JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is plaintiff's second appeal. The allegations made in the plaint were that one Ram Chandra was Sirdar of the land in dispute. He entered into an agreement of sale of his land in favour of the plaintiffs on 5-8-1967 and a sum of Rs. 1000/- was paid to him as an advance. A period of four months was agreed upon within which the plaintiffs were entitled to have the sale deed executed in their favour after payment of a total consolidation of Rs. 5000/-. Between 5-8-1967 and 5-11-1967, further sum of Rs. 25000/- is alleged to have been paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant on various dates. Thereafter on 6-11-1967 another sum of Rs. 500/- was paid by the plaintiff to Ram Chandra and he then acquired Bhumidhari rights in respect of his Sirdari land in dispute. On that very date, a draft of the sale deed on a stamp paper was prepared and was duly signed by Ram Chandra. However, he was prevailed upon his sister Smt. Ram Katori and her son who prevented him from going to the registration office and getting the sale deed registered. In the circumstances, on 25-11-1967, the plaintiff applied for registration of the sale deed. The sub-registrar issued notice to Ram Chandra for appearance on 30-12-1967 to have the sale deed registered. The summons sent by the sub-registrar for this purpose came back unserved with an endorsement that Ram Chandra had died. On the date fixed Smt. Ram Katori and her son, however, appeared before the sub-registrar and filed an affidavit which is paper No. 103-C on the record contending that Ram Chandra had never executed any sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and that it was a forged document. In the circumstances the sub-registrar refused to register the sale deed on 30-12-1967. The plaintiffs did not apply before the sub-registrar to have notices issued to the legal representatives of Ram Chandra and to compel registration by them. On the contrary, an appeal was filed before the Registrar on 31-1-1968 which was also rejected on 28-9-1968 as being not maintainable. Subsequent thereto the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 19-10-1968 for the relief of getting the sale deed dated 6-11-1967 duly registered by the defendants basing his claim on the fact that Ram Chandra had executed an agreement dated 5-8-1967. Subsequent thereto the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 19-10-1968 for the relief of getting the sale deed dated 6-11-1967 duly registered by the defendants basing his claim on the fact that Ram Chandra had executed an agreement dated 5-8-1967. In the alternative the plaintiffs also prayed for the relief of specific performance of the sale deed dated 6th November, 1967. 2. The suit was contested by the defendant on several grounds but the main ground with which we are here concerned with is that the deceased Ram Chandra had not executed any agreement on 5-8-1967 in favour of the plaintiffs nor any sale deed had been executed by him on 6-11-1967. The plaintiffs some how wanted to grab the property of Ram Chandra which would have normally devolved on his sister Smt. Ram Katori. It was stated that Ram Chandra had been done to death and had not died a natural death. The dead body of Ram Chandra was found in a well on 29-11-1967. The plaintiff and some of his relations were implicated in the murder case but they were subsequently acquitted only on appeal. The defendant also set forth a series of circumstances, in view of which, it was submitted that it was not conceivable that Ram Chandra would have entered into any agreement to sell his property or to have executed the sale deed in question. The suit was also said to be barred under Section 77 of the Registration Act. It was also urged that the totality of the circumstances require that on equitable consideration also the plaintiff's suit should not be decreed for specific performance. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal, however, the lower appellate Court was of the view that the suit of the plaintiffs was barred under Sec. 77, of the Registration Act. The Court also held that since the plaintiffs had not claimed specific performance of the agreement dated 5-8-1967 but instead had merely claimed specific performance of the sale deed dated 6-11-1967, on relief of specific performance of agreement dated 5-8-1067 could be granted to the plaintiffs. The third question, whether the agreement should be performed or not was however left undecided. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal. 5. The third question, whether the agreement should be performed or not was however left undecided. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal. 5. Shri S.P. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has assailed the finding of the lower appellate Court on the ground that the plaintiffs inherently had two rights, namely to file a suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act, if the circumstances so permitted and, secondly a general right under the Specific Relief Act to claim enforcement of the agreement dated 5-8-1967. According to him, the lower appellate Court was wrong in treating suit as one under Section 77 of the Registration Act and in dismissing the same only on the ground of plaintiff's failure to get the sale deed registered within one month from the date of the decree dated 30-9-1972 as directed by the trial Court. It also held that as a result of plaintiff's failure to do so the right of the plaintiffs had come to an end Learned counsel contended that the Court below failed to consider that principle of merger of orders would apply in such a case and once the aggrieved party had filed an appeal and obtained a stay order, the decree of the trial Court, ceased to be effective and will stand merged in the decree of the appellate Court and the rights under the decree of the trial Court did not subsist independently any longer. It was also contended that even if the suit was not maintainable under Section 77 of the Registration Act, at-least the suit would be maintainable under the general provisions for specific performance of the agreement but merely because there was a slight error in the relief claimed, the Court wrongly did not grant any relief and even refused to consider that aspect of the matter. According to him, the approach of the learned lower appellate Court was absolutely erroneous. 6. In order to decide this appeal, it is necessary to see as to what is the true nature of the proceedings which is contemplated under the various provisions of Chapter XII of the Registration Act. This Chapter deals with the power of authorities under the Act to refuse registration in certain circumstances. 6. In order to decide this appeal, it is necessary to see as to what is the true nature of the proceedings which is contemplated under the various provisions of Chapter XII of the Registration Act. This Chapter deals with the power of authorities under the Act to refuse registration in certain circumstances. Section 71 deals with the power of the sub-registrar to refuse to register a document and provides that reasons for refusing to register any document should be recorded in book No. 2 and also an, endorsement of refusal should be made on the document itself when the same is presented for registration. Section 72 deals with those cases except in which after the executant denies having executed the document then the sub-registrar may refuse to register the document. This order, however, is subject to reversal by the registrar, if the matter comes up for consideration before him on an application moved within 30 days from the date of the order of the sub registrar. Section 73 of the Registration Act reads as under:- "73. (1) When a Sub-Registrar has refused to register a document on the ground that any person by whom it purports to be executed or his representative or assign, denies its execution, any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent authorised as aforesaid may, within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, apply to the Registrar to whom such sub-Registrar is subordinate in order to establish his right to have the document registered. (2) Such application shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by a copy of the reasons recorded under Section 71, and the statements in the application be verified by the applicant in manner required by law for the verification of plaints." In all cases in which the sub-registrar refused to register the document on the ground that the executant or his representative, assign had denied execution of the document put up for registration and the matter is taken up before the Registrar within 30 days, the party would be entitled to establish his right to have the document registered. Section 74 of the Act provides the procedure and matters which are to be considered by the Registrar when an application contemplated under Section 72 has been presented to the Registrar. Section 74 of the Act provides the procedure and matters which are to be considered by the Registrar when an application contemplated under Section 72 has been presented to the Registrar. Sections 75 and 76 of the Registration Act provide for the procedure to be followed in case Registrar directs registration of the document or refuses to register the document. S. 77 then provides:- "77. (1) Where the Registrar refuses to order the document to be registered, under Section 72 or Section 76, any person claiming under such document, or his representative, assign or agent, may within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal, institute in the Civil Court, within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which the document is sought to be registered, a suit for a decree directing the document to be registered in such office if it be duly presented for registration within thirty days after the passing of such decree. (2) The provisions contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 75 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to all documents presented for registration in accordance with any such decree, and, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the document shall be receivable in evidence in such suit." According to this provision, the decision of the registrar to direct registration or refuse to register the document is subject to a remedy by way of a suit by the aggrieved party. We are, however, not very much concerned with all this in the present appeal for the simple reason that a suit under Sec. 77 confines itself to registration of the document, which is alleged to have been executed by a party. However, in the present case, the relief on which the suit of the plaintiffs rests is based on an anterior document, that is, an agreement to sell executed by Ram Chandra in favour of the plaintiffs on 5-8-1967, The question is even if the sale deed dated 6-11-1967 may not be proved to have been executed by Ram Chandra, yet can the plaintiffs not file a suit to enforce the rights, if his rights flow the basis of agreement dated 5-8-1967 which had nothing to do with the execution or otherwise of sale deed dated 6-11-1967. It appears that the lower appellate Court confined itself to the consideration as to whether it was a suit under Section 77 or not and did not direct its attention to the question that the relief in the suit was also based on the original agreement. It is true the plaintiff has prayed for specific performance in respect of the sale deed dated 6th November, 1967. It is, however, urged by the appellant that the sale deed had been executed and the only thing which remained to be done was its registration and this relief was fully covered in the first relief claimed by the plaintiffs. The alternative relief was only in respect of the specific performance of the agreement. The reliefs as claimed by the plaintiffs in the plaint are as under:- "The plaintiffs, therefore, pray (a) That enforcing the agreement for sale dated 5-8-67 executed by Ram Chandra in favour of the plaintiffs, the sale deed dated 6-11-1967, executed by Ram Chandra in favour of the plaintiffs with respect to the property in suit be got registered by the defendant and a decree to that effect may be passed in favour of the plaintiffs as against the defendant and if the defendant fails to get the sale deed registered as representative of Shri Ram Chand the said sale deed be got registered through Court by an officer of the Court appointed for this purpose. In the alternative The Court be pleased to pass a decree for specific performance of the sale deed dated 6th November, 1967, against Smt. Katori Devi directing her to execute the sale and deliver possession of the property to the plaintiffs". 7. It is urged that the words in the relief clause enforcing the agreement of all sale deed dated 5-8-67 executed by Ram Chand in favour of the plaintiffs apply to both the alternative reliefs. According to him the above words must be deemed to qualify the first relief which was in respect of registration of the sale deed and also the alternative relief which was in respect of specific performance of the agreement of sale. According to him the above words must be deemed to qualify the first relief which was in respect of registration of the sale deed and also the alternative relief which was in respect of specific performance of the agreement of sale. The argument appears to be that both these alternative reliefs having been asked for by enforcement of the agreement for sale dated 5-8-1967 and from this if ought to follow that the alternative relief claimed must have relation with and pertain to specific performance of the agreement and not merely of the sale deed. In paragraph 15 of the plaint the plaintiffs have made necessary averments that they were always ready and willing to have the sale deed registered according to the terms and conditions of the agreement in question and that they had been always trying to get the sale deed registered. It appears to me that the lower appellate Court has taken rather too technical a view of the wordings used in the relief clause and what the plaintiffs really wished to pray for in the alternative was specific performance of the agreement dated 5-8-1967. This will also be apparent from the fact that the plaintiffs had paid ad volorem court-fee on the total consideration of the sale deed. If, therefore, the right of the plaintiffs to have the agreement dated 5-8-1967 specifically performed be an independent right apart from the right to get the sale deed executed by the vendor registered under Section 77 of the Registration Act, then these two rights have to be independently and separately considered. Even if the suit of the plaintiffs under Sec. 77 of the Registration Act may not be maintainable, still it will have to be considered whether the plaintiffs would be entitled to the specific performance of the agreement of sale or not. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, has urged in this connection that the proceedings before the sub-registrar and the registrar had been initiated at the instance of the plaintiffs themselves. The defendant had filed an objection before the sub-registrar as a legal representative of the deceased alleged vendor, in which she had denied execution of the sale deed on 6-11-1967. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, has urged in this connection that the proceedings before the sub-registrar and the registrar had been initiated at the instance of the plaintiffs themselves. The defendant had filed an objection before the sub-registrar as a legal representative of the deceased alleged vendor, in which she had denied execution of the sale deed on 6-11-1967. In these circumstances it is urged that the matter fell within the purview at Section 72 (sic) of the Registration Act and the registrar while hearing the representation of the plaintiff under Section 72 (sic) must be deemed to have considered that aspect of the matter and also to have decided the case under Section 75 of the Registration Act, thus making it obligatory for the plaintiff to bring a suit under Section 77 of the Act. The learned counsel, however, seems to ignore that in spite of the objections by the defendant before the sub-registrar, he refused to register the document not on the ground that the execution has been denied with merely on the ground that Ram Chandra, the alleged executant had died. From this, it must be inferred that the sub-registrar had completely ignored the objections filed by the defendant denying execution of the sale-deed and as no steps had been taken by the plaintiffs to have the legal representatives of the deceased vendor brought on the record, the sub-registrar had merely refused to register the sale deed, as the executant of the deed was more alive. When the matter came up before the Registrar under Section 73, he also did not consider it to be a matter of denial of execution but, on the contrary, refused to entertain the appeal itself and rejected the same on the ground that it was not maintainable because the requirements of Section 72 of the Act not being complied with. Had the plaintiff taken steps to bring the legal representatives or assigns on the record or to have the notices served on them, by the Sub-Registrar, then the position may have been different. In fact, the legal representatives had no opportunity to contest the plaintiff's application in the instant case and the matter remained entirely between the sub-registrar and the plaintiffs. In fact, the legal representatives had no opportunity to contest the plaintiff's application in the instant case and the matter remained entirely between the sub-registrar and the plaintiffs. Under the circumstances, I am of the view that the occasion to apply provisions of Chapter XII of the Registration Act did not at all arise in the instant case and the suit brought by the plaintiffs cannot, therefore, be said to be barred by Section 77 of the Act. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that the decree of the trial Court in the case was passed on 30-9-1972 in the following words:- "The plaintiff's suit for getting the sale deed dated 6-11-1967 executed by Late Ram Chandra deceased registered is decreed with costs against defendant. Plaintiffs shall deposit Rs. 1000/- in Court within ten days of this order. The sale deed will be sent to the sub-registrar concerned for registration who will register it accordingly. Rs. 1000/- so deposited will be for the benefit of the defendant and the defendant may withdraw this account from the Court. The sale deed be sent to the sub-registrar concerned and be presented for presentation within 30 days of the date of this order. If the plaintiffs fail to deposit this amount within the time, the suit will stand dismissed. The plaintiffs shall pay the expenses of the registration." The appeal was filed by the defendants on 11-10-1972 and they also obtained a stay of the trial Courts decree on 12-10-1972 on 30th January, 1973, the appeal was allowed and the decree of the trial Court in favour of the plaintiffs was set aside. The lower appellate Court has mentioned in its judgment the document was required to be presented before the sub-registrar within one month. There is no explanation why it was not so presented within the said period. "Relying on the case of Bal Kishan Dass v. Bachan Pandey (AIR 1932 All 96): (1931 All LJ 1092) the Court held that the document should have been taken back from the Court and presented before the sub-registrar within 30 days. On failure to do so, the decree in favour of the plaintiffs had become inoperative and the plaintiffs would not be entitled to any benefit under the decree even if the defendant's appeal fails. On failure to do so, the decree in favour of the plaintiffs had become inoperative and the plaintiffs would not be entitled to any benefit under the decree even if the defendant's appeal fails. The approach in the above case is not warranted by the provisions contained in the Registration Act, under Section 77 of the Registration Act the Court has merely to decide that the document presented for registration had been executed in a proper manner or not and whether such a document could be registered, keeping in view the other provisions of law in mind. If the document could be registered and it was proved to the satisfaction of the Registrar that the document had been duly executed, the Courts have no option but to order registration of the document. In the proceedings under Section 77 of the Act, the only order that the Civil Court can pass is to direct the registration of the document. It does not, however, take into account those rights of the party in whose favour the document has been executed, which flow and arise from the original transaction. This section does not also debar the plaintiffs seek a relief on its basis. For example if the document had been executed and some consideration had been paid to the vendor, who subsequently refused to get the document registered, the remedy all the vendee to claim refund of the money already paid cannot be refused nor can such a claim for refund be subject to Section 77 of the Registration Act. The two are absolutely independent rights and are not dependent on the registration of the deed at all. Similarly, if there be a contract of sale and in pursuance of the same one party had executed a document but it later on refused to register it, then in proceedings under the Registration Act, the Court will confine its enquiry to the question whether document had been properly executed or not and whether it can be registered. It will not look to the question whether there existed a previous agreement of the sale deed. If the Registrar refused to direct registration of the document, the vendee can file a suit under Section 77 seeking to have the deed registered. It will not look to the question whether there existed a previous agreement of the sale deed. If the Registrar refused to direct registration of the document, the vendee can file a suit under Section 77 seeking to have the deed registered. This however, does not take away his right to seek specific performance of the agreement against the other contracting party, i.e., vendor and seek necessary relief against him on its basis. The provisions of Section 77 are in the nature of an enabling provision which is designed to cut short an otherwise longer remedy of a suit to get the document registered through specific performance. A party is, how were, free to choose a longer and different course and may even seek remedy against the defaulting party on the basis of the original contract without confining its claim to get the document registered. 10. Certain lessee whose lessor refused to have the lease deed registered did not apply under the provisions of the Registration Act before the Sub-Registrar or Registrar and directly brought a suit against the lessor for the directions that the lease deed be got registered. The trial Court held that the suit was barred under Section 77 of the Registration Act. A Division Bench of this Court in Abdullah Khan v. Janki, (1894 All WN 94) had observed thus not a word of Section 77 of the Registration Act can be made to have application to this case. Section 77 contains no provision which could bar this suit or any other suit otherwise entertainable. It is on the contrary an enabling section which, under the peculiar circumstances, provides for special suit to a person deeming himself entitled to have the document registered. Special conditions are that the registrar of deed and not the sub-registrar shall have refused to order the document to be registered under Sections 72 and 77 of the Act and another conditions that the suit be brought within 30 days a year making the order of refusal. It is plain that section like this cannot possibly be held to bar this suit. 11. It is now well settled that Sec. 77 does not contain an exclusive remedy to a person who seeks to enforce his right flowing from a contract of sale and it does not bar a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell in his favour. 11. It is now well settled that Sec. 77 does not contain an exclusive remedy to a person who seeks to enforce his right flowing from a contract of sale and it does not bar a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell in his favour. It is entirely a different matter than in peculiar set of circumstances the Court may not deem it equitable to grant the relief as claimed. For that well established equitable principles have to be applied and in some cases justify the Court in refusing to grant of relief of specific performance. However, in the present case, the lower appellate Court has not gone into this question, at all and merely on the basis of the alternative relief being worded slightly faultily, it has refused to consider the dispute from that point of view. I have already held earlier that there was merely a mistake in the relief and the real purpose of the plaintiffs was to seek remedy of registration or in the alternative, remedy of specific performance basing their claim on the agreement dated 5-8-1967 though while claiming alternative relief the sale deed dated 6-11-1967 has been wrongly mentioned. 12. Shri G.P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondent has further placed certain circumstances before me in order to impress that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the equitable relief in their favour and that the agreement itself does not appear to have been executed in a fair manner. He has further urged that instead of remanding the case to the lower appellate Court for decision on the Points Nos. 2 and 3 framed by it, the matter should be decided by this Court itself. It is true that this Court is empowered to do so, but in the present case, I do not think it will be proper to do so. The lower appellate Court itself would be in a better position to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and then to determine as to whether, in fact, the agreement dated 5-8-1967 had been fairly and properly executed and if so, whether it would at all be equitable to order specific performance of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff. 13. 13. In view of the above, the decision of the lower appellate Court on the point, mentioned above is found to be totally erroneous and the judgment and decree passed by it have to be set aside. As already mentioned above, since two main points have not been decided by the lower appellate Court, there is no choice except to send back the case to the lower appellate Court for decision on these points also. 14. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the case is remanded to the lower appellate court with a direction to readmit it on its original number and to decide the suit on merits on points Nos. 2 and 3 framed by it and then to decide the appeal afresh, keeping the observations of this Court in view. 15. The costs of this appeal will abide the ultimate result of the suit.