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1981 DIGILAW 384 (MAD)

Sundaribai also known as Jayalakshmi v. State

1981-09-23

S.SWAMIKKANNU

body1981
Judgment : An interesting point has arisen in this application and that is this. When a complaint had been given by an aggrieved wife that the husband turned to be a Muslim when she had believed that he husband was a Hindu and that she could know the same after cohabitation, the competent Magistrate had sent the application that had been so filed by the aggrieved wife, who is a Hindu, to his subordinate to find out the truth or otherwise of the contents therein. Now we are concerned with certain sections of the Criminal Procedure Code, in this regard-sections 190 and 198 together with section 156 (3), Criminal Procedure Code. Sections 156 (3), 202 and 155 (2) are the relevant provisions of the procedural law of the land, namely, Criminal Procedure Code, that comes to the judicial gauntlet as a result of the submissions that had emanated from either side in this application. 2. It is contended by Mr. Sam V. Chelliah, that as for the ratio imbedded in Basir-ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal1 and Abdul Rahman v. Mad. Haji Ahmad2, the action tha has been taken by the Court in which the complaint has been laid under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code by the aggrieved wife, cannot be handed over to the police by the Magistrate for investigation, because, according, to him, what is contemplated by the section is, by himself enquiring into it and not delegate-ing the judicial discretion to the executive authority or police authority in this manner. In other words, the sum and substance of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner herein is that if the Magistrate himself had reduced to writing the sworn statement, if any, that was required to be given by the petitioner herein at the initial stage itself, i.e., before actually handing over the complaint to the police for investigation and thereafter had resorted to another procedure that is contemplated under the provisions of section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, he would not have had any grievance at all. These are the very submissions made by Mr. Sam V. Chelliah during the course of his argument. 3. During the course of his argument, Mr. These are the very submissions made by Mr. Sam V. Chelliah during the course of his argument. 3. During the course of his argument, Mr. Sam V. Chelliah has stressed that the handing over of a complaint to the police authorities by the Magistrate for completing the enquiry relating to the contents of the same and for submission of a report, can actually be done only subsequent to himself reducing to writing the sworn statement of the complainant/aggrieved party under section 302, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Public Prosecutor, on these, submits that the wrong mention of the number of section does not in any way fetter the power of the Court, namely, the Magistrate’s Court, under the provisions of sections 156 (3) and 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, and in the instant case, according to the learned Government Advocate No. III, it is the provision of section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, that has been exercised and as such there has been absolutely no procedural irregularity or illegality that has been committed by the learned Magistrate in handing over the complaint. The Government Advocate No. III further contends that the non-recording of the sworn statement is not fatal to the course taken by the police officer because the complaint itself has not been taken on file by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, the argument advanced by Mr. Sam V. Chelliah can be uphold, according to the State, only if the complaint had been taken on file, and without having actually recording the statement of the complainant if the complaint is sent to the police officer then there is infirmity in the procedure. On the other hand, in the instant case, Mr. Karpagavinayagam, learned Government Advocate No. III submits that even before actually talcing the complaint on file, the same had been handed over to the police by the learned Magistrate by the power vested in him under the provision of section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code. Section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: "No police, officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial". Section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, which is very much stressed by Mr. Section 155 (2), Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: "No police, officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial". Section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, which is very much stressed by Mr. Sam V. Chelliah, reads as follows: "Prosecution for offences against marriages: (1) No Court shall take cognisance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence: Provided that; (a) where such person is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman, who, according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, same other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf; (b) where such person is the husband and he is serving in any of the Armed Forces of the Union under conditions which are certified by his Commanding Officer as precluding him from obtaining leave of absence to enable him to make a complaint in person, some other person authorised by the husband in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4) may make a complaint on his behalf; (c) where the person aggrieved by an offence punishable under sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code, is the wife, complaint may be made on her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter or by her father’s or mother’s brother or sister or with the leave of the Court, by any person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption. (2) For the purpose of sub-section (1) no person other than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence punishable under section 497 or section 498 of the said Code. Provided that in the absence of the husband, some persons who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf. Provided that in the absence of the husband, some persons who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf. (3) When in any case falling under clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the complaint is sought to be made on behalf of a person under the age of eighteen years or of a lunatic by person who has not been appointed or declared by a competent authority to be the guardian of the person of the minor or lunatic, and the Court is satisfied that there is a guardian so appointed or declared, the Court shall, before granting the application for leave, cause notice to be given to such guardian and give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (4) The authorisation referred to in clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1), shall be in writing, shall be signed or otherwise attested by the husband, shall contain a statement to the effect that he has been informed of the allegations upon which the complaint is to be founded, shall be countersigned by his Commanding Officer, and shall be accompanied by a certificate signed by that officer to the effect that leave of absence for the purpose of making a complaint in person cannot for the time being granted to the husband. (5) Any document purporting to be such an authorisation and complying with the provisions of sub-section (4), and any document purporting to be a certificate required by that sub-section shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to the genuine and shall be received in evidence. (6) No Court shall take cognisance of an offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, where such offence consists of sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife being under fifteen years of age, if more than one year has elapsed from the date of the commission of the offence. (7) The provisions of this section apply to the abetment of, or attempt to commit, an offence as they apply to the offence". 3. Paragraph 11 of the decisions reported in Abdul Rahman v. Md. (7) The provisions of this section apply to the abetment of, or attempt to commit, an offence as they apply to the offence". 3. Paragraph 11 of the decisions reported in Abdul Rahman v. Md. Haji Ahmad1, runs as follows: "In our opinion, the offence charged was a separate offence although of the same kind from the offence in respect of which the facts had been stated in the complaint. For this separate offence a complaint should have been filed and the provisions of section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, complied with. In our opinion, the provisions of that section are mandatory. Even in section 238 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the importance of the, provisions of section 198 or 199 of the Code is emphasised. Clause (3) of the section specifically states that the provisions of this section do not authorise the conviction of offence referred to in section 198 or 199 when no complaint has been made as required by these sections.. The Presidency Magistrate wrongly framed the charge, so on the record, when in respect of the offence charged there was no complaint filed and the facts as stated in the complaint actually filed did not make out the offence as charged". The ratio decidendi imbedded in the decision referred to by Mr. Sam V. Chelliah in Basir-ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal2, can be extracted as follows: "Where the allegations made in first report disclose two distinct offences, one against the public servant and the other against a private individual, that other is not debarred by section 195 from seeking redress for the offence committed against him. (Section 500, Indian Penal Code.) The ingredients of the offence under section 182 cannot be said to be the ingredients for the offence under section 500. Nor can it be said that the offence relating to giving false information relates to the same group of offences as that of defamation. Though section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. Though section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the Court or of the public servant is required". 4. Referring to paragraph 11 occurring at page 160 of the decision reported in Abdul Rahman v. Md. Haji Ahmad3, Mr. Sam V. Chelliah submits that a complaint must be given only by an aggrieved person and not by a Magistrate. There is a fallacy in the argument that has been advanced, without understanding the true concept of the observations made in paragraph 11 in Abdul Rahman v. Md. Haji Ahmad3, and this can never be uphold and this contention has to be repelled as one which does not stand a moment’s scrutiny. There is nothing in the Code nor it has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner herein that there is anything by way of provision or rule or regulation or notification or amendment made by the High Courts concerned in this Code, namely, procedural law of the land, namely, Criminal Procedure Code, which prohibits a complaint before actually taken on file by the Magistrate, being handed over by the learned Magistrate for a report. The said procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate, in the instant case, does not interfere with any of the principles of the Criminal Procedure Code, nor any established principles of the law of equity recognised by Court so as to apply its discretionary powers vested in it. Under these circumstances, I find that there is no merit in this application and this application at this stage has to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Application dismissed.