JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application under section 482, Cr. P.C. against the order dated 6-11-78 of the SDM., Fatehpur, and the order dated 8-11-78 of the Sessions Judge, Sikar. 2. The case relates to agricultural fields, which have got the chequered history of litigation, both civil and criminal. Suit No. 54/71 was decreed by the S.D.O., Fatehpur on 20-5-74, and the decree for eviction was granted against the applicants and in favour of the respondents-non-applicants. An application under Order 9, rule 13 CPC was filed to set aside this decree on the ground that Laduram defendant died and a decree has been given against that person. This application was dismissed. An appeal was filed before the Revenue Appellate authority which was accepted on 19-10-76. From this order, an appeal had been filed before the Revenue Board, and it is alleged that the operation of the order has been stayed. 3. After the suit was finally decreed on 0-5-74. it is the case of the non-petitioner-plaintiffs that in compliance with that decree possession was given to them on 8-9-75 on 24-9-75 the police authorities of Laxmangarh filed proceedings u/s 145, Cr, P.C. in the court of SDM Fatehpur. On 31-5-76, the property was ordered to be attached and Tehsildar, Laxmangarh was appointed receiver. 4. On 31-5-76, after passing an order of attachment, the proceedings were dropped. The non-applicants filed an application before the S.D.M. for getting possession, but the same was dismissed on 16-6-76. The second application was dismissed on 15-9-76. 5. On 27-9-77, the non-applicants filed application before the S.D.M. Fatehpur for getting possession of the land in dispute from the receiver, and on 6-11-78, the land was released from attachment and it was directed to be given to the non-applicants by the Tehsildar. A revision application was filed but was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sikar on 8-11-78. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am convinced that after the proceedings were dropped by the Magistrate on 31-5-76, he had no jurisdiction to pass further orders in 1978 for grant of possession to the non-applicants on the basis of the decree of a revenue Court. 7. It is established law that in proceedings u/s 145, Cr. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am convinced that after the proceedings were dropped by the Magistrate on 31-5-76, he had no jurisdiction to pass further orders in 1978 for grant of possession to the non-applicants on the basis of the decree of a revenue Court. 7. It is established law that in proceedings u/s 145, Cr. P.C., the relevant date for deciding the question of possession is either the date of preliminary order or two months earlier to it- In the decision dated 6-11-78, no such finding has been given that the non-applicants were in possession of the land on the date of preliminary order or within two months earlier to it. 8. It is also established law that once an attachment is made, then the proceedings will not be dropped unless the attachment is made on the ground that the court is not in a position to find out which party was in possession on the crucial date. Obviously, the present one was a not case of that type. 9. It appears that the learned S.D.M. committed serious illegalities one after the other in dropping the proceedings, reviving the proceedings and passing the order about possession. 10. The proceedings were dropped on 31-5-76 mentioning that no proceedings can be taken after attachment. This was based on the decision of Chandi Prasad and others v. Om Prakash Kanodia and others, 1976 Cr. L.J. 209 .but is now settled law that this view is not correct, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal and another, AIR 1980 S.C. 242 which reads as under ; "The Magistrate's jurisdiction does not come to an end as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency. S. 146 does not contemplate that regardless of the situation, consequent upon which an attachment is effected, it is the Civil Court and not the Magistrate that is to have further jurisdiction in the matter, after an attachment is effected. Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal P.C. together constitute a scheme for the restitution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of the dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal P.C. together constitute a scheme for the restitution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of the dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. If s. 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of S. 145, it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. But Section 46 cannot be so separated from S. 145. Contetual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise, it may mislead. In a case of emergency, a Magistrate may attach the property, at any time after making the preliminary order under S. 145( ), There is no express stipulation in S. 146 that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate ends with the attachment. Nor is it implied. Far from it. The obligation to proceed with the enquiry as prescribed by s. 145, sub-s. (4) is against any such implication. The only provision for stopping the proceeding and cancelling the preliminary order is to be found in S. 145(5) and it can be on the ground that there is no longer any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. An emergency is the basis of attachment under the first limb of S. 146(1) and if there is an emergency, no one can say that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. A comparative study of Ss. 145 & 146 as they stood, before 1955 and after 1955 under the old Code and as they now stand under 1973 Code, also leads to the conclusion that the Magistrate's jurisdiction does not end as soon as an attachment is made on the ground of emergency. The provisions of Ss. 145 and 146 of the 1973 Code are substantially the same as the corresponding provisions before the 1955 amendment of the old Code". 11. Now, there is no doubt that after attachment u/s 146 the court should proceed to determine the question of possession and case appropriate orders after due enquiry. The provisions of Ss. 145 and 146 of the 1973 Code are substantially the same as the corresponding provisions before the 1955 amendment of the old Code". 11. Now, there is no doubt that after attachment u/s 146 the court should proceed to determine the question of possession and case appropriate orders after due enquiry. Undoubtedly, in the present case, the attachment was ordered on account of emergency and not because the court was not in a position to decide who was in possession of the crucial date. In fact, no such enquiry was made at all regarding possession. 12. I am convinced that this basic and fundamental infirmity has vitiated all subsequent orders. It is not without significance that the revenue suit was decreed in 1974 even before the criminal proceedings u/s 145 started and, therefore it was not proper for the lower court to direct delivery of possession to the non-petitioners on the ground that the judgment of the SDO was confirmed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. This action is fallacious, because the Revenue appellate Authority accepted the appeal of the defendants and directed that the decree passed against the defendants shall not be treated as valid because of it having been passed against dead person and now the plaintiff should take proceedings under Order 22, C.P.C. It is true that this judgment under appeal is before the Revenue Board, but that litigation has not resulted in final and conclusive adjudication of title of any of the parties so far. 13. I am, therefore, convinced that on both the above counts, this application u/s 482, Cr. P.C. should succeed. The orders of the learned Magistrate dated 31-5-76 and all subsequent orders including the order dated 6-1 -78 and also the order of the learned Sessions Judge dated 8-11-78 are quashed. The attachment of the property would continue in pursuance of the earlier order of the S D M, Fatehpur dated 22-10-75 and the Tehsildar, Laxmangarh would continue to be the receiver of this property. The S.D.M. would now decide the crucial question of possession on the crucial date of drawing the preliminary order or two months earlier to it, as required by Section 145, and that would be done after permitting opportunity to both the parties to produce evidence of possession. The S.D.M. would now decide the crucial question of possession on the crucial date of drawing the preliminary order or two months earlier to it, as required by Section 145, and that would be done after permitting opportunity to both the parties to produce evidence of possession. In case the revenue suit about the title is finally decided between the parties, then the S D.M. would give weight and due consideration to it. 14. The application u/s 482. Cr. P.C. is accepted as indicated above.Application Accepted. *******