JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated june 30, 1975 made by the Civil Judge, kolar in O. S. No. 15 of 1966 by which the suit of the appellant for declaration of his adoption was dismissed. The facets briefly stated are these: ( 2 ) ON August 9, 1965, Narasimhiah- the plaintiff was taken in adoption by an issueless couple Achiah Setty and vishalakshamma. Subbiah Setty was the natural father of Narasimhiah. The adoption ceremony was followed by the execution and registration of a deed of adoption. Achiah Setty was then the sole surviving coparcener in possession of his family properties which are items 1 and 2 in the plaint schedule. On January 28, 1966, Achiah Setty without the knowledge of the adopted son, sold item No. 1 to Honnappa Gupta -defendant-7-for Rs. 15,000. On June 28, 1966 Achiah Setty died leaving behind his, wife and the aodpted son. On october 31, 1966, the adopted son brought the suit out of which this appeal arises. The suit was for a declaration that be is the adopted son of achiah Setty and as such he and his adoptive mother are entitled to the plaint schedule properties, with a right to recover rents from defendants 2 to 6. Defendants 2 to 6 are the tenants occupying the shop premises in item no. 1 which comprises a house and five shops at Kolar town. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT-7 like any other alienee naturally resisted the suit. His first attack was at the plaintiff. He contended that the plaintiff was not validly adopted and even if he was validly adopted, he acquired no rights in the plaint schedule properties. He also contended that in any event the alienation by Achiah Setty was valid and binding on the plaintiff since it was to discharge the antecedent debts. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS 2 to 6 did not contest the suit Defendant-1 died during the pendency of the suit. ( 5 ) THE court below was called Upon to decide the two principal issues: the first regarding the validity of the plaintiff's adoption and the second regarding the legality of the alienation of item No. 1 of the plaint schedule. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff in support of his case has produced as many as 16 witnesses and defendant-7 in turn has examined 11 witnesses. ( 6 ) THE plaintiff in support of his case has produced as many as 16 witnesses and defendant-7 in turn has examined 11 witnesses. Most of the oral evidence, in our opinion, appears to be unwarranted and perhaps produced without comprehending the law bearing on the question in dispute. ( 7 ) ON the first issue, the dispute was mainly centred at the age of the plaintiff on the date of his adoption. The age of the plaintiff assumed importance in view ef S. 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Act No. 78 of 1956) (called shortly as "the ADMA act" ). It provides that the adopted boy shall not have completed the age of 15 years on the date of his adoption unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties permitting persons beyond 15 years being taken in adoption. The parties did not set up any such custom in the community to which they belong. ( 8 ) THE main argument for defendant-7 was that the plaintiff had crossed 15 years on the date of his adoption. The court below accepted that contention. It was held that the plaintiff on the date of his adoption was more than 15 years and therefore his adoption was void under S. 5 (1) of the ADMA Act. On the determination of the second issue, there appears to be some confusion. It was held that the property sold by Achiah Setty was his separate or self-acquired property and the plaintiff has no right to question the alienation. There are also some observations in the judgment to the effect that the plaintiff being an adopted son could not divest Achiah Setty of his self-acquired property in view of S. 12 (c) of the ADMA Act. Having stated so, the court found it unnecessary to examine the existence of antecedent debts for the discharge of which the alienation was said to have been made in favour of defendant-7 ( 9 ) BEFORE we proceed further, it is better that we clear the confusion created by the Court below as to separate property and self-acquired property of a coparcener. Separate property is no doubt often called as self-acquired property. But the two terms do not mean the same thing. Separate property is no doubt often called as self-acquired property. But the two terms do not mean the same thing. The term separate property is used to distinguish the individual property of a male Hindu from the joint family property of the family or his interest in the joint family property. It may be acquired by inheritance, will or gift or by one's own labour. Self-acquired property, on the other hand, is a property acquired by a person by his own labour or exertions. It is more appropriately termed as "self-acquisition". Self-acquired or self-acquisition is a separate property of a coparcener, but all separate properties cannot be catgorised as self-acquired property. ( 10 ) IN the case before us, there is no dispute either on tha factum of adoption or on the execution of the deed of adoption. The dispute, however, in the first place revolved around the age of the plaintiff on the date of his adoption, and secondly, his right to acquire a share in the properties held by Achiah setty as a sole surviving coparcener. ( 11 ) WITH the arguments of learned counsel on both sides, and in the light of the statutory provisions to which we have called attention, the two points that arise for consideration in this appeal are: (1) Whether the plaintiff was less than 15 years at the time of his adoption? and (2) Whether the alienation under ext. D-13 dated January 29, 1966 made by Achiah Setty in favour of defendant-7 was valid and binding on the plaintiff? ( 12 ) WE will take the first point first for consideration. The original deed of adoption appears to have been lost and its certified copy has been produced as Ext. P-10. The execution and registration of the deed has been proved by the evidence of Basaviah (P. W. 1), purohit Subbarama Shastry (P. W. 7), vallabha Rao (P. W. 9) and Subbiah setty (P. W. 12 ). The factum of adoption with the necessary religious ceremonies was proved by the evidence of venkataramana Setty (P. W. 4), Kalyana sundara (P. W. 5), Siddappa setty (P. W. 6), Thippiah (P. W. 10), saraswathamma (P. W. 11) and Purohit subbarama Shastry (P. W. 7 ). ( 13 ) ORDINARILY it is for the plaintiff to prove that he has been validly adopted by Achiah Setty satisfying all the statutory requirements. ( 13 ) ORDINARILY it is for the plaintiff to prove that he has been validly adopted by Achiah Setty satisfying all the statutory requirements. But since there is a deed of adoption recording the giving and taking of the child with all the ceremonies and that deed has been proved to have been executed and registered in accordance with law, the court shall presume under Section 16 of the ADMA Act that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions, unless and until it is disproved. It would be then for the party challenging the adoption to prove that the adoption had either not taken place in fact or though it did take place, it was not in compliance with the provisions of the adma Act and was invalid. The court below without noticing S. 16, has put the onus of proving the adoption on the plaintiff and that lapse has contributed for the records to grow one foot high. We however have no inclination to criticise the approach made by the Court since generally Courts are guided by the advocates of the parties. ( 14 ) WE shall now proceed to cull out the relevant evidence on the first question. In support of the contention that the plaintiff was above 15 years on the date of his adoption, defendant-7 relied upon the adoption deed Ext. P-10, the cause title in the plaint in o. S. No. 15 of 1966, and the written statement Ext. D-3 in O. S. 87 of 1969. He also relied upon the application i. A. No. III filed by the plaintiff in the court below for discharging the next friend. ( 15 ) IT is true that in the adoption deed Ext. P-10 it was stated that the plaintiff was about 16 years. The suit o. S. No. 15 of 1966 out of which the present appeal arises was instituted by the minor plaintiff represented by next friend Subbiah Setty. His age given in the cause title was about 18 years. Apparently, the plaintiff has had no part to play in giving his age either in the adoption deed or in the said plaint. It could not have been written by or at the instructions of the plaintiff since he was a minor. When confronted with the document Ext. His age given in the cause title was about 18 years. Apparently, the plaintiff has had no part to play in giving his age either in the adoption deed or in the said plaint. It could not have been written by or at the instructions of the plaintiff since he was a minor. When confronted with the document Ext. P-10 and the said plaint, Subbiah, setty in his evidence has asserted that the age of the plaintiff mentioned at both the places was incorrect. He has further stated that the plaintiff's age on the date of adoption was 13 years. Be that as it may, the age stated thereunder was not definitive. It was a rough estimate and that too not given by the plaintiff and therefore, cannot be held against him. The statement as to the age of the plaintiff contained in Ext. D-3 is also of a similar nature. Ext. D-3 was the written statement filed in O. S. No. 87 of 1969. That suit was filed by Srinivasaiah setty (D. W. 10) against the present plaintiff and defendant-7 for the rer covery of a sum said to be under a promissory note. There, the present plaintiff was impleaded as defendant-2 represented by his guardian Subbiah setty. Subbiah Setty filed a written statement (Ext. D-3) contending inter alia that his son was born in the month of Shivarathri 1948 and therefore, not a minor. In the present suit, Subbiah setty has, however, stated that he did not give such a date to his Advocate sri Bhikka Boriah who drafted that written statement. Here again, even if we proceed on the ground that that advocate had drafted the written statement at the instructions of Subbiah setty, the averments therein are not quite relevant in this case since the present plaintiff did not verify ext. D-3. ( 16 ) BY clearing the debris, we could now see the nugget of truth as to the correct date of birth of the plaintiff. Fortunately for the plaintiff, defendant-7 himself has discovered and produced a relevant document. It is ext. D-6, a school leaving certificate of the plaintiff issued by Sri Vinayaka, school, Cubbonpet. It shows that the, plaintiff was born on January 17, 1953. The plaintiff also produced his school leaving certificate Exts. P-17 and P-19 along with a like certificate Ext. P-20 of his elder brother. Ext. It is ext. D-6, a school leaving certificate of the plaintiff issued by Sri Vinayaka, school, Cubbonpet. It shows that the, plaintiff was born on January 17, 1953. The plaintiff also produced his school leaving certificate Exts. P-17 and P-19 along with a like certificate Ext. P-20 of his elder brother. Ext. P-17 was issued by the management of the Government primary School, Pitchapally and Ext. P-19 was issued by the Primary boys' School, Jakkarasanakoppa, bangarpet Taluk. The date of birth of the plaintiff recorded in both these certificates is January 17, 1953. Ext. P-20 is the transfer certificate of the plaintiff's elder brother. It was also, issued by the Government Primary school, Pitchapally. The date of birth entered in Ext. P-20 was October 15, 1950. A reasonable interval as between the two brothers further lends credence to the contention of the plaintiff that he was born in 1953. Plaintiff's father Subbiah Setty (P. W. 12) has stated that he admitted his two sons to the Pitchapally Government Primary school and he gave their dates of birth to the authorities for recording in the school registers. The evidence of the plaintiff was also consistent in this regard. We have, therefore, no good reason to disbelieve their sworn testimony and discard the said documentary evidence as has been done by the Court below. Exts. P-17, p-19 and P-20 are transfer certificates granted by the authorities of the Government schools. They are admissible as proof of the age of the plaintiff under S. 35 of the Evidence Act. ( 17 ) IT was. however, urged by Mr. Goulay, learned counsel for defendant-7, that Exts. P-17, P-19 and P-20 are not admissible under S. 35 of the Evidence Act, since the original registers maintained by the school authorities have not been produced and none of the school authorities has been examined. We do not think that these requirements ought to have been followed in the instant case. Exts. P-17, P-19 and P-20 are the certified copies of the registers of admissions of the Government Schools. They were maintained by public servants in the discharge of official duties enjoined by law and are public documents. The father of the plaintiff has been examined in support of the school registers. Secondly, it was defendant-7 who produced Ext. D-6 and depended upon it. They were maintained by public servants in the discharge of official duties enjoined by law and are public documents. The father of the plaintiff has been examined in support of the school registers. Secondly, it was defendant-7 who produced Ext. D-6 and depended upon it. The plaintiff did not dispute the entry as to the date of birth entered in that certificate. In support thereof, he also produced Exts. P-17 and P-19. Defendant-7 cannot, therefore, be heard to contend that the plaintiff has not proved the entries in exts. P-17 and P-19. Since the date of birth of the plaintiff recorded in all those certificates being consistent, it was, in our opinion, unnecessary for the plaintiff to have produced the original registers or examined any one of the school authorities to prove the authenticity of the entries in Exts. P-17 and P-19. ( 18 ) IT is true that the plaintiff filed i. A. No. III on August 8, 1968 along with an affidavit Ext. D-10 seating that he had attained majority and his next friend should be discharged. But he did not mention his date of birth in that application. He appears to have realised his mistake in filing that application and came forward with I. A. No. 25 with an affidavit in which he has testified that he became major on January 17, 1971 and not on the date of I. A. No. III. The Court has practically ignored that application. Even in the judgment there is no reference to it. The Court has unnecessarily highlighted the seeming conflict in the oral evidence of the plaintiff and his natural father and ignored the entries in Exts. P-17 and p-19. ( 19 ) THE plaintiff might have committed an act of indiscretion in giving an incorrect age in I. A. No. III but we fail to understand why he should not be permitted to correct himself when he realised his mistake. The Court must recognise such a right of every party to litigation and face up to the fact whenever it is brought to its knowledge. It must bring to bear a cool headed competence on all the material produced, no matter whan it was produced or by whom it was produced. The Court must recognise such a right of every party to litigation and face up to the fact whenever it is brought to its knowledge. It must bring to bear a cool headed competence on all the material produced, no matter whan it was produced or by whom it was produced. On the strength of the facts deposed to by the plaintiff coupled with the documents produced, we are by no means satisfied with the manner in which the Court below has assessed the evidence. It has rejected the relevant documents and invalidated the adoption on irrelevant evidence. We feel bound to differ from its opinion and hold that the plaintiff was below 15 years on the date of his adoption and his adoption was valid. ( 20 ) THIS leads to the next and important question. The question is whether the alienation made by Achiah Setty after the plaintiff was adopted was binding on the plaintiff. The decision on this question depends firstly, on the scope of clause (c) of the proviso to S. 12 of the ADMA Act; and secondly, on the existence of antecedent debts for which the property was alleged to have been alienated. It was urged that achiah Setty was a sole surviving member of the family in whom the plaint schedule properties vested as his separate properties and the plaintiff, by reason of his adoption could not divest him of those properties in view of the constraint imposed by clause (c) of the proviso to S. 12. It was also urged that the alienation, in any event, was binding on the plaintiff as the adoptive father sold the property to discharge antecedent debts. ( 21 ) FOR a proper determination of the scope and purpose of clause (c) of the proviso to S. 12, we may briefly state the Shastric Hindu Law prevalent prior to the passing of the ADMA Act. The rights of an adopted son of a Hindu were held to be the same in every respect as those of a natural born son. He was the continuator of his adoptive father's line exactly as an aurasa son. The rights of an adopted son of a Hindu were held to be the same in every respect as those of a natural born son. He was the continuator of his adoptive father's line exactly as an aurasa son. It was so declared by the Privy Council in Pratapsingh Shivasingh v. Thaker shri Agarsingji (1) and that has been accepted as a correct rule of Hindu law by the Supreme Court in Srinivas krishnarao v. Narayan Devji (2) and krishnamurthy Vasudeorao v. Dhruwaraj (3) 21. (i) The adopted son although was entitled to claim the properties of his adoptive father with the rights accrued to him on the date of his adoption, by the fictional theory of relation back, he was considered to be in existence as on the date of the death of his adoptive father. This fiction was introduced for the purpose of bringing a new heir into succession since it is a well-known principle that succession cannot remain in abeyance and there cannot be a hiatus in the continuity of the line. 21 (ii) One of the consequences of the application of the theory of relation back was that the adopted son as a preferential heir to the adoptive father could retrospectively invoke the rule of survivorship, undo the partition effected after the death of his adoptive father and divest the properties vested in the intermediate holder, rf any. These principles, however were allowed to operate only in respect of the estate of the adoptive father, and not with regard to the properties of collaterals as held by the Supreme court in Srinivas Krishnarao v. Narayan devji (4) and Krishnamurthy vasudeorao v. Dhruwaraj (5 ). ( 22 ) HAVING looked back to the past, we may now look forward and consider what rule of law was intended to be incorporated by the Legislature by enacting s. 12 of the ADMA Act. The section was apparently designed to remove the hardship and injustice caused to persons by the operation of the said rule of relation back. It states that although the adopted child shall be deemed to be the child for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption, he shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. It states that although the adopted child shall be deemed to be the child for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption, he shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. There is thus no relation back to the death of the adoptive father and the Legislature has expressly abolished that doctrine. The adopted child shall, however, be deemed to be child for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption. ( 23 ) THE question now to be considered is only as to the applicability of the above law to the coparcenary property held by Achiah Setty as a sole surviving coparcener. The submission of Mr. Goulay for the respondent was that even such a property is vested in the sole surviving coparcener and is therefore not liable to be divested by the plaintiff in view of the fetter under clause (c) of the proviso to S. 12. ( 24 ) THE submission, in our opinion, proceeded on the misconception of the nature of the property and the interest in it held by Achiah Setty. "the Law of succession" as Lord Turner put it in katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivgunga (6) ''follows the nature of the property and of the interest in it. " The plaintiff claims his right only in the joint family properties in the possession of his adoptive father and not in his self-acquired properties. He claims that right under the accepted concept of Hindu Law that an adopted son would acquire an interest in the joint family property on adoption as if he was born to the adoptive father. This, in turn, is based on the recognised principle that an adopted son also becomes a coparcener as if he was a natural born son of the adopting father. This would always be the position whether the adoptive father is the sole surviving coparcener or a member thereof. These con cepts of Hindu Law have never been in doubt, and as we understand, have not been given a go by under the adma Act. There is also another accepted principle. This would always be the position whether the adoptive father is the sole surviving coparcener or a member thereof. These con cepts of Hindu Law have never been in doubt, and as we understand, have not been given a go by under the adma Act. There is also another accepted principle. So far as the sole surviving coparcener is concerned, he holds the family property as his separate property, but it would be subject to its becoming at any moment coparcenary property when he has male issue or when an adoption, is made by or to him or to a predeceased coparcener in the family. (See Mayne hindu Law, 11th Edn. page 551 ). ( 25 ) THERE is yet another concept or principle of Hindu Law to be borne in mind. The adopting coparcener has no specific share in the coparcenary property; it is liable to be diminished or increased by birth or death of any other coparcener. Sri S. V. Gupta in his commentary on Hindu Law of adoption, Maintenance, minority and guardianship has neatly explained this principle at page 317 as follows:"the position under clause (c) is that when a son is adopted by a coparcener, the adopter son also becomes a coparcener as if he was a natural-born son of the adopting coparcener; he would take an interest in the coparcenary property as a natural-born son would take by virtue of his birth. In such a case there is no divesting of the interest of the, adopting coparcener inasmuch as the adopting coparcener also continues to have a coparcenary interest in the property. Before adoption the adopting coparcener had no specific share in the coparcenary property; it was liable to be diminished or increased by death or birth of any other coparcener. If he adopts a a son, his interest may become diminished but it is not divested. "the Bombay High Court in Y. K. Nalarade v Ananda G. Chetiar (7) had also taken a similar view it has observed. "it is true that the property includes an interest therein, and such an interest may admit the process of vesting and divesting in the same manner as the property itself. "the Bombay High Court in Y. K. Nalarade v Ananda G. Chetiar (7) had also taken a similar view it has observed. "it is true that the property includes an interest therein, and such an interest may admit the process of vesting and divesting in the same manner as the property itself. No process of vesting or divesting, however, can be said to be, strictly speaking, involved merely, in the fluctuations of such indefinite and uncertain interests in the property to which the joint family property is exposed, on an increase or decrease in the strength thereof " ( 26 ) THE joint family property belonging to a coparcener is a concept special to Hindu Law and the nature of such a property even in the hands of a sole surviving coparcener does not change. In such a property the adopted son automatically acquires an interest as a natural-born son would take by virtue of his birth but that is not the same thing as stating that the adopted child would divest the property of the adoptive father. It is a misnomer to term it like that. There cannot be any question of divesting in such a case because the sole surviving copar also has had an interest in that property and it continues to vest in him ( 27 ) IT was, however, contended that some text writers in Hindu Law have used the word "vest" and stated that the joint family property vests in the sole surviving coparcener as his separate property and if the property is so vested, the adopted son cannot acquire a share unless it is divested from the adoptive father. It is true that the Text Writers have stated that the joint family property vests in the sole surviving coparcener as his separate property and there is nothing wrong in using the word and we need not be undul chary about it. Ordinarily, "vest" means the property in something passes, as Farwell, j. observed in Urban Elcetric Light co. v. Fincteley Urban, District Council (8 ). But it has different connotations in different contexts. An estate or interest may vest in one or two ways, namely in possession or in interest. The possession of a joint family property vests, in the manager and the ownership or title vests in the joint family. v. Fincteley Urban, District Council (8 ). But it has different connotations in different contexts. An estate or interest may vest in one or two ways, namely in possession or in interest. The possession of a joint family property vests, in the manager and the ownership or title vests in the joint family. Under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912, the lunatic's personal estate "vested" in the manager appointed by the Court. He may have the powers of a proprietor under S. 75 of the said act to manage and collect rents of the estate, but without the permission of the Court, he shall not mortgage, charge or transfer any immovable property. Under some Legislative enactments the 'inams' or 'jagirs' or 'watans' are abolished and vested in the State free from all encumbrances. These are illustrations to demonstrate that the word "vest" has no definite connotation. Sometimes it is used in a sense connoting the right to obtain and deal with the property and sometimes in its strict legal sense of conferring absolute rights extinguishing all the rights of others. There is, therefore, nothing wrong if anybody slates that the joint family property is vested in the sole surviving coparcener as a separate property. He will have an unlimited right of disposal, but it is always subject to the rights to be acquired by a natural born or adopted son. On the happening of any such event, the property becomes coparcenary property automatically and not by the process of divesting. That is the special nature of the property vested in the sole surviving coparcener. We therefore reject the contention urged. ( 28 ) MR. Goulay next pointed out the similarity in the wordings under clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to s. 12 of the ADMA Act and urged that the word "vest" used in both the clauses must be given the same meaning. Under clause (b), the property vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person. The interest in the joint family property vests in the coparcener by birth and he gets a vested right in the property and it shall continue to vest in him or her even after the adoption of such a person. Under clause (b), the property vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person. The interest in the joint family property vests in the coparcener by birth and he gets a vested right in the property and it shall continue to vest in him or her even after the adoption of such a person. So also, according to the counsel, the joint family property vests in the sole surviving coparcener and when once it is vested it cannot be divested by a subsequently adopted son, in view of the restraint under clause (b ). In support of the contention, reliance was placed on the decision of the andhra Pradesh High Court in Yarlagadda nayudnmma v. Government of ap (9 ). ( 29 ) THE decision in Yarlagadda nayudamma (9) of the Andhra Pradesh high Court proceeded only on the scope of clause (b) and it has no relevance to clause (c) of the said proviso. Under clause (b) of the proviso, a property in the natural family or an interest thereof which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person notwithstanding the adoption. This is a benefit conferred on the adopted child as against the disadvantages suffered under the traditional Hindu Law. That principle has no relevance to the case on hand. We are not concerned with the word "vested" used in clause (c) but are only concerned with the word "divested" used thereunder and as to its applicability to the family property held by a sole surviving coparcener and not in any other case. Even otherwise, it would be inappropriate to compare clause (b) with clause (c) of the said proviso. ( 30 ) IN the present rase it cannot be held that item No. 1 of the plaint schedule was not a joint family property. In the sale deed Ext. D-13, it was no doubt stated that the property sold was the self-acquired property of achiah Setty, but it appears to be patently an incorrect recital. One half of that property was purchased by chickkarangiah Setty, father of achiah Setty under Ext. P-27 dated 24, 1926 and the other half was purchased by Achiah Setty under Ext. D-1 dated August 25, 1939. The portion of the property purchased under Ext. P-27 was undisputedly an ancestral property in the hands of Achiah Setty. One half of that property was purchased by chickkarangiah Setty, father of achiah Setty under Ext. P-27 dated 24, 1926 and the other half was purchased by Achiah Setty under Ext. D-1 dated August 25, 1939. The portion of the property purchased under Ext. P-27 was undisputedly an ancestral property in the hands of Achiah Setty. The portion purchased by Achiah setty could not also be otherwise. It cannot be held to be his self-acquired property because he had no independent income and separate business. It is on record that Achiah Setty was continuing the Kulachar. i. e. . Gandige business out of which he was earning rs. 10 to 15 per day. He was also getting rs. 40 per month by way of rent from the other joint family property. This was admitted even by defendant-7 in the course of his evidence. So item No. 1 of the plaint schedule which was sold by Achiah Setty was indubitably a joint family property. ( 31 ) THE next submission made by the counsel is somewhat less formidable than the foregoing. The question is whether there were antecedent debts justifying the alienation in favour of defendant-7. Achiah Setty sold item No. 1 of the plaint schedule to defendant-7 for Rs. 15,000. The deed states that there was a debt of Rs 4,000 due under the promissory note (Ext. D. 17) dated February 10. 1956 with the interest of Rs. 3,850. It also refers to another debt of Rs. 3,000 with interest of Rs. 795 due under the promissory note Ext. D-21 dated august 22, 1963. It further states that defendant-7 must clear those debts and the amount required for that purpose was left in his hands. Rupees 1,500 was spent towards stamps; and the balance of Rs. 1,885 was paid in cash to the plaintiff's father at the time of registration of the deed. ( 32 ) THE execution of Ext. D. 17 and the acknowledgement of payment of the interest thereon, have been proved by the evidence of defendant-7 (D. W. 11),abdulla Khan (D. W. 5), Venugopal Setty (D. W. 6) and narasimha Murthy (D. W. 7 ). The execution of Ext. D-21 was also proved by the evidence of Sreenivasaiah setty (D. W. 10) and defendant-7 (D. W. 11 ). The execution of Ext. D-21 was also proved by the evidence of Sreenivasaiah setty (D. W. 10) and defendant-7 (D. W. 11 ). The counsel for the appellant, however, urged that the said promissory notes were all make-believe arrangements and no consideration passed thereunder. He referred to us the evidence of defendant-7 wherein a suggestion was made to him regarding the inability of his father to advance rs. 4,000 to Achiah Setty under ext. D-17. The witness, however, has denied that suggestion and further stated that it was false to say that his father had no capacity to advance money. There is no other acceptable evidence to lend credence to the contention of the appellant that the consideration did not pass under Ext. D-17. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the submission that there was no debt due under Ext. D-17. ( 33 ) BUT the contention urged by the counsel in regard to Ext. D-21 appears to be sound. Ext. D 21 was was the subject-matter of O. S. No. 87 of 1969 on the file of the First munsiffs Court, Mysore. That suit was filed to recover the amount due under the said instrument as against the present plaintiff and defendant-7. There, defendant-7 has admitted the suit claim, while the present plaintiff has denied it. He contended that that promissory note was a gbt up instrument. The trial Court accepted that plea and dismissed the suit as against the present plaintiff. The court however made a decree as against the present defendant-7 solely on the basis of his admission. The plaintiff therein challenged that decree in R. A. No. 83 of 1973 before the Civil Judge at Mysore contending inter alia that the decree ought to have been made against both the defendants. The appeal, however, was not decided on merits. It was disposed of as settled out of Court by deleting the present plaintiff as party respondent. The judgments of both the Courts in that litigation have been produced in this suit and they are relevant as between the parties to prove that Ex. D-21 was not a genuine instrument. No more evidence is therefore necessary to prove that the antecedent debt under Ext. D-21 for which the property was sold was non-existent. The judgments of both the Courts in that litigation have been produced in this suit and they are relevant as between the parties to prove that Ex. D-21 was not a genuine instrument. No more evidence is therefore necessary to prove that the antecedent debt under Ext. D-21 for which the property was sold was non-existent. ( 34 ) THE question next to be considered is whether the impugned alienation could be sustained only for the antecedent debt due under the promissory note Ext-D-17. The answer to this question turns on the value of the property sold. The plaintiff (P. W. 13), Muniyappa (P. W. 14), Lakshmaiah Setty (P w. 15) and Ganga Reddy (PW 16) have all testified that the value of that property was anywhere between 40 to 45 thousands of rupees. Defendant-7 in his evidence, however, has denied, it. But he on his part has not produced any evidence to show that it was worth only Rs. 10,000 or Rs. 15,000 on the date of his purchase. Being the alienee the burden was upon him to justify the alienation. The building consists of five shops, a house with four fooms, kitchen, two latrines, one bath room, one well, court-yard with compound wall on four sides. In the absence of any credible evidence from defendant-7 as to the real value of the property, and in the light of the evidence produced by the plaintiff, we are inclined to believe that the property was certainly worth more than Rs. 20,000. The antecedent debt proved was only to the extent of Rs. 7,850 under the promissory note Ext. D-17. The alienation of the entire property including the five shops and a house was. therefore, uncalled for and unjustified. But this is not a case of an all-or-nothing situation and the entire alienation cannot and need not be rendered invalid. The alienor had a share in that property and he could throw away his share for any consideration. The plaintiff has no right to question it. We could, therefore, hold that the alienation was valid and binding as against the share of the adoptive father and was not valid as against the plaintiff's share. That is our conclusion on the second question urged before us. ( 35 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree appealed against are reversed. We could, therefore, hold that the alienation was valid and binding as against the share of the adoptive father and was not valid as against the plaintiff's share. That is our conclusion on the second question urged before us. ( 35 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree appealed against are reversed. The plaintiff's suit is decreed declaring that the plaintiff is the adopted son of deceased Margal Achiah Setty and his wife the first defendant. It is further declared that the alienation in favour of defendant-7 under Ext. D-13 of the plaint item No. 1 was valid and binding only as against the share of the plaintiff's adoptive father Achiah Setty. The said alienation so far as it relates to the plaintiff's share or that of his adoptive mother was invalid and not binding on them. The parties are left free to work out their respective rights in the said property. ( 36 ) THE appellant is entitled to two third of the costs here and in the Court below. ( 37 ) MR. Goulay, counsel for the respondent seeks a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. In our opinion. the case does not involve any substantial question of law of general importnace which needs to be decided by the supreme Court. The certificate prayed for is therefore refused. --- *** --- .