ORDER 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of compulsory retirement passed against him by the State Government under Note (1) to Article 465 of the Civil Services Regulations. The order was passed on 21-9- 73, Ann. 3. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged this order before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal II, Lucknow, through a claim petition under S. 4, U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act. The order of the Tribunal dated 26-3-1977 is Ann. 3. 2. The petitioner challenged the order of compulsory retirement before the Tribunal on two grounds. Firstly, it was alleged that the petitioner had not completed 25 year's qualifying service and, therefore, he could not be retired under Note (1) to Article 465, secondly, it was pressed that the order was based on a consideration of irrelevant entries in his service record. Neither of the two grounds found favour with the Tribunal. The petitioner has, therefore, approached this Court. Both the grounds have been repeated before us. Before we deal with the grounds a few facts about which there is no dispute between the parties may be noticed. 3. The petitioner was appointed as Agriculture Inspector in the scale of Rs. 80-150 in Sept. 1945. This was a Group II post in the U. P. Subordinate Agriculture Service. While working on this post, the petitioner was selected to the post of Senior Horticulture Inspector which was a Group I post in the Subordinate Agriculture Service in the pay scale of Rs. 200-350. In pursuance of this selection the petitioner was issued appointment order on 11-12-1947 and he joined the post on 7-2-1948. In this service the petitioner was confirmed in July 1963 with retrospective effect from April 1959. In Nov. 1956 the petitioner was promoted to U. P. Agriculture Service Class II. On the Class II post the appointment of the petitioner was approved by the U. P. Public Service Commission. In 1966 the U. P. Public Service Commission approved the petitioner's appointment to the post of Agriculture-Horticulture Officer. The petitioner held posts carrying various designations and he was finally posted as Superintendent, Government Gardens, Faizabad in May 1969. While he was so posted the impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed against him. From what has been stated hereinbefore it would be seen that right from Sept. 1945 till 21st Sept. The petitioner held posts carrying various designations and he was finally posted as Superintendent, Government Gardens, Faizabad in May 1969. While he was so posted the impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed against him. From what has been stated hereinbefore it would be seen that right from Sept. 1945 till 21st Sept. 1973 when the order of retirement was passed the petitioner remained in the employment of the U. P. Government without break. Another fact which may be noticed is that there is no dispute between the parties that the Directorate of Agriculture in which the petitioner worked was a permanent and pensionable establishment. 4. Article 465 together with Note 1 as it stood at the time the order of retirement was passed read as follows :- "465(1) - A retiring pension is granted to a Government servant who is permitted to retire after completing qualifying service for twenty-five years or on attaining the age of fifty years. (2) A retiring pension is also granted to a Government servant who is required by Government to retire after completing twenty-five years or more of qualifying service. Note - 1. Government retains the right to retire any Government servant after he has completed 25 year's qualifying service without giving any reasons, and no claim to special compensation on this account shall be entertained. This right shall only be exercised by Government in the Administrative Department, where it is in the Public interest to dispense with the services of a Government servant." One of the necessary conditions to earn a retiring pension is that the Government servant concerned should have completed the qualifying service for 25 years. Under Note 1 the Government can exercise the right to compulsorily retire a Government servant only after he has completed 25 year's qualifying service, that is after he has become entitled to a retiring pension. The manner of computing the qualifying service is prescribed under Articles 361, 368 and 370 which as they stood prior to the amendment made by U. P. Civil Services (First Amendment) Regulations 1973, provided as follows :- "361. The service of an officer does not qualify for pension unless it conforms to the following three conditions : First - The service must be under Government. Second - The employment must be substantive and permanent. Third - The service must be paid by Government." "368. The service of an officer does not qualify for pension unless it conforms to the following three conditions : First - The service must be under Government. Second - The employment must be substantive and permanent. Third - The service must be paid by Government." "368. The Service does not qualify unless the officer holds substantive office on a permanent establishment." 370. An officer may count continuous temporary or officiating service under the Government of Uttar Pradesh followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or any other post except (i) periods of temporary or officiating service in a non-pensionable establishment, (ii) periods of service in a work-charged establishment, and (iii) periods of service in a post paid from contingencies. Note - If service rendered in a non-pensionable establishment, work-charged establishment or in a post from contingencies, falls between two periods of temporary service in a pensionable establishment or between periods of temporary service and permanent service in a pensionable establishment, it will not constitute an interruption of service." Under the second condition of Article 361 the service counts towards qualifying service if the employment is substantive and permanent. Under Article 368 service does not qualify unless the Government servant concerned holds a substantive office on a permanent establishment. Article 370 provides an exception to what has been provided under Articles 361 and 368. Under this provision even the period of temporary or officiating service may be counted towards qualifying service but this would be possible only if this period is followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or any other post. But this would not be possible in respect of periods of temporary or officiating service in a non-pensionable establishment. Thus the period of temporary or officiating service in a non-pensionable establishment will not count towards qualifying service although the Government servant concerned was confirmed without interruption of service. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, argued that the benefit of Article 370 is available only to the Government servant and it is not available to the Government. According to the learned counsel the Article would be attracted only when the Government servant seeks voluntary retirement and it will not be attracted if the Government servant concerned is sought to be retired by the Government. According to the learned counsel the Article would be attracted only when the Government servant seeks voluntary retirement and it will not be attracted if the Government servant concerned is sought to be retired by the Government. The argument was based on the use of the words "an officer may count ." In support of his argument the learned counsel relied upon two decisions of this Court, one of the decisions having been rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court and the other having been rendered by a Division Bench. The Division Bench comprising of V.G.O. C.J. and B. Dayal, J. was dealing with special appeal No. 348 of 1968 (State of U. P. v. Krishna Nand Roy). By the judgment dated 24-2-1969 the Division Bench dismissed the appeal of the State of Uttar Pradesh and upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the retirement order had been quashed. The Division Bench has observed that the order of retirement was liable to be quashed on two grounds. First, that the benefit of Article 370 could be availed of only by the Government servant and not by the State Government, and secondly, the Government servant concerned in that case was working for a certain period in temporary capacity in a non-pensionable establishment. We have observed hereinbefore that the exception provided under Article 370 would not be available in respect of period of temporary or officiating service in non-pensionable establishment. In view of the fact that this essential requirement was lacking in the case of Krishna Nand Roy it was not necessary for the Division Bench to decide the other question, namely whether the benefit of Article 370 could be availed of only by the Government servant or it could be availed of even by the State Government. Thus the observations of the Division Bench with regard to the competence of the State Government to avail of Article 370 are in the nature of obiter. We are of the opinion that Article 370 will be attracted whether the Government servant concerned himself opts for voluntary retirement or the State Government proceeds to retire him compulsorily. If a different view is taken the same term "qualifying service" used in Article 465 will acquire two meanings which in our opinion is not in consonance with the should principles of interpretation. If a different view is taken the same term "qualifying service" used in Article 465 will acquire two meanings which in our opinion is not in consonance with the should principles of interpretation. Unless a statute or regulation specifically assigns different meanings in different situations to the same term, the term should not be given different meanings. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Tribunal was correct in holding that Article 370 could be relied upon by the State Government for computing the period of petitioner's qualifying service. The view taken by us was taken by another Division Bench of this Court in special appeal No. 257 of 1972 (State of U. P. v. Karam Singh Sirohi, decided on 16-5-1972 by Satish Chandra and K. N. Seth, JJ.). We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in this case. It may be pointed out that the writ petition from which the special appeal in Krishna Nand Roy's case arose was decided by Satish Chandra, J. 6. The Single Judge decision relied upon by the learned counsel was rendered by K. N. Singh, J. in Civil Misc. Writ No. 6922 of 1972 (Kamta Prasad Garg v. State of U. P., decided on 16-4-1974). In this case a part of the service was rendered by the petitioner in the Department of Food and Civil Supplies which remained temporary and non-pensionable till 1-4-1959. It was only with effect from 1-4-1959 that the Department became permanent and pensionable. The question involved in the petition was whether the period of service rendered by the petitioner in the Department prior to 1-4-1959 could be counted towards qualifying service. Relying upon cl. (1) of Article 370 the learned Single Judge answered the question in negative. He also observed that the Article 370 could be availed of only by the Government servant and not by the Government. He accordingly quashed the order of compulsory retirement. Against this decision Special Appeal No. 194 of 1970, (State of U. P. v. Kamata Prasad Garg) was preferred by the State. When the matter came up before the Division Bench it was noticed that two Division Benches had expressed conflicting opinions. The Bench accordingly referred the special appeal to a Full Bench. Against this decision Special Appeal No. 194 of 1970, (State of U. P. v. Kamata Prasad Garg) was preferred by the State. When the matter came up before the Division Bench it was noticed that two Division Benches had expressed conflicting opinions. The Bench accordingly referred the special appeal to a Full Bench. The Full Bench comprising of K. B. Asthana, C.J., G. C. Mathur and Gopi Nath, JJ., by its judgment dated 22-3-1975, held that the question whether State Government could rely upon Article 370 was not necessary to be decided in view of the fact that the order of compulsory retirement could not be sustained because of cl. (1) of Article 370. As observed hereinbefore part of the service had been rendered by Kamta Prasad Garg in temporary capacity in a non-pensionable establishment. The observations of K. N. Singh, J., therefore, regarding the competence of the State Government to rely upon Article 370 are in the nature of obiter. With utmost respect to the learned Judge we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by him. 7. In view of the above discussion we find no merit in the first ground of challenge raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. With regard to the second ground of challenge the learned counsel argued that the petitioner was confirmed with effect from 1-4-1959 and he crossed the last efficiency bar on 4-12-1965 and therefore adverse entries prior to 4-12-1965 could not be taken into account while taking decision regarding the petitioner's compulsory retirement. The Tribunal has reproduced the entries earned by the petitioner for the years 1958-59, 1959-60, 1964-65, 1965-66 and 1968-69. From this it would be seen that even after crossing the efficiency bar in 1965 the petitioner earned adverse entry in the year 1968-69. 9. It was argued by Sri Trivedi that the petitioner continued to earn increments in the scale and he was never reverted from his post which indicated that he was an efficient officer and even if he was not fit to hold the higher post at the most he could be reverted to the lower post but there was no occasion to retire prematurely. In support of this proposition the learned counsel relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India ( (1980) 4 SCC 321 ): (1980 Lab I C 1184). At page 329 (of SCC) : (at p. 1188 of Lab I C) their Lordships observed as follows : "One wonders how an officer whose continuous service for 14 years crossing the efficiency bar and reaching the maximum salary in the scale and with no adverse entries at least for five years immediately before the compulsory retirement, could be cashiered on the score that long years ago, his performance had been poor, although his superiors had allowed him to cross the efficiency bar without qualms. A short cut may often be a wrong cut." In Chadha's case their Lordships found that the reviewing committee which considered Chadhas case for compulsory retirement had taken into account entries for the period 1961-62 to the end of 1970 but had not taken into account entries for the years 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76 which were favourable to Chadha. It was in this background that their Lordships quashed the order of compulsory retirement. In the present case we had summoned the record from the State Government and we found that even in the years 1971-72 and 1972-73 the petitioner had earned adverse entries. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that these entries could not be taken into account as they were not communicated to the petitioner. These entries were not relied upon either by the committee which reviewed the petitioner's case nor by the petitioner's retiring authority. We have looked into the record only to find out whether there was any material favourable to the petitioner even in the period subsequent to the period noticed by the reviewing and the retiring authorities. 10. In his long period of service the petitioner worked in various sections and earned adverse entries in various years. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it cannot be said that the State Government acted arbitrarily and on irrelevant considerations in retiring the petitioner. Allegations of mala fides had been made by the petitioner against Sri Yashpal Chandra who had given some of the adverse entries. There are however adverse entries by other officers also. 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it cannot be said that the State Government acted arbitrarily and on irrelevant considerations in retiring the petitioner. Allegations of mala fides had been made by the petitioner against Sri Yashpal Chandra who had given some of the adverse entries. There are however adverse entries by other officers also. 11. It was next argued that if the petitioner was not found to be useful to the potato section as it was mentioned in the entry for the year 1968-69, he could be transferred to another section but on the basis that he was not useful to the potato section he could not be retired prematurely. The entry for this year states thus : "He could not prove useful to potato section." This entry cannot be read in isolation from the other entries. This entry does not mean that the petitioner was not useful only to potato section although he was useful to other sections. The entry refers to potato section because during this period he had worked in the potato section. 12. With reference to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M. E. Reddy ( (1980) 2 SCC 15 ) : (1980 Lab IC 221), the learned Chief Standing Counsel argued that the object of compulsory retirement was to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain a high standard of efficiency and initiative in service and therefore the order of compulsory retirement was to be examined in the light of these requirements in public service. In para 18 at page 25 (of (1980) 2 SCC) : (at p. 226 of Lab I C) it was observed thus : " The assessment made by his superior officers from the very beginning of his service until the impugned order was passed shows that at the best Reddy was merely an average officer and that the reports show that he was found to be sometimes tactless, impolite, impersonated and suffered from other infirmities though not all of them were of a very serious nature so as to amount to an adverse entry which may be communicated to him. We might also mention that before passing an order under R. 16(3) it is not an entry here or an entry there which has to be taken into consideration by the Government but the overall picture of the officer during the long years of his service that he puts in has to be considered from the point of view of achieving higher standard of efficiency and dedication so as to be retained even after the officer has put in the requisite number of years of service. " Again in para 28 at p. 30 it was observed thus :- "------ It was, however, contended by counsel for Reddy that reading the order as a whole it contains an odour of victimisation, so as to make the order arbitrary. We are, however, unable to find any material on the record to show that the order was in any way arbitrary. The Government of India acted on the orders passed by the Home Minister concerned who had considered the report of the Review Committee in its various aspects. There is nothing to show that Reddy was victimised in any way. On the other hand, the history of his service shows that he was always given his due. He was taken in the I.P.S. and allotted the year 1952. He was promoted to the selection grade also at the proper time. The order of suspension was withdrawn and the departmental enquiry was dropped and the officer was reinstated and later promoted as D.I.G. These facts completely militate against the concept of victimisation. It appears that on an overall consideration of the entire history of the service of Reddy and the various stages through which he had passed it was considered in the interest of administration and to ensure better initiative and efficiency to retire him in public interest. We are also unable to find any element of arbitrariness in the impugned order. " (Emphasis supplied). From the underlined portion it would appear that it would not be illegal for the retiring authority to consider the entire record of Government servant concerned while taking a decision to retire him. In the present case we have examined the record and we do not find that at any stage the petitioner's performance has been of outstanding character. From the underlined portion it would appear that it would not be illegal for the retiring authority to consider the entire record of Government servant concerned while taking a decision to retire him. In the present case we have examined the record and we do not find that at any stage the petitioner's performance has been of outstanding character. In fact he has earned several adverse entries apart from the five entries referred to in the order of the Tribunal. We are therefore satisfied that the impugned order has been passed in the interest of efficiency and initiative in service and the same does not suffer from arbitrariness. 13. In view of the above the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. Stay order if any shall stand discharged. 14. After we had pronounced the above order, Sri R. N. Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for certificate of fitness under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion the questions decided by us do not raise substantial question of law of general importance which require to be decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The certificate prayed for is, accordingly, refused.