatening the persons. There is another one dated 9th of February, 1981 more or less reiterating the same kind of allegations and upon the basis of these reports on 9th of February, 1981 the deponent had made the order of removal wherein he pad mentioned about the report about the threats, about the gherao and the atmoshphere of assault and violence. In the circumstances, the deponent has further stated that he was satisfied that the only course left to the Railway was to remove him from service. He has further observed that since it was reasonably not practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in the rules “in the prevailing atmosphere charged with violence no fruitful evidence is likely to be available from the enquiry”, he had decided to remove the said petitioner under Rule 14(ii) of the said rules. 17. As I have mentioned before in respect of all these petitioners it was commented that the so called reports were vague, no names of the persons who were alleged to have beer. 17. As I have mentioned before in respect of all these petitioners it was commented that the so called reports were vague, no names of the persons who were alleged to have beer. threatened or complained to Sri Sharma had been mentioned, Sri Sharma the person who had reported had not personally stated that he had either see n in his own eyes or heard with his own ears the alleged allegations nor has he mentioned the names of the persons from whom he had gathered reports and/or information nor has he pledged his oath or affirmed any affidavit verifying the truth of the said allegations and/or statements contained in the said reports. There is the affidavit in reply filed by one Srinivas Charan Biswal who is the petitioner no. 3. It is stated in the first paragraph of the said affidavit that he was making the said affidavit on behalf of all the petitioners. The said petitioner no 3 stated that he was aware of the facts and circumstances and was authorised to affirm the affidavit on behalf of the others. He has dealt with the affidavit-in-opposition and after leaving aside the technical points he has referred to the background of the loco strike and tried to justify the strike. He has stated that the Railway Administration improperly and illegally resorted to Rule 14(ii) in the facts and circumstances of the case. He has generally denied all the allegations. It was denied that an illegal strike was called and except what were matters of record he denied all the other allegations. It was, further, stated that the said deponent namely, the petitioner no. 3 and other “being sick were on sick leave.” In the petition, however, it may be mentioned in paragraph 7 it was stated that there was an agitation of the loco running staff and pursuant to the said agitation the petitioners could not discharge their duties and functions in the usual manner and the mid agitation was launched no 29th of January 1981 and was called off on 25th of February, 1981. There is, therefore, an apparent contradiction in the two versions because the case in the petition was that the petitioners could not join the work because what they called ‘agitation’ by the association. The affidavit-in reply states that the petitioners ‘were sick’ and ‘were on sick leave’. There is, therefore, an apparent contradiction in the two versions because the case in the petition was that the petitioners could not join the work because what they called ‘agitation’ by the association. The affidavit-in reply states that the petitioners ‘were sick’ and ‘were on sick leave’. The deponent had denied generally the truth of the reports against the petitioners but had not dealt with the specific allegations and has further stated that the said reports and the reasons for dismissals were afterthoughts and recorded subsequently in order to victimise the petitioners. He has further alleged that the authorities concerned did not want to make any lit tempt to hold any enquiry in accordance with provisions of Jaw and the allegations were based on surmises, conjectures and hypothesis without any reason. He has, further, stated that the alleged reports were false and fabricated reports. He has also denied that they had prevented the loyal workers from joining and there had been no assaults. He has further stated that had there been any assault stated in the alleged reports the employees on wham such assaults were done would have identified the person. There was no material to come to the conclusion for removal of the petitioners from service and there was no reason for coming to the conclusion that enquiry as contemplated was not reasonably practicable, the alleged reports and the orders and the reasons are manufactured and tailored documents according to the said deponent. He has charged the authorities with malice and he has also made the legal submissions. He has also annexed certain communications from the higher authorities where it has been stated that those who were indulging in this acts of violence might be removed under Rule 2046 of the Rail way Establishment Rules on the ground of compulsory retirement, in case of those who had reached the age of 55. At the time of the hearing such circulars or communications were handed over to me. He has also staled that there were certain notices issued that the unauthorised absence would be treated as break in service and also the appointment of sons of such staff who had taken part in the illegal strike would be terminated and names of such staff for taking part in the illegal strike should be listed and there should be no consideration of their sons employed in the future. In order to conclude the narration of facts I have, further, to state that at the time of the hearing of this application I was shown postal envelopes addressed to the petitioners sent by the railway authorities and which came back either with the remark ‘refused’ or ‘not found’. These were shown to learned advocate for the petitioners also at the time of hearing. it must, however, be noted that there were not any notices prior to the passing of the impugned order of removal calling for any explanation but it was only orders communicating the factum of removal. 19. Bearing the aforesaid facts in the background I have to determine whether in this case there were materials for the appropriate authority to pass orders removing the petitioners from service and secondly, whether there were materials before the appropriate authorities to come to the conclusion that enquiry in the manner provided in the rules were not reasonably practicable and thirdly, I have to consider whether in passing the impugned order there was proper consideration namely, consideration of the punishment that was required to be inflicted even it was considered that the petitioners were guilty and even if it was not practicable to hold any enquiry in the manner provided under the rules. These are the points upon which it is necessary to adjudicate. 20. On these points before I deal with the several authorities cited at the bar and rival contentions made on the points at issue in the instant case it would be necessary to bear in mind that in case powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same on fulfillment of certain conditions then the authority could only act objectively on fulfillment of those conditions and whether the conditions precedent for the exercise of the authority under the particular provisions have been fulfilled or not are matters which are justiciable in Courts of law. This position, in my opinion, follows logically from the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M.A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala AIR 1974 SC page 2249 where Chief Justice Ray observed that where powers were conferred on public authorities to exercise the same when “they are satisfied” or when “it appears to them” or when “in their opinion” a certain state of affairs exists;” or when powers enable public authorities to take “such action as they think fit” in relation to a subject matter, the Courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of an executive authority’s opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated. Where reasonable conduct was expected the criterion of reasonableness was not subjective but objective. The onus of establishing unreasonableness, however,, rested upon the person challenging the validity of the acts. Administrative decisions in exercise of powers even if conferred in subjective terms were to be made in good faith on relevant consideration. In such case the Courts should enquire whether a reasonable man could have come to the decision in question without misdirecting himself on the law or the facts in a material respect. The standard of reasonableness to which the administrative body was required to conform might range from Court’s own opinion of what was reasonable to the criterion of what a reasonable body might have decided. The courts would find out whether conditions precedent for the formation of the opinion had any factual basis. In this connection reliance may also be placed on the observations of the Supreme court in the case of Rohas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal AIR 1969 SC 707 . To this limited extent the Courts have jurisdiction by this court in the background of the facts and circumstances disclosed, Bearing the above propositions in mind I will have to examine in the instant case the facts and circumstances. 21. On behalf of the petitioner great emphasis and reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Divl Personnel Officer v. T.R. Challappan AIR 1975 SC page 2216. There the Supreme Court was dealing with Rule 14(i) of the aforesaid Rules. 21. On behalf of the petitioner great emphasis and reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Divl Personnel Officer v. T.R. Challappan AIR 1975 SC page 2216. There the Supreme Court was dealing with Rule 14(i) of the aforesaid Rules. The Supreme Court observed that Rule 14(i) only incorporated the principles enshrined in proviso (a) to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The words ‘where any penalty is imposed’ Rule l4(i) should actually be read as ‘where any penalty is imposable’, because so far as the disciplinary authority was concerned it could not impose a sentence. It could only impose a penalty on the basis of conviction and sentence passed against the delinquent employee by a competent Court. Furthermore, the rule empowering the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case and to make such orders as it deemed fit clearly indicated that it was open to the disciplinary authority to impose any penalty as it liked. In this sense, therefore, the word ‘penalty’ used in Rule 14(i) of the Rules of 1968 was relatable to the penalties to be imposed under the Rules rather than a punishment given by a criminal Court. Therefore, Supreme Court was of the view that where the Magistrate convicting an employee of a criminal charge released him on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, no penalty was imposed on him within Rule 14(i) was not correct. The Supreme Court in that case discussed the provisions of Ss. 3, 4(i) and 9(3) & (4) of the Probation of Offenders Act and held that these would clearly show that an order of release on probation came into existence only after the accused was found guilty and was convicted of the offence. Thus, the conviction of the accused or the finding of the Court that he was guilty could not be washed out at all because that was the sine qua non fur the order of release on probation of the offender. The order of release on probation was merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed. The Supreme Court then discussed the effect to the expression used in S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The order of release on probation was merely in substitution of the sentence to be imposed. The Supreme Court then discussed the effect to the expression used in S. 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The Supreme Court then reiterated that the concluding part of Rule 14(i) merely imported a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case might be objectively considered. The word ‘consider’ in the last part of Rule 14(i) merely connoted that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entree circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. The provision conferred power in the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of the particular case what penalty, if at all should be imposed on the delinquent employee At page 2224 of the report the Supreme Court observed, inter alia, as follows :– “21. We now come to the third point that is involved in this case, namely, the extent and ambit of the last part of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1968. The concerned portion runs as thus; "............the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon a, it deems fit.” In this connection it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that this provision does not contemplate a full-dress or a fresh inquiry after hearing the accused but only requires the disciplinary authority to impose a suitable penalty once it is proved that the delinquent employee has been convicted on a criminal charge. The Rajasthan High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 352 or 1971 concerning Civil Appeal No. 891 of 1975 has given a very wide connotation to the word “consider” as appearing in Rule 14 and has held that the word ‘consider’ is wide enough to require the disciplinary authority to hold a detailed determination of the matter. We fed that we are not in a position to go to the extreme limit to which the Rajasthan High Court has gone. The word ‘consider’ has been used in contradiction to the word ‘determine’. We fed that we are not in a position to go to the extreme limit to which the Rajasthan High Court has gone. The word ‘consider’ has been used in contradiction to the word ‘determine’. The rule making authority deliberately used the word ‘consider’ and not ‘determine’ because the word ‘determine’ has a much wider scope. The word ‘consider’ merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent authority is heard and given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the authority. In other words, the term ‘consider’ postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an inquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. It is not at all necessary for the disciplinary authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry which is dispensed with under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 which incorporate, the principle contained in Art. 311(2) proviso (a). This provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering this matter the disciplinary authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances of redeeming features if any present in the case and so on and so forth. It may be that the conviction of an accused may be for a trivial offence as in the case of the respondent T.R. Challappan in Civil Appeal No. 1664 of 1974 where a stern warning or a fine would have been sufficient to meet the exigencies of service. It may be that the conviction of an accused may be for a trivial offence as in the case of the respondent T.R. Challappan in Civil Appeal No. 1664 of 1974 where a stern warning or a fine would have been sufficient to meet the exigencies of service. It is possible that the delinquent employee may be found guilty of some technical offence, for instance, violation of the transport rules or the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act and so on, where no major penalty may be attracted. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rules as to the factors which the disciplinary authority would have to consider, but I have mentioned some of these factors by way of instances which are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. In other words, the position is that the conviction of the delinquent employee would be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employees and in the course of the inquiry if the authority is of the opinion that the offence is too trivial or of technical nature it may refuse to impose any penalty in spite of the conviction. This is a very salutary provision which has been enshrined in these Rules and one of the purposes for conferring this power is that in cases where the disciplinary authority is satisfied that the delinquent employee is a youthful offender who is not convicted of any serious offence and shown poignant penitence or real repentance he may be dealt with as lightly as possible. This appears to us to be the scope and ambit of this provision. We must, however, hasten to add that we should not be understood as laying down that the last part of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 contains a license to employees convicted of serious offences to insist on reinstatement. The salutary provision referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair-play. The salutary provision referred to above merely imports a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair-play. The disciplinary authority has the undoubted power after hearing the delinquent employee and considering the circumstances of the case to inflict any major penalty on the delinquent employee without any further departmental inquiry of the authority is of the opinion that the employee has been guilty of a serious offence involving moral turpitude and, therefore, it is not desirable or conducive in the interests of administration to retain such a person in service.” I have set out the passage in extensor because great reliance was placed on the aforesaid authority. 21. On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that the condition precedent for the exercise of the power had not been fulfilled. It was submitted that in the absence of any affidavit of Sri Sharma and in view of what the petitioners described as denial in the affidavit-in-reply to the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition, the factual existence of the conditions had not been proved to the satisfaction of the court. It was, secondly, contended that under the terms of the rules the reasons for invoking the rule and not holding the enquiry and not conducting any enquiry in accordance with the appropriate rules had to be recorded in the order of dismissal communicated to the petitioner which, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners, was not done in the facts and in the circumstances of this case. It was, then, contended that in any event such grounds as were mentioned in the orders of removal or even in the orders recording the removal which have been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition did not indicate any rational nexus with the conditions that an enquiry in the facts and circumstances of the case was not reasonably practicable. It was submitted that there was a significant distinction between the expression ‘desirable’ and ‘not reasonably practicable’. It was submitted that there was a significant distinction between the expression ‘desirable’ and ‘not reasonably practicable’. The rule did not, according to the petitioners, empowered the authorities concerned not to hold the enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the rules or in the manner contemplated in the rules it was thought desirable not to hold the enquiry but the rules enjoined that such enquiries could only be dispensed with if the conditions were there which could reasonably point out that it was not reasonably practicably to hold such enquiries in the manner contemplated by the rules. Such conditions were not fulfilled according to the petitioners. It was, lastly, contended that the last part of Rule 14 it was common to all the clauses namely, clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) enjoined the disciplinary authority “to consider the circumstances of the case and thereafter to make such orders thereon as it deem fit.” It was emphasised that the expression used was to consider and not to adjudicate. It was submitted that consideration enjoined an active application of mind and that active application of mind could only be take place after hearing the version either in writing or personally about the nature of the punishment to be inflicted if at all. Learned advocate for the petitioners contended that even if the other conditions of Rule 14 were fulfilled before imposition of the penalty there should have been consideration by the authorities concerned and such consideration was not possible without participation in some form or other or without consideration of the version or the case of the petitioners. It is in aid of this last limb of the argument that reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Peasonnel Officer v. T.R. Chpllappun AIR 1975 SC 2216 at 2224. The said decision of the Supreme Court was reviewed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. P.C. Choudhury 80 CWN 946. The said decision of the Supreme Court was reviewed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. P.C. Choudhury 80 CWN 946. There the Division Bench observed that a final order passed under clause (ii) of Rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, was not invalid merely because no opportunity was afforded to the delinquent employee of showing cause against the order dispensing with an inquiry if there was proper consideration of all attending circumstances and an appreciation of the position in law and or facts in proper perspective, Non-communication of the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry would not vitiate the order of removal from service if reasons were in fact recorded. There after analysing Rule 14 (ii) after analysing the ratio the Division Bench held that the above decision did not lay down any broad proposition that in all cases of conviction on a criminal charge which was the case under Rule 14(i) of the Rules, the delinquent authority was required to heard before passing the order of removal from service. The authority which was required to consider the circumstances of the case and make such order as it deemed fit had to embark upon a summary inquiry and to take into consideration all relevant circumstances and it was not obligatory for the authority to remove a delinquent employee from service as soon as there was a conviction on a criminal charge. While the authority should consider the circumstances and hear the delinquent in appropriate cases the Supreme Court decision, according to the Division Bench of this Court did not lay down that as an universal rule that in all cases the delinquent employee had to be given a hearing even if he was convicted by the criminal courts of the offence of serious moral turpitude. The contention that the decision applied to cases coming under clauses (i) and (ii) was also examined. It was held that under clause (iii) where the President had dispensed with an enquiry in the interest of the security of the State the disciplinary authority was required to consider the circumstances of the case for the purpose of imposing penalty, and the Division Bench was of the opinion that the purpose of imposing penalty in such cases might be defeated if an opportunity was given. The Division Bench, further, observed that it was undoubtedly true that the disciplinary authority was required to consider the circumstances and if there was no consideration of the circumstances attending or if there was non-application of the mind by the authority or the order was otherwise perverse or biased or mala fide or based on extraneous matters or on misconception of the situation or law any final order passed might be challenged in a court for security. But according to the Division Bench the said Supreme Court decision did not warrant the conclusion as a proposition of universal application. Similar contention was urged before me. 22. It was also urged that the observations of the Division Bench was no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC page 597. That was, however, a case of a entirely different nature. There the passport of Smt. Gandhi was impounded and the question arose whether such impounding was valid in law. The Supreme Court reiterated that there must be the principles of fairplay in action and decision on all matters effecting the rights of the citizens must be arrived at by the authority concerned in a just, right and fair manner and no exception can be made to this. Nothing impairing the principles of natural justice and a right to be treated fairly can be inferred from any statute and must be clearly demonstrated by the authorities and in all the particular provisions. In this connection, reliance was placed on the observations of Mr. Justice Bhagwati at page 624 of the report where Mr. Justice Bhagwati observed that all procedure must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive otherwise it would be no procedure at all. These observations, however, were made ill the context of Article 21 of the Constitution but the learned Judge reiterated that natural justice was by and large an essential element unless expressly excluded to the procedure established by law. Referring to the provisions of the Passport Act Mr. Justice Bhagwati observed that it was true that there was no expressed provision in the Passport Act which required audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport. Referring to the provisions of the Passport Act Mr. Justice Bhagwati observed that it was true that there was no expressed provision in the Passport Act which required audi alteram partem rule should be followed before impounding a passport. but that was not conclusive of the question, if the statute made it dear on this point then no more question arose, but when the statute was silent, the law might in a given case make an implication and should apply the principle. Referring to the observations of Justice Bentley, Mr. Justice Bhagwati observed that when there was no positive word in the statute requiring that the party should be heard yet the justice of the common law would supply the omission of the legislature, His Lordship observed that the principle of audi alteram partem which demanded that no one should be condemned unheard was part of rules of natural justice. Then his Lordship referred to the several decisions of different lands and observed that in the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice there could not be any distinction between quasi-judicial function and administrative function for this purpose. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi judicial inquiry was to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice was calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice it was difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. According to the learned Judge, there was really no exception to the principle of natural justice because the exclusionary cases for which reference might be made to the observations of SA. De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action was really no exception and it was only a misnomer because in those exclusionary cases it could be said that audi alteram partem rule was inapplicable not by way of exception to ‘fair play in action’ but because nothing unfair could be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. The learned Judge was of the view that the audi alteram partem rule was intended to inject justice into the law and it could not be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law lifeless, absurd, stultifying self-defeating or contrary to the common sense of the situation. The learned Judge was of the view that the audi alteram partem rule was intended to inject justice into the law and it could not be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law lifeless, absurd, stultifying self-defeating or contrary to the common sense of the situation. Since the life of the law as observed by Mr. Justice Holmes which was also echoed by Mr. Justice Bhagwati was not logic but experience and every legal proposition must in the ultimate analysis be tested on the touch stone of pragmatic realism. audi alteram partem rule would by the experimental test be excluded it importing the right to be heard had the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demanded. But the learned Judge cautioned that it must be remembered that it was a rule of vital importance in the field of administrative law arid should not be set aside save in very exceptional circumstances or where compulsive necessity so demanded. Reliance was also placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the Court was concerned with the question of suppression of a Municipal Committee in the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 and the Supreme Court reiterated that opportunity to be heard should be given even though the statute did not provide but where the appropriate authority was required to consider the situation. 23. On behalf of the petitioners, it was stressed as I have mentioned before that (1) consideration required application of mind and in a situation of the type of the present case there could not be any consideration or a proper application of mind to the need and the nature of the punishment to be imposed unless the person concerned was given an opportunity to have a say not necessarily in the form of a hearing but even by calling for a representation and application of mind to the said representation. Without that, merely on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned the action would be arbitrary and would be contrary to the rule of law, and should not be passed save in very exceptional circumstances or where compulsive necessity so demanded. Without that, merely on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned the action would be arbitrary and would be contrary to the rule of law, and should not be passed save in very exceptional circumstances or where compulsive necessity so demanded. Reliance was also placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan AIR 1981 SC page 136 where the Supreme Court was concerned with the question of supersession of a Municipal Committee in the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 and the Supreme Court reiterated that opportunity to be heard should be given event though the statute did not provide but where the appropriate authority was required to consider the situation. It has to be borne in mind that that decision was given in the context of entirely different provision. It is well settled now that where the statute or the rule is silent as to giving of the notice in order to consider whether a particular action should be taken by the authority concerned rules of natural justice would be attracted and normally it should be presumed that a person or group of persons whose rights are intended to be affected by the order or action of the authorities concerned should be preceded by a notice to the person or persons concerned and after taking into consideration any representation that can be made. But this principle would not be attracted where a specific rule or the statute provides that though in normal cases opportunities should be given to the persons affected to make representation, in special circumstances for special reasons such opportunities might be denied. Quite apart from that, the said decision had no occasion to consider the situation where exclusion of the right of opportunity of being heard was necessary for very prompt or preemptive action in order to meet certain emergent situation. Therefore the ratio of the said decision cannot, in my opinion, be applied to the facts and circumstances of all cases to contend that when the statute is silent consideration entails opportunity to be heard. 24. The question, whether, in case the provision of the section or Rule requires consideration it is obligatory or mandatory that the person affected should always be heard depend naturally upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. The question, whether, in case the provision of the section or Rule requires consideration it is obligatory or mandatory that the person affected should always be heard depend naturally upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Exclusion of hearing in exercise of fair judgment or in respect of fair play in action in adjudication may in certain special circumstances exclude hearing-See in this connection observations of SA De Smith Judicial Review of Administrative Action”, 2nd Ed, where at page 174 the learned author deals with case where insistence to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action, especially action, of a preventive or remedial nature. The learned author noticed that in South Africa the validity of an order restricting the movement of a person alleged to have promoted infer-racial hostility was upheld despite the absence of any opportunity to controvert the information on which the order was based. Summary action, the learned author noticed, for maintenance of public security or public order in peace time might also be permissible. He also noticed that in a recent Canadian case the need to protect the public against the fraudulent dealings in securities was held to justify summary action. Of course the basis upon which deprivation of the right of hearing in dismissal cases or masters and servants cases would be different in the case of public utility services. On one hand the public interest has to be considered, on the other the individual’s right of livelihood has to be balanced. It is a delicate balance and has to be striven as far practicable in an objective manner. 25. In the case of Sadham Chandra Ghosh v. Union of India, 1981 (1) CHN 475 Mr. Justice Borooah had occasion to consider Rule 14(ii) and Rule 14(iii), the actual facts and circumstances under which the order for removal was passed do not appear from the reported Judgment. It appears that two contentions were urged namely (1) that the authority concerned in dismissing the petitioner in that case from service by taking resort to Rule 14(ii) had not recorded the reasons in the impugned order as to why it was not practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner provided in the rules and (2) that the petitioner had not been afforded an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment. The learned Judge was unable, after considering the records to accept the first contention. He, however, on the authority of the decision in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer. Southern Railway, v. T.R. Challappan AIR 1975 SC 2216 in construing clause (iii) of Rule 14 held that in that case the impugned order was bad on that score. Firstly, as I have mentioned before the facts and circumstances on which the impugned order was passed do not appear from the judgment. Secondly it is not clear whether the attention of His Lordship was drawn as to the amendment of Rule 9(5) and the amendment of the Constitution by the 42nd amendment as mentioned hereinbefore nor does it appear that the attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the decision in the case of P.C. Choudhury & Co. (supra) rendered by the Division Bench of this Court after construing the aforesaid Supreme Court decision. In that view of the matter the said decision is a decision in per incuriam and the petitioners in the instant application before me cannot get much assistance from the said decision. In the premises leaned Advocate for the respondents was right in contending that this was a decision given per incuriam and as such it would not be proper for me to follow the observations of Mr. Justice Borooah in the aforesaid decision. See in this connection Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed Vol 2. page 800, paragraph 1687. See also the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Jaisri v. Rojdewan AIR 1962 SC pages 83 & 88. 26. As mentioned hereinbefore a great deal or argument was advanced on the question that the alleged materials upon which the impugned orders had been passed were not legal materials. It was contended that these materials were not supported by any affidavit and as such the factual existence of the material, cannot be verified. I am unable to accept this contention. The person who has passed the impugned orders has affirmed on affidavit indicating that he has acted on these materials. Therefore, the fact that he has acted on these materials is verified by legal evidence. It is true that the evidence upon which he has acted are not supported by any affidavit. But in my opinion, however, that does not establish that there were no factual existence of these materials. Therefore, the fact that he has acted on these materials is verified by legal evidence. It is true that the evidence upon which he has acted are not supported by any affidavit. But in my opinion, however, that does not establish that there were no factual existence of these materials. These materials were there, whether these materials stated correctly or incorrectly the facts is not an issue before the Court, unless it could be undisputedly demonstrated to be false. When conditional power is given to an authority concerned the scope of the judicial review is to verify whether the conditions were fulfilled but that power of judicial review does not extend further to the power of adjudication on the truth or veracity of the materials upon which the authority concerned has acted. If however, it could be demonstrated that the statement made by the authority concerned that he has acted on these materials were false then different considerations might apply. In this case that position cannot be established. In this connection reliance on behalf of the petitioners was placed on the observations in the case of Mohindra Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner AIR 1978 SC 851 where the Supreme Court observed that when a statutory functionary made an order based on certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be so supplemented by fresh reasons there the order of the Chief Election Commissioner was under challenge. Here in the instant case before me where the challenge is, firstly that there were non-consideration and there were no reasons and secondly that the reasons were not recorded in my opinion it was open to the respondents to indicate the circumstances which necessitated the passing of the orders and in fact reasons were recorded. Facts here are significantly different from the facts before the Supreme Court. 27. There is nothing to indicate that the authority concerned being the Divisional Manager was making an incorrect or untrue statement. No personal or individual malice or notice has been attributed to him. On the other hand, the circumstantial evidence indicate the probability of the truth of these materials. The circumstantial evidence are (a) there was a strike or agitation which is not warranted under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and (b) it was a strike or agitation which affected the running of the essential services. On the other hand, the circumstantial evidence indicate the probability of the truth of these materials. The circumstantial evidence are (a) there was a strike or agitation which is not warranted under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and (b) it was a strike or agitation which affected the running of the essential services. On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that there was no evidence as to how much production had been disrupted or how many trains had not run, to what extent the prices had been affected or to what extent the power supply had been affected. Now these factors cannot be demonstrated in the manner sought for on behalf of the petitioners in this application. The indisputable statement of the petitioners in that they could not attend work due to what they called agitation by the loco staff. There is no denial that these persons namely, the petitioners were at the place where the were alleged to have been there is no categorical averment or denial that they did not take part in any movement either by abstaining from work or asking others from work. The number of persons affected by the orders of removal in comparison to the large number of staffs in loco section indicate that there must have been some principle of pick and choose. That would suggest normally application of mind. In the instant case there was allegation of the atmosphere of violence, there was a case of assault which had been launched against the petitioner no. 1 by the GRP and I further find that in respect of one of the petitioners the authority concerned has referred to the fact that he had delayed taking action on the ground that with the passage of time the person concerned would sober down and in another case he had considered differing action because of the age of the person concerned. Now, all these factors indicate that there was application of mind to the facts of the cases of the petitioners. In this age and in this country if one says in the background of the facts, if they are true which appeared from the reports of the Assistant Divisional Engineer that he came to the conclusion that evidence to prove these allegation was unlikely to come out, can it be said that he was saying something absurd or unreal? In this age and in this country if one says in the background of the facts, if they are true which appeared from the reports of the Assistant Divisional Engineer that he came to the conclusion that evidence to prove these allegation was unlikely to come out, can it be said that he was saying something absurd or unreal? I do not think that anybody used to the atmosphere of industrial agitation in this country would say so. Acting on these lines would not be acting on presumption or conjectures or surmises. The normal presumption that follows from the circumstantial evidence is corroborated by the averment of the Divisional Manager. If a Divisional Manager or an authority empowered to pass the orders is satisfied having regard to the reports of the persons or authority making the reports that he could act on these reports then for the courts to sit on judgment whether he should have believed these reports or not when there is no positive averment that the person making these reports had any personal malice or motive in making these reports, would, in my opinion, be interfering with the administrative discretion which is not warranted by the scope of judicial review of the administrative action in these cases. 28. It was next argued that in any event there had to be consideration. I have already mentioned that consideration there must be but consideration in all circumstances specially in the background of the situation and as has been observed by Mr. Justice Bhagwati in the decision referred to hereinbefore, the principle of audi alteram partem cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make law lifeless. absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or contrary to the common sense of the situation and every proposition must be judged by the touchstone of pragmatic realism and the right to be heard cannot be imported if giving effect of that right has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or for the urgency of a situation. Maintenance of essential service is vital. There prompt action is required. Unfortunately, the judges cannot be immune to the objective reality prevailing in a country at the particular time. Maintenance of essential service is vital. There prompt action is required. Unfortunately, the judges cannot be immune to the objective reality prevailing in a country at the particular time. It is common knowledge that for whatever factors which are not for this Court to enquire into in this litigation a feeling has generated that one can get away with anything provided one has a sufficient nuisance value. who is responsible for that atmosphere is however, another question, not relevant to be enquired at this stage. The recent experience in many of the essential services of many of the common citizen create that felling. Indeed learned advocate for the petitioners stressed in aid of his submission that an enquiry if held would normally have been held after show cause notice was given even in respect of the punishment which would have taken place after some time. Therefore, the fact that in the highly explosive situation witness could not have been available where preventive or pre-emptive action is required for the interest of public which was one of the grounds indicated by the respondents could be a good or valid ground. This indeed indicates that the procedure is so delayed unfortunately that prompt action cannot be taken and those who indulge in these kinds of action that is to say in terrorizing others to their course of action are aware of that fact and very often take full advantage of that situation. 29. One behalf of the petitioners it was criticised that the authorities concerned have stated that it was unlikely that evidence would be forthcoming. This, it was submitted, was pure conjecture. No attempt had been made to produce any evidence, no names had been mentioned as to persons who would not have been forthcoming or had been terrorized. In my opinion in the present context in which industrial or labour or any adjudication is done or is carried on it would be unreal to contend that no amount of coercion and force are used and if people try to give evidence against those who are indulging in these types of activities, if true, their life and safety are at great risk and danger. This is a situation which, in my opinion, no Court can ignore and if I take that factor into consideration I would not be acting subjectively but objectively Principles of law and theories of legal principles must be applied in an objective manner and one can ill afford to ignore the objective reality of a situation. Therefore if in a particular situation as in this case, the authority concerned has not mentioned the names of the persons who would not have come to give evidence and has concluded that it was unlikely that evidence would be forthcoming it cannot be said, in my opinion, that the authorities concerned had acted on surmises or conjectures. In the premises, I am unable to accept the contention that these was no consideration in the facts and circumstances of the case as enjoined by the rules. 30. It is true that so far as the petitioners nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are concerned the materials indicated are not so grave as in the case of other petitioner but, in my opinion, the materials were sufficient to warrant the action taken but in order that justice may be done in case of these petitioners namely 2, 3, 4. 5 & 6, I would indicate that if they make applications for re-consideration of the decisions against them then authorities concerned are not debarred by this decision having regard to the their past conduct and other relevant factors to consider the question of re-employing these persons in Railways on such terms and conditions as they consider fit, proper and just. 31. Before I conclude, I must also notice some other decisions and principles to which my attention was drawn. Attention was drawn to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. Nirmal Kanti Chanda Roy, 1976 (1) CLJ page 218 where several railway employees were removed from service in accordance with Rule 14(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeals) Rules. 1968. They were removed from service without any enquiry held against them but after service of notices of such removal. The court held that the only point for consideration in that appeal was whether the authority concerned had recorded its reasons in writing to show that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry. 1968. They were removed from service without any enquiry held against them but after service of notices of such removal. The court held that the only point for consideration in that appeal was whether the authority concerned had recorded its reasons in writing to show that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry. On the materials before the Court, the Court found that no such reasons had in fact been recorded. In the facts and circumstances of this case I find the position otherwise. It was contended that in the case before the Division Bench an attempt had been made to serve the petitioner at various places and these were recorded. Here indisputably no such attempt had been made. Only the order of removals were sought to be pasted in the notice hoards after these were refused to be accepted by the petitioners. These, however, did not indicate the reasons why it was not practicable to hold the inquiry but in the facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned hereinbefore I have found that reasons were in fact recorded. I do not find any warrant for the proposition that in the orders for removal it was mandatory to communicate the reasons for which the enquiry could not be held. My attention was also drawn to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sudhirabala Roy v. State of W.B. 85 CWN page 273 where in the context of S. 3(1) of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947 it was held that where the allegation was made on oath in the petition for oath in a petition for a writ that no notice under sub-s. 3(1) had been served and the statement was not denied by any of the counter-affidavits, the mere production of the records maintained by the Government department concerned which merely contained a report of the process server that the order for requisition was handed over to the officer of the aggrieved party and that he having refused to accept the same it was served by affixation could not be accepted to disprove the allegation in the petition. In the instant case, however, the petitioners have themselves annexed the contents of the copy of the notice which they alleged to have obtained from the notice board. In the instant case, however, the petitioners have themselves annexed the contents of the copy of the notice which they alleged to have obtained from the notice board. Furthermore, the letters sent by registered post were produced and had come back with endorsement either ‘refused’ or ‘not available’. In that background, in my opinion, the ratio of the principle of the aforesaid Division Bench that without proper attempt of service where the petitioners themselves have set out the contents of the notice of removal, cannot be accepted. 32. Reliance was also placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Romana v. I.A Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628 in aid of the proposition that the State could not act arbitrarily. My attention was drawn to the observations of Mr. Justice Bhagwati at paragraph 21 at page 1642 of the report Reliance was also placed on the observation of Mr, Justice Bhagwati that the democratic form of Government demanded equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in all Governmental transactions. The Government cannot act at its sweet will in dealing with the people like a private individual, and action must be in conformity with the standards and norms which are not arbitrarary, rational or irrelevant. With great respect I agree with the aforesaid observations. But in the facts and circumstances of this case as I have mentioned hereinbefore I do not find that there has been any breach of the principles mentioned above in the conduct of the respondent authorities. 33. On consideration of these materials and the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court it appears to me that Rule 14(ii) enjoins that the authority concerned must act reasonably, fairly and not arbitrarily and there must be materials upon which a person can reasonably arrive at the conclusion that an employee covered by the Rule 14 had to be imposed penalty and secondly there must be materials to come to the conclusion that enquiry in the manner contemplated under Rules 5 to 9 of the aforesaid rules was not practicable. (2) Upon these materials the reasons must be recorded. (2) Upon these materials the reasons must be recorded. (3) The materials must be objective and should have a rational nexus on the points mentioned hereinbefore and whether there were such reasons in fact and whether in fact a belief on those reasons was formed and whether those reasons had rational nexus of the purpose of the two holding of enquiry and whether there was need for imposition of penalty without hearing the delinquent should be arrived at fairly, justly and not arbitrarily Fourthly, whether these conditions have been fulfilled or not are justiciable in courts of law. The Court, however, is not concerned either with the sufficiency or even with the truth of these materials though these materials must have a factual basis to the grounds for the formation of the belief. To this limited extent and to the above extent only judicial review of the action, call it administrative or quasi-judicial, under S. 14(ii) is permissible. 34. Now, I have to consider whether in this instant case that has been done or not. I do not accept the proposition that in all cases irrespective of the facts and situation of a particular case, irrespective of the fact that hearing might delay while promptitude was the urgency and where preemptive action to prevent damage to the community at large was necessary, there should be hearing or opportunity if the situation was lather explosive. On behalf of the petitioners it was emphasized that there was a vital difference between what is desirable and what is practicable. That is true. But in certain circumstances what is not desirable might not also be practicable. But in the instant case whatever may have been the expressions used in certain places the authorities concerned concentrated on the question of the practicability of holding the enquiries which is the relevant point to be taken into consideration under the rules. 35 On behalf of the respondents it was contended that this was a joint petition and in respect of different causes of action and as the grounds for removals were different in case of the several petitioners the joint petition was bad because if the cause of action of one petitioner was liable to fail then the causes of action of the other petitioners must also fail. It is true that in respect of several causes of action the Courts discourage joint petition but essentially it is a question of Court's embarrassment in adjudicating the rights of the parties. In the instant case, the petitioners’ grievance is that the impugned orders, though several in number, were passed as a result of a common policy decision and there was non-application of mind in individual cases I have not felt any difficulty in adjudicating this question though it covered several different orders. Therefore, if I were able to accept the contentions of the petitioners I would not have dismissed this application on this ground. In this connection reliance was placed on the observations of Halsbury’s Laws of England 3rd Ed. Vol 11, page 83, paragraph 155 and the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of P.R. Naida v. Govt. of A.P. AIR 1977 SC 854 . But in the view I have taken as indicated before it is not necessary for me to refer to these decisions. 36. It was then contended that the impugned orders were alleged to have been passed as a result of policy decision of the Eastern Railway at Garden Reach while it was contended that the headquarters of the Eastern Railway was not at Garden React but at Fairlie Place. It is true that the statement is not quite correct. Because the headquarters of the Eastern Railway is as the respondents said at Fairlie Place and not Garden Reach but nothing very material turns on this statement and I would not have dismissed the application if was otherewise able to accept the contentions of the petitioners on this ground. A point was taken whether the petitioner was not entitled to come to this Court before all the statutory remedies were exhausted. The petitioners contended that they made appropriate representations the respondents denied that. In the view I have taken it is not necessary for me to discuss this aspect in detail. 37. In the result, this application fails and it is accordingly dismissed with the observations that if the petitioners nos. The petitioners contended that they made appropriate representations the respondents denied that. In the view I have taken it is not necessary for me to discuss this aspect in detail. 37. In the result, this application fails and it is accordingly dismissed with the observations that if the petitioners nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6 make appropriate applications to the appropriate authorities for their reinstatement to the railway service this decision would not prevent the said authorities from considering the said applications objectively and pass such orders on such conditions as they consider fit and proper in the interest of the administration. With these observations this application is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. Rule nisi is discharged. Application dismissed with observations.