ORDER By an order, dated 9th November, 1979 made in C.C. No. 481 of 1978, the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad while allowing Crl.M.P. No. 611 of 1979, permitted the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer to withdraw the case and acquitted the accused therein, Nawab Nadir Ali Mirza, who can hereafter be conveniently referred to as ‘the Nawab’. The said Nawab, it is stated, married the grand-daughter of the Ex-Nizam of Hyderabad. The same Magistrate, by an order, dated 13th November, 1979 dismissed the private complaint filed by one P. Keshavulu in exercise of his powers under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. Roth the revisions are filed by P. Keshavulu, the former questioning the grant of permission by the Magistrate under section 321, Criminal Procedure Code, and the latter questioning the correctness of the dismissal of his private complaint. 2. The material facts which are mostly common to both these revisions are these…… the Nawab is a beneficiary of Trust created by the Ex-Nizam. Keshavulu is working as the Chief Cashier in the firm of M/s. Rampershad Janki Pershad & Sons situated at Abids Road in Hyderabad. The said firm deals, among other things in discounting cheques, issued either by the Government or by some recognised institutions. At 11.30 a.m. on 12th July, 1977, the Nawab presented a bearer cheque No. 466900 for Rs. 10,000 and it purported to have been issued on the Central Bank of India by the H.E.H. Nizam's Trust in favour of the Nawab. Keshavulu received it and discounted it for Rs. 9,950 and in his presence the Nawab signed on the back of the cheque and also on a certain register and slip maintained by Keshavulu in his shop. Keshavulu sent the cheque through his son Janardhana Rao for encashment to the Central Bank of India and Janardhana Rao was accompanied at that time by one Narayana Das. By about the time the cheque reached the Central Bank, the Nizam's Trust gave a complaint at Sultan Bazar Police Station allegating that one blank cheque was found missing from the Trust Office. The Sultan Bazaar Police registered that complaint in Crime No. 227 of 1977 under sections 420 and 411, Indian Penal Code. By about the time the cheque reached the Central Bank, the Nizam's Trust gave a complaint at Sultan Bazar Police Station allegating that one blank cheque was found missing from the Trust Office. The Sultan Bazaar Police registered that complaint in Crime No. 227 of 1977 under sections 420 and 411, Indian Penal Code. Meanwhile, the officials of the Central Bank suspected the genuineness of the Cheque No. 466900 and informed the Trust Office and the Sultan Bazar police people came to the Central Bank of India and took Janardhana Rao, into custody. Keshavulu also, on knowing about this incident at the Centra] Bank of India, reached the Bank and found that the cheque No. 466900, which he had earlier discounted in favour of the Nawab, was forged. He gave a complaint at the Abids Police Station against the Nawab and the Abids Police registered the same in Crime No. 161 of 1977 under section 420, Indian Penal Code. Ultimately, the Abids Police investigated into the case in both the Crime Nos. referred to above and filed a charge-sheet, against the Nawab in August, 1978, alleging offences under sections 419 , 420 , 467 and 411, Indian Penal Code. That charge-sheet was filed after the police referred the cheque to a Handwriting expert whose opinion is that the writing in the cheque is that of the Nawab. In the charge-sheet as many as 17 witnesses were cited by the Police and after going thorough the material, the Magistrate took the same on his file in C.C. No. 481 of 1978. 3. While the case was pending trial, several adjournments were taken by the Nawab on the ground that he was expecting Government's order to withdraw the prosecution against him. Keshavulu became alert and then filed his private complaint on 8th August, 1979 alleging the same facts and listing out the same witnesses’ as were mentioned by the police in the charge-sheet filed by the police. The Magistrate, without examining the complainant, kept it pending as S.R. No. 1867 of 1979 and posted it for counter and arguments to 13th August, 1979. He went an adjourning the complaint till 9th November, 1979 on which date he recorded the evidence of Keshavulu in the private complaint case. In the private complaint case, three other witnesses were examined on 18th November, 1979. He went an adjourning the complaint till 9th November, 1979 on which date he recorded the evidence of Keshavulu in the private complaint case. In the private complaint case, three other witnesses were examined on 18th November, 1979. As Keshavulu felt that if the Magistrate had passed any orders in C.C. No. 481 of 1979 permitting the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer to withdraw the case he would be prejudiced he applied meanwhile to the High Court in Crl.M.P. No. 1668 of 1979 for directions to be issued to the Magistrate under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, requiring him to proceed with his private complaint. Crl.M.P. No. 1668 of 1979 originally came before Muktadar, J., who referred the same to a Bench. The matter came before Madhu-sudan Rao and Amareswari, JJ., and the petition was disposed of by the said Bench on 28th September, 1979 and this Court held that it is for the Magistrate to deal with the application filed before him under section 321 , Criminal Procedure Code, but he cannot refuse to make any progress with the private complaint came till after he passed any orders on the application filed before him under section 321, Criminal Procedure Code. 4. The Magistrate passed the following order on 9th November, 1979 in C.C. No. 481 of 1979: (Only material portions extracted.) “As the Government of Andhra Pradesh, G.O.Rt. No. 2036, dated 18th July, 1979, have decided to withdraw the case and for which this Crl.M.P. is filed seeking permission of this Court, I accord premission for the same. In the result, the accused is acquitted as the case is withdrawn.” The G.O. referred to by the Magistrate reads in its material terms as follows: “Government have considered that the case of prosecution launched against Nawab Nadhir Ali Mirza (of Machilipatnam) in Crl.No. 161 of 1977 under section 420, Indian Penal Code of IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, is weak and have, therefore, decided that the same case should be withdrawn. The Collector, Hyderabad District is requested to instruct the Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, to take action under section 321, Criminal Procedure Code.” In the petition filed by the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer, the A.P.P.O. has stated: “In the abovementioned case it is submitted that the Government has decided to with draw the case and the same has been communicated in G.O.Rt. No. 2036, dated 18th July, 1979, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. It is therefore requested that permission may kindly be accorded to with draw the case under section 321, Criminal Procedure Code.” The de facto complainant who is faced with the difficulty of the acquittal of the Accused in C.C. No. 481 of 1979, had no other option but to question the correctness of the order of the Magistrate, dated 9th November, 1979 according permission to the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer to withdraw the prosecution against the Nawab. 5. Mr. Srikrishna, learned’ Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer in filing the memo, applying for withdrawal, did not exercise his discretion and he merely felt himself bound to follow the directions issued to him by the Government and he did not bring to bear his independent judgment on the facts of the case before he applied for withdrawal of the prosecution. It is also submitted that the passing of the G.O. by the Government is an attempt to interfere with the administration of criminal justice and it is not for the Government to decide whether the case is weak or not, but it is either for the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer to express such an opinion or for the Court to concur with that finding, if any, expressed by the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer. 6. The fact remains that in taking the charge-sheet on file in C.C. No. 481 of 1979 and in framing the charges against the Nawab, the Court was satisfied that there was enough material relied on by the prosecution to proceed against the Nawab. The material put forward by the prosecution consists of — (1) The Nawab handed over the cheque to P. W. 1 for being discounted; (2) the Nawab has appended his signature on the back of his cheque and has also signed on a register and a slip maintained by P.W. 1; (3) the signature of the drawer of the cheque is forged; (4) there was theft of a blank cheque from the office of the Ex-Nizam's Trust, and (5) the hand-writing in the cheque was found by the Government Hand-writing Expert to be in the hand-writing of the Nawab. One fails to understand how, in the face of such a material appearing against the accused, the Government could have said that the prosecution case as against the Nawab was weak. One cannot help forming the impression that the G.O. is a result of some influence brought on the Executive by the Nawab to withdraw the case. Assuming that the Government had its own reasons to have passed that G.O. the more important question is whether the Assistant Police Prosecuting Officer had applied his mind to the facts of the case before he applied for withdrawal of the prosecution case. The memo, filed by him which has been extracted above leaves no doubt whatsoever that he filed the memo as a matter of routine without bringing to bear his mind on the question whether the prosecution case was weak or not. If he had really applied his mind, he would not have applied for withdrawal of the prosecution case against the Nawab. 7. It is enough if reference is made to Bansi Lal v. Chandan Lal, (1976) 2 S.C.J. 35: (1976) MLJ. (Crl.) 357: (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 39: (1976) 1 S.C.C. 421 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 370. The de facto complainant in that case was Bansilal, Chandan Lal and a several others forcibly caught hold of Mewa Ram, the husband of Bansi Lal's sister and dragged him inside Chandan Lal's house. Several persons attempted to rescue Mewa Ram, but at that time one Baldeo Prasad and Sukh Lal who were inside Chandan Lal's house, closed the door from inside. One of the inmates of Chandan Lal's house, taking position on the roof of the house, was threatening crowd which collected outside Chandan Lal's house with a gun. The Police, on knowing about the incident, proceeded to Chandan Lal's house and found it to be closed from inside. Some one from the roof of the house started firing at the crowd and the police party killed one Rameswar. The police party entered into Chandan Lal's house and found the injured Mewa Ram and besides Chandan Lal, Baldeo Prasad and Sukh Lal and some others who were all arrested. On an application filed by the Public Prosecutor, the prosecution was allowed to withdraw the case against Sukh Lal by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, dated 7th July, 1974. Charges were framed against the other accused on 8th July, 1974. On an application filed by the Public Prosecutor, the prosecution was allowed to withdraw the case against Sukh Lal by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, dated 7th July, 1974. Charges were framed against the other accused on 8th July, 1974. On 18th November, 1974, the Public Prosecutor made an application before the Additional Sessions Judge praying for permission to withdraw the case against. Chandan Lal and Baldeo Prasad by stating that the prosecution is reluctant to prove its case against those two accused persons. The Additional Sessions Judge granted the permission and the High Court dismissed the revision filed by Bansilal at the stage of admission. Bansi Lal carried the matter to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court observed in this case: “The request to grant permission should not be accepted “as a necessarily formality”, “for the mere asking” but the Court must be satisfied “on the materials placed before it” that the grant of permission would serve the administration of justice and that permission was not being sought convertly with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law which the executive organs are in duty bound to further and maintain”. After referring to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in M.N. Sankaranarayanan Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan, 1972 Crl.L.J. 301: (1972) 2 S.C.R. 599 : (1974) 1 S.C.J. 84: (1974) MLJ. (Crl.) 1: (1974) L.W. (Crl.) 128: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 496, it was observed: “Though the section “does not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution, the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice………”. Though is not possible to catalogue all the circumstances in which this power can be exercised, by way of illustration M.N. Sankaranarayanan Nair's case1, mentions a few instances where the Public Prosecutor would be apparently justificated in seeking such permission, as in a case where the prosecution will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances”. In Subhash Chandra v. State (Chandigarh Administration, (1980) 1 S.C.J. 496: (1980) MLJ. In Subhash Chandra v. State (Chandigarh Administration, (1980) 1 S.C.J. 496: (1980) MLJ. (Crl.) 423: (1980) 2 S.C.R. 44 : 1980 Crl.L.J. 324: (1980) 2 S.C.C. 155 : (1980) L.W. (Crl.) 376: A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 423) the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the right of a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. Though in that case it was found on merits that the prosecution was withdraw for proper reasons, still the following observations made by the Supreme Court become apposite: “When a case is pending in a criminal Court, its procedure and progress are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code, or other relevant statute. To intercept and recall an enquiry or trial in a Court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the law, itself a violation of the law. Whatever needs to be done must be done in accordance with the law. The ‘function of administering justice, under our constitutions order, belongs to those entrusted with judicial power. One of the few exceptions to the uninterrupted flow of the Court's process is section 321, Criminal Procedure Code. But even here it is the Public Prosecutor, and not any executive authority, who is entrusted by the Code with the power to withdraw from a prosecution, and that also with the consent of the Court. We repeat for emphasis. To interdict, intercept or jettison an enquiry or trial in a Court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the Code itself, is lawlessness. The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the executive, however, high the accused, however, sure Government feels a case is false, however, unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers that he who wish to scuttle Court justice because of hurbis, affection or other noble or ignoble consideration, justicing, tender our constitutional order, belongs to the Judges”. “Once a prosecution is launched, its relentless course cannot be halted except on sound considerations germs to public justice. All public power is a public trust, and the Public Prosecutor cannot act save in discharge of that public trust, a public geared to public justice. The consent of the Court under section 321 as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of that power. All public power is a public trust, and the Public Prosecutor cannot act save in discharge of that public trust, a public geared to public justice. The consent of the Court under section 321 as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of that power. Consent will be given only if public justice in the larger sense is prompted rather than subverted by such withdrawal”. “The promotion of a law and order is an aspect of public justice. Grounds of public policy may call for withdrawal of the prosecution. A prosecution discovered to be false and vexatious cannot be allowed to proceed. The grounds cover a large canvass. But the power must be cautiously exercised, and the statutory agency to be satisfied is the Public Prosecutor in the first instance, not the Distrist Magistrate or other executive authority. Finally the consent of the Court is imperative.” “In the setting of the present facts, the enquiry must be whether the considerations on which the withdrawal was sought by the Assistant Public Prosecutor were germane and partinent, and whether the actual decision to withdraw was made by the Assistant Public Prosecutor or was the result of blind compliance with executive authority. If it appears from the material before the Court that germane or relevant considerations did not prompt the motion for withdrawal but it was that pressure of political influence, the Court will withhold its consent. The functionary clothed by the Code with the power withdraw from the prosecution is the Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor is not the executive, nor a flunkey of political power. Invested by the Statute, with a discretion to withdraw or not to withdraw, it is for him to apply an independent, mind and exercise his discretion. In doing so he acts as a limb of the judicative process not as an extension of the executive”. Having regard to the material made available by the prosecution in C.C. No. 481 of 1978 there cannot be doubt that the A. P. P. O. in this case has not applied his mind at all before applying for withdrawal of the prosecution. The Magistrate had also mechanically accepted the request made by the Public Prosecutor without exercising its own discretion whether, on the material, such permission ought to be refused. The Magistrate had also mechanically accepted the request made by the Public Prosecutor without exercising its own discretion whether, on the material, such permission ought to be refused. The order permitting the A. P. O. to withdraw from the prosecution made by the Magistrate in C.C. No. 481 of 1978 is palpably wrong and is accordingly set aside. The Magistrate is directed to take C.C. No. 481 of 1978 back-to his file. 8. The order passed by the Magistrate dismissing the complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, was based on two grounds. The first ground is that because he directed acquittal in C.C. No. 481 of 1978 the complainant cannot be allowed to proceed against the Nawab. Now that C.C. No. 48 of 1978 is ordered to be restored back to the file of the Magistrate, this ground given for dismissing the complaint goes. The Magistrate appears to have made a force of an appreciation of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 4. He has overlooked the fact that the complainant did nothing more than to repeat in his private complaint all the material averments made in the charge-sheet filed by the police and he listed out only those witnesses who were listed in the charge-sheet by the police. If only the Magistrate had applied his mind to the circumstances in which Keshavulu felt the need to file the private complaint, he would have desisted passing any order of acquittal in C.C. No. 481 of 1978 and should have proceeded to try to private complaint case. Same material relied on by Keshavulu is such that it is impossible to justify the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code. The said order is also set aside and the Magistrate is directed to restore C.F. No. 1867 of 1979, back to his file, number it as C. C. and proceed to make further enquiry into that case. To avoid any embarrassment to the Magistrate as the Police, are likely to take any further interest in going on with the prosecuting in C.C. No. 481 of 1978, the Magistrate is directed to keep the said C.C. pending on his file till he completes the trial in the case registered on the private complaint. 9. Both the revisions are accordingly allowed. G.S.M. ----- Revisions allowed.