JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - The plaintiff-appellant was employed as law officer with Panni Ji Sugar and General Mills, Ltd., Panni Nagar, Bulandshahr, of which defendant-respondents 1 to 7 are the proprietors and defendant-respondent 8 is the official receiver. He sued for a declaration that he was entitled to get his pay of Rs. 300 regularly along with servant allowance and other extra benefits available to every employee of the said sugar mills, and also sued for recovery of Rs. 6,840 said to be the salary in arrears. The trial Court dismissed the principal claims made by the plaintiff in the suit but decreed the suit for the recovery of Rs. 300 as pay for the month of February 1967, and Rs. 270 as servant allowance for nine months. The lower appellate Court on appeal by the plaintiff decreed the suit for recovery of Rs. 944 being the salary for the month of February 1967 and four days of March 1967, as also one month's pay in lieu of notice, together with the amount of Rs. 270. 2. Sri S. N. Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that even after 4 March 1967, the plaintiff was in service inasmuch as no written notice was ever given and even one month's salary in lieu of notice was not tendered to the plaintiff before the alleged termination of his services at any time on or before 4 March 1967. According to the contention of Sri S. N. Agarwal for the plaintiff - appellant his services were never terminated and he not only continued in service, he even continued to do work for the mills as would be apparent from certain documents referred to in ground (13) of the memorandum of appeal, and that the claim for arrears of salary due on the date of suit has wrongly been refused. 3. It is not the case of a Government servant, nor does it involve any violation of any statute. Consequently the declaration prayed for by the plaintiff that he is entitled to get his regular pay, servant allowance and other extra benefits as available to each employee of the said sugar mills could not be allowed and I need not say anything more about it. 4. The only question was whether the services of the plaintiff could be said to have been terminated on 4 March 1967. 4. The only question was whether the services of the plaintiff could be said to have been terminated on 4 March 1967. According to the letter of plaintiff's appointment, exhibit 4, his services were terminable on one month's notice on either side. The lower appellate Court has interpreted this to mean that the services could be terminated even by an oral notice and it is apparent from the allegations made by the plaintiff himself in Paras. 4 and 5 of the plaint that his name was scored off from the attendance register of the mills in March 1967, after he was informed by the general manager of the mills of the advisability of doing so. The plaintiff's story that he was assured that although his name will be struck off from the attendance register, he will be continued in service and get his salary has been disbelieved by the lower appellate Court. That is a finding of fact and sitting as a Court of second appeal, it is not open for me to go into it unless it was shown that it suffers from any error of law, which the learned counsel for the appellant failed to establish. That being so, it seems to be indisputable now that the plaintiff did have notice in March 1967, that his name was struck off of the rolls of the mill. That in my opinion, did clearly amount to a notice of termination of the plaintiff's services. I agree with the view of the lower appellate Court that under the terms of the plaintiff's appointment letter, it was not necessary that the notice should have been in writing. I must in this context point out that this was not a case of a Government servant, for, while the acts of the Government are required to be in writing. It is not the law that an individual acting in his private capacity must also act in writing. 5. But argued Sri S. N. Agarwal, for the plaintiff-appellant, the notice was bad inasmuch as the notice of termination had to be given one month prior to the date of termination of the services or at any rate one month's pay in lieu of notice should have been tendered along with this notice in order to comply with the requirement of law. In support Sri Agarwal cited the case of Senior Super-intendant, Railway Mail Service, Cochin v. K. V. Gopinath, Sorter, (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1487)., That case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as it dealt with rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965, as it then stood. if the law requires a thing to be done in a particular way, it has to be done in that. way but that rule does not apply to a contract The contract in the present case provided that the service was terminable on one month's notice. The substance of the matter was that an employee must get one month's pay after he is told that his services are no longer required or that if the employee wants to leave service he must continue to serve the employer for one month more telling the employer that he wants to leave, or pay one month's salary as compensation inasmuch as the employer did not tender one month's pay in lieu of notice, there was breach of contract on his part but that did not render the termination of service bad. The employee became entitled to sue for damages for breach of contract and the measure of damages was the amount of one month's salary which would have been payable to the employee in case the term of the contract had been complied with. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the maximum that the plaintiff was entitled to for terminating his services otherwise than by giving him one month's prior notice could be remedied by giving him a decree for one month's salary by way of damages in lieu of notice. 6. Sri Agarwal also tried to assail the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff did not do any work of the mills as its law officer after 4 March 1967, nor did he attend the mills after that date. He wanted me to refer to certain evidence on this point but the finding being of fact and it not being established that it suffers from any error of law, I declined to go Into the evidence. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.