ORDER.- This petition filed under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exhibits as the matters imbedded into, that the petitioner herein calling himself as a respectable man, requires that by an order of this Court he should not be touched by the large pole of the extended arm of the Police, which arm has to be of course extended and made use of as per the provisions of the procedural law of the land in consonance with the principle of the criminal law of the land exhibited by the principles imbedded in the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or any of the provisions of the enactments which contained the penal provisions or quasi-penal provisions. 2. It is relevant to note that in the affidavit that has been sworn by the petitioner himself in this petition disclosed that in the event of arrest by the Kulasekarapattinam Police Station, Tirunelveli District in Crime No. 288 of 1981, he should be enlarged on bail and as such, an order contemplated in dealing about the anticipatory bail in the amended procedural Code regarding the Criminal Procedure applicable to the Courts of this country is actually prayed for in the application. It is submitted by the petitioner herein inter alia that the prosecution is that on 19th August, 1981 at about 4-30 a.m. Pattu and one identified person came and attacked the Kulasekarapattinam Police Station and Duty Police men then forcibly taken out one prisoner named Rajmohan from the lock-up room and that inasmuch as he is aged 65 years, he should be granted anticipatory bail. It is further submitted in paragraph 4 of the affidavit sworn to by him that he is an agriculturist and that he came from a decent and very respectable family and had no bad antecedent. 3. It is relevant in this connection also to incorporate the submissions made by either side. So far as the petitioner's plea is concerned, at this stage, there is absolutely no overt act against the petitioner herein, who is aged 65 and as such he should be granted anticipatory bail. Mr. 3. It is relevant in this connection also to incorporate the submissions made by either side. So far as the petitioner's plea is concerned, at this stage, there is absolutely no overt act against the petitioner herein, who is aged 65 and as such he should be granted anticipatory bail. Mr. Karpagavinayagam, the learned Government Advocate, No. III, inter alia, submits that in the First Information Report it is clear that the petitioner herein had indulged in snatching the key from the Station Officer and actually relieved one of the prisoners, who was in Police lock-up, this is a highhanded act that has been actually done by the petitioner and as such he is not entitled to the discretionary powers vested with this Court under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in the decisions extracted below by the Supreme Court together with the decision reported in G. Narasimhalu v. Public Prosecutor1 this Court thinks that this is not a stage at which an order favourable to the petitioner herein can be pronounced in this petition. 5. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan, Jaipur v. Bal-chand alias Ballu2, as follows: — It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of bail. So also the heinousness of the crime. Even so, the record of the petitioner in this case is that, while he has been on bail throughout in the trial Court and he was released after the judgment of the High Court there is nothing to suggest that be has abused the trust placed in him by the Court; his social circumstances also are not so unfavourable in the sense of his being a desparate character or unsocial element who is likely to betray the confidence that the Court may place in him in turn up to take justice at the hands of the Court. He is stated to be a young man of 27 years with a family to maintain. The circumstances and the social millieu do not militate against the petitioner being granted bail at this stage. He is stated to be a young man of 27 years with a family to maintain. The circumstances and the social millieu do not militate against the petitioner being granted bail at this stage. At the same time any possibility of the ab-sconsion or evasion or other abuse can be taken care of by a direction that the petitioner will report himself before the police station at Baren once every fortnight. It is laid down also in Balchand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh3 as follows: On a reading of section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, and rule 184, it can be laid down: (1) that section 438 of the Code has not been repealed or overruled by rule 184 of the Rules but the two have to be read harmoniously without interfering with the spheres contemplated by each of those provisions. In fact, rule 184 of the Rules is only supplemental to section 438 of the Code and contains the guidelines which have to be followed by the Court in passing orders for anticipatory bail in relation to cases covered by rule 184 of the Rules; (2) that here is no real inconsistency between section 438 of the Code and rule 184 of the Rules; (3) that section 438 of the Code is an extraordinary remedy and should be resorted to only in special cases. It would be desirable if the Court before passing an order under section 438 of the Code issues notice to the prosecution to get a clear picture of the entire situation; and (4) that in cases covered by rule 184 of the Rules, the Court exercising power under section 436 or section 438 of the Code has got to comply with the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of rule 184 and only after the Court has complied with these conditions that an order under any of these sections of the Code in respect of such offences could be passed. There does not appear to be any direct conflict between the provisions of rule 184 of the Rules and section 438 of the, Code. There does not appear to be any direct conflict between the provisions of rule 184 of the Rules and section 438 of the, Code. However, the conditions required by rule 184 of the Rules must be impliedly imported in section 438 of the Code so as to form the main guidelines which have to be followed while the Court exercises its power under section 438 of the Code in offences contemplated by rule 184 of the Rules. Such an interpretation would meet the ends of justice, avoid all possible anomalies and would at the same time ensure and protect the liberty of the subject which appears to be the real intention of the Legislature in ensuring section 438 as a new provisions for the first time in the Code. There is no real inconsistency between section 438 of the Code and rule 184 of the Rules and therefore the sow obstante clause cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to repeal or override the provisions of section 438 , of the Code in respect of cases where rule 184 of the Rules applies. The scope of rule 184 of the Rule is wider than that of section 438 of the Code, inasmuch as while section 438 can be invoked only in cases of non-bailable offences and not in cases of the Rules would apply not only to non-bailable offences and in these circumstances therefore, the conditions mentioned in rule 184 would have to be impliedly imported into section 436 of the Code which deals with orders for bail regarding bailable offences. In other words, the petition is that where a person who is an accused for offences contemplated by rule 184 of the Rules and which are bailable, yet, he cannot got bail as a matter of right under section 436 of the Code unless the Court complies with the conditions laid down in rule 184, clauses (a) and (b). So far as the question of anticipatory bail is concerned that does not apply to bailable offences at all. The rule of prudence requires that notice should be given to the other side before passing a final order for anticipatory bail is not obtained by a party by placing incorrect of misleading facts or suppressing material facts. In future the Courts will exercise this power keeping these observa-tions in view. The rule of prudence requires that notice should be given to the other side before passing a final order for anticipatory bail is not obtained by a party by placing incorrect of misleading facts or suppressing material facts. In future the Courts will exercise this power keeping these observa-tions in view. In emergent cases the Courts may make an interim order of anticipatory bail before issuing notice to the other side, It is clear that the intention of the Legislature in ensuring the salutary provision In section 438 of the Code which applies only to. non-bailable offences was to see that the liberty of the subject is not put in jeopardy on frivolous ground at the instance of unscrupulous or irresponsible persons or officers who may sometimes be in charge of prosecution.” 5. It was laid down in Mananthagouda v. State of Karnataka1 as follows: “On the ground that the name of the first petitioner is not in the complaint and the first information report, and the second petitioner could not have committed the alleged offence as he was being treated by a doctor on the date of offence, the petitioners claimed anticipatory bail. Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is an extraordinary remedy and should be resorted to only in special cases. It is desirable if the Court before passing an order under the section issues notice to the prosecution to get a clear picture of the entire situation. Section 438 should be read in conjunction with other provisions of law and the grant of blanket anticipatory bail cannot be read into the provision. The said power is not unguided or uncanalised, but all the limitations imposed in section 437 are implicit therein and must be read into section 438 as well. In addition to the limitations imposed in section 437, the petitioner must further make out a special case for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail. He must prove that the charge levelled against him is mala fide, and steins from ulterior motive. Mere allegation of mala fides by an offender and a vehement claim of innosence put forward by him are manifestly insufficient at such a conclusion by the Court. He must prove that the charge levelled against him is mala fide, and steins from ulterior motive. Mere allegation of mala fides by an offender and a vehement claim of innosence put forward by him are manifestly insufficient at such a conclusion by the Court. The burden of establishing the mala fides is on the person alleging it and it is for him to prima facie substantiate his allegation that the charge of serious non-bailable offence against him has been levelled mala fide. In respect of non-bailable offence, all the conditions imposed by section 437 of the Code are implicitly contained in section 438 as well. Where the nature of the charge is so serious as to be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, it would normally be inapt to exercise the power of the grant of anticipatory bail at the very threshold of the investigation unless the Court at that very stage, is satisfied that such a charge is false or groundless. Where the person is charged with an offence, punishable with death or imprisonment for life and he does not establish that the said charge is groundless or that it is inspired by mala fides, bail cannot be granted normally under section 437, Criminal Procedure Code, and, therefore, anticipatory bail cannot he granted to such a person.” 7. In Gurbhaksh Singh Sibia v. State of Punjab2 it was held as follows: “The normal application of the provisions of section 438 of the Code would be to cases where the, charge itself is of a frivolous nature. A case of this kind would be a fit one to exercise jurisdiction in order to needlessly prevent the unmiliation of the offender. Similarly the course from which such a charge stems has been considered of significance and where it has been levelled by unscrupulous or irresponsible persons, that would itself be a ground for consideration in the exercise of the power. Where the Court can on adequate material came to a fine conclusions that the charge is totally false, it may nevertheless resort to section 438, however serious be the nature of the crime. Section 438 of the Code is in the nature of the crime. Section 438 of the Code is in the nature of a shield for protecting entirely innocent persons from mala-cious humiliation, if the necessary conditions for its exercise are satisfied. Section 438 of the Code is in the nature of the crime. Section 438 of the Code is in the nature of a shield for protecting entirely innocent persons from mala-cious humiliation, if the necessary conditions for its exercise are satisfied. Care has to be taken that this provision does not become a sword in the hands of the unscrupulous persons to gain time for destroying the incriminating evidence against them and to mock at the legitimate investigative processes authorised by the law&. 8. The power under section 438 is not to be exercised in a vacuum, but only on the satisfaction of the conditions spelled out in the section itself. The jurisdictional fact for the exercise of the power under section 438 is the co-existence of the two conditions, namely and existing accusation (or in any case an accusation which reasonably arises from the existing facts) and a reasonable apprehension of arrest on the basis of such an accusation. It is thus plain that the exercise of power under section 438 is with regard to a specific accusation and cannot be extended in a blanket fashion to cover all offences with which the petitioner may come to be chared. Therefore, no question of the grant of anticipatory bail can arise with regard to an accusation not yet levelled or in respect of an offence yet not committed. 9. A person lawfully released on bail either on his own bond or with sureties cannot thereafter be deemed in fact or by any legal fiction as being in the custody of a police officer for the purpose of section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 10. Mere allegation of mala fides by an offender and a vehement claim of innocence put forward by him are manifestly insufficient for arriving at a conclusion by the Court that the charge levelled against him is mala fide and stems from ulterior motive. There is hardly any case where a person seeking bail on a serious charge does not plead innocence and further does not allege some reason, for his alleged false implication. If the allegations by themselves are to be accepted at their fare value, then virtually in every case the power under section 438 would have to be exercised. Therefore, what indeed is an extraordinary power for exceptional circumstances would in fact become routine and common place. If the allegations by themselves are to be accepted at their fare value, then virtually in every case the power under section 438 would have to be exercised. Therefore, what indeed is an extraordinary power for exceptional circumstances would in fact become routine and common place. That is not the intent of the law. A mere claim of innocence and liberal allegations of mala fide motives invariably laid at the door of the investigating agency by the offender is not enough. The Court has to be independently satisfied about the prima facie falsity of the charge and the ulteriorness of the motive for levelling the same. Section 438 of the Code invariably operates at the very initial stage of the investigation and even the most competent prosecutor may not then be in a position to put before the Court conclusive material to bring the charge against the person accused. To put the prosecutor to proof at the very inception of the investigation appears as running counter to the whole scheme of investigation into cognisable cases as laid down in Chapter XII of the Code. This, indeed, is not the stage for invoking the known maxim of the Criminal Law that the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. That stage arrives at the end of the investigation and in the course of the trial itself. The inception of the investigation is not a trial. Thus the petitioner must show (and the Court must be very cautious that mere allegations of mala fides by the petitioner are inadequate) and the Court must be satisfied on materials before it that the allegations of the mala fides are substantial and the accusations appear to be false and groundless. 11. It is difficult to unravel the crimes of corruption. It is harder to detect the same when it is committed by what is now a well known category of white coller criminals. However, it is the hardest to bring to book when such crime stems from the corridors of executive power and the hitches of high offices. Therefore, the Courts must ever remain wary of throttling and in any way impeding the legitimate investigations process in such cases. However, it is the hardest to bring to book when such crime stems from the corridors of executive power and the hitches of high offices. Therefore, the Courts must ever remain wary of throttling and in any way impeding the legitimate investigations process in such cases. In cases of serious economic offences involving blatant corruption at the higher range of executive and political power, the larger interest of the public and the State demand that the extraordinary power under section 438 of the Code be not exercised in favour of the offenders at the very threshold of the investigation. 12. From a reading of the relevant provisions of the Code together, it is plain that in a serious cognizable offence the Code authorises the arrest and detention in custody of the offender for the first twenty-four hours without the interposition of the Magistracy and further police custody upto a period of 15 days within the authority of the Magistrate. It is clear that the arrest and interrogation in police custody for cognizable crime is not only visualised but expressly authorised by the Code. Therefore, a mere joining of a person in the course of the investigation whilst an anticipatory bail is not substitute for investigation in custody in all those cases where his personal interrogation may be legitimately required. There is hardly any case where a party seeking bail would not zealously offer to join the investigation thereof and to similarly undertake not to tamper with the witnesses. If this by itself were to be sufficient then the provisions of section 167(2) of the Code need hardly be ever reported to. 13. There is nothing in section 438 itself or in its Legislative history which could give the least indication that the provisions was intended to override the legitimate procedure of investigation into serious crime which has been prescribed by the code itself in Chapter XII of which section 167(2) forms the material part. Indeed, in the event of conflict the discretionary grant of anticipatory bail must give way to the statutory rights and duties under section 167 (2) of the Code. 14. In Crl.M.P. No. 4968 of 1981, the decision reported in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibia v. State of Punjab1 has been extracted by me elaborately. 15. Indeed, in the event of conflict the discretionary grant of anticipatory bail must give way to the statutory rights and duties under section 167 (2) of the Code. 14. In Crl.M.P. No. 4968 of 1981, the decision reported in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibia v. State of Punjab1 has been extracted by me elaborately. 15. Taking into consideration all the decisions cited above and under the circumstances, the finding of this Court is, that there is no merit in this application and there are no circumstances warranting an order of anticipatory bail as contemplated under the provisions of section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, can be granted in favour of the petitioner. The petition is hereby dismissed. R.S. ----- Petition dismissed.