JUDGMENT V. D. Misra, C. J.—This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court dismissing the appellants writ petition. 2. The appellant was appointed as Assistant Police Prosecutor on 8th June, 1957. He was on probation for a period of three years. In 1963 the question of appellants crossing the efficiency bar arose. A show cause notice (Annexure P-2) was given to the appellant that it was proposed to extend his efficiency bar for a further period of six months. In this notice various adverse entries of his character rolls were conveyed to him. The appellant showed cause and prayed that the notice be discharged. But the appellants request was turned down. He was permitted to cross-the efficiency bar with effect from 8th December, 1963 (Annexure P-5). The appellant was promoted as Police Prosecutor on 14th January, 1966 and he was confirmed on 24th June, 1966. The appellant was reported against a number of time for having been found drank and. misbehaving. His three colleagues Malkiat Singh, Yudhvir Singh, and Gopi Chand, respondents, who were junior to the appellant were, however, promoted in June and July, 1965. The appellant claimed that he should have been confirmed the moment his period of probation was over. He also claimed that the efficiency bar could not be withheld and that his juniors should not have been promoted and confirmed before him. 3. The appellant, who has argued his case himself, relied upon sub- rule (1) of rule 19.26 of the Punjab Police Rules, Volume II, as applicable to Himachal Pradesh, in support of his contention that he should have been confirmed after a period of three years. This rule reads : "Directly appointed Prosecuting Sub-Inspectors shall be an probation for a period of three years. They shall normally be appointed in the end of February or the beginning of March and shall be deputed to attend the 12 months Prosecuting Sub-Inspectors course at the Training School commencing from the 15th March each year." Sub-rule (3) reads thus : "On successfully completing the course at the School, directly appointed Prosecuting Sub-Inspectors will be posted to rural police stations for six months practical training under experienced selected Sub-Inspectors, after which they will work for 1 1/2 years as Prosecuting Sub-Inspectors. On the conclusion of this period, provided they have given satisfaction, they shall be confirmed in their appointments. On the conclusion of this period, provided they have given satisfaction, they shall be confirmed in their appointments. Their confirmation shall, however, depend on the reports received from the Principal, Police Training School, and from the Superintendent of Police of the district to which they are posted. The Principal shall make a report on the capacity and character of each officer as evidenced by his conduct while under training at the School, and the Superintendent of Police shall submit half-yearly reports showing his progress in practical work." 4. It is true that sub-rule (1) does not expressly provide for the extention of the period of probation. But then it does not lay down the maximum period of probation. There is no outside limit provided in the rule. It is by now well settled that after successfully completing the period of probation a person cannot claim automatic confirmation [see Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711]. The appellant, therefore, cannot be heard to say that either he should have been confirmed after the expiry of three years or should have been thrown out of service. It may be noticed that under sub-rule (3) it has been specifically provided that the confirmation will depend on satisfactory reports from the Principal Police Training School as well as from the Superintendent of Police of the District concerned. The appellant had no right to be confirmed the moment the probationary period was over. 5. The next contention of the appellant is that he should have been allowed to cross the efficiency bar when it fell due. The very words efficiency bar connote that unless a person is efficient he should not be allowed to progress further in terms of pay. The Inspector General of Police had given a show cause notice to the appellant before withholding his increment to which he would have been entitled after crossing the efficiency bar. This notice is Annexure P-2. The appellant was told that the Principal of Police Training School Phillaur had described the appellant as a mediocre. The reporting officer had also described the appellant as a mediocre officer and had cast doubts about his moral character. These remarks bad been duly communicated to the appellant earlier. Further reports for the period from 16-8-1961 to 31-3-1962 as well as 1-4-1S62 to 15-1-1963 were of the same character. He was censured in 1963 for negligence. The reporting officer had also described the appellant as a mediocre officer and had cast doubts about his moral character. These remarks bad been duly communicated to the appellant earlier. Further reports for the period from 16-8-1961 to 31-3-1962 as well as 1-4-1S62 to 15-1-1963 were of the same character. He was censured in 1963 for negligence. All these adverse reports had been conveyed to the appellant as and when they were made. It was in these circumstances that the appellant was not allowed to cross the efficiency bar. The learned single Judge was right in rejecting this contention. 6. Coming to the question of promotions, it is rule 13.1 which deals with it. It reads as under : "Promotion from ore rank to another, and from one grade to another in the name rank, shall be made by selection tempered by seniority. Efficiency and honesty shall be the main factors governing selection. Specific qualifications, whether in the nature of training courses passed or practical experience, shall be carefully considered in each case. When the qualifications of two officers are otherwise equal, the senior shall be promoted. This rule does not affect increments within a time scale." 7. It is obvious that promotion has to be by selection tempered by seniority, and efficiency as well as honesty are the main considerations for it. The appellant claims that he should have been promoted before respondents Malkiat Singh, Yudhvir Singh, and Gopi Chand were promoted. We have already referred to the adverse entries in the character rolls of the appellant which were duly conveyed to him. Now Malkiat Singh was confirmed in August, 1963, long before the appellant was confirmed. He was thus senior to the appellant. As regards the other respondents, there is nothing to show that their record was no better than the appellant. Persons with better record were entitled to be selected. It may be noticed that the appellant has been reported to be a habitual drunkard and having misconducted himself on a number of occasions even after his promotion as Police Prosecutor. 8. No other point was urged before us by the appellant. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.