JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J. - The petitioner, Glaxo Laboratories (India), Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the company), is a public limited company and has its registered office at Bombay with one of its factories situate at Aligarh in the State of Utter Pradesh. The factory is registered under the Factories Act, 1948, and is engaged in the production of food products. It has its standing orders certified under the provisions of the industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Respondent 2, B. L. Bashambhoo is a workman employed in the petitioner's establishment at Aligarh. On 6 June 1977, he was served with a charge. sheet. In the charge-sheet it was alleged that on 27 May 1977, some of the loyal workmen reported for work even though an illegal strike sponsored by the Glaxo Staff Association, a union of workmen of the petitioner's factory at Aligarh was continuing. At about 5.35 PM. on that date when those loyal workmen boarded the chartered bus of the company after working hours to go back to the town, the charged workman along with other workmen also unauthorizedly got on to the bus though he was on illegal strike. As soon as the bus started, Bashambhoo alongwith certain workmen named in the charge-sheet started abusing the loyal workmen sitting in the bus and when it reached Anupshahr-Aligarh Road, Bashambhoo along with the workmen nominated in the charge-sheet started beating some of the loyal workmen with shoes, chappal and sticks. The loyal workmen thus treated had reported that when the chartered bus reached the approach road to the Central Dairy Farm it was stopped and they were pushed out of it were further assaulted by Bashambhoo and the others on strike under Bashambhoo's Instigation. During the course of the assault, it was alleged, some of them were deprived of their watches, gold-rings as well as cash. After the loyal workmen had been assaulted and battered mercilessly, they were forced to promise that they would not go to work during the period of strike and threats were held out to them that if they did so they and the members of their families would be murdered. in Para. 3 of the charge-sheet it was stated that Bashambhoo's actions as stated above if established would amount to misconduct as per Sub-cls. (10), (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders. in Para. 3 of the charge-sheet it was stated that Bashambhoo's actions as stated above if established would amount to misconduct as per Sub-cls. (10), (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders. The charge-sheet contained an intimation to the effect that Sri S. K.S Gupta who had been appointed enquiry officer would conduct an enquiry against Bashambhoo on 20 June 1977, at 2. 30 P. M. and he was required to attend and remain present thereat. By means of that very notice Bashambhoo was suspended from service. 2. Respondent 2, Bashambhoo, thereupon filed an application, dated 24 June -1977, before the Labour Court, Meerut, purporting to be under S. 11C of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In which it was prayed that the Court be pleased to decide the question and/ or application of various clauses of the certified standing orders of the company. The Labour Court framed as many as eight issues which according to it arose for decision as a consequence of the application made by Bashambhoo and the written statements exchanged between the parties. Issues (3) to (5) and (8) with which we are concerned in this petition were: "(3) To what relief, if any, is the applicant entitled ? (4) Can the opposite party take disciplinary action against the applicant for acts of misconduct, said to have been committed at the places, referred to in the charge-sheet issued to him ? (5) Whether the point, where the bus in question is said to have started, is part of the premises of the opposite party or is situated in the vicinity of the aforesaid premises ? * * * (8) Is the place, where the bus is said to have started, situated on the public road?" Before we state the findings arrived at by the Labour Court on these issues, Sub-cls. (10), (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 of the certified standing orders of the company which came up for interpretation before the Labour Court may be usefully quoted: " 22. (10), (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 of the certified standing orders of the company which came up for interpretation before the Labour Court may be usefully quoted: " 22. The following acts or omissions will be treated as misconduct: * * * (10) Drunkenness, fighting, indecent or disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees, or conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace or conduct endangering the life or safety of any other person, assault or threat of assault, any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude, committed within the premises of the establishment, or in the vicinity thereof. Note : The existing language of this clause is retained as the elected representatives of workmen were agreeable to it. * * * (16) Conduct of a workman singly or in combination with others endangering the lives or the safety of other workmen or endangering the safety of the company's premises, machinery or equipment. Note : The language of this clause was agreeable to the elected representatives of workmen. Hence it may be retained. * * * (30) Being rude towards officers, employees, customers of and visitors to the company. Note : The language of this clause was agreeable to the elected representatives of workmen. Hence it is retained." Issues (4), (5) and (f) were decided together by the Labour Court. It was held that the place from where the bus is said to have started on 27 May 1977, was not situate at any public road and was part of the premises of the opposite party. The Labour Court held that it had not been disputed before it on behalf of the employees that in case the place from which the bus is said to have started according to the employer's version was part of the premises of the opposite party, the opposite party could take disciplinary action against the applicant for acts of misconduct said to have been committed at the time when the bus was standing at the place referred to above as well as at the time when it started under Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders of the employer's concern. While considering the question as to whether the allegations made against Bashambhoo in the charge-sheet amounted to misconduct within the meaning of Cl. 22, Sub-cls. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders of the employer's concern. While considering the question as to whether the allegations made against Bashambhoo in the charge-sheet amounted to misconduct within the meaning of Cl. 22, Sub-cls. (10), the Labour Court held as under:- " The contention on behalf of the employers was that the words `committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof, relate only to an act, involving moral turpitude, and that action could be taken under Sub-cl. (10) in respect of any act mentioned therein which did not involve any moral turpitude, even if it was committed beyond the vicinity of the premises. If this argument is accepted, drunkenness, fighting, indecent or disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace, conduct endangering the life or safety of any other person, assault or threat of assault, indulged in or committed anywhere would be acts of misconduct. Drunkenness at any place outside the vicinity of the premises of the establishment would not affect the working of the employer's concern in any way. Similarly, if a workman fights with a person, who is not an employee of the concern, beyond the vicinity of the factory or uses abusive language towards such a person or is guilty of indecent or disorderly behaviour or conduct, likely to cause a breach of the peace or conduct endangering the life or safety of any other person, who is not an employee of the concern, or assault, or threat to assault any such person beyond the vicinity of the premises of the concern, his conduct would not affect the working of the concern in any manner. in the circumstances, there is no reason for limiting the application of the words 'committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof' to any act, involving moral turpitude. in the circumstances, there is no reason for limiting the application of the words 'committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof' to any act, involving moral turpitude. It is true that the use of the word 'committed' with reference to drunkenness, fighting, indecent or dis- orderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees and conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace or conduct endangering the life or safety of any other person is not appropriate but that is not a sufficient reason for ignoring the fact that the employers could not have reasonably Intended that acts, which had no concern at all with the work in the establishment should amount to misconduct. In the circumstances, I think that the words ' committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof' should be taken to refer to all the acts, mentioned in Sub-cl. (10) even though by doing so the language of Sub-cl. (10) appears to be inappropriate. It is common ground that the places on the Anupshahr-Aligarh Road and the approach road to the Central Dairy Farm, where the acts of misconduct are said to have been committed by the workman concerned, are not within the premises of the establishment of the employers or in the vicinity thereof. Consequent, the employers cannot take any disciplinary action with regard to those acts under Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders." While considering the question as to whether the acts attributed to Bashambhoo amounted to misconduct within the meaning of Sub-cls. Consequent, the employers cannot take any disciplinary action with regard to those acts under Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders." While considering the question as to whether the acts attributed to Bashambhoo amounted to misconduct within the meaning of Sub-cls. (16) and (30) of Cl.22 of the standing orders, the Labour Court held that: " There is nothing in either of the clauses to indicate that any act done outside the premises of the establishment would amount to misconduct." In the result giving its finding on issue (3) as extracted above, the Labour Court held that:- " The opposite party can charge-sheet and take disciplinary action against the applicant for misconduct at the place where the bus is said to have been standing and from where it is said to have started and it cannot charge-sheet and take disciplinary action against the applicant for misconduct, said to have been committed when the bus is said to have reached the Anupshahr- Aligarh Road or the approach road to the Central Dairy Farm." Aggrieved by the decision of the Labour Court with regard to the application and interpretation of Sub-cls. (10), (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 of its certified standing orders, the petitioner has moved this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and has prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Labour Court, Meerut, dated 18 May 1979, in as far as it held that the charge-sheet for acts which had happened on Anupshahr-Aligarh Road is outside the purview of the standing orders. 3. 3. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel who has put in appearance on behalf of the union, which was impleaded as a party at its own instance, has raised a number of preliminary objections, inter alia, that the order passed by the Labour Court under challenge is one passed under S. 11C of the Act and since an industrial dispute with regard to matters including the question as to whether a workman of the factory could be punished for misconduct of the character alleged to have been indulged in by Bashambhoo is pending in a reference under S. 4K of the Act, it is open to the petitioner to challenge the correctness of the interpretation given by the Labour Court in proceedings under section 1IC and consequently this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution need not interfere. It was urged that the order under S. 11C of the Act does not bind the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court under S. 4K of the Act and by itself has no impact on the rights of the parties. It was further contended that the Interpretation placed on Sub-cls. (10), (16) and (30) of Cl 22 of the standing orders by the Labour Court was a reasonable one and consequently there was no error apparent on the face of the record attracting the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution assuming that we are inclined to take a different view of the scope of those provisions of the standing orders of the petitioner-company. In the view we propose to take with regard to the scope and interpretation of the clauses of the standing orders which came up for consideration before the Labour Court, we are not inclined to dispose of this petition on the basis of the preliminary objections raised. 4. Sri Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously contended that while interpreting Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders, the Labour Court had completely misdirected Itself. 4. Sri Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously contended that while interpreting Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders, the Labour Court had completely misdirected Itself. it was urged that drunkenness, fighting, indecent or disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees, or conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace or conduct endangering the life or safety of any other person, assault or threat of assault were not acts and hence the word "committed" could not be grammatically or appropriately used in relation to conduct of the nature enumerated in the earlier part of Sub-cl. (10) and the Labour Court had committed a patent error of law in holding that such conduct to amount to misconduct must be committed within the premises of the establishment or the precincts thereof. According to the learned counsel, the phrase "committed within the premises of the establishment, or in the vicinity thereof " was application only to acti mentioned in the concluding portion of Sub cl. (10) of Cl. 22. The contention raised by the learned counsel was that the words "committed within the premises of the establishment, or in the vicinity thereof" applied only to any "act subversive of discipline and efficiency" and "any act Involving moral turpitude." Drunkenness, fighting, etc., amounted to misconduct within the meaning of the sub. clause irrespective of the situs where they were indulged in provided they had a reasonable and rational nexus with the working of the establishment. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied mainly on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Tata Oil Mills Company, Ltd. v. Workmen, (A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 155), Munchandani Electrical and Radio Industries, Ltd. v. Its workmen, (1975-I L. L. N. 269), and Lalla Ram v. D. C. M. Chemical Works, Ltd. and another, (1978-II L. L. N. 1), We shall comment upon these decisions presently but we first propose to interpret Cl. 22 uncumbered by any decisions cited since none of them had occasion to consider an identical clause in any standing order. 5. We agree that in Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 the word "committed" must be held to govern only "an act subversive of discipline and efficiency" and "any act involving moral turpitude" and does not apply to conduct of the character mentioned in the earlier part of Sub-cl. (10). 5. We agree that in Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 the word "committed" must be held to govern only "an act subversive of discipline and efficiency" and "any act involving moral turpitude" and does not apply to conduct of the character mentioned in the earlier part of Sub-cl. (10). Sub-clause (10), it may be noticed, mentions not only acts but also conduct of various character. We are, however, of the view that the words "within the premises of the establishment, or in the vicinity thereof" apply not only to the acts mentioned in the sub-clause but also to conduct like drunkenness, etc. We are inclined to the view that Sub-cl. (10) should be appropriately read as follows : " Drunkenness, fighting, indecent or disorderly behaviour, use of abusive language, wrongfully interfering with the work of other employees, or conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace conduct endangering the life or safety of any other parson, assault or threat of assault within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof, any act subversive of discipline and efficiency and any act involving moral turpitude committed within the premises of the establishment, or in the vicinity thereof. " Read thus, the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court with regard to the scope and application of Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 is, in our opinion, correct and in any case not unreasonable. The punctuations occurring in the sub-clause need not deter us from reading it as above. See Aswini Kumar v. Arbinda Bose, (A.I.R. 1952 S. C. 369). Acts subversive of discipline and efficiency even if committed beyond the premises of the establishment and beyond the vicinity thereof are also capable of having grave and adverse effects on the working of the establishment and there seems no rational justification for it having been provided that such acts in order to amount to misconduct must be committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof while conduct of the nature mentioned in the earlier part of Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 would become misconduct irrespective of the place of their performance if they have repercussions on the working of the establishment. 6. (10) of Cl. 22 would become misconduct irrespective of the place of their performance if they have repercussions on the working of the establishment. 6. Rule 18, the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946, imposes a duty on employers to post not only a copy of its certified standing orders in English but also in Hindi on a notice-board maintained at or near the main entrance to the establishment in a legible condition. These rules have been framed in exercise of powers under S. 15 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. During the hearing of this petition a printed booklet containing the Hindi version of the standing orders of the petitioner-company was placed before us by the learned counsel representing the respondents. Its authenticity has not been challenged before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is this Hindi version of the standing orders of the company which evidently must have been placed on the notice board of the establish. went in compliance with rule 18. Sub- clause (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders in the Hindi version of the booklet is in following terms :- [Matter in Hindi not printed] In our view Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders of the company in English by itself is clear and unambiguous and acts and conduct of the nature mentioned therein amount to misconduct within the meaning of that sub-clause only if committed or performed within the promises of the establishment or within the precincts thereof. Nonetheless, assuming that there is any ambiguity therein it stands resolved by the clear terms in which the Hindi translation of the sub-clause is worded. Nonetheless, assuming that there is any ambiguity therein it stands resolved by the clear terms in which the Hindi translation of the sub-clause is worded. In Mata Badal Pandey v. Board of Revenue, (Second Appeal No. 622 of 1965), a Full Bench of three Judges referred for its opinion to a larger Bench the following question :- " Whether it will be a sound rule of interpretation or construction of statutes that if there appears to be some doubt or ambiguity in the authorised text in English language of an Act enacted in Hindi by the Legislature of Uttar Pradesh, then for resolving the ambiguity or doubt and for ascertaining the correct meaning thereof, reference can be made to the corresponding Hindi text and reliance placed thereon ?" A Full Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court by a majority opinion answered the question in the following manner "We are, therefore, of opinion that where there is some doubt or ambiguity in any provision in the authoritative English text, it is permissible to look into the Hindi text to remove the doubt or ambiguity." The Full Bench of seven Judges placed reliance on the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in J. K. Jute Mills Company, Ltd. v State of Uttar Pradesh and another, [A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 1534], which had accorded approval to an earlier decision of this Court in Haji Lal Mohammad Bidi Works, Meerganj, A1lahabad, and others v. Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad, (A.I.R. 1959 All. 208). seems no justification in our view not to apply the above ruse of interpretation to certified staing orders framed according to the requirements of an enactment. The Hindi version of the English text is a contemporaneous exposition thereof by the employer itself. In D.B Gupta v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association, Ltd., (A.I.R. 1979 S. C. 1049), the Supreme Court was called upon to intrepret a proviso to a notification issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred on it by Sub-sec. (1) of S. 16 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. On the construction of the proviso, counsel for the respondent, invited the Court's attention to two documents on record which had come into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification explaining the manner in which the proviso was to be interpreted. (1) of S. 16 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. On the construction of the proviso, counsel for the respondent, invited the Court's attention to two documents on record which had come into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification explaining the manner in which the proviso was to be interpreted. One was a press statement or press note issued by the Finance Ministry immediately upon the issuance of the notification and the other was a letter, dated 28 June 1969, addressed by the Joint Director to the Government and in response to a communication addressed by appellant 2 before the Supreme Court requesting the respondent to seek clarification from the Government on the points raised by him. The Supreme Court observed as follows: " It may be stated that it was not disputed before us that these two documents which came into existence almost simultaneously with the issuance of the notification could be looked at fox finding out the true intention of the Government in issuing the notification in question, particularly in regard to the manner in which outstanding transactions were to be closed or liquidated. The principle of contemporanea expositor (interpreting a statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction." In support of the above statement the Supreme Court placed reliance on passages occurring to Maxwell, 12th Edn., Page 268 and in Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 Edo.), Para. 219. For the reasons given, we are clearly of the view that the scope of Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 has been rightly construed by the Labour Court, though our reasons are slightly different. 7. Sub-clauses (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders also have, in our judgment, been correctly interpreted by the Labour Court. Sri Shansi Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that while some of the sub-caluses of Cl. 22 specifically mention that acts and conduct of the nature mentioned therein would be misconduct only if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof, Sub-cls. Sri Shansi Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that while some of the sub-caluses of Cl. 22 specifically mention that acts and conduct of the nature mentioned therein would be misconduct only if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof, Sub-cls. (16) and (30) contained no such limitations with regard to the situs of conduct of the description mentioned in these sub- clauses and consequently there is no occasion for placing any such Inhibitions on the scope or sweep thereof, it is true that the words "within the premises of the establishment or the vicinity thereof " do not occur in Sub- cls. (16) or Sub-cl. (30). There is, however, in our opinion, intrinsic evidence in them to show that the acts or conduct mentioned in them were meant to be treated as misconduct only if committed or performed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. The safety of the company's premises cannot evidently be endangered outside the premises of the company. it is conceivable that the machinery or equipment of the company may sometimes, while on the move be outside the premises of the establishment and beyond the vicinity thereof, but in such cases if a workman endangers their safety, in our opinion, he must be employed as a workman at that time. if a workman, while not so employed and beyond his working hours when he is not so functioning endangers the safety of the machinery or equipment, he cannot be described as a workman whose conduct has endangered the machinery or re-equipment of the company. We do not think it would be reasonable to hold that Sub-cl. (16) would apply even to conduct of workmen when they are not employed as workmen. The conduct of a workman singly or in combination with others endangering the life and safety of other workmen must be conduct while he is engaged as a workman and not otherwise. 8. We must bear in mind that the object of the Act is only to ensure that employers frame standing orders defining" sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen under them. " The Act does not envisage empowering the employers to regulate the manners or morals of workmen otherwise than as workmen. " The Act does not envisage empowering the employers to regulate the manners or morals of workmen otherwise than as workmen. The standing order defines what amounts to misconduct and such conduct lays open the workmen to penal consequences. The Act is an Instance of welfare legislation and it strikes us that if a clause of the standing order defining misconduct is ambiguous and lacking in sufficient precision, the doubt must be resolved in favour of workmen since it is an under-privileged class. See K. C. P. Employees' Association, Madras v. K. C. P, Ltd, and others, (A.I.R. 1971 S. C. 474). 9. Similarly, we are of the opinion that Sub-cl. (30) envisages rudeness by a workman towards his offices, employees, customers and visitors to the company while the officers, employees and customers or visitors to the company are functioning as officers, employees, customers or visitors. It would not be, in our opinion, reasonable to hold that it was contemplated that even after a visitor had left the premises of the company and can no longer be described as such if he behaved rudely with a workman outside his duty hours, it would amount to misconduct by him as a workman within the meaning of Sub-Cl. (30). The officers, employees and customers of the company must be occupying such status at the time when rudeness is offered and so also the workman must be fundctioning in such capacity to attract Sub-cls (30). A close analysis of various sub-clauses of Cl. 22 discloses that all acts or conduct covered by them are such which would apply only either when committed or performed within the premises of the establishment or precincts thereof or committed by it workman while functioning as such or in relation to conduct attributed to him in. relation to his duties as a workman. Some of the extreme cases are to be found in Sub-cls (6) ant (21) of Cl. 22. Sub-clause (6) is concerned with " demanding, accepting or offering bribes or any illegal gratification." It is evident that demanding or accepting or offering bribes or illegal gratification would usually be committed outside the premises of the establishment and beyond its precincts. Nonetheless, they would invariably be directly connected with the position of the workman concerned as a workman and in relation to his duties. Similarly, under Sub-cl. Nonetheless, they would invariably be directly connected with the position of the workman concerned as a workman and in relation to his duties. Similarly, under Sub-cl. (21) which characterises as misconduct : "disclosure to any unauthorized person or persons any information in regard to the working or process of the establishment which comes into the possession of a worker during the course of his work " is clearly concerned with the workman's functions as a workman. The allegations against Bashambhoo were not that he committed the acts attributed to him while he was engaged as a workman. They were done, assuming the allegations are correct while he was on strike and in any case they were done admittedly when the factory had closed work and the other workmen affected were beyond the promises of the establishment as well as precincts thereof on their way home after the duty hours were over. 10. We shall now next refer to some of the decisions on which counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in support of his contention with regard to the applicability and interpretation of the three sub-clauses of Cl. 22h. 11. The relevant facts giving rise to the decision in Tata Oil Mills Company, Ltd. v. Workmen, (A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 155) (vide supra), on which considerable reliance was placed by Sri Shanti Bhushan were that K. K. Raghavan, an employee of the appellant before the Supreme Court, was dismissed by the company with effect from 14 November 1955. The allegation against Raghavan was that on 12 November 1955, he and another employee of the appellant named Mathews waylaid Augustine, the charge man of the soap plant of the company's factory at Tatapuram while he was returning home after his duty in the second shift and assaulted him. At that time an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its employees and so the appellant applied to the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the dismissal of Raghavan and others. The Tribunal approved the dismissal of Raghavan but did not accord approval to the dismissal of Mathews. Not satisfied with the order, the respondent-workman raised an Industrial dispute in regard to the propriety and validity of the dismissal of Raghavan. A reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudicating upon the dispute. The Tribunal approved the dismissal of Raghavan but did not accord approval to the dismissal of Mathews. Not satisfied with the order, the respondent-workman raised an Industrial dispute in regard to the propriety and validity of the dismissal of Raghavan. A reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudicating upon the dispute. The Tribunal held that the facts proved against Raghavan did not attract Cl 22 (viii) of the standing orders of the appellant. The standing order provided that without prejudice to the general meaning of the term "misconduct," it shall be deemed to mean and include, inter alia, drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour within or without the factory. (Emphasis supplied). It was common ground that the alleged assault took place outside the factory, and, in fact, at a considerable distance from it. The Tribunal held that the assault in question could be treated as a purely private matter between Raghavan and Augustine with which the appellant was not concerned and as a result of which standing order 22 (viii) could not be invoked against Raghavan. The employers went up in appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of the Tribunal. It was urged by the counsel representing the respondent before the Supreme Court that in construing the standing order of the character in question, care must be taken to see that a dispute of a purely private or individual type was not brought within its scope. It was contended that it would be unreasonable to include within standing order 22 (viii) any riotous behaviour without the factory which was the result of a purely private and individual dispute and in curse of which tempers of both the contestants became hot. It was conceded that in order that standing order 22 (viii) be attracted, the appellant should be able to show that the disorderly or riotous behaviour had some rational connexion with the employment of the assailant and the victim. The Supreme Court reversed the finding recorded by they Tribunal and held that in the case before it, it was quite clear that the assault committed by Raghavan on Augustine was not a purely private or individual affair. The Supreme Court noticed that the assault on Augustine had been committed by Raghavan because Augustine was in favour of introduction of incentive bonus scheme which was opposed by a set of workmen, including Raghavan. The Supreme Court noticed that the assault on Augustine had been committed by Raghavan because Augustine was in favour of introduction of incentive bonus scheme which was opposed by a set of workmen, including Raghavan. It may be noticed here that the standing order which the Supreme Court was called upon to construe specifically used the words "within or without" the factory. 12. The Supreme Court agreed that the words "without the factory" must be read as act of the nature mentioned in standing order 22 (viii) and would amount to misconduct only if they had nexus with the employment of the charged workman as a workman, and the working of the employer. In that case, the situs of the conduct to be treated as misconduct was not circumscribed as has been done in Sub-cl. (10) of Cl. 22 of the standing orders with which we are concerned. The decision in Taro Oil Mills Company, Ltd case [A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 1551 (vide supra), clearly, in our view, has no relevance as far as the case before us is concerned. 13. In Munchandani Electrical and Radio Industries, Ltd. v. Its Workmen [1975-I L. L. N. 269 (vide supra), to which our attention was invited by the learned counsel, the Supreme Court interpreted standing order 24 (1) of the certified standing orders of the appellant before it which, as would appear from the judgment as reported, were in the following terms: " 24. The following acts and omissions on the part of a workman shall amount to misconduct: (1) Commission of any act subversive of discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment. " The question before the Supreme Court arose in the circumstances that on 30 December 1970, one Ashok Bhambani, who was an operator employed in the company's factory was alleged to have threatened a charge-hand, Ramesh Thadani, with assault because Ramesh Thadani had reported against another operator who was consequently removed from service. According to the management, Ashok Bhamban followed up his threat by actually assaulting Ramesh Thadani at about 5.30 P.m. that very day in the train between Thana and Mulund when Ramesh Thadani was on his way home after the day's work. According to the management, Ashok Bhamban followed up his threat by actually assaulting Ramesh Thadani at about 5.30 P.m. that very day in the train between Thana and Mulund when Ramesh Thadani was on his way home after the day's work. The Labour Court held that the alleged assault did not amount to misconduct under standing order 24 (1) which, it held, was restricted to acts and omissions inside the premises of the establishment. The Supreme Court reversed this view and held that: "On a plain reading of the clause, the words 'within the premises or precinct of the establishment' refer not to the place where the act which is subversive of discipline or good behaviour is committed but where the consequence of such an act manifests itself. In other words, an act, wherever committed, if it has the effect of subverting discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment will amount to misconduct under starving order 24 (1)." Thus in the view of the Supreme Court, the words "within the premises or precincts of the establishment" governed not the word "commission of an act" but the phrase "in subversion of discipline or good behaviour." Sub-clauses (10), (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 are entirely differently worded and consequently the above mentioned decision of the Supreme Court, in our opinion, has no application to the facts of the case before us. 14. The facts leading up to the decision in Lalla Ram v. D. C. M. Chemical Work, Ltd., (1978-II L. L. N. 1], (ride supra), on which also learned counsel for the petitioner relied were that behind the premises situate on Najafgarh Road, Delhi, of respondent 1, the Delhi Cloth Mills Chemical Works, Ltd., which was a unit of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company, Ltd., there was a plot of land, ownership whereof had been transferred in favour of the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company, Ltd. The plot being adjacent to the premises of respondent 1 the same was being looked after by the management of the respondent which also had constructed some quarters for its employees. There was also some jhuggies (hutment's) standing on the land in which lived 172 families out of which seventy were of the employees of respondent 1, and the rest were of some outsiders. There was also some jhuggies (hutment's) standing on the land in which lived 172 families out of which seventy were of the employees of respondent 1, and the rest were of some outsiders. The appellant before the Supreme Court Lalla Ram was the president of the Jhuggi Jhonpuri Sudhar Sabha. He and a few other jhuggi dwellers brought a suit in the Court of the Sub-Judge, First Class, Delhi, for injunction restraining the company and respondent 1 from constructing the boundary wall and from evicting them from the joggle. On the basis of a voluntary statement made on behalf of the company that it would not evict the appellant and his co. plaintiffs except by due process of law, the Sub-Judge had issued a temporary injunction restraining the company and respondent 1 from evicting the appellant and his co- plaintiffs except by due process of law but refused their prayer for injunction restraining the company and respondent from building the boundary wall. On appeal, the order had been maintained. The company had employed a security force to protect further encroachments on the plot of land under its management and in the ownership of the Delhi Cloth Mills. On 2 March 1968, Shyam Singh, assistant security officer of respondent 1, received a report from sentry Dharam Singh alleging that one Sheo Ram had started making unauthorized construction on the aforesaid plot. In the discharge of his official duty of preventing encroachment and unauthorized constructions on the immovable property belonging to the company, Shyam Singh proceeded to the spot accompanied by two members of his staff to investigate the matter. On reaching the spot and finding Sheo Ram constructing a new jhuggi in front of his existing jhuggi, Shyam Singh pleaded with the former and asked him to desist from constructing the new jhuggi. While he was so engaged, the appellant, who was an employee of respondent 1, made his appearance along with eight others and adopted a very aggressive attitude intervening on behalf of Shyam Singh. He was also alleged to have manhandled and hurled provocative invectives at him and his companions and bade them to quit on pain of dire consequences. While he was so engaged, the appellant, who was an employee of respondent 1, made his appearance along with eight others and adopted a very aggressive attitude intervening on behalf of Shyam Singh. He was also alleged to have manhandled and hurled provocative invectives at him and his companions and bade them to quit on pain of dire consequences. Unnerved by the threats held out by the appellant, Shyam Singh left the place along with his security personnel and hastened to make a report of the incident to his immediate superior which led to the suspension of the appellant and issuance to him of a notice by the general manager of respondent 1 calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed for his aforesaid misbehaviour towards and attempt to assault Shyam Singh who was discharging his official duties which were acts subversive of discipline within the meaning of standing order 27 (1) of the appellant. The appellant submitted his explanation denying the charges levelled against him and questioning the authority of the respondent to charge-sheet him in respect of an incident which was purely private. On completion of the enquiry in accordance with the standing orders, the enquiry officer submitted a report against the appellant. The conclusion of the enquiry officer was that Lalla Ram committed the acts alleged against him, viz., obstructing the assistant security officer in the discharge of his duty and threatened him and caught hold of him by band and thereby committed acts subversive of discipline, a misconduct under standing order 27 (1). Accepting the report, the general manager of respondent 1 passed an order dismissing the appellant from service. Since an industrial dispute was pending, the general manager directed the appellant to take his final dues together with one month's pay in lieu of notice and made an application on the same day to the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, seeking its approval of the order of the appellant's dismissal as required by S. 33(2) (b) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, refused to accord its approval to the appellant's dismissal on the ground that the disciplinary action taken against the appellant was misconceived since there was no rational connexion between the employment of the appellant and Shyam Singh in regard to the affairs of the D. C. M. Chemical Works and standing order 27 (i) was not attracted to the case which was really one of a civil dispute between the company and jhuggi dwellers who were long being pressurised to surrender to possession of the area to the company and the machinery of security staff of D. C. M. Chemical Works was pressed into service for that purpose. Aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Tribunal, respondent i, moved the High Court, Delhi, under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court allowed the petition holding that since there v,as a clear finding by the enquiry officer about the existence of rational connexion between the aforesaid incident and the duties of Shyam Singh and there was nothing in the order of the Tribunal to show that the enquiry officer had arrived at that finding without any evidence, it was not open to the Tribunal to come to a different conclusion on the facts or to hold that it was a case of victimisation and then to refuse Its approval. The High Court quashed the order of the Tribunal and directed it to consider the aforesaid application of respondent in the light of its judgment. Lalla Ram appealed against the judgment of the High Court. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that since the quarrel between the appellant and Shyam Singh was purely private and the misconduct attributed to the appellant had no rational connexion with his employment and that of Shyam Singh the dismissal of the appellant under standing order 27 (i) was not valid and legal and the Tribunal was well within its authority to refuse to accord Its approval to the action taken by the management of respondent in dismissing the appellant. The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal took into account the factors referred to above and held that a strong prima facie case had been made out against the appellant and it was difficult, in the circumstances, to understand how the Industrial Tribunal could legitimately ignore the bona fide findings of the enquiry officer which it had itself endorsed. The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal took into account the factors referred to above and held that a strong prima facie case had been made out against the appellant and it was difficult, in the circumstances, to understand how the Industrial Tribunal could legitimately ignore the bona fide findings of the enquiry officer which it had itself endorsed. Standing order 27(1) which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court is not quoted in the judgment as reported. The Supreme Court noticed that the enquiry officer had, after a regular enquiry properly made according to the requirements of the standing orders and principles of natural justice, come to a categoric and bona fide conclusion that the appellant had obstructed Shyam Singh in the execution of his legitimate official duties of protecting the immovable property of the company and preventing its improper and unauthorized use by abusing, threatening and roughly handling him and thereby committed misconduct as contemplated by standing order 27(i). The Supreme Court noticed that the misconduct for which the disciplinary action was taken against the appellant was undoubtedly directed against Shyam Singh to prevent him from investigating into a matter relating to immovable property belonging to the company which he was bound to protect in the discharge of the duties which devolved upon him as a security officer. On this finding, the Supreme Court upheld the view taken by the High Court. It is noticeable that the appellant was a workman of the company residing on premises belonging to the company and had obstructed an employee of the company while he was discharging his official duties as such. The appellant was also a subordinate of Shyam Singh as would appear from the judgment reported. We fail to see how this judgment is of any assistance to the petitioner. 15. For the reasons given above, we, as already stated, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court with regard to the Interpretation and applicability of the sub-clauses of Cl. 22 of the standing orders. 16.On behalf of the petitioner, it was further contended that the standing orders are not exhaustive and, therefore, the Labour Court was wrong in holding that Bashambhoo could not be charge-sheeted for the acts alleged to have been committed by him. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors, Ltd., (1976-II L. L. N 304). In support of his contention, he placed reliance on Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors, Ltd., (1976-II L. L. N 304). Whether the standing orders in question are exhaustive or not will depend on the terms thereof. In Para. 22 of the decisions by the learned counsel, the Supreme Court itself observed at page 309 that : " .. Ordinarily the standing orders may limit the concept but not invariably so." In any event this question does1 note arise in the present case. As would appear from the cbarge-sheet, a copy of which has been annexed to the petition, the petitioner clearly charged Bashambhoo of misconduct as set out in Sub-cls. (10), (16) and (30) of Cl. 22 of its certified standing orders which have been quoted therein. In any case, the view taken by the Labour Court with regard to the interpretation and applicability of the standing orders is very reasonable and un questionably plausible. There is no error of law apparent on the face of the record in the impugned order. Merely because it might have been possible for this Court to take a different view of the scope of the relevant provisions of the standing orders, there is no justification for interference. See Agnani (W. M.) v. Badri Das and others, (1963 - I L. L. J. 684), and Satyararayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Malikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale (A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 137). 17. For the reasons given, we find no merit in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed with costs to the contesting respondents who were represented by Sri K. P. Agrawal and Sri S.S. that nagar, advocates. Interim orders, if any, are hereby vacated.