JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE Dena Bank had filed a Civil Suit for Rs. 3,628 against Sarvashri Raghunandan Prasad Gupta son of Ramadhin Gupta, Har-sewaklal Gupta son of Keshri Prasad Gupta, and Narayan Prasad Gupta son of Ganesh Prasad Gupta, all cultivators by occupation, residents of village arang, tahsil and district Raipur, M. P. ( 2. ) THIS suit was filed in the Court of 6th Civil Judge, Class II, Raipur and was registered as Civil Suit No. 120-B of 1977. These defendants in the suit on 14-2-1979, had filed an application, submitting that the plaintiff-bank is a nationalised bank and the suit was for the recovery of agricultural loan, hence a civil suit for its recovery was barred under the provisions of section 5 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure; section 256 (ii) of the M. P. Land revenue Code, 1959; section II of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Udhar Pravartan tatha Prakirn Upabandha (Bank) Adhiniyam, 1972 and section 14 of M. P. Samaj Ko Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharkon Ka Udhair Dena walon Ke Bhumi Hadapne Sambandhi Kuchakron Se Paritran Tatha Mukti adhiniyam, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as mukti Adhiniyam) and prayed that the suit be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The application was opposed by the Bank. ( 3. ) DEFENDANTS contention challenging the jurisdiction of the Civil Court did not find favour with the Court of the Civil Judge. He vide his order dated 19-11-1979 rejected the same. The defendants being aggrieved by this order filed a revision in this Court which was registered as Civil Revision no. 1387 of 1979. This revision was dismissed on 8-7-1980 by this Court. Sharma J. , who decided this revision considering the provisions of the various laws referred to in paragraph 2 of this order, in his elaborately reasoned order came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred. ( 4. ) THE contemner who was neither a party to the suit nor to the revision, sent to the Chief Justice of this Court, a copy of the application dated 3-10-1980 addressed to the Chief Justice of India. As it appears from the endorsement on this copy, copies have also been sent to- (i) President of India. (ii) Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay. (iii) District and Sessions Judge, Raipur. As it appears from the endorsement on this copy, copies have also been sent to- (i) President of India. (ii) Governor, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay. (iii) District and Sessions Judge, Raipur. This was placed before the Court on 28th October, 1980 for necessary orders with the note of the Additional Registrar that in the application allegations scandalising this Court have been made which amounts to contempt of Court. ( 5. ) ON the perusal of the record, this Court found that prima facie portions A and B of the application extracted hereinbelow amounts to scandalising this Court more specifically Justice S. S. Sharma and, therefore, directed notice to be issued to the contemner to show cause why he should not be punished for criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 6. ) TO this show cause notice, the- contemner sent his reply dated 1-1-1981 by registered post. In this reply, the contemner reiterated with greater vigour and elaboration, the allegation that he had made in his fore-referred application, and pleaded justification on the ground that order of sharma J. , was erroneous in law; what he stated was a fair and reasonable comment on the order in public interest without any intention to scandalise the Court, inasmuch as he did not make any publicity and the application was nothing but an appeal representation to the concerned authorities for taking steps to ameliorate the conditions in the judiciary and save the reputation of judiciary. ( 7. ) THE contemner was absent despite notice and did not avail of the opportunity of oral hearing. He was, however, heard in connected case-M. C. C. No. 43 of 1980 wherein similar contumacious allegations have been made with the only difference that in that case there is a reference to the Court only and not to the Judges deciding the case, whereas in the instant case there is, in addition to the Court, the Judges has also been named. In that case the contemner was heard at length and during the course of hearing it was explained to him that proper remedy for a party aggrieved by a decision was jo challenge the same in higher Court and that he should have been better advised to follow that course; but the contemner without any demur stuck to the objectionable allegations and went on repeating the same and intransigently maintained that there was nothing scandalous in the allegations made by him; instead of even obliquely reflecting a ray of contrition or pretext of remorse. ( 8. ) THE defence of the contemner shorn of all irrelevant statement in his reply, can be summed up as follows- (i) that what is stated in the application is a fair and reasonable criticism of Justice Sharmas order in good faith and in public interest; (ii) that the application is nothing but an appeal representation to the higher authorities for seeking eradication of the worst happenings in the judiciary so that confidence of the public is maintained in judiciary. ( 9. ) THE Act defined criminal contempt in section 2 (c) of the Act, as under; "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interfers or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. " On the perusal of the definition of the criminal contempt, it is obtainable that sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) describe 3 distinct species of criminal contempt; they are always mutually exclusive. Interference or tendency to interfere in judicial proceedings or administration of justice is a common element of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii ). " On the perusal of the definition of the criminal contempt, it is obtainable that sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) describe 3 distinct species of criminal contempt; they are always mutually exclusive. Interference or tendency to interfere in judicial proceedings or administration of justice is a common element of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii ). This element is not required to be established for a criminal contempt of the kind falling under sub-clause (i);but if the impugned act scandalises the judicial officer in regard to the discharge of his judicial function, it substantially interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of justice, a broad concept of administration of justice and would thus be a contempt falling within the mischief of sub-clause (iii) also. ( 10. ) UNFOUNDED imputation of mala fides, bias, prejudice or ridiculing the performance of a Judge or casting aspersions on his integrity are always considered to mean scandalising the Court and lowering the authority of his court by bringing him and his office into disrespect and disrepute. Vilification of the Judge even in administrative matters or decided judicial matters also amounts to criminal contempt under sub-clause (i) of section 2 (c) as it lowers or tends to lower the authority or dignity of the Court by undermining public confidence in the capacity of the Judge to mete out even-handed and impartial justice. This has been so held by their Lordships of the Supreme court in R. Subba Rao v. Advocate General A. P. (AIR 1961 SC 755. ). (See Paragraphs 14 and 17 ). ( 11. ) IN the instant case, the tone, temper and contents of the application particularly the passages extracted herein above in paragraph 5 of this order clearly impute malice, dishonesty, bias and partiality to Shri Justice Sharma and ridicules his performance casting aspersions on his integrity To iterate, the significant portion is as under; These imputations are unfounded, scandalous and lower the authority of this Court by bringing Shri Justice Sharma into disrespect and disrepute and we are of the firm opinion that the passages extracted herein above in paragraph 5 of this order do constitute criminal contempt falling within the purview of section 2 (c) (i) and (iii) of the Act and not a mere libel or defamation of the Judge. At this stage we would like to set out the following excerpt from R. Subbaraos case (Supra), which fully supports the view taken by us: " In the instant case, the contempt committed, though not in connection with any pending proceeding, primarily and squarely falls under sub-clause (i) though the aforesaid residuary phrase in sub-clause (iii) may also be attracted. Unfounded imputation of mala fides, bias, prejudice or ridiculing the performance of a Judge or casting aspersions on his integrity as has been done by the appellant in the notice in question, are always considered to mean scandalising the Court, and lowering the authority of his court by bringing him and his office into disrespect and disrepute. Vilification of the Judge, even in administrative matters or decided judicial matters, may amount to criminal contempt under sub-clause (i) of Section 2 (c) as it lowers or tends to lower the authority or dignity of the Court by undermining public confidence in the capacity of the Judge to mete out even-handed and impartial justice. " ( 12. ) NOW we turn to the consideration of the defence of the contemner. We are aware of the consensus of the judicial decisions that power to punish for contempt has to be sparingly used. It must always be exercised cautiously and with circumspection. It should be used only for protecting the interest of administration of justice only but at the same time we should also not take this circumspection to such an extent that we fail in our duty in maintaining the majesty of justice, the administration of unobstructed and independent justice. To ignore serious contempts would be in a way encouraging persons to hamper the administration of justice, a valuable right of people and a sacrosanct obligation of the State. Irrelevant allegations and imputation under the pretext of fair and reasonable criticism should not be tolerated. To ignore serious contempts would be in a way encouraging persons to hamper the administration of justice, a valuable right of people and a sacrosanct obligation of the State. Irrelevant allegations and imputation under the pretext of fair and reasonable criticism should not be tolerated. It would be pertinent at this stage to quote the observations of Mukerjee, J. which have been made on a conspectus of various authorities in Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ( 1953 SCR 1169 ) "reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen, possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in Courts can be created. " (Emphasis supplied by us) ( 13. ) IT would also be useful to advert to the decision of the Supreme court in C. K. Duftary, Sr. Advocate v. O. P. Gupta ( AIR 1971 SC 1132 ). In this case the allegations were made against Shah and Hegde, JJ. in connection with a case that was decided by them against the contemner O. P. Gupta. The impugned words were "dishonest judgment", "open dishonesty", "deliberately and dishonestly", "utter dishonest". ( 14. ) THE defence of the contemner was that it was a fair and reasonable criticism and in support of that defence various authorities were cited to show that the judgment criticised was erroneous. Their Lordships of the Supreme court rejecting the defence held that imputations amounted to contempt of the Court. The relevant excerpt from the aforesaid judgment is as under: "we have already referred to cases which show that he cannot justify contempt. If a judgment is criticised as containing errors, and coupled with such criticism dishonesty is alleged, the Court hearing the contempt petition, would first have to act as an appellate Court and decide whether there are errors or not. This is not and cannot be the function of a Court trying a petition for contempt. If evidence was to be allowed to justify allegations amounting to contempt of Court it would tend to encourage disappointed litigants-and one party or the other to a case is always disappointed-to avenge their defeat by abusing the Judge. This is not and cannot be the function of a Court trying a petition for contempt. If evidence was to be allowed to justify allegations amounting to contempt of Court it would tend to encourage disappointed litigants-and one party or the other to a case is always disappointed-to avenge their defeat by abusing the Judge. " ( 15. ) THE allegations in the instant case against Mr. Justice S. S. Sharma are scurrilous and reckless. It is a stifling reckless criticism and not a fair and reasonable criticism of the order. It is a foul play and deliberate design to malign and interfere with the judicial powers of this Court. ( 16. ) FOR the foregoing reasons the first part of the defence of the contemner has to be repelled and is accordingly repelled. ( 17. ) WE now turn to the second part of the defence. This part of the defence deserves to be rejected in the light of the decision of the Supreme court in Mulkhraj v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1972 SC 1197 ). ( 18. ) THE facts of Mulkhrajs case (Supra) were, that the contemner had filed a suit which was decreed by the trial Court. Defendants filed an appeal in the Court of Additional District Judge, which Court modified the decree. Against that decree of the lower appellate Court, the contemner filed a second appeal which was dismissed by the Single Bench at a preliminary hearing. Thereafter the contemner moved an application for leave to file Letters Patent appeal: that application was also dismissed. In the meantime, the contemner had recovered the decretal amount and the costs. Therefore, the defendants filed an application for restoration under section 144 of the Code of Civil procedure. During the pendency of this application, the contemner forwarded an application to the Chief Justice of India wherein he made the following allegations. The appellant in that application made the following allegations:-that against this decision of Shri J. P. Gupta, (Officio) District additional Judge, the plaintiff-applicant had filed an appeal in the Punjab high Court, Chandigarh on 30-3-1965 through Shri Srichand Goyal, advocate, which appeal was dismissed unjustifiably by the Honble Justice harbans Singh simply to suppress my case on 1-4-1965. The case relates to Mulkh Raj v. Jhabbar Mal etc. and its number is R. S. A. 480/1965. The case relates to Mulkh Raj v. Jhabbar Mal etc. and its number is R. S. A. 480/1965. The plaintiff (applicant) filed a letters patent appeal (applications with grounds of appeal) against the verdict of Honble Justice Harbans Singh through, Shri Shamer Chand, Advocate, Bar-at-Law on 25-5-1965 but the said Honble Justice Singh on 28-3-1965 used his nadar shahi system without going to any discussion into the case thereby dismissing my application of letters patent appeal unjustifiably and forcibly and just to suppress my case and did not allow to file a letters patent appeal. This resulted in my full destruction and disaster. The defendant party is too rich and has many approaches. ( 19. ) THE High Court in Mulkhrajs case (supra) held that the appellant maliciously endeavoured to impair the image of the judicial integrity of the high Court and wilfully attempted to damage the dignity and high esteem which the office of a Judge of a High Court carries with it. The High Court added that "the appellant had the audacity to add that the judgment-debtors were rich enough and had many approaches thereby insinuating some kind of approach on their part to the Honble Judge. He further stated that as a result of orders passed by Harbans Singh J. , justice has been murdered and cruelty committed to him because of corruption. " The High Court held the contemner liable for contempt of Court. 19-A. In appeal before the Supreme Court, it was contended that the application by the contemner was at the most representation of a person against a subordinate Court and the High Court to the highest Court of the land and if the appellant made a libellous remark against a Judge, the appellant might be punished under the Indian Penal Code. 19-B. An apology was also tendered by the contemner in the High court which the High Court declined to accept. 19-C. The Supreme Court rejecting the appeal held as under: "the submission of the appellant that the application was a representation is unmeritorious. It will be most improper for litigants to send applications to the Chief Justice of India concerning pending matters and making allegations against Judges. The dismissal of the appellants application by the High Court was characterised by the appellant in offensive language casting aspersions on the Judges and lowering the dignity and esteem of the judiciary. It will be most improper for litigants to send applications to the Chief Justice of India concerning pending matters and making allegations against Judges. The dismissal of the appellants application by the High Court was characterised by the appellant in offensive language casting aspersions on the Judges and lowering the dignity and esteem of the judiciary. The submission of the appellant that the application in the present case was a libellous remark punishable under the Indian Penal Code and did not amount to a contempt is unsound and unacceptable. The appellants application constituted a clear case of contempt. " ( 20. ) WE have hereinabove found that the imputations made by the contemner fall within the purview of criminal contempt as defined under section 2 (c) of the Act and the defences raised by him also are not available to exonerate him from the charge of his having committed contempt of this court. The contemner is thus guilty for gross contempt of this Court. The imputations levelled by the contemner against Sharma J. are per se scandalous. It is strange that the contemner had the temerity to make such serious gross and reckless imputations. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the contemner deserves to be punished. We accordingly sentence him (contemner)to simple imprisonment for a period of two months. 20 (a) As the contemner is absent, a copy of this order be sent by registered post (A. D.) to the contemner. Ex-debito justitiae we suspend the execution of the punishment awarded for a period of 45 days from today so as to enable the contemner to prefer an appeal, if he so intends. Order accordingly.