JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This second appeal by the administration of the North Eastern Railway is directed against the decree of the Second Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, passed on appeal from the decree of the Court of the Second Additional Munsif, Gorakhpur, in Suit No. 979 of 1968. 2. The plaintiff-respondent was employed as a casual labour. His services were terminated by a notice, dated 23 May, 1968. He challenged the notice terminating his service on a number of grounds mentioned in Cls. (a) to (d) of Para. 6 of the plaint. The relief claimed in the suit was for a declaration that the said notice, dated 23 May 1968, terminating the plaintiff's service as a khalasi, was unconstitutional and not binding on the plaintiff and that he continued in service. A mandatory Injunction for reinstatement of the plaintiff in service and for payment of his salary was also claimed. 3. The trial Court framed the following issues, namely : (1) Whether the order, dated 23 May 1968, terminating the plaintiff's service from the post of khalasi is illegal, unconstitutional and not binding on the plaintiff and he still continues to be in service of the department for the reasons given in Para. 6 of the plaint ? (2) Whether the Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit ? (3) Whether the suit is barred by S. 34 of the States Reorganisation Act? (4) Whether the notice relied upon under S. 80, Civil Procedure Code, is invalid and illegal? If so its effect. (5) To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled ? The second issue was decided by a preliminary judgement against the defendant on 6 November 1970. On issue (4) the trial Court held that the notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was invalid. issue (3) was decided against the defendant, and on issue (1) the trial Court held that two of the requirements of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, namely, (1) one month's notice indicating the reasons for termination of service ; and (2) the payment of retrenchment compensation, were not satisfied in the present case and, therefore, the order terminating the plaintiff's service was bad in law. In view of its finding on issue (4) that the notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was bad in law, the trial Court dismissed the suit. In view of its finding on issue (4) that the notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was bad in law, the trial Court dismissed the suit. 4. The decision of the trial Court about the invalidity of the notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was reversed by this Court on second appeal and the matter was remanded to the lower appellate Court and after remand the three points raised before the lower appellate Court were: (1) Whether the suit was cognizable by a civil Court ; (2) whether the order of termination was hit by Art 16 of the Constitution of India; and (3) whether the order was rendered invalid and unenforceable because of the non-compliance of the provisions of Para. 149 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code, Vol. 1, or in other words the provisions of Sections 25F and 28G of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. The lower appellate Court in its judgment took notice of the decision of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles, Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others, (1976-I L. L. N. 1), yet it held that the suit was maintainable spite of the fact that the ground on which the termination of the plaintiff's service was challenged was a violation of the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant urged before me that the case that the termination of the plaintiff's service was bad for violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act had been given up by an amendment of the plaint and that the only ground on which the notice terminating the services of the plaintiff was challenged was violation of the provisions of Para. 149 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code; and that being so it is the second principle laid down in Premier Automobiles case [1976-I L. L. N. 1] (vide supra), which is applicable and not the third principle. 7. A perusal of Cl. (6) of Para. 149 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code, Vol. 1, shows that notwithstanding anything contained in Cls. 7. A perusal of Cl. (6) of Para. 149 of the Indian Railways Establishment Code, Vol. 1, shows that notwithstanding anything contained in Cls. (1), (2) and (4) of the rules prescribed by that paragraph, if the railway servant is one to whom the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, apply, he shall be entitled to notice or wage in lieu thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and not in accordance with the provisions of rules (1), (2) and (4) of Para. 149. It could not be disputed that in the present case the plaintiff, was a railway employee to whom the provisions, of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were applicable. He had himself claimed relief on the basis of a violation of the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the trial Court had even found that there was a violation of that provision. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff's case was clearly governed by the third principle laid down in Premier Automobiles case (1976-I L. L. N. 1] (vide supra), namely, that if the Industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under that Act and a suit in a civil Court is barred. It is indisputable that the dispute in the present case having arisen after the amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Introduction of S. 2A, the plaintiff could clearly claim relief under the provisions of that Act. The principle laid down by this Court in Bechan Ram v. Union of India and others, (Second Appeal No. 103 of 1968), relied upon by the lower appellate Court is accordingly not applicable to the present case. 8. In the result it must be held that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and that was the only substantial question of law on which this second appeal was admitted by this Court after hearing under Order 4l, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No other point survives for consideration. 9. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decree under appeal are set aside. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed but in the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.