M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER is the owner of a goods vehicle bearing registration No. MEG 7852. The vehicle is covered by a public carrier permit bearing No. P. Puc. No. 426/nk/ 81-82 issued by the Secretary. Regional transport Authority, Karwar. The said permit was valid upto 18th May 1986. ( 2 ) ON 29/4/81 the vehicle was checked by the first respondent-Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karwar Sub-Division, uthara Kannada. He found that the vehicle was carrying 38 passengers on hire basis. Therefore he issued a show cause notice under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S 33 of the Indian Motor Vehicles act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') as to why action should not be taken against the petitioner under sub-section (1) of S. 33 of the Act. Thereafter the registration certificate of the vehicle was suspended by the first respondent-Deputy superintendent of Police by an order made on 25-9-81. Aggrieved by that order petitioner preferred an appeal as provided for to the 2nd respondent-Commissioner for Transport in Karntaka, Bangalore. The appeal came to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the present petition is filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India inter-alia contending that the order of suspension of the registration certificate is contrary to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of S 33 of the Act and therefore liable to be set aside. ( 3 ) MR. K. H. Sharma learned counsel appearing for the petitioner gargued that the carrying of passengers in the vehicle by the petitioner is violative only of the conditions of the permit and therefore action is permitted to be taken under S 60 of the act and that the first respondent had no jurisdiction to proceed to make an order of suspension under Clause (b) of sub-sec (1) of S 33 of the Act. The thrust of the argument is that the permit covering the vehicle in question imposes condition not to carry passengers and therefore carrying of passengers has become a breach of the conditions of the permit and nothing else. The thrust of the argument is that the permit covering the vehicle in question imposes condition not to carry passengers and therefore carrying of passengers has become a breach of the conditions of the permit and nothing else. Infact reliance has been placed on the decision of S. R. Rangaiah v. R T 0, bellary (1) in which it has been held on the facts of that case that the procedure in case of violation of conditons of permit is to pass an order only under S 60 of the Act and not under S 33 of the Act. The facts of that case were that a certain stage carriage operator who had a permit for a particular route, operated outside that route as a stage carriage, In other words, that permit covered carrying of passengers on hire basis on a specified route but it carried the passengers on a different route, In that circumstance it was held to be only breach of the conditions of the permit and therefore liable to be dealt with under S 60 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE the instant case the vehicle is covered by a permit which only authorises it to carry goods If on that permit the petitioner carried so many human passengers for hire or reward, he not only committed violation of the conditions of the permit but also used the vehicle contrary to the express prohibition contained in s 33 of the Act. ( 5 ) SEC 33 (1) (a) and (b) read as follows :-"33 (1 ). If any registering authority or. other prescribed authority has reason to believe that any motor vehicle within its jurisdiction, (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) has been, or is being, used for hire or reward without a valid permit for being used as such, the authority may, after giving the owner an opportunity of making any representation he may wish to make (by sending to the owner a notice by registered post acknowledgement due at his address entered in the certificate of registration), for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the certificate of registration of the vehicle - (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii) in any case falling under clause (b), for a period not exceeding four months"under sub-sec. (1) (b) of S 33 of the Act, empha is is on the expression "permit for being used as such". When a vehicle is operated contrary to the conditions of the permit, there is an offence committed contrary to the conditions of the permit and therefore liable to be dealt in accordance with the provisions of S 60 of the Act. When the vehicle is used or operated for a purpose other than that for which the permit is issued, then there is contravention of S 33 of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Deputy Superintendent of police (first respondent herein) did not have jurisdiction to suspend the registration. If this distinction is not made, then S 33 of the Act becomes a superfluity as all such matters are to be disposed of only under s. 60 of the Act. Such a construction is impermissible for another reason, as under s. 33 of the Act the authority empowered to pass such a suspension order is not only the registering authority but also other prescribed authorities, whereas under S 60 of the Act jurisdiction is exclusively conferred on the Transport authority which granted the permit. If this distinction is borne in mind, then the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application to the facts of this case. ( 6 ) IT was next contended by Mr. K. H. Sharma learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the first respondent has not intimated the fact of suspension order made by him to the orginal registering authority as mandatorily required by subsection (2) of S 33 of the Act. This ground has been urged by way of an application made for urging additional grounds. ( 7 ) I do not see much force in the argument stated above. What is required to be done under sub-sec (2) of Sec. 33 of the Act. is not mandatory. This ground has been urged by way of an application made for urging additional grounds. ( 7 ) I do not see much force in the argument stated above. What is required to be done under sub-sec (2) of Sec. 33 of the Act. is not mandatory. For better administration of the provisions of the Act the fact of suspension by the other authority than the registering authority is required to be notified to the registering authority so that the suspension is given effect to properly by all concerned. Nothing under sub-sec (2) of 33 of the Act is suggestive of the fact that what is required by the officer suspending the registration certificate confers any legal right on the vehicle owner. Failure of such requirement is not going to harm the petitioner. On the other hand he will have the advantage of not be ng brought to the notice of the registering authority that his registration certificate has been suspended. 1 am therefore of the view that sub-sec (2) of S 33 of the Act is not mandatory but only meant to be directory and meant for proper administration of the act and no more. ( 8 ) IN the above view of the matter, the petitioner has not made out any case for interference with the orders of the respondents. Therefore the Writ Petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .