K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) AT the stage of admission, the respondent has entered caveat, therefore the matter is taken up for final hearing itself. ( 2 ) THIS civil revision petition is preferred against the order dated 30th september 1981 passed by the learned Prl. Munsiff, Kolar, in Exn. No. 142 of 1981 over-ruling the objection raised by the petitioner judgment debtor and directing that the execution be proceeded with. ( 3 ) ONE and the only contention of Sri r. Nagaraj, learned counsel for the patitioner judgment debtor is that the order of eviction which is passed on the basis of the compromise is null and void in as much as the Court has not, in express terms, while recording the compromise, recorded a finding that it is satisfied that any one or more of the grounds pleaded for eviction as per the provisions contained in the Karnataka rent Control Act, 1961, under S. 21 (1) (d), (h) and (o) have been established. This contention cannot at all be accepted. It is already pointed out that the Executing court has over-ruled the objections and has directed the execution to proceed. 3. 2. It was not disputed that the petitioner was the tenant of the suit premises in question and the respondent was the owner/landlord thereof. The respondent landlord had filed HRC 31 of 1976 in the court of the Munsiff, Kolar, for eviction of the petitioner not only on the ground that the suit premises was required for his bona fide use and occupation but also on the grounds falling under S. 21 (1) (d) and (o) of the Karnataka Rent Control act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' ). In the first round of litigation, the court of first instance dismissed the petition and there was an appeal to the District court which was also dismissed. Then, crp 2891 of 1978 was preferred before this Court challenging the correctness of the order passed by the District Court confirming the order passed by the Court of first instance. This Court allowed the revision petition and remitted the case to the Court of first instance for fresh consideration. Then, crp 2891 of 1978 was preferred before this Court challenging the correctness of the order passed by the District Court confirming the order passed by the Court of first instance. This Court allowed the revision petition and remitted the case to the Court of first instance for fresh consideration. After the remand, the parties have filed the compromise petition which reads as follows :"under Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC, the petitioner and the respondent most humbly beg to state as follows : the petitioner and the respondent jointly submit that they have compromised the case. The respondent herewith withdrawing all his defence and he has no objection for eviction order, of the petition schedule premises. The respondent be granted four month's time to vacate the scheduk premises and put the petitioner in actual possession. The respondent also undertakes to vacate the portion of the Schedule premises in which he is running Bangle Factory in his daughter's name. The parties must bear their own cost. The respondent admits all the averments in the main petition. Wherefore the petitioner and the respondent most humbly pray that the hon'ble Court be pleased to pass order as per terms of the compromise petition according to law in the interest of justice. Kolar, Sd. Chikkanna dated : 28-2-81 (in Kannada) Petitioner sd. N. G. Vasudeva Murthy, advocate for Petr. Sd. M. K. Anjaneyaswamy Mudaliar, respondent". The Court, on recording the compromise, has passed the order of eviction. The order recording the compromise is as follows :"28-2-81. PETITIONER by Sri N. G. V. Respondent by Sri S. K. To hear on I. A. II. Both the parties jointly file I. A. III under Order 23 R. 3 of CPC reporting compromise and praying for an order in terms of the compromise with four month's time from to-day. The parties admit the compromise. It is stated in the compromise petition that the respondent admits all the averments made in the petition and withdraws his objections. Therefore, the agreement contained therein is hereby recorded. The petition is allowed in terms of the'compromise. The respondent is allowed four month's time from to day to vacate the schedule premises. There is no order as to costs. Sd. / H. Basavaraj. 28-2-81". Therefore, the agreement contained therein is hereby recorded. The petition is allowed in terms of the'compromise. The respondent is allowed four month's time from to day to vacate the schedule premises. There is no order as to costs. Sd. / H. Basavaraj. 28-2-81". The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme court in Nai Baku v. Lala Ramnarayan (1 ). Similarly, the learned Counsel for the respondent also, in support of his contention that the decree for eviction passed by the court exercising the jurisdiction under the Act on the basis of the compromise in question is valid, has placed reliance on another decision of the Supreme Court in suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janibhai (2 ). It is further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the compromise petition filed by the parties, the allegations made in the petition are admitted and added to that, there is a positive statement that all the contentions raised by the petitioner have been given up. Having regard to these statements contained in the compromise petition, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the Court must be deemed to have been satisfied that the grounds falling under S. 21 (l) (d), (h) and (o) of the Act, for passing a decree for eviction have been established. 3. 3. It is now well settled that the court exercising the jurisdiction under the act, can pass an order/decree for eviction on the basis of a compromise after it is satisfied that one or other of the statutory grounds pleaded by the landlord for eviction of the tenant is established by reason of the admission of the same by the tenant as contained in the compromise. In nagindas's (3) case, the Supreme Court has held as follows :". . . . that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court, could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in tbe case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. . . . . . . . ". The same view has again been reiterated in the subsequent decision of the Supreme court in Roshanlal's. case (4), in which it has been pointed out that the Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise if the compromise indicates either on its face or in the back ground of other materials in the case that the tenant has expressly or impliedly agreed to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances of the case, is entitled to have such a decree under the law. Even in Nai Bhau's (1), on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been held that the Court is to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded, which the tenant has admitted by the compromise and thereby dispensing with further proof on account of the compromise ; and the Court is to be satisfied about compliance of the statutory requirements on the totality of facts of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the pleadings upto the stage when the compromise is effected. It has also been further held that when a compromise decree is challenged as a nullity in the course of its execution, the executing court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. For that purpose, it has been further held chat if the pleadings and other materials on record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction, a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing Court will have to give effect to it. In Suit man Noormohamed's (2) case after referring to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, it has been held that the decree lor eviction passed on compromise is not a nullity "if there is abundant intrinsic material in the compromise itself to indicate that the decree passed upon its basis was not in violation of the Act, but was in accordance with it". It has also been further pointed out that while recording the compromise under order 23 R. 3. of CPC, it is not necessary for the Court to say in express terms in the order that it is satisfied that the compromise is a lawful one and it will be presumed to have been done so unless the contrary is shown. 3. 5. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it emerges that it is open for the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act, to pass an order or decree of eviction on the basis of a compromise if it is satisfied that by reason of such a compromise one or the other of the statutory grounds pleaded for eviction stand established. It also emerges that if a question arises during the course of execution that the order/decree of eviction, the execution of which is sought for, is a nullity because it is passed on the basis of a compromise, the executing Court is entitled to look into the compromise and also the pleadings of the parties and other materials if any on the record to find out whether it is really so. ( 4 ) IN the instant case, in the petition for eviction, necessary averments for passing an order of eviction on the grounds contained in S. 21 (l) (h), (d) and (o) of the act, have been made. Though it is a fact that the tenant in the first round of litigation has contested the petition and has succeeded and the matter came to be remanded by this Court. But, after the remand, the petitioner tenant has filed a compromise petition and has given up all his contentions and admitting that the contents of the petition are correct. The court while recording the compromise has adverted to these aspects inasmuch as in the order it has been stated that the parties admit the compromi e, and it is stated in the compromise petition that the respondent admits all the averments made in the petition and withdraws his objections. The Court has further stated that the compromise is recorded and the petition is allowed in terms of the compromise. It is not the case of the petitioner that the compromise is unlawful. The Court has further stated that the compromise is recorded and the petition is allowed in terms of the compromise. It is not the case of the petitioner that the compromise is unlawful. Therefore, it becomes clear that the order of eviction is passed not only on the basis of the compromise but on the basis of the admission of the petition averments which go to establish the case of the landlord for eviction. When once the petition averments are admitted, there is no question of proving them by adducing evidence, as the same stand proved by admission. A fact can be established either by admission or by adducing evidence if the existence of that fact is disputed. Therefore, in the instant case, the petition averments have been admitted and added to that, the petitioner has withdrawn all his contentions ; as such, it cannot be said that the order of eviction is passed merely on the basis of compromise, but it is based on the proof of the allegations contained in the petition as the same have been admitted in the compromise. ( 5 ) FOR the reasons stated above and also having regarded to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Suleman noor mohamed's (2) case, I do not think that the order of eviction is null and void, merely because in the order recording the compromise, it is not specifically stated by the Court that it is satisfied that the requirements of the Act for the purpose of passing an order of eviction under S. 21 (1) (d), (h) and (o) of Act, are established. ( 6 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this civil Revision Petition fails and the same is dismissed. --- *** --- .