JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The facts giving rise to the present petition briefly are as follows :- The opposite party No. 3 Dr. T.D. Srivastava (hereinafter referred to as the Doctor) was a Government Doctor posted at Mirazapur. By an allotment order dated 6.7.1964, he was allowed a portion of the building situate at Elliot Ghat, Mohalla Welleselygan of Mirzapur city. This was the front portion of the house. The back portion of the house was then in occupation of one S.P. Misra, a local advocate. He vacated the premises. The said back portion was also allotted by the rent control authority on 20th August, 1968 in favour of the Doctor. Prior to this allotment the Doctor resigned from the Government service and started doing consultation work in the portion which was allotted to him. The effect of both the allotment orders was that the entire building was allotted to the Doctor. The petitioner Radhey Shyam Vaish is the owner and landlord of the said premises. In 1975 the Doctor purchased a house in Mission Compound, Ram Bagh, Mirzapur. Thereafter he moved a release application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the ground of his personal need. The said house was consequently released in favour of the Doctor and he shifted his residence and his nursing home in the said premises. After the Doctor had shifted to his own house, the petitioner moved an application on Ist August, 1977 under Section 16(1)(b) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act XIII of 1972), hereinafter referred to as the Act, for release of the said building. The ground which was set up in release application was that the landlord's son, Dr. Vinod Kumar Gupta was unemployed and wanted to start his private practice and that the petitioner also having been transferred from Allahabad to Varanasi as a Junior Auditor wanted to shift his family in the same building and reside there. Further contention of the petitioner was that the property should be deemed vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act as the tenant had acquired in a vacant state a residential building in the same city and that the Doctor had removed his affects from the building in question and had completely shifted to the house in Mission compound. 2. Further contention of the petitioner was that the property should be deemed vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act as the tenant had acquired in a vacant state a residential building in the same city and that the Doctor had removed his affects from the building in question and had completely shifted to the house in Mission compound. 2. This application of the landlord was contested by the Doctor on the ground that the house at Mission Compound was very unsuitable for the profession purposes and that he has been using the building in question since 1967 and consequently he has developed a good will and reputation in respect of the building. It was further urged that the petitioner was possessed of another building in the locality and as such his need is not bonafide and the property be not released in his favour. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by an order dated 15th November, 1978 held that the property could not be deemed vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act and as such the release application was rejected. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not go into the merits of the need which was set up by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 18 of the Act in the Court of the District Judge, Mirzapur. This revision was also dismissed by the III Additional District Judge, Mirzapur by judgment dated 18th February, 1980. He was also of the view that the property could not be deemed vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act and consequently he rejected the release application. The revisional Court further held that the revision under Section 18 of the Act was not maintainable. Aggrieved by the decision dated 18th February, 1980 as well as 15th November, 1978 the present petition has been filed challenging these orders. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged firstly that the revision was maintainable under Section 18 of the Act and view to the contrary taken by the revisional Court is manifestly erroneous. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the District Judge has erred is not property considering the scope of the expression "residential building" and therefore, erred in holding that the property in dispute is not a residential building. The third submission of the learned counsel is residential building. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the District Judge has erred is not property considering the scope of the expression "residential building" and therefore, erred in holding that the property in dispute is not a residential building. The third submission of the learned counsel is residential building. The third submission of the learned counsel is that the Court below has misread paragraph 5 of the application and has wrongly treated this to be an admission of the petitioner and consequently erred in holding that the petitioner had consented to the change of the purpose of the residence from residential to business. 4. In so far as the first question is concerned, Section 18 of the Act clearly lays down that any person aggrieved by the order passed under Section 16 of the Act can file a revision in the Court of the District Judge In the instant case, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had dismissed the release application holdings that there was no vacancy. Therefore, clearly the order was revisable. In any case in Rajindera Kumar v. District Judge, Meerut, 1979 UPRCC 491, I have already considered this question in detail and have taken the view that the question of vacancy is a jurisdictional fact and as such the revision was clearly maintainable. The view to the contrary taken by the III Additional District Judge is manifestly erroneous. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is consequently well founded. 5. So far as the second and third questions are concerned, I am considering both the questions together. In the Act Section 3(i) defines the word `building'. This means a residential or non-residential roofed structure. From a perusal of various sections of the Act and Rules framed thereunder which I will enumerate hereinafter, it is clear that the legislature intended to create two classes of property, one 'residential' and the other 'non-residential'. These words have been used in Section 3(i), 12(1)(c), (2), (3), (3-A) (3-B) 16(3)(a), 17(2) Explanation Section 21(1)(a), third proviso (ii) and (ii) and Explanation 1 in the said Section and Section 24-B. The rules also speak of the same two classes. Reference may be made of Rule 10(5) proviso (b) and (c) and sub-clause (8). These words have been used in Section 3(i), 12(1)(c), (2), (3), (3-A) (3-B) 16(3)(a), 17(2) Explanation Section 21(1)(a), third proviso (ii) and (ii) and Explanation 1 in the said Section and Section 24-B. The rules also speak of the same two classes. Reference may be made of Rule 10(5) proviso (b) and (c) and sub-clause (8). Section 16(3)(a) is quoted below :- "(3) The allotment order shall specify - (a) whether the building shall be used by the tenant for residential or non-residential purposes". 6. Similarly form A which is a form of application for allotment of a building, Columns 10 and 11 require the applicant to state as to whether the building is required for residential or non-residential purpose and if it is required for non-residential purpose then for what purpose it is required and the name of the co-proprietor or partner, if any, of any business proposed to be carried on in her building. Form B is the prescribed form in which the order of allotment has to be passed and the allotting authority has to specify whether the building will be used for residential or non-residential purpose. Section 21(1)(a) is also very significant which entitles a landlord to apply for release either for residential purpose or for the purposes of any profession, trade, or calling. The purpose of profession, trade or calling, are non-residential purposes. In view of the above, I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the Court when it has to determine the nature of the building, has to record a finding as to whether it is residential or non-residential as these are the only two categories contemplated by the Act. No building can be nomenclated as a residential-cum-business building. The approach, therefore, of the Court below in this regard is clearly erroneous. The Court has to determine what is dominant purpose for which the property is being used. In Bashir Uddin v. District Judge Bulandshahr, 1978 All. Rent. Cases 62 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the scope of expression residential as well as business purposes. After examining various authorities the Court has laid down the following proposition. "The dominant purpose for which an accommodation is being used must be discovered for the purpose of determining as to whether a particular accommodation is being used for a residential purpose or otherwise. 7. After examining various authorities the Court has laid down the following proposition. "The dominant purpose for which an accommodation is being used must be discovered for the purpose of determining as to whether a particular accommodation is being used for a residential purpose or otherwise. 7. The Bench relied upon an observation made by the Madras High Court in Krishan Nair v. Valliammal, AIR 1949 Madras 785, wherein it has been laid down that a premises must be deemed to be taken and used for a 'residential purpose' though a portion of the premises may be used otherwise. The passage approved by the Bench of this Court reads as follows; - "A lawyer may advice his clients in a room of his house, a Doctor may give consultation to this clients in a room of his house, an astrologer may give his predictions to his clients in a room of his house, a barber may his select and urgent clients in a room in his house, a papadom-marker can make papadom in room of his house provided the portions so used form only a fraction of the entire premises and does not alter the nature of the premises from residential to non-residential purpose." 8. In Bashir Uddin v. District Judge Bulandshahr (supra), J. opined as follows :- "Residential premises are not only those which are let out for residential purpose as the appellant would have it. Nor do they cover all kinds of structures where humans may manage to dwell. If a beautiful bungalow were let out to a businessman to run a showroom or to a meditation group or music society for meditational or musical uses, it remains non the-less a residential, accommodation Otherwise, premises may one day be residential another day commercial and, on yet a later day, religious. Use or purpose of the letting is no conclusive test. Likewise the fact that many poor persons may sleep under bridges or live in a large humne pipes or crawl into verandahs of shops and bazars can not make them residential premises. That is a case of education adabsurdum. 9. Use or purpose of the letting is no conclusive test. Likewise the fact that many poor persons may sleep under bridges or live in a large humne pipes or crawl into verandahs of shops and bazars can not make them residential premises. That is a case of education adabsurdum. 9. From the above principle laid down by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court it is clear that if a building has been let out for residential purpose and is being used by a person residing therein for the purpose connected with his profession etc., it cannot convert the residential building into a non-residential building. It is a common knowledge that all Doctors who reside in an accommodation also do consultation work and entertain patients in case they come to their residence for consultation and in fact carry on practice there during the course of the day. The mere fact that private practice is being carried on in a portion of a building essentially used by the Doctor for residence and let out also for residential purposes cannot convert that building into a non-residential one. The dominant purpose for which the building is being used has to be seen in order to determine whether it is residential or non-residential. In the instant case in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the petition, it has been categorically stated that the front portion of the building was allotted to the Doctor on 16th July, 1964 for residential purpose. The back portion of the building which was allotted subsequently in the year 1968 was also allotted for residential purpose. In the counter affidavit, which has been filed, it has not been denied that the allotment had been made for residential purposes. It is also not denied by the Doctor that been made for residential purposes. It is also not denied by the Doctor that his entire family resided in the major portion of the house but what has been contended by the Doctor is that in the year 1967 when he resigned from Government service he started his medical practice in a portion of the said building. It is on this basis that it is alleged that he is occupying the building for business purposes. It is on this basis that it is alleged that he is occupying the building for business purposes. The mere fact that a Doctor does private practice in a portion of the building cannot, as I have already expressed above, convert the residential building into a non-residential building. The law does not contemplate anything like residential-cum-business building. The dominant purpose in the instant case for which the building was taken was residential and the mere fact that in a portion of the building medical practice was being carried on cannot change the nature of the building from residential to non-residential. The Court below has also recorded a finding that the building had been initially let out for residential purposes, but the Court further found on the basis of paragraph 5 of the application that the petitioner admitted that the purposes of the building was converted into non-residential. I have examined paragraph 5 which is as follows :- "5. That the applicant has made certain changes in the said house during the tenancy of Dr. T.D. Srivastava for the purpose of medical professions keeping in view his sons further profession." 10. This possibly cannot be treated as an admission of the petitioner. What he wanted to say was that certain changes had been made in the building for the requirement of his son on which basis the present application for release has been made. This possibly cannot be treated to be an admission. The Court evidence referred to by Courts below is in regard to the fact that a portion of the building was being used for private practice of the Doctor. This appears to be the admitted position. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the approach of the Court below is entirely erroneous. On the basis of admitted facts on record, it was to be inferred that the dominant purpose was the residential purpose for which the building was allotted and as such in law the property in dispute has to be taken to be a residential building. 11. Learned counsel for the Doctor has, however, relied on Gopaldas v. S.K. Bhardwaj, AIR 1963 T.C. 337. He was urged that since the petitioner had given his consent for the use by the Doctor for private practice, the building has to be treated as a non-residential building. 11. Learned counsel for the Doctor has, however, relied on Gopaldas v. S.K. Bhardwaj, AIR 1963 T.C. 337. He was urged that since the petitioner had given his consent for the use by the Doctor for private practice, the building has to be treated as a non-residential building. In my opinion, the principle laid down in the case of Gopaldas (supra) does not apply in the present case. Th Hon'ble Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act No. 38 of 1952 which provided that premises let for residential purposes would include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are without the consent of the landlord used incidentally for commercial or other purposes. 12. The Supreme Court on the facts of that case held that the building was not incidentally used for commercial purposes but the landlord had initially let out the property for residential-cum-commercial purpose and since the consent of the landlord was there the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) would not apply. In the instant case, as I have already indicated above, the property had been let out for residential purpose only. Therefore, the principle laid down in this case would not apply. 13. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that both the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are well founded. 14. In the instant case, I am constrained to observe that the Doctor has attempted to blow hot and cold in the same breath. When the Doctor purchased the building in Mission Compound, he moved an application for release before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. This application is attached as Annexure 5 to the portion. In this application it has been categorically stated by him that he required the house so purchased by him for residential purpose and a petition of the same would be used for a Nursing Home. On the basis of the allegation the authorities released the building in the Mission Compound in his favour and thereafter he shifted the entire residence therein. When he took possession of the building purchased by him on the basis of the released order he started raising objections in order that he may not be asked to vacate the building in dispute which was earlier occupied by him for residence. When he took possession of the building purchased by him on the basis of the released order he started raising objections in order that he may not be asked to vacate the building in dispute which was earlier occupied by him for residence. The provisions of the Supreme Court Act cannot be subverted in this manner. The legislative intention behind Section 12(3) of the Act is that once the tenant acquires in a vacant state any residential building in the same city, the property would be deemed residential building in the same city, the property would be deemed vacant so that either the landlord or some other person may take benefit of the same and the tenant should not have the benefit of both the buildings. 15. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the petition is liable to succeed, and is accordingly allowed. The order dated 10.11.1978 and 18.2.980 are quashed. The property would be deemed vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act and consequently the application for release made by the petitioner is liable to be considered on merits. The case is consequently remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mirzapur for deciding the release application of the petitioners on merits. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs from the opposite party No. 3.