JUDGMENT Anil K. Sen, J.–This is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution at the instance of the respondent in 4 proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. The application is directed against an appellate order dated June 3, 1981 passed by the Chief Judge, Court of small Causes at Calcutta being the appellate authority. 2. Amiya Singha Roy initiated the aforesaid four proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act being P.W.A cases nos. 8 of 1977, 62 of 1977, 127 of 1977 and 21 of 1978 in the Court of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, West Bengal. He claimed unpaid wages from the respondent for a period covering August 1976 to December 1977. In contesting these claims the respondent (petitioner before us) raised an objection that since Amiya Singha Roy, the petitioner before the authority, is not a person employed in the factory the four proceedings as initiated by him are not maintainable in law. It was further pointed out by the respondent that in any event the factory itself having been closed with effect from February, 15, 1977 be could not have been an employee in the factory at all since that date. On such a pleading a preliminary issue was raised before the authority under the Payment of Wages Act whether the proceedings are maintainable in law or not. Parties adduced evidence in support of their respective claims on the point and the Authority found on evidence that though Amiya Singha Roy was an employee employed as such by the respondent before the Authority he was not an employee in the factory itself and as such he is not entitled to sustain the proceeding under the Payment of Wages Act. 3. Amiya Singha Roy, the petitioner before the Authority, filed four appeals being nos. 9 to 12 of 1979 before the appellate authority. The appellate authority agreed with the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and held that Amiya Singha Roy was employed by the respondent. He also appears to have agreed with the finding of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act that Amiya Singha Roy was not so employed in the factor itself. The appellate authority agreed with the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and held that Amiya Singha Roy was employed by the respondent. He also appears to have agreed with the finding of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act that Amiya Singha Roy was not so employed in the factor itself. Nonetheless he took the view that since Amiya Singha Roy was engaged in jobs incidental to the work of the factory he must be treated to be one who is covered by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. To quote the ultimate finding of the appellate authority he observed "I, therefore, hold that the appellant might not be a worker in the factory within the meaning of the Factories Act but he is certainly an employee under the respondent and his work was incidental to the work of the factory establishment." Notwithstanding such a finding he took the view that such an employee is not excluded from the operation of the Payment of Wages Act. This conclusion he arrived at notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U. P. v. M. P. Singh, AIR 1960 SC 569 which decision he preferred to distinguish because that was based on a different statute. Feeling aggrieved the respondent in the original proceeding has now preferred the present revisional application. The petitioner having made to pay the additional Court fee payable on four applications since the order was passed in four such appeals we have entertained the present application. 4. Mr. Sen appearing in support of this revisional application has taken a short point before us to the effect that upon the findings concurrently arrived at by the two authorities below the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act at the instance of Amiya Singha Roy were not maintainable in law since the applicant was found not to be a person employed in any factory. Mr. Chunder, appearing to contest this revisional application on behalf of Amiya Singha Roy, has raised a preliminary objection that since the appellate authority happens to be the chief Judge of the Small causes Court and since he is not a persona designata an application under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable. In fairness, however, Mr. Mr. Chunder, appearing to contest this revisional application on behalf of Amiya Singha Roy, has raised a preliminary objection that since the appellate authority happens to be the chief Judge of the Small causes Court and since he is not a persona designata an application under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable. In fairness, however, Mr. Chunder is not in a position to dispute that if such a contention put forward by him is upheld then the appellate order impugned would be revisable under S. 115 of the Code. In our view, when the simple point raised before us is to the effect that the authorities below had no jurisdiction to entertain the impugned proceedings upon their own finding it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether the appellate authority is a court or a persona designata. It would be open to us to convert the application from one under Article 227 of the Constitution to S. 115 of the Code in the event we accept the contention of Mr. Chunder. The objection raised on this account, therefore, in our view, is inconsequential and as such overruled. 5. On merits Mr. Chunder made best efforts to support the order by contending that the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act should be liberally construed and on such construction the applicant before the authority should be held to he an employee covered by the Act or, in other words, according to Mr. Chunder, the learned appellate authority correctly took the view that though his client was not a person employed in the factory still he would be covered by the previsions of the Act in view of the fact that he was an employee of the respondent and was engaged in work incidental to the factory establishment. Though we may agree with Mr. Chunder that this beneficial legislation should be liberally interpreted, yet in our view we cannot exceed the limit of extending the statute beyond all its terms. Section 1 sub-s. (4) is specific enough to say that the Act applies to the Payment of Wages to person employed in any factory and not to a person employed by a factory. The obvious intention of the legislation was to cover the persons employed in the factory as are covered by the Factories Act. Section 1 sub-s. (4) is specific enough to say that the Act applies to the Payment of Wages to person employed in any factory and not to a person employed by a factory. The obvious intention of the legislation was to cover the persons employed in the factory as are covered by the Factories Act. That being the specific provisions and the section being clear enough on its terms it would be a mis-interpretation on out part to extend it to cover cases of employees engaged in work incidental to the factory even if they are not so employed in the factory itself. Such a construction being impermissible, we regret, we cannot accept either the view taken by the learned appellate authority or the contention put forward by Mr. Chunder. Indeed, we are of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court cited before the learned appellate authority was not really distinguishable. That apart as we have indicated hereinbefore the provision in the statute is explicit enough to cover persons employed in a factory and not an employee of the nature as the opposite party is in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 6. In the result, this revisional application succeeds. The impugned appellate order being set aside the order of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act is restored. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout. B. C. Chakrabarti, J. I agree, Application allowed. Appellate order set aside.