JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - In this second appeal the defendant-appellant has only challenged the decree of the lower appellate court on the ground that it was not permissible for the court to substitute the decree of the trial court. 2. A suit had been filed by the plaintiff for possession over a shop of which the boundaries were given at the foot of the plaint. The defendant raised a question about the valuation of the suit and for that purpose prayed for appointing the Amin as Commissioner to evaluate the property in dispute. The Amin gave his report in which the dimensions of the land in question were given along with the boundaries. The boundaries given in the plaint are the same as given by the Amin. It is admitted between the parties that the shop is no longer in existence and the property in suit is only in the shape of an open piece of land now. The trial court decreed the suit for possession with reference to the boundaries given at the foot of the plaint. In appeal, however, it was submitted that the land in question was not identifiable and, therefore, the trial court had erred in granting the decree. This contention of the defendant-appellant was repelled. In order to avoid any future complications, the lower appellate court while dismissing the appeal directed that the suit of the plaintiff for possession shall stand decreed with regard to the land shown by letters A.B.C. and D. in the Amin's map, which was directed to be made part of the decree. It is this amendment made in the decree of the trial court which is being assailed by the defendant-appellant. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the lower appellate court was not competent in exercise of its jurisdiction to alter the decree of the trial court as the plaintiff had not come up in appeal and he did not feel aggrieved by the decision of the trial court. He has further submitted that the court could not make such an amendment under the provisions of Order 41, R. 33 C.P.C.I do not agree. He has further submitted that the court could not make such an amendment under the provisions of Order 41, R. 33 C.P.C.I do not agree. Order 41 R. 33, C.P.C. as it stood at the relevant time was in the following terms: "The appellate court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection. Provided......." The powers of the appellate court under this Rule are very vide and have been designed to correct any mistake in the judgment or decree of the trial court so as to make it in conformity with law. The words "to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require" clearly signify that the powers of the appellate court are wide enough to pass a proper decree or order to find that the decree or order of the trial court may not suffer from any infirmity. This power has been specifically granted to the appellate court even in those cases where the respondents, may not have appealed or the appeal was filed by a party only against a part of the decree. The underlying principle behind this rule is that the appellate court should make an effort that an appropriate decree is passed to further the ends of justice. Mere technicalities, therefore, cannot come in the way of the court in finally adjudicating the rights of the parties in a proper manner. 4. The underlying principle behind this rule is that the appellate court should make an effort that an appropriate decree is passed to further the ends of justice. Mere technicalities, therefore, cannot come in the way of the court in finally adjudicating the rights of the parties in a proper manner. 4. In this connection reference was made to a decision of this court in the case of Shyam Lal v. Babu Lal (1971 All WR (HC) 22) wherein learned single Judge of this Court held that where the trial court rightly passed decree for ejectment, but by giving direction which is beyond jurisdiction made the decree un-executable, there is no reason why the appellate court should have refused to exercise its powers under Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C. merely on the ground that no appeal or cross-objection has been filed by the plaintiff. In that case the trial court had decreed the suit for ejectment but had further directed that the decree shall not be executed till the plaintiff gets the Bhumidhari Sanad issued to the defendant cancelled. The plaintiff did not file any objection but the defendant assailed the decree of the trial court in appeal. The appeal filed by the defendant was allowed solely on the ground that so long as the Bhumidhari Sanad in favour of the defendant was not cancelled the decree for ejectment could not stand. Aggrieved by this decision the plaintiff came up in second appeal before this Court and in those circumstances the appeal was allowed relying on the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C, Under Rule 33 of O. 41 power has been given to the lower appellate court to see that a correct decree or order is made by the trial court. It is true that normally if a party does not file any appeal or a cross-objection against the decree he cannot question the decree appealed against as a matter of right but it is the duty of the lower appellate court to see that the decree or order which has emerged on account of its decision should be one which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. This power of the appellate court, though discretionary, has to be exercised according to the well-recognised judicial principles. This power of the appellate court, though discretionary, has to be exercised according to the well-recognised judicial principles. In the present case we find that the lower appellate court has only tried to make the decree of the trial court more specific. In the plaint map no measurements were given and during the trial these measurements were provided in the shape of Amin's map prepared by him after visiting the spot. None of the parties filed objections against the same. The Amin's map, therefore, was a correct map of the spot situation and the same had not been disputed by either of the parties. In the appeal before the lower appellate court it was sought to be argued that the decree was un-executable because the land is unidentified. In view of this objection the lower appellate court thought it proper that while decreeing the plaintiff's suit on merits it must make the decree more specific so that the future complications may be avoided. These are precisely the circumstances under which the power granted to the court under Order 41, Rule 33, C. P. C. ought to be exercised. In view of this I do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The decision of the lower appellate court has not been challenged on any other ground. 5. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.