JUDGMENT 1. - This is a defendant's second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. directed against the judgment and decree dated March 31, 1981 of the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by which, he maintained the judgment and decree dated September 8, 1979 of the Munsif City, Jodhpur. 2. It is not necessary to state the facts in detail. Suffice it to mention that the plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for ejectment in respect of the premises described in para 1 of the plaint, inter alia, on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. It was contested by the defendant-appellant. The learned Munsif framed necessary issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties. The evidence was recorded. By his judgment and decree dated September 8, 1979, the learned Munsif decided issues No. 4 and 7 relating to reasonable and bonafide necessity and comparative hardship in favour if the plaintiff and against the defendant and decree the suit for ejectment. The defendant preferred an appeal and the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, by his judgment dated March 31, 1981 confirmed the findings of issue Nos. 4 and 7 and maintained the decree for ejectment. Hence this second appeal by the tenant-defendant as aforesaid. 3. Learned counsel for the parties stated that the appeal may finally be heard and disposed of. 4. I have heard Mr. L.R. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. G.R. Singhvi, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court have failed to record a finding as contemplated in the second para of Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, (No. XVII of 1950), (for short 'the Act' hereafter). Para second of Section 14(2) of the Act provides that where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, this a mandatory. In this connection, he placed reliance on Rahman v. Ramchand, 1978(1) Rent Control Reporter 572 : AIR 1978 Supreme Court 413. and Arun Kumar v. Md Basir Ahmed, AIR 1981 Patna 239. 6. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, this a mandatory. In this connection, he placed reliance on Rahman v. Ramchand, 1978(1) Rent Control Reporter 572 : AIR 1978 Supreme Court 413. and Arun Kumar v. Md Basir Ahmed, AIR 1981 Patna 239. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the aforesaid contention was neither raised before the trial Court nor the first appellate Court and, therefore, the defendant-appellant shall be deemed to have abandoned it. He further submitted that no such plea was taken in the written statement by the defendant and, therefore, he should not be permitted to raise this point in second appeal. 7. I have considered the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties. 8. While considering proviso to explanation to Section 11(h) of the J. and K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, (No. XXXIV of 1966), a somewhat similar question arose in Rahman's case (1) before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In that case, it was observed as follows : "The only ground which we consider tenable and which had been urged by the appellant before us turns on the failure of the courts of fact in recording a finding as contemplated in the proviso to Explanation to Section 11(1)(h) of the Act. Obviously an error has been committed by the High Court in thinking that there is a concurrent finding of fact under the proviso aforesaid. The trial Court and the first appellate Court have really not considered this question on the merits; indeed evidence itself has not been taken on the score that there has been no specific plea in that behalf. We are satisfied that the proviso aforesaid mandates the Court to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated therein should be ordered or the entire holding should be directed to be evicted. This aspect, therefore, requires judicial exploration after giving opportunity to both sides to lead evidence in this behalf." The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was noticed in Arun Kumar's case (2), wherein while considering proviso to Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, (No. III of 1947), the learned judge accepted the argument pertaining to the partial eviction and remanded the case. 8. 8. I may also notice Krishna Das Nandy v. Bidhan Chandra Roy (3), wherein it was observed by P.N. Mookerjee, J. with whom P.K. Sarkar, J., agreed as under : "As the statute stands it is only when the Court think that a portion of the premises will substantially satisfy the plaintiff's reasonable requirement that the question of the defendant's occupying the rest or of his agreement to do so will arise. The defendant certainly cannot be expected to anticipate what portion the Court will take as sufficient for the plaintiff's legitimate purpose or reasonable requirement of occupation and to agree in advance to occupy the rest without knowing what that 'rest' will contain. He may, no doubt, suggestion a division or a particular division but he is not bound to do so. There is thus enough justification under the statute to allow this plea of partial eviction to be taken by the defendant for the first time before the appellate Court if it has not been considered or considered properly by the trial Court (vide in this connection Sardar Singh v. Bimbal Krishna Basu, 59 Cal W.N. - 430 and if, on the materials before it, the appellate Court be of the opinion that a partial eviction or occupation of a portion of the premises would meet the plaintiff's reasonable requirement, it would pass a decree accordingly, allowing the defendant, if he so agrees, to continue in occupation of the rent, provided, of course, the proviso otherwise applies." As both the Courts below have failed to consider whether partial eviction as contemplated in para 2 of Section 14(2) of the Act be ordered or the entire premises should be directed to be evicted. I consider it proper to follow the course laid down in Rahman's case. 9. The result is that I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated March 31, 1981 of the Civil Judge Jodhpur and direct the first appellant Court to go into the question as to whether the reasonable requirement of the landlord may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the premises as contemplated in the second para of Section 14(2) of the Act. If after taking evidence, the Court is satisfied that the entire premises must be vacated to fulfil the reasonable requirement of the landlord, the decree of ejectment will stands. If after taking evidence, the Court is satisfied that the entire premises must be vacated to fulfil the reasonable requirement of the landlord, the decree of ejectment will stands. If, on the other hand, the Court finds as a fact, that partial eviction will meet the ends of justice as contemplated in the second para of Section 14(2) of the Act, an appropriate order will be passed on that footing. The learned Civil Judge will take up the case on file pursuant to this order of remand and confine itself to the limited question stated above, give opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence on the sole question and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law within four months. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this appeal.The parties are directed to appear in the Court of the Civil Judge, Jodhpur on September 7, 1981. Thereafter, the learned Civil Judge will fix the date for recording the evidence on the aforesaid limited question.Petition allowed. *******