Judgment S.J. Hyder, J. 1. THE dispute in this writ petition relates to a house situated at P. L. Sharma Road, Begum Bagh, in the city of Meerut. THE said house originally belonged to one Ganga Prasad Bhatnagar who died on June 19,1960. THE house was requisitioned under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', for the residence of one Sita Ram Pandey, Deputy Collector, as far back as the year 1951. 2. SUBSEQUENTLY, some of the heirs of Ganga Prasad Bhatnagar transferred the house to one Nand Kishore. The petitioner, who is a practising Advocate at Meerut, alleges that by means of transfer, he has become the owner of the entire house. On behalf of the respondents, namely, the State of U. P. and the District Magistrate, Meerut, it is averred in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner has only acquired 7/8th share in the said house. It is, however, unnecessary to go into this controversy for the purpose of this writ petition. Sri Sita Ram Pandey, Deputy Collector, was transferred from the district and the District Magistrate passed a fresh order of requisition dated 4-9-1973 and delivered possession of the house to Sri Ram Bharosey Lal Sharma, Regional Transport Magistrate, Meerut. In due course, Shri Sharma was also transferred from the district and the District Magistrate, opposite party no. 2, passed an order dated 21st of August, 1976 allotting the accommodation in favour of Sri Alauddin Siddiqui. On the transfer of Sri Alauddin Siddiqui, the District Supply Officer, Meerut, submitted a report to the District Magistrate inter alia, stating that Sri D. C. Jain, Stenographer of the District Magistrate, was living in a house in respect of which he was paying a rent of Rs. 100/- per mensem which was much in excess of his paying capacity and that it would be proper if the house in dispute which carried a lower rent, may be allotted in his name. On this report, the District Magistrate passed a short order in the following words :- "As proposed." 3. IN consequence of the above order of the District Magistrate dated 4-12-1976, the accommodation was occupied by Sri D. C. Jain. The retirement of Sri D. C. Jain was due in January, 1980. 4. On this report, the District Magistrate passed a short order in the following words :- "As proposed." 3. IN consequence of the above order of the District Magistrate dated 4-12-1976, the accommodation was occupied by Sri D. C. Jain. The retirement of Sri D. C. Jain was due in January, 1980. 4. IT may be stated that the petitioner had become a co-sharer in the house in dispute as early as 1974. Since then he had started making applications to the District Magistrate that the accommodation in dispute may be released from requisition and that he may be permitted to occupy the same. As the retirement of Sri D. C. Jain drew nearer, the petitioner made frantic efforts and made repeated applications to the District Magistrate for the said purpose. The petitioner was informed by the District Supply Officer by his order dated 15th of May, 1979 that after considering the entire circumstances, the District Magistrate has reached the conclusion that it was not possible to accede to his request. The petitioner thereupon filed the present writ petition. He claimed the relief that a writ of mandamus be issued to opposite party no. 2 commanding him to hand over vacant possession of the accommodation to the petitioner. He further prayed that a suitable writ, order or direction may be issued to the District Magistrate prohibiting him from making any further order of requisition. In the writ petition, it has been averred that the petitioner is an advocate practising at Meerut since the year 1973 and that he has no accommodation, except the accommodation in dispute, which had been purchased by him for valuable consideration to meet his personal requirements. It is alleged that the order of requisition dated 4-9-1973 passed by the District Magistrate for the residence of Sri Ram Bharosey Lal Sharma had exhausted itself after his transfer in 1976 and the District Magistrate could not allow the accommodation to be occupied by Sri Siddiqui and thereafter by his own Stenographer Sri D. C. Jain. It is further averred that the orders permitting the accommodation to be occupied by Sri Siddiqui and Sri D. C. Jain as well as the order rejecting the petitioner's request for the release of the accommodation are mala fide. 5. It is further averred that the orders permitting the accommodation to be occupied by Sri Siddiqui and Sri D. C. Jain as well as the order rejecting the petitioner's request for the release of the accommodation are mala fide. 5. IT may be noticed that the Act was passed as a temporary statute in 1947 and its life had been extended from time to time by the Legislature. The preamble of the Act states that whereas shortage of the accommodation in Uttar Pradesh has become very acute due to influx of refugees, it is expedient to provide during a limitted period for powers to requisition accommodation. Section 3 of the Act, insofar as it is relevant for the purpose of the case, is quoted below : "If in the opinion of the District Magistrate it is necessary to requisition any accommodation for any public purpose, he may by order in writing requisition such accommodation and may direct that possession there shall be delivered to him within such period as may be specified in the order. Provided that the period so specified shall not be less than 15 days from the date of the service of the order." 6. SECTION 8 of the Act deals with the powers of the District Magistrate to release an accommodation from requisition and it inter alia provides that where an accommodation requisitioned under the Act is to be released from requisition, he shall release it in favour of the person from whom it was requisitioned and deliver possession thereof to him. The existence of a public purpose is a sine qua non for the exercise of the powers under Section 3 of the Act. The Act does not define the expression 'public purpose'. However, the expression has been judicially considered in a catena of decisions concerning enactments which deal either with acquisition or requisition of property for public purpose. It is now well recognised that public purpose is one which is essential for the public in general. The expression includes a purpose i. e. an object or aim, in which the interest of the community as opposed to a particular interest of individual or individuals is directly and vitally concerned. Public servants posted at a particular place are required to take up residence at the place to which they are posted. The expression includes a purpose i. e. an object or aim, in which the interest of the community as opposed to a particular interest of individual or individuals is directly and vitally concerned. Public servants posted at a particular place are required to take up residence at the place to which they are posted. Unless they reside at that place, they cannot discharge effectively the public duties entrusted to them. On account of shortage of accommodation, such public servants are put to great inconvenience which impair their efficiency in discharge of public functions. It is, therefore, a public purpose to requisition accommodation for the residence of public officials who are placed in such a predicament. It cannot, therefore, be gain-said that an order of requisition under Section 3 of the Act can be passed requisitioning an accommodation for the residence of a public servant provided such order complies with the other requirements of the Act with which we are not concerned in this case. An accommodation requisitioned under Section 3 can be de-requisitioned in accordance with the provisions of law contained in Section 8 of the Act. 7. LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner has pressed upon us two grounds in support of the writ petition, one of which shall be referred to by us as the broader ground and the other as the narrower ground. The broader ground urged is that an order of requisition under Section 3 of the Act can only be passed for the residence of a particular public servant and not for the residence of public servants as a class. The narrower ground is to the effect that the accommodation could not have been allowed to be occupied by Sri D. C. Jain and that the order of requisition passed on 4-9-1973 in favour of Sri Ram Bharosey Lal Sharma exhausted itself when the accommodation was vacated by Sri Siddiqui. In support of the narrower ground it is submitted that an order of requisition passed under Section 3 does not terminate only when an order of de-requisition is passed under Section 8. The said order may also spend itself out once the public purpose for which it was passed has come to an end. 8. SINCE this petition must succeed on the narrower ground, we do not consider it necessary to pronounce upon the broader ground urged by the learned counsel. The said order may also spend itself out once the public purpose for which it was passed has come to an end. 8. SINCE this petition must succeed on the narrower ground, we do not consider it necessary to pronounce upon the broader ground urged by the learned counsel. For the decision of this case, we assume that the order of requisition passed on September 4, 1973 in favour of Sri Ram Bharosey Lal Sharma was an order to requisition the accommodation for the residence of public servant in general. It, therefore, follows that when Sri Ram Bharosey Lal Sharma was transferred in 1976, the accommodation was rightly allowed to be occupied by Sri Alauddin Siddiqui in the year 1976. However, on the transfer of Sri Alauddin Siddiqui, the accommodation was not made available to its owners. Instead the District Supply Officer put up a report before the District Magistrate stating that it may be allowed to be occupied by Sri D. C. Jain, Stenographer of the District Magistrate. On that application, the District Magistrate passed an order which has already been quoted above. In consequence, inspite of the protest of the petitioner, the accommodation was occupied by Sri Jain. The report of the District Supply Officer for the occupation of the accommodation by Sri D. C. Jain was based only on the ground that the accommodation which was then in the occupation of Sri D. C. Jain was carrying more rent and that he would have to pay lesser rent for the accommodation in dispute. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 8 of the Act is not exhaustive of the means by which an order under Sec. 3 can be terminated. As already stated by us, the essential pre-requisite which empowers the District Magistrate to pass an order of requisition under Section 3 is the existence of a public purpose. The moment the public purpose ceases to exist, the substratum on which the order of requisition is based automatically disappears. Section 8 of the Act may be called in aid when the public purpose continues to exist. If the public purpose for which the order under Section 3 was passed continues to exist yet, for certain reasons, the District Magistrate may consider it advisable to de-requisition a particular accommodation. Section 8 of the Act may be called in aid when the public purpose continues to exist. If the public purpose for which the order under Section 3 was passed continues to exist yet, for certain reasons, the District Magistrate may consider it advisable to de-requisition a particular accommodation. The repository of a power conferred upon an authority by the statute must exercise it strictly in accordance with the conditions under which such power has been made exercisable. The exercise of power is bad where the true object of such exercise substantially differs from the one for which the power was entrusted. The purported exercise of power under a provision of law conferring that power must be based on some rational and relevant principle which have a close nexus with the object for which power has been conferred on the authority. On the other hand, if the power is exercised for considerations which are foreign to the object for which the power has been conferred, the result would be that the power exercised would be a nullity and would be liable to be struck down on the ground that it is mala fide. 9. LEGAL mala fides or legal malice are to be distinguished from personal bias or personal malice. An authority on whom power has been conferred may act honestly and with the best of motives. In such a case, it cannot be said that it is guilty of any personal bias or personal vice. However, if the action taken by such authority is based on extraneous considerations, which are wholly irrelevant for the purpose for which power has been conferred upon it, the resultant action would be hit by the doctrine of legal bias or legal malice. 10. IN Ramana v. I. A. Authority of India (?), it has been observed as follows :- "It is well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them." We have already seen that Sri D. C. Jain was in occupation of an accommodation before he was allowed to occupy the accommodation in dispute. He was permitted by the District Magistrate to reside in the accommodation in dispute only on the ground that it carried a lesser rent. Now the question of quantum of rent, in the circumstances of this case, was foreign to the purpose of Sec. 3 of the Act and has no reasonable nexus with it. It may be that payment of rent at a lower rate may have been more advantageous to Sri D. C. Jain as it would be to any other person. In the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that Sri D. C. Jain was wholly without any accommodation or that it was absolutely beyond his capacity to pay the rent of the accommodation formerly occupied by him. The order of the District Magistrate endorsing the suggestion made by the District Supply Officer was, therefore, void and is hit by the doctrine of legal malice or legal bias. 11. AFTER the transfer of Sri Alauddin Siddiqui, the accommodation must be deemed to have been free from the effect of the order dated September 4, 1973. In these circumstances, the District Magistrate was in error in rejecting the application of the petitioner for the release of the accommodation. The petitioner is a practising Advocate at Meerut. He has no accommodation at his disposal. He has stated that he has purchased the accommodation for his personal requirement. These are all circumstances which should be taken into account in passing an order of release in favour of the petitioner. The accommodation cannot be treated as still governed by the provisions of the Act. 12. THE result is that this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued against the District Magistrate, Meerut, commanding him to deliver vacant possession of the house in dispute to the petitioner. We allow three months' time from today to the District Magistrate to comply with this order. THE respondents shall pay the costs of the petition. Petition allowed.