ORDER R R Rastogi, J. - The State of Uttar Pradesh has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The brief facts are that a notice under Section 10 (2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (hereafter 'the Act') was issued to one Buddh Singh. He contested that notice. Some surplus land was declared, possession of which was taken. He died on 2-10-1978. He had executed a will bequeathing his holding to his grandson Jaspal Singh. After his death notice under Section 10 (2) read with Section 29 of the Act was issued to his son, Kabul Singh, respondent No. 2 in which it was proposed to declare 2.13 hectares irrigated land as surplus. Kabul Singh contested that notice and filed an objection. He also filed an objection on behalf of his minor son Jaspal Singh, respondent No. 3. The objection taken was that the land bequeathed by late Buddh Singh to his minor grandson Jaspal Singh could not be clubbed with the holding of Kabul Singh. This contention did not find favour with the Prescribed Authority and, by its order dated 31-3-1979, it confirmed the notice. From that decision two appeals were filed, one by Kabul Singh for self and the other as guardian of his minor son. These appeals were taken together by the 1st Additional District Judge, Nainital and he took the view that the land acquired by Jaspal Singh as a result of the will from his grandfather was held by him in his own right and could not be clubbed with the holding of his father and if that land was excluded, Kabul Singh had no surplus land. In the result both the appeals were allowed. This petition has been preferred against that decision. 2. It was submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that the learned appellate Court took a wrong view of Section 29-A of the Act. In the result both the appeals were allowed. This petition has been preferred against that decision. 2. It was submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that the learned appellate Court took a wrong view of Section 29-A of the Act. The legatee being minor on the date of devolution of this property on him, he cannot be treated as a tenure-holder thereof within the meaning of this expression as defined in Section 3 (17), and it would be taken that it was his father who was its tenure-holder and because of this accretion to his holding as a result of which there was surplus land in his hand, action could be taken to redetermine the ceiling and surplus areas under Section 29-A. On the other hand it, was submitted on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3 that firstly Section 29-A speaks of succession and not of testamentary disposition and secondly that it can be invoked only when any land has come to be held by tenure-holder under a decree or order of any Court or as a result of succession or transfer or by adverse possession and not by a member of his family. I am not inclined to agree with the learned counsel. 3. Section 29 (a) in so far as it is relevant for the present purpose reads : "Where after the date of enforcement of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972- (a) any land has come to be held by a tenure-holder under a decree or order of any Court, or as a result of succession or transfer, or by prescription in consequence of adverse possession, and such land together with the land already held by him exceeds the ceiling area applicable to him or (b) ................. the ceiling area shall be liable to be redetermined and accordingly the provisions of this Act, except Section 16 shall mutatis mutandis apply". According to the learned counsel for the respondents Clause (a) refers to succession simpliciter, that is, intestate succession. It does not refer to testamentary disposition and in this behalf my attention was invited to the Indian Succession Act to illustrate that there is an essential difference between intestate succession and testamentary succession. According to the learned counsel for the respondents Clause (a) refers to succession simpliciter, that is, intestate succession. It does not refer to testamentary disposition and in this behalf my attention was invited to the Indian Succession Act to illustrate that there is an essential difference between intestate succession and testamentary succession. It is no doubt correct that there is essential difference between intestate succession and testamentary succession but there is no justification for contending that reference to succession in Clause (a) above is confined to intestate succession and not to testamentary succession. The Indian Succession Act is a consolidating Act. It consolidates the law applicable to intestate and testamentary succession as will be clear from its preamble. In other words, it is an exhaustive enactment of the Legislature in respect of intestate and testamentary succession. However, there is no justification for saying that when the word succession is used it will necessarily refer to intestate succession and would not embrace within its scope testamentary succession also. Succession is a process by which one person succeeds another in the occupation or possession of any estate or some other position. It is an act or fact of succeeding, according to custom or law, to the rights and liabilities of a predecessor, the conditions or principles in accordance with which this is done (vide the Shorter Oxford Dictionary on Historical Principles Volume II page 2067). In other words, succession imports the act of becoming entitled to the possession and enjoyment of some legal estate or privilege. Succession may be intestate succession. It may also be by the mode of a testament. Testamentary disposition or succession is pertaining to or having relation to a testament or a will. A will is an act of making a voluntary posthumous disposition of property. It is a declaration in a prescribed manner of the intention of the person making it with regard to the matters which he wishes to take effect upon or after his death. It would thus be seen that intestate succession takes place in accordance with personal law, local usage or customary or legislative enactment, while testamentary disposition takes place as a result of a will or a testament. By making a will the testator seeks to limit the mode and line of succession. It would thus be seen that intestate succession takes place in accordance with personal law, local usage or customary or legislative enactment, while testamentary disposition takes place as a result of a will or a testament. By making a will the testator seeks to limit the mode and line of succession. The effect is the same and it is the passing of property, right or a privilege from one to his successor. Thus what I mean to show is that the scope of the word 'succession' occurring in Clause (a) aforesaid cannot be confined to intestate succession. It would embrace within its ambit testamentary succession as well and thus if any land has come to be held by a tenure-holder as a result of testamentary disposition and such land together with the land already held by him exceeds the ceiling limit applicable to him, then action can be taken under this provision. 4. This takes me to the other part of the argument of the learned counsel that the word tenure-holder should be confined to the individual and not to the unit referred to in Section 5 (3). According to the learned counsel clubbing of the land held by the members of the family is permitted only under sub-section (3) of Section 5 and it cannot be extended to invoke Section 29. I do not find any merit in this contention either, because tenure-holder as defined in sub-section (17) of Section 3 means "a person who is holder of a holding, but except in Chapter III does not include:- (a) a woman whose husband is a tenure-holder, (b) a minor child whose father or mother is the tenure-holder". In the instant case since Kabul Singh was a tenure-holder his minor son Jaspal Singh cannot be treated as tenure-holder of the holding which devolved on him from his grandfather. For the purposes of Section 5 (3) the appointed date is the 8th of June, 1973. No tenure-holder in the State can, as on that date, hold any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. For the purposes of Section 5 (3) the appointed date is the 8th of June, 1973. No tenure-holder in the State can, as on that date, hold any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. It is not disputed that as on 8th of June, 1973 if there is a minor holding some agricultural land in his own right and his father is also a tenure-holder, then the land held by the minor will be included in the the holding of the father for the purpose of determining the ceiling area applicable to him. The question is as to whether the same can be done when the cause of action arises for taking action under Section 29. The appointed date for that purpose will be the date of accretion. In the present case thus the relevant date would be the date of death of Buddh Singh because the will take effect on that date. It was after the death of Buddh Singh that Jaspal Singh became the holder of the land bequeathed to him. Now on that date also he was a minor and in view of the definition of the word tenure-holder discussed above, he cannot be treated as a tenure-holder of this land because his father was the tenure-holder. In my opinion the expression tenure-holder in Clause (a) of Section 29 as well refers to the unit and not to the individual and on the date relevant for invoking this provision as wefq the same position will obtain as obtained in regard to the determination of ceiling area applicable to the tenure-holder on 8th of June, 1973. On this view, the land held by Jaspal Singh would have to be clubbed with the holding of his father for determining the ceiling area applicable to him and the contrary view taken by the appellate Court is manifestly erroneous in law. 5. It was also submitted by learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 that since the legal aspect is not free from doubt it cannot be said that the view taken by the appellate Count suffers from any manifest error of law so as to justify interference by this Court in writ petition. 5. It was also submitted by learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3 that since the legal aspect is not free from doubt it cannot be said that the view taken by the appellate Count suffers from any manifest error of law so as to justify interference by this Court in writ petition. I am not impressed with this contention either because, as discussed above, in my opinion the position is clear and on the relevant date Jaspal Singh being minor the land held by him has to be clubbed with the holding of his father for the purposes of this Act and certainly the view taken by the appellate Court is manifestly erroneous in law and requires interference by this Court. 6. In view of the above discussion, this petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order of the appellate Court is quashed while that of the Prescribed Authority is restored. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.