Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff who is the appellant in this second appeal having partly succeeded in her relief for redemption has come forward with the second appeal to this Court only in so far as she has been denied the right of scaling down. The facts which led to the second appeal are as follows: The first defendant executed the bogiam in respect of the suit property in favour of the second defendant in and by a registered document, dated 1st July, 1961 (Exhibit A-2) for a sum of Rs. 2,500. The second defendant was a minor then and therefore, she was represented by her husband as guardian. The second defendant was in possession of the property since the date of bogiam. Under a registered sale deed, Exhibit A-1, dated 17th March, 1966, the plaintiff came to purchase the suit property. The plaintiff and the first defendant are agriculturists and therefore, the bogiam amount has to be scaled down in accordance with the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1938 as amended by Act VIII of 1973. Inasmuch as the first defendant has been in possession of the suit property for 13 years the plaintiff is liable to pay as per the provisions of the Act only Rs. 1,416.66. The said amount is deposited into Court and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to redemption. 2. The first defendant remained ex parte. In the written statement filed by the second defendant it was contended that she has paid a sum of Rs. 345 to the plaintiff’s husband and got the service connection transferred in her name. In addition to this second defendant had put up 13 electric points in the house and she has spent Rs. 400. The plaintiff is bound to pay these amounts before she is granted a decree for redemption. The second defendant informed the plaintiff about the damages occurring to the property, but the plaintiff did not care to repair the same. Therefore, any claim on that score is untenable. The second defendant has not admitted that she is entitled only to Rs, 1,416.66 as stated in the plaint. The learned District Munsif found that the plaintiff was entitled to redemption on payment of the principal amount due on the mortgage. Therefore, any claim on that score is untenable. The second defendant has not admitted that she is entitled only to Rs, 1,416.66 as stated in the plaint. The learned District Munsif found that the plaintiff was entitled to redemption on payment of the principal amount due on the mortgage. In so far as the relief of scaling down was concerned he was of the view that the plaintiff did not prove that she was an agriculturist on the date of the incurring of the debt and hence, that relief was denied. There upon, the matter was taken on appeal in A. S. No. 139 of 1976 to the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. The learned appellate Judge also concurred with the findings of the trial Judge and dismissed the appeal. Thus arises the present second appeal. 3. It is urged by Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that the Courts below are wrong in so far as they failed to note that the claim of the plaintiff was under Act IV of 1938, as amended by Act VIII of 1973. Therefore, the Courts below ought to have held with regard to the amended provisions under Act VIII of 1973, particularly the definition of debt, the definition of agriculturist, the non-obstante clause in section 7 and granted the relief under section 9-A. As a matter of fact the claim for relief under these Acts has not been disputed by the other side. 4. Mr. Umapathi, learned counsel for the defendants-respondents, states that the basic qualification for obtaining relief under Tamil Nadu Act IV of 1938. or Act VIII of 1973, would be that on the date of the incurring of the debt the claimant must be an agriculturist and in the instant case the debt was in 1961. Exhibit A-4 is dated after the suit and therefore, that has been rightly rejected. The only other document on which reliance is placed and as a matter of fact it is admitted by the lower appellate Court is Exhibit A-6. That document by itself does not prove that on the date of the incurring of the debt the plaintiff happens to be an agriculturist, because it was a partition decree of the year 1968. There is nothing to prove that even in 1961 the plaintiff or her predecessor owned this property. That document by itself does not prove that on the date of the incurring of the debt the plaintiff happens to be an agriculturist, because it was a partition decree of the year 1968. There is nothing to prove that even in 1961 the plaintiff or her predecessor owned this property. Having regard to all these documents it cannot be said the basic proof or the qualification that one must show that on the date of the incurring of the debt the claimant must be an agriculturist has been established. Hence, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below can easily be sustained. 5. I have given my careful consideration to the above arguments. I have also perused the judgments of the Courts below. One thing appears to be certain by a reading of the provisions of Act IV of 1938 as amended by Act VIII of 1973, viz,, that in order to claim the benefit under these Acts one should prove that on the date of the incurring of the debt one must be an agriculturist. The fact that one becomes subsequently an agriculturist cannot take within it the definition of agriculturist, because even under amended section 3 (iii) of Act VIII of 1973 the debt that is spoken to is due from an agriculturist. Therefore, by a careful reading of that section the matter appears to be simple. The debt must be by an agriculturist. At what point of time she has to be an agriculturist is easily discernible. It must be nothing but the date of the incurring of the debt. Therefore, this basis cannot and as of fact is not dispensed with. What about the definition of agriculturist? In my considered view all that the amended Act VIII of 1973 has provided for is nothing more than to extend the benefits to a few other categories of persons. That is not to say that the basic qualification, viz., on the date of incurring of the debt one has to be an agriculturist, has been dispensed with. Now, we go to section 7. Section 7 contains the non-obstante clause, but that has nothing to do whatever with the definition of debt. It merely means, in spite of the decree of the Court there can be a scaling down. For instance, supposing a person has obtained a decree against an agriculturist. Now, we go to section 7. Section 7 contains the non-obstante clause, but that has nothing to do whatever with the definition of debt. It merely means, in spite of the decree of the Court there can be a scaling down. For instance, supposing a person has obtained a decree against an agriculturist. Even on the date of the execution of the decree it is open to that agriculturist to seek the benefit of scaling down. Therefore, section 7 is not helpful. Equally I can say about section 9-A. I am also of the view that in so far as there is total lack of proof that the plaintiff is an agriculturist I see no scope for applying any one of these provisions. The reason why I say there is total lack of proof that the plaintiff-appellant is an agriculturist is because there are only two documents filed on his side. One is Exhibit A-4. That is post litem mortem. The suit is filed in 1974. The document is dated 16th September, 1974. Rightly therefore, that has been rejected by both the Courts below. Then what remains is only Exhibit A-6. No doubt, that is admitted as an additional evidence by the lower appellate Court. That has not advanced the case of the appellant any further for the very simple reason that it is a compromise decree in which the plaintiff-appellant was allotted certain properties. Even that does not show that on the date of incurring of the debt the plaintiff-appellant was an agriculturist. Thus the conclusion is inescapable as correctly found by the Courts below, the plaintiff is not an agriculturist Hence, I have no other alternative but to dismiss the second appeal. This second appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, since the argument before us is on a question of law relating to the interpretation of the provisions of Act IV of 1938, as amended by Act VIII of 1973, I make no order as to costs in this second appeal. Appeal dismissed.