JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - In the Commerce Department of the University of Lucknow some posts of Lecturers were vacant. Regular appointments can be made only after following the procedure laid down in Section 31 of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973. Under Section 13 (6) of that Act the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of his emergency powers can make appointments on ad hoc basil.. Such appointments can last for a maximum period of six months as laid down in Section 13 (8). However, there is no bar in Section 13 (8) to the same person being reappointed on the expiry of the said maximum period. Accordingly, the petitioner was initially appointed as ad hoc teacher by order dated 28-12-1974, a copy of which is Annexure A.-1 to the counter-affidavit of Sri H.L. Yadava. Acting Registrar of the University. This appointment commenced on 1-1-1975. Thereafter the appointment was renewed from time to time. By order, Annexure A-4 to the same counter affidavit, it was extended till 3lth September, 1979. It may be mentioned here that in the meantime in 1978 an advertisement was issued inviting applications for regular appointment to the two posts of temporary Lecturers in Commerce. That advertisement is Annexure 1 to the writ petition. On 5-10-1979 an order was passed, vide Annexure A-5 to the said counter-affidavit, and Annexure 13 to the writ petition, to appointing the petitioner on ad hoc basis from 1 10-1979 till further orders. This time the appointment was not made for the normal period of six months. 2. On 13-9-1979 a Selection Committee constituted under Section 31 met and its decisions are contained in Annexure 2 to the writ petition which is identical to Annexure A-8 to the counter-affidavit. The Selection Committee placed two other persons, namely, Shri Ghaashyam Das Pattani and Sri Fida Husain Ansan in order of preference at serial nos. (1) and (2) for the two posts. The minutes also mentioned that the experts, however recommended that the petitioner, Dr. Siya Ram, be also placed as the 3rd candidate in order of merit. The appointing authority is Executive Council of the University, vide Section 21 (1) (vii) of the Act. Accordingly, these recommendations were placed before the Executive Council winch did not agree with the Selection Committee. The meeting of.the Executive Council at which these recommendations were considered took place on 28-9-1778. The appointing authority is Executive Council of the University, vide Section 21 (1) (vii) of the Act. Accordingly, these recommendations were placed before the Executive Council winch did not agree with the Selection Committee. The meeting of.the Executive Council at which these recommendations were considered took place on 28-9-1778. The Vice Chancellor is the Chairman of the Executive Council, vide Section 21 (1), (a), and the Registrar K is its Ex-office Secretary, vide Section t6 C4). It may, therefore, be presumed that the minutes ate recorded by the Registrar under the instructions of the Vice-Chancellor. As is the normal practice, the minutes are placed before the next following meeting for confirmation as the first item of the agenda. The minutes as recorded on 28-9-1978 were not accepted as correct by the Executive Council. When it was asked to confirm them at its meeting dated 23-1.0-1979. The rectification in the miuutes as accepted by the Executive Council, however, again gave rise to controversy. When the minutes of the betting dated 23-10-19/9 came up for confirmation at the meeting dated 26-12-1979, the Executive Council did not accept the minutes as correct and made certain modifications, The minutes of these three meetings are Annexures 3, 4 and 5 respectively to the writ petition. 3. The Vice-Chancellor in pursuance of the decision of the Executive Council dated 28-9-1979 referred the matter to the Chancellor under Section 31 (8) (a) on 18-10-1979. With this reference he enclosed the decision of the Executive Council in the form originally recorded by him on 28-9-1979. Alter the meeting of the Executive Council dated 23-10-1579. he forwarded to the Chancellor on 31-10-1979, vide Annexure 5, the modified resolution of the Executive Council as recorded by the Vice-Chancellor on 23-10-1979. On 24-11-1979 the Secretary to the chancellor issued a letter to the Registrar intimating him that the chancellor bad "accepted" the recommendations of the Executive Council and had directed re advertisement of the posts. This letter is Annexure 6 to the writ petition. On the same date, under orders of the Vice-Chancellor, an office memorandum was , vide Annexure 12, terminating the ad hoc appointment of the petitioner with effect from the same afternoon and paying him one month's salary in lieu of notice. This letter is Annexure 6 to the writ petition. On the same date, under orders of the Vice-Chancellor, an office memorandum was , vide Annexure 12, terminating the ad hoc appointment of the petitioner with effect from the same afternoon and paying him one month's salary in lieu of notice. On 4-12 1979 at an emergency meeting one of the members of the Executive Council, Sri H K. Awastbi, moved a resolution to the effect that the Executive Council noted with concern that in the matter of selection of the lecturers in the Department of Commerce the correct facts of the matter had not reached H. E.. the chancellor in their proper perspective. It wits further stated that the minutes were not being correctly recorded and even the inaccuracies removed at the subsequent meeting were not properly incorporated and thus the letter sent to the chancellor on 31-10.1979 did not represent the views of the Executive Council as it wished it to be. A copy of the minutes relating to this resoluter is Annexure 7 to the petition. On the same date, another member of the Executive Council, Sri Abdui Mannan, moved another resolution whereby the Executive Council resolved to continue certain ad hoc appointments til 31-12- 1979. Reference was made, inter alia, to the appointments of the petitioner and the other candidates whose names had been approved by the Selection Committee, namely, Sri Partani and Sri Ansari whose appointments had been terminated by the Vice Chancellor. A copy of the relevant minutes is Annexure A 5 to the counter-affidavit. 4. It further appears from Annexures 7 and 8 to the writ petition that between 4-12-1979 and some date in January, 19r0 (the Annexure 8 does not bear that date) some members of the Executive council met the chancellor Sri Raiyapal pleading with him, in terms of Annexures 7 and 8, in favour of the petitioner for the selection in question The petitioner also made a representation to the chancellor, vide Annexure 11. Nothing seems to have come out of all this, and a fresh advertisement was issued, vide Annexure 14. This time one of the pests was described as permanent and the other remained temporary although at the time of the original advertisement, Annexure 1, both the posts in commerce were temporary. Nothing seems to have come out of all this, and a fresh advertisement was issued, vide Annexure 14. This time one of the pests was described as permanent and the other remained temporary although at the time of the original advertisement, Annexure 1, both the posts in commerce were temporary. Challenging the order of the chancellor an intimated by Annexure 6, and the order terminating the petitioners ad hoc appointment as contained in Annexure 12 the petitioner has come to this court under Article 226 of the constitution^ He has questioned the validity of these orders on a number of grounds that would appear hereinafter aDd has also assailed the bona fides of the Vice-Chancellor. Sri G.P. Eandey. Although the Vice Chancellor was not impleaded by name, but only by designation as respondent no. 4, Sri Pandey has filed his own counter-affidavit separately in order to repudiate the allegations of mala fides. A combined counter-affidavit on behalf of the University and the Executive Council (respondents 1 and 2) has been filed by the Acting Registrar, Sri M.L Yadava as noted above. No counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the chancellor, but the learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for him has fairly placed office us notes and orders of the Office of the Chancellor relating to the case without claiming my privilege therefor. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Sri S.C. Misra and the Chief Standing Counsel, Sri Umesh Chandra, at some length. 6. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the chancellor as communicated by Annexure 6 suffers from any legal infirmity. The letter merely says that the chancellor "had been pleased to accept the recommendations of the Executive Council and had, accordingly directed that the selection be set aside and the posts he re advertised and a fresh Selection Committee he constituted for the purpose" It was contended, inter alia, that as the order does not give any reasons, it was bad in law. The learned Chief Standing Counsel has countered this argument by placing reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of which one of us (Goyal, J.) was a member in Dr Mrs. Prabha Gupta v. Lucknow University, 1981 LLT (Ser 51). The learned Chief Standing Counsel has countered this argument by placing reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of which one of us (Goyal, J.) was a member in Dr Mrs. Prabha Gupta v. Lucknow University, 1981 LLT (Ser 51). In that case the Selection Committee had made a recommendation in favour of the respondent to the writ petition, while the Executive Council differing from it had recommended the appointment of the petitioner. The chancellor had agreed with the views of the Selection Committee. It was held in paras 15 to 22 of the report that the order of the chancellor under Section 31 (8) need not be a speaking order as it was not quasi judicial in nature and that in any case even if the chancellor was required to give any reason, his order read with the minutes of the meeting of the Selection Committee did amount to sufficient specification of reasons inasmuch as he had agreed with the reasons given by the Selection Committee. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in view of the second reason given by the Division Bench for upholding the order of the chancellor, namely, that his concurrence with the reasons given by the Selection Committee amounted to sufficient specification of reasons for purposes of Section 31 (8) (a), the view expressed in the first part, namely, that the chancellor's decision was not quasi judicial and need not be a speaking one was merely obiter. Learned counsel further contended that the dicta in this ruling cannot possibly apply to a case where the chancellor differs both from the Selection Committee and the Executive Council and takes a third view. It is, however, not necessary for us to express any opinion on these rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties because even in respect of a purely administrative decision, the validity of which is under challenge, the authority is expected to disclose its reasons before the court. In Manager Government Branch Press v. Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 , (para 24) it was pointed out that where an administrative order is challenged as ` arbitrary" it is the duty of the authority to dispel that charge by disclosing to the court the reason or notice which implied it to take the impugned action". In Manager Government Branch Press v. Belliappa, (1979) 1 SCC 477 , (para 24) it was pointed out that where an administrative order is challenged as ` arbitrary" it is the duty of the authority to dispel that charge by disclosing to the court the reason or notice which implied it to take the impugned action". Their Lordships further observed : Excepting, perhaps, in cases analogous to tho e covered by Article 311 (2), proviso (c), the authority cannot withhold such information from the court on the lame excuse that the impugned order is purely administrative and not judicial, having been parsed in exercise of its administrative discretion under the rules governing the conditions of the service. "The giving" of reasons, as Lord Denning put it in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering union, (1971) 1 All Ell 114, `is one of the fundamentals of good administration', and, to recall the words of this court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SBC 81 : 1975 SCC (Cr; 435) : (1975) 2 SCR 832 , 845, in a Government laws `there is nothing like unfettered discrete in immune from judicial review ability'. The executive, no less than the judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee epitomised in Articles 14 and 16 (1)". 7. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, the reasons have been disclosed to us as the relevant file has been placed before us. Accordingly, the point need not be laboured further. 8. The learned Chief Standing Counsel does not contest the proposition that although the decision rests with the chancellor, he is bound in law to consider the reasons given by the Executive Council while making the reference to him. Section 31 (8) specifically requires the Executive Council to record its reasons for disagreeing with the Selection Committee. These reasons are to be communicated to the chancellor. If the chancellor omits from consideration those reasons, then the order would be bad on the ground of unreasonableness `within the meaning of that term as given in the leading case of Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1948 KB 223. In Rajendra v. Civil Judge, 1981 Ed. These reasons are to be communicated to the chancellor. If the chancellor omits from consideration those reasons, then the order would be bad on the ground of unreasonableness `within the meaning of that term as given in the leading case of Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1948 KB 223. In Rajendra v. Civil Judge, 1981 Ed. Cases 7 : 1981 UPLBEC 214, (para 8), a case under Section 31 (8) (b), which is on para materia with Section 31 (8) (a), a similar view was taken by another Bench of this Court. 9. In the instant case, the relevant file of the chancellor's office shows that the chancellor appended his signature below the note of the Legal Advisor. He may, therefore be assumed to have agreed with the entirety of reasons given by the Legal Advisor. It was undisputed before us, as disclosed from the file, that only the minutes of Executive Council as originally recorded on 28-9-1979, Annexure 3, were placed before him and those too were placed with a gloss which happened to be adverse to the petitioner. These minutes were finally approved in the form modified on 26-12-1979, vide Annexure 8, while the decision of the chancellor had already been reached on 24-11-1979. Not only this, even though the Vice-Chancellor had communicated the minutes of the Executive Council as recorded by him on 23-10-1979, vide Annexure 4, on 31-10-1979, vide Annexure 5, that is to say, more than three weeks before the chancellor's order, this letter of the Vice-Chancellor was not placed before the chancellor. It appears that in the chancellor's office the matter was first examined by the Legal Advisor on 30-10-1979 even before the receipt of the Vice-Chancellors letter dated 31-10-1979. The Legal Advisor read the minutes dated 28-9-1979, Annexure 3, as meaning that the Executive Council had in sub-para (b) taken the view that the petitioner did not have a consistently good academic record. This sub-para (b) is as follows : "(b) one of the candidates recommended does not have consistently good academic record as against some of the applicants who were available with D. degree and research work". The Legal Advisor understood this sub para to refer to the petitioner although he was not named therein. This sub-para (b) is as follows : "(b) one of the candidates recommended does not have consistently good academic record as against some of the applicants who were available with D. degree and research work". The Legal Advisor understood this sub para to refer to the petitioner although he was not named therein. From this misreading of the minutes he was led to the inference that the view of the Executive Council was that none of the three candidates should be appointed and that the posts be re advertised. In the minutes recorded on 23-10-1979 #4few sub-para (c) was added and the original sub-para (c) was renumbered as (d) in a modified form. The new sub-para (c) was as follows : - "One of the candidates at Serial No. 3 namely Dr. Siya Ram who had Ph. D- Degree to his credit was ignored despite the fact that he has Ph. D. Degree, published research work and more than 4 years' experience of teaching under-graduate and post-graduate classes in this University" After reading this new sub-para (c) nobody could reasonably interpret the Executive Council's resolution as suggesting that Dr. Siya Ram, the petitioner, should not have been considered. Thus, the only reasonable view that could be taken of the said sub-para (b) after reading Annexure 4 could be that the said sub-para (b) related not to Dr. Siya Ram, but to some other candidate. When this letter of the Vice-Chancellor dated 31-10-1979, Annexure 5, was received, the normal thing would have been for the office to have recalled the file from the chancellor and to have submitted a corrected and revised note for his kind consideration. This was riot done and the matter was left with the chancellor for recording his concurrence on the note dated 30 10-1979. The record of the chancellor thus belies the assertion made in para 22 of Sri Yadava's counter-affidavit, sworn by him as true to his "information derived from the records", that the chancellor had considered the Executive Council's resolution as modified on 23-10-1979. As has been shown above, the interpretation placed by the Legal Advisor on the minutes of 14-9-1979, Annexure 2, was contrary to what the Executive Council meant, as shown by its subsequent minutes of 23-10-1979, communicated to the chancellor on 31-10-1979. As has been shown above, the interpretation placed by the Legal Advisor on the minutes of 14-9-1979, Annexure 2, was contrary to what the Executive Council meant, as shown by its subsequent minutes of 23-10-1979, communicated to the chancellor on 31-10-1979. Indeed, in Annexure 9, the matter was further made clear inasmuch as sub-para (c) was modified to read that Dr. Siya Ram "should not have been ignored as he had, besides a Ph. D. Degree, published research work and more than four years' experience of teaching under-graduate and post-graduate classes in this University to his credit" 10. It is thus obvious that the chancellor's decision was vitiated because he did not have the correct resolution of the Executive Council before him, and, moreover, even the incorrect form of resolution as transmitted to him stood further distorted by office note dated 30-10-1979 on which he recorded his concurrence. It is not for us to speculate as to how the chancellor would have decided the matter if the correct resolution and a correct interpretation thereof had been placed before him. It is for the chancellor alone to decide the matter and, accordingly, the only correct course would be to remit the matter back to the chancellor for a fresh decision in accordance with law. 11. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has, however, strenuously contended that even though the chancellor's decision may suffer from the aforesaid legal infirmity, the writ petition cannot be allowed because the decision in either case could not have been favourable to the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner's name was not recommended by the Selection Committee at ail. According to his contention, the Selection Committee recommended only two names, and the rider that the two experts had added could not be treated as a recommendation of the Selection Committee. As against this, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the other members of the Selection Committee did not express any dissent to the said recommendation of the experts in favour of the petitioner. Under Section 31 (6) no recommendation made by a Selection Committee can be considered to be valid unless one of the experts had agreed to such selection. Under Section 31 (6) no recommendation made by a Selection Committee can be considered to be valid unless one of the experts had agreed to such selection. In other words, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, if both experts take a particular view, the same is binding on the Selection Committee and there is no question of the rest, of the Selection Committee dissenting from them. If only one of the experts had expressed his view, the same could have been ignored, but the unanimous view of both he experts. Every act should, so far as possible, be so construed as to make -it valid and effective (up res magis valeat quam pereat) and, accordingly, the Recommendation contained in Annexure 2 should be interpreted to mean that it was the recommendation of the Selection Committee itself, on the insistence of the expert members, that the petitioner be placed as the 3rd candidate in order of merit. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has on the other hand contended that the decision of a statutory body like the Executive Council has to be gathered from the manner in which it is expressed. As observed in Vice Chancellor v. S.K. Ghosh, [AIR 1954 SC 2171 (para 16), a statutory body can "only express its will in a formal way by a formal resolution", and, accordingly, it was contended by learned standing counsel that it could not be presumed, unless it is formally so expressed in the resolution, that the Selection Committee had agreed with the experts. 12. On behalf of the petitioner, however, it has been contended that the current practice followed in, or the imprecise manner of, the recording of minutes in the bodies of this University cannot be ignored. For instance, in respect of none of the two resolutions of the Executive Council dated 4-12-1979, contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition and Annexure A-9 to the counter affidavit, also, is it anywhere stated in the minutes that the resolution was actually passed by the Executive Council, although undisputedly these resolutions were in fact passed. For instance, in respect of none of the two resolutions of the Executive Council dated 4-12-1979, contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition and Annexure A-9 to the counter affidavit, also, is it anywhere stated in the minutes that the resolution was actually passed by the Executive Council, although undisputedly these resolutions were in fact passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further pointed out that even the Vice-Chancellor who was the Chairman of the Selection Committee and as such the author of the minutes must have meant at that time by using this language, to say that the Selection Committee was giving the petitioner the third place, for neither did he record in the minutes any contrary views of the other members of the Selection Committee nor did he dissent to this interpretation placed by the Executive Council at its meeting dated 28-9-1979, 23-10-1979, 4-12-1979 and 26-12-1979. At the meetings of the Selection Committee as well as of the Executive Council he himself had presided and had recorded the minutes. Annexure A-9 also shows that whenever the Vice-Chancellor disagrees with the views of the Executive Council he expressly records his dissent. 13. Having noted these rival contentions, it appears to us that we need not express any final opinion on this question because the matter is going back to the chancellor, who will undoubtedly consider the entire matter, which the legislature has advisedly entrusted to his august widsom-according to its merits. As regards the contention of the learned banding counsel that the chancellor's decision did not operate in any manner prejudicial to the petitioner, it is borne out from para 4 of the counter-affidavit of Sri M.L. Yadrva that it was because of the chancellor's order dated 24-11-1979 that the petitioner's ad hoc appointment was terminated. The counter-affidavit of the Vice-Chancellor also mentions in paras 9, 10 and 11 that the order of termination of the petitioner's services was passed by him mainly in consequence of the chancellor's order dated 24-11-1979. Indeed, as noticed earlier, it was passed on the very day on which the chancellor's order was communicated. Thus it cannot be contended that even if the chancellor's order be unsustainable in law it cannot be interfered with at the instance of petitioner. The petitioner was the sufferer because of that decision, and he is certainly entitled to maintain the petition against the chancellor's order. 14. Thus it cannot be contended that even if the chancellor's order be unsustainable in law it cannot be interfered with at the instance of petitioner. The petitioner was the sufferer because of that decision, and he is certainly entitled to maintain the petition against the chancellor's order. 14. Learned Chief Standing Counsel also contended that the petitioner himself did not possess the minimum qualification of the consistently good academic record. As the qualifications were relax able, and the matter rests in the discretion of the chancellor, do not think it necessary to examine this question on merits. 15. If the very basis of the order of termination, namely, the chancellor's order, disappears, then the termination order, Annexure 12, cannot stand either. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has, however, contended in this connection that an ad hoc appointment does not confer any right on any appointee and its continuance is entirely within the discretion of the Vice Chancellor on whom the power has been conferred by the legislature by Section 13 (6). Sri Yadava in para 33 of his counter affidavit has gone to the extent of contending that the exercise of the Vice-Chancellor's Power "is not justiciable". It has further been contended that even the Executive Council has no say in the matter of ad hoc appointments as the matter rests exclusively within the discretion of the Vice-Chancellor, and further that in any view of the matter the appointment automatically came to an end on the expiry of the period of six months as provided in Section 13 (8). 16. We are not impressed by these contentions. Administrative absolutism is foreign to the scheme of our constitution. All powers conferred by the legislature are meant to be exercised in the public interest. As observed in Smt. S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India, [ (1979) 2 SCC 491 , (para 7) : "If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take into account matters which the courts consider not to be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in the eye of the law they have not exercised their discretion". The power to make ad hoc appointments has to be exercised in the interest of the University. The normal procedure for making appointments is that laid down in Section 31. The power to make ad hoc appointments has to be exercised in the interest of the University. The normal procedure for making appointments is that laid down in Section 31. The process of selection takes a long time and meanwhile work cannot stand still Ad hoc appointments are thus unavoidable. The six months' time limit has been imposed by the Legislature only as a safeguard in order to ensure that the power of making ad hoc appointments is not abused for by-passing the normal procedure laid down in Section 31. At the same time, the legislature has realised that it may not be practicable to adhere rigidly to the six months' time limit. That is why the legislature has not placed a fetter on reappointing the ad hoc appointee for further periods. The legislature by placing a time limit of six months does not contemplate that after every six months the incumbents should be changed. That would certainly not be in the interest of the students for their studies and would also be unduly harsh on the teachers who are so appointed. There is no express provision in the Act about the power of terminating an ad hoc appointment. That power, however, flows from Section 13 E) itself, read with Sections 16 and 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. So the power of making ad hoc appointments and the power of terminating such ad hoc appointments both have to be exercised objectively and in the interest of the University. This power of appointment has to be exercised only in the case of an emergency. The subjective satisfaction as regards the existence of emergency has to be that of the Vice-Chancellor. However, as is well-settled, even a power exercisable on subject we satisfaction of the authority is not totally beyond judicial review. This power of appointment has to be exercised only in the case of an emergency. The subjective satisfaction as regards the existence of emergency has to be that of the Vice-Chancellor. However, as is well-settled, even a power exercisable on subject we satisfaction of the authority is not totally beyond judicial review. Even though nobody has right to receive a largesse from the Government or from any public authority, yet the powers of the authorities to distribute largesse (in cheding jobs) are not beyond judicial review as laid down by Hon'ble Bhagwati, J. in his, if one may say so with respect, illuminating and historical judgments in R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority, (1979) 3 SCC 489 , and speaking for the Constitution Bench, in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, [ AIR 1981 SC 487 ] and also in M/s. Kasturi Lal v. State of J&K, ( AIR 1980 SC 1992 ]. 17. No circumstance has been pointed out as to how the emergency in which the petitioner was originally appointed has come to an end. Mere ipse dixit of the authority is not sufficient. The situation has apparently remained unchanged inasmuch as a regular appointment has not yet been made. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Vice-Chancellor had any ground for arriving at a satisfaction that the emergency which had been continuing since 1975 suddenly case on 24-1-1975 as soon as the Chancellor's Secretary's letter, Annexure 6, was received. 18. The stand of the Vice-Chancellor that the Executive Council has not say in the matter and that there is operation of powers between him and the Executive Council in this regard is too widely stated to commend acceptance, The initiative for taking action originally, no doubt, vests in the Vice-Chancel for alone and not in the Executive Council. But once an ad hoc appointment has been made by him for a post and the Vice-Chancellor seeks to terminate that appointment, then the person whose services are terminated has a right to appeal against the termination to the Executive Council under the third proviso to Section 13 (6) and thereupon the Executive Council may "confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor". The Vice-Chancellor acts initially, but his action is not final because sub-section (6) clearly provides that he is required to report forthwith the action taken by him to the chancellor and to the authority which in the ordinary course would have dealt with the matter. Under Section 21 (1) (vii) the power to appoint teachers vests in the Executive Council. The Vice-Chancellor is, therefore, bound to report his action to the Executive Council. It is, therefore, difficult to appreciate the stand of the Vice-Chancellor, as taken by him in this court and before the Executive Council on 4-12-1979, vide Annexure A-9, that the matter was beyond the purview of the Executive Council. Indeed, even where the Vice-Chancellor does not expressly pass any order of termination and allows the appointment to run its course of six months and thereafter omits to make a fresh appointment, it cannot be said that the Executive Council is powerless in the matter. For the purposes of the power of the Executive Council (though not for entitling an appointee to one month's notice) it must be assumed that "a termination may take place where the term expires either by the active step of the (authority) or by the running out of the stipulated term". It was so held in State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, [ AIR 1976 SC 1111 ], albeit in a different statutory context, and Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer speaking for the Supreme Court added with his characteristic sloquence, "Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision". The `provision' here is the third proviso aforesaid which confers a valuable right of appeal on the aggrieved teacher. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the petitioner cannot get any relief in so far as his ad hoc appointment is concerned. If the order, Annexure 12, is quashed, the normal consequences would ensue. In other words, the petitioner's ad hoc appointment shall be deemed never to have been terminated and to have been renewed from time to time and shall continue to be so renewed until for any valid and relevant reason the Vice-Chancellor, subject to the appellate power of the Executive Council, decides to terminate it either by an express order or by non-renewal. 19. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner also challenged the power of the chancellor to order re-advertisement of a post when the Executive Council has not recommended it and contended that the chancellor must confine himself to the point of disagreement referred to him. In view of the conclusion reached by us by a different route it is unnecessary to express any view on this contention. 20. In view of the above, it is not necessary to go into the other contentions of the petitioner such as the allegations of mala fides, discrimination and bias made against the Vice-Chancellor, and his contention that Sri M.L. Yadava had no authority to file counter-affidavit on behalf of the Executive Council also in the terms in which he has filed before us. 21. It was for these reasons that we at the close of arguments pronounced the order on 17th March, 1981 allowing the writ petition. 22. In the result, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the orders of the chancellor communicated through his Secretary's letter dated 24-11-1979, Annexure 6, and the O. M. dated 24-11-1979, Annexure 12, are hereby quashed. The chancellor, opposite-party No. 3, shall now decide the reference afresh in accordance with law. 23. After we pronounced the judgment, an oral prayer was made by the Chief Standing Counsel on behalf of the opposite-parties for certificate of fitness under Article 133 read with Article 134-A of the constitution. We are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As such the certificate prayed for is refused.