ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against two orders, one dated 14-9-1978 passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Saharanpur decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents for the ejectment of the petitioner from an accommodation, and the other dated 15-11-1978 passed by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, dismissing the petitioner's revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act filed against the former order. 2. The suit giving rise to this petition was filed by respondents Nos. 3 to 10, admittedly the owners and landlords of the accommodation in question for the ejectment of the petitioner on the assertion that in pursuance of the compromise reached between the parties in two suits, namely, Suit No. 478 of 1957 and Suit No. 71 of 1958, the petitioner had executed a rent note dated 3-12-1959 under which he was to hold the accommodation in dispute for a fixed period of ten years on a monthly rental of Rupees 25/-. The petitioner's tenancy had come to an end by efflux of time on 1-12-1969. The petitioners, however, did not hand over possession of the accommodation even after determination of his tenancy and, therefore, the suit for ejectment as well as for recovery of certain amount as damages for use and occupation. 3. The suit was contested by the petitioner inter alia, on the ground that it was barred by the provisions of S. 20 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, not being based on one or the other of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) thereof. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, relevant issues were framed by the trial court. One of the issues framed was whether the suit was barred by S. 20 (2) of the aforesaid Act. It is not necessary to refer to the other issues as the finding of the court below only on the above issue was challenged before me by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The trial court as well as the revisional court have answered that issue against the petitioner. 5. Both the courts below have held that the petitioner was a tenant for a fixed term and that his tenancy has come to an end by efflux of time. The trial court as well as the revisional court have answered that issue against the petitioner. 5. Both the courts below have held that the petitioner was a tenant for a fixed term and that his tenancy has come to an end by efflux of time. They have further held that Section 20 (2) of the aforesaid Act would not bar the suit inasmuch as the suit fell within the proviso to S. 20 (1) of the Act. The suit having been decreed by both the courts below, the petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing of the aforesaid orders. 6. The only point urged by Sri Jagdish Swarup, learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition was that on the facts of the present case the aforesaid proviso to S. 20 (1) was not attracted. His contention was that the said proviso applied only to a case where a fresh tenancy was brought into being for a fixed terms by or in pursuance of a compromise arrived at between the parties with reference to a suit, appeal, revision, or execution proceedings. 7. In order to appreciate the controversy, I may briefly set out the relevant facts. The petitioner was admittedly the tenant of the aforesaid respondents on a monthly rental of Rs. 40/- per month. The said respondents had earlier filed a Suit No. 478 of 1957 for the ejectment of the petitioner from the accommodation in question (barring a Kothri). The petitioner had also filed Suit No. 71 of 1958 against the said respondents for determination of the annual reasonable rent of the accommodation in question. These two suits and a third proceeding which had been launched by the said respondents against the petitioner in the court of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for the release of the aforesaid Kothri were also pending at the relevant time. All these proceedings were sought to be brought to an end by means of a compromise entered into between the parties on 3-12-1959. The substance of this compromise was that the petitioner recognised the said respondents as his landlords, and the landlords on their part agreed that the petitioner might continue in occupation of the accommodation in question for a period of ten years on a reduced rental of Rs. 25/- per month. The substance of this compromise was that the petitioner recognised the said respondents as his landlords, and the landlords on their part agreed that the petitioner might continue in occupation of the accommodation in question for a period of ten years on a reduced rental of Rs. 25/- per month. In pursuance of this compromise, the petitioner executed a rent note in favour of the said respondents where under the terms of the lease were set out a detail including that the tenancy of the petitioner would come to an end on 30-11-69. This period of ten years was to begin from 1st Dec, 1959. The rent note was subsequently registered. Upon the expiry of the terms of the lease, the aforesaid respondents demanded possession from the petitioner and on the latter's refusal to hand over possession, the present suit was brought 8. I may now reproduce the relevant statutory provision, namely, S. 20 (1): "20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified ground. (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or with the expiration of the notice to quit or in any other manner : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceedings which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant." 8A. The contention of the petitioner's Counsel was that the aforesaid proviso would be attracted only if a fresh tenancy is created by or in pursuance of the compromise or adjustment referred to therein. It was urged, relying on the terms of the compromise and of the rent note that the intention of the parties was that the tenancy was to continue even after the compromise, and that consequently, the said proviso would not be attracted. It was urged, relying on the terms of the compromise and of the rent note that the intention of the parties was that the tenancy was to continue even after the compromise, and that consequently, the said proviso would not be attracted. Learned Counsel laid particular emphasis on the recital in the compromise a true copy of which has been annexed to the counter-affidavit as Annexure "A" which reads as follows : " ,d fdjk;s ukek okLrs eq|r 10 lky 25 :i;s ekg okj dh nj ls fy[k fn;k gSA izfroknh bl fdjk; ukes okyh lEifRr ij igys ls dkfct gS vkSj dksbZ u;h fdjk;s nkjh 'kq: ugha dh tk jgh gSA flok; blds fd igys gLr fdjk;k bl lEifRr dk 40 :i;s ekgokj Fkk vkSj vc o jtkeUn QjhdSu eqcfyx 25 :i;k ekg okj dk fdjk;k gSA " 9. Emphasis was also laid by the learned Counsel on the recital in the rent note executed in pursuance of the compromise, a true copy whereof is Annexure "B" to the counter-affidavit to the effect that the tenancy was being created for a period of ten years beginning from 1st Dec., 1959 on a monthly rental of Rs. 25/- in continuation of the previous tenancy. 10. Having given the matter a careful thought, I find no substance in the submission of the petitioner's counsel. While it is true that both in the compromise as well as in the rent note itself executed by the petitioner in pursuance of the compromise, it has been recited that the rent note was being executed for a fixed term of ten years beginning from 1st Dec., 1959 in continuation of the previous tenancy, I have no doubt in my mind that the rent note executed by the petitioner clearly amounts to entering into a contract of tenancy by the petitioner for a fixed term in pursuance of the compromise referred to above within the meaning of the aforesaid proviso. Both the compromise as well as the rent note executed in pursuance thereof lay down terms which clearly amount to creation of a fresh contract of tenancy for a fixed period of ten years beginning from 1st Dec., 1959. The rent note contains all the material terms which go to constitute a contract of tenancy. Both the compromise as well as the rent note executed in pursuance thereof lay down terms which clearly amount to creation of a fresh contract of tenancy for a fixed period of ten years beginning from 1st Dec., 1959. The rent note contains all the material terms which go to constitute a contract of tenancy. It fixes the rent as well as the period for which the petitioner was being admitted as a tenant by the landlords. If the rent note contains terms which amount to a creation of a fresh tenancy, the fact that in the preamble of the rent note there is a reference that the contract was being entered into in continuation of the previous contract of tenancy, would not derogate from the legal effect and operation of the rent note as a contract of tenancy. It is obvious that the petitioner was entering into a fresh contract of tenancy for a fixed term in pursuance of the compromise. Furthermore both in the compromise as well as the rent note, the term of ten years has been stated to have begun from 1st Dec., 1959 showing that a new lease was being created in favour of the petitioner upon fresh terms with effect from that date. The view taken by the courts below, therefore, that the first proviso to S. 20 (1) of the Act was attracted to the case, is correct. 11. Moreover, it seems to me that the underlying purpose behind the enactment of the aforesaid proviso was to leave the compromise (under which the tenant was allowed to hold the building under tenancy for a fixed term) reached between the landlords and the tenants in a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceedings in a case where the compromise or adjustment is duly recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant, undisturbed. The basic idea seems to have been to respect the sanctity of such a compromise or adjustment. It appears that the legislative intent was that if the tenant had agreed as part of a compromise or adjustment in a suit to remain in occupation of the building under tenancy for a certain number of years, it would be unfair and unjust to enable the tenant to undo the compromise after he has enjoyed in full the advantage conferred upon him thereunder. Keeping this intention of the Legislature in mind, it appears to me that the proviso would be attracted even to a case where the defendant was in occupation of the building under an existing tenancy from before the compromise or adjustment, but who is allowed to continue thereafter in pursuance of the compromise under a fresh rent note or a contract of tenancy executed by the tenant for a fixed term. Viewed from this angle also, I am clearly of the view that the proviso became attracted to the facts of the present case upon its plain terms in view of the rent note executed by the petitioner for a fixed term in pursuance of the aforesaid compromise. 12. In view of what has been stated above, I find no substance in the only argument advanced in support of this petition. 13. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 14. The execution of the decree under challenge is, however, stayed for a period of three months from today. The petitioner shall hand over vacant possession of the accommodation in dispute to the plaintiffs-respondents within this period. The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly induct any other person into possession of the accommodation.