S.C. AGRAWAL, J.— This special appeal has been filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, against the order of the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No 1182 of 1981, whereby the writ petition submitted by the appellant has been dismissed. 2. In the writ petition aforesaid, the appellant had challenged the validity of the proceedings for the acquisition of certain lands, initiated under the provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act") and had prayed that the notifications (annexed as Annexures 3 and 4 to the writ petition) which had been issued under Sections 52(2) and 52(1) respectively of the Act, be declared void and be quashed The said writ petition related to a plot of land measuring 75 x 90, situated in Survey No. 421 in Tehsil-Sikar. Yuvrani Trilokay Rajyalakshmi Devi, widow of late Raj Kumar, Shri Hirdayal Singh of Sikar, was the owner of Survey No. 49!, measuring 11 Bighas and 12 Biswas. A plot of land measuring 75* x 90 out of the said survey number was purchased by the appellant from the aforesaid Yuvrani Trilokya Rajyalakshmi Devi under a sale deed, dated March 2, 1967. After the execution of the aforesaid sale-deed, notification dated March 15, 1978 was issued under Section 52 (2) of the Act and all the lands in Survey No. 421 were covered by the said notification. The said notification was followed by another notification dated April 18, 1981, issued under sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the Act. By the aforesaid notification, it was notified that the land mentioned in Survey No. 421 would vest in the State from the date of the publication of the said notification. The aforesaid notification dated April 18. 1981 was published in the Gazette, dated April 21, 1981. After the aforesaid notification had been issued, a notice, dated June 17, 1981, was issued under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the Act and by the said notice, the appellant was asked to deliver possession of the plot in dispute within 30 days and she was informed that on her failure to do so, forcible possession of the land would be taken under subsection (6) of Section 52. By another notice dated June 17, 1981, the appellant was informed that she could approach the concerned authorities for the settlement of compensation amount to be paid to her for her plot The aforesaid notice was issued under sub-section (3) of Section 53 of the Act. Aggrieved by the notifications and the notices referred to above, the appellant filed the aforesaid writ petition in this Court. 3. In support of the aforesaid writ petition, the following contentions were urged on behalf of the appellant before the learned Single Judge :- (i) Besides their publication in the Official Gazette the impugned notifications (Annexures 3 and 4) should also have been pasted on a conspicuous part of the locality and that the said notices should also have been served personally on the appellant and since both the steps were not taken the appellant had no knowledge of the commencement of the proceedings and she could not make representations in time and, therefore, she had been deprived of the valuable right of submitting her representation. (ii) In the notification (Annexure 3), the name of the petitioner has not been shown in column No. 3 which relates to the name of the person interested in accordance with the revenue records. (iii) No proper scheme has been framed and published and, therefore, the lands could not be acquired. All the aforesaid contentions urged on behalf of the appellant have been rejected by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has held that the transfer of the land in dispute in favour of the appellant was void inasmuch as it was made in contravention of the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 which prohibits transfers, either by way of sale, gift or bequest, by a Khatedar tenant of a part of his interest in his holding in a survey number except in certain circumstances and that the appellant could not claim any right or title in the plot of land in dispute and, therefore, she has no locus standi to file the writ petition. The learned Single Judge further held that even it be held that the sale in favour of the appellant is valid, since the land had not been mutated in favour of the appellant, the authorities were well within their right to place reliance on the entries made in the revenue records and that the appellant was not entitled to any notice under s. 52 (2) of the Act, and that the failure on the part of the authorities to give personal notice to the appellant did not invalidate the impugned notifications. The learned Single Judge also held that the notifications that had been published in the Gazette of September 9, 1976 (Part IV Ka page 25), September 12, 1972 (Part IV page 25) and April 23, 1981 (Part IV Ka page 1) that had been issued under Section 32 of the Act read with Annexures 3 and 4 reveal that housing scheme has been prepared by the Urban Improvement Trust and that the same had been approved of by the State. The learned Single Judge observed that the impugned notification (Annexures 3 and 4) show that the site shall be utilised for development of Abadi and that was sufficient for acquisition. While dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge has, however, observed that if the Urban Improvement, Trust, Sikar, decides to make allotment of the lands in dispute, the appellants case may be considered sympathetically according to law if she chooses to make an application for such allotment provided her case falls within the categories permitted either under the scheme or under the Act. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant has filed this special appeal. 4. We have heard Shri N.L. Tibrewal, the learned counsel for the appellant and Shri M R. Singhvi, the learned counsel for respondent No. 3, the Municipal Board, Sikar. 5. During the course of his arguments, Shri Tibrewal did not challenge the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the sale-deed executed in favour of the appellant was void inasmuch as it was made in contravention of the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 5. During the course of his arguments, Shri Tibrewal did not challenge the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the sale-deed executed in favour of the appellant was void inasmuch as it was made in contravention of the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The submission of Shri Tibrewal, however, was that even if the said sale deed is held to be void, the appellant is a person interested for the purpose of the Act and, therefore, she is entitled to maintain the writ petition to challenge the impugned notifications with regard to the acquisition of the land in dispute. In support of his aforesaid submission, Shri Tibrewal has submitted that in Section 2 (ix) of the Act, it is laid down that the expression "person interested" shall have the same meaning as has been assigned to it in Section 3 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, and that under Section 3(b) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, the expression person interested" has been defined to include all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of acquisition of the land under the said Act. According to Shri Tibrewal, in order to be a person interested, a person need not have any interest in the land and therefore, the mere fact that the sale-deed that was executed in favour of the appellant, is void and the appellant did not acquire any interest in the land that was sold under the said sale-deed, does not mean that she was not a person interested because the appellant is a person having an interest in the compensation to be paid for the land. In support of his aforesaid submission, Shri Tibrewal has placed reliance on the decision of Madras High Court in Siva Pratapa Bhattodu vs. A.E.L. Mission (1) and the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sunderlal vs. Paramsukhdas (2) and General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Sh. Wahab Uddin (3). 6. In support of his aforesaid submission, Shri Tibrewal has placed reliance on the decision of Madras High Court in Siva Pratapa Bhattodu vs. A.E.L. Mission (1) and the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sunderlal vs. Paramsukhdas (2) and General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Sh. Wahab Uddin (3). 6. In Siva Pratapa vs. A.E.L Mission (supra), the Madras High Court, while dealing with the provisions contained in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which are pari materia with Section 3(b) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953, has laid down that the definition of •person interested" contained in Section 3(b) does not contemplate that a person interested need have a legal interest in the land, because, it specifically alludes to interest in the compensation to be made and that it has frequently been held that a person may be interested within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act without holding any legal estate in the land. In the said case it was held that an attaching decree-holder who seeks to satisfy his claim out of the land is certainly interested in the compensation that has to be paid for that land, as it is a matter of considerable importance to him that a sufficient amount of compensation should be paid in order that he may be able to satisfy his decree, and therefore, an attaching decree-holder is a person interested in the land within the meaning of the Act. 7. In Sunderlal vs. Paramsukhdas (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the question whether a person having a decree against owner of the land under acquisition, could be said to be a person interested for the purpose of proceedings under Sections 20 and 21 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894. The Supreme Court held that the decree-holder was a person interested in the objections which are made in the reference made to the Court and which is pending before it and was also a person whose interest was affected by the decision on the objections and he was accordingly entitled to be made a party. 8. 1894. The Supreme Court held that the decree-holder was a person interested in the objections which are made in the reference made to the Court and which is pending before it and was also a person whose interest was affected by the decision on the objections and he was accordingly entitled to be made a party. 8. In General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society vs. Shri Wahab Uddin (supra), it was held that a tenant, though not in possession, but whose right to recover the land is not barred by limitation and whose interest in the land is not extinguished under Section 45(b) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, was a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1854, and as such, had locus standi to file writ petition for challenging the acquisition proceedings. 9. In our view, a distinction has to be drawn between a person having an interest in the compensation and who is treated as a person interested for the purpose of Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act and a person having interest in the land. A person interested in the compensation would be entitled to have a say in the matter of fixation of quantum of compensation and in the apportionment thereof. But he cannot have any say in the matter of validity of the acquisition proceedings inasmuch as he cannot be said to be a person having an interest in the land. The provisions contained in Sections 52 and 53 of the Act also land support to the aforesaid view. Section 52 makes provision with regard to compulsory acquisition of land and Section 53 makes provision for compensation to be paid for the land which is compulsory acquired under Sec. 52 of the Act. Under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 52 of the Act, an obligation has been placed upon the State Government to issue a notice before publishing a notice under sub-sec. (1) calling upon the owner of the land and any other person who in the opinio a of the State Government may be interested therein to show cause, within such time as may be specified in the notice, why the land should not be acquired, and lays down that such notice shall be individually served upon the owner of the land and any other person who, in the opinion of the State Government may be interested therein. Similarly, in sub-section (3) of Section 52, it is laid down that within the time specified in the notice, the owner of the land or any other person interested therein, may show cause and make objections, why the land should not be acquired In our opinion, the use of the word "therein" after the expression "person interested" indicates that only a person having an interest in the land is entitled to raise objections against the acquisition of land under Section 52 of the Act and a person who only claims interest in the compensation but has no interest in the land, cannot be said to be a person who is entitled to raise any objection to the acquisition proceedings. In our opinion, therefore, the decision of the Madras High Court in Siva Pratapa vs. A E.L. Mission (supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sunderlal vs. Paramsukh (supra) which related to the rights of a person interested in compensation to participate in the proceedings with regard to determination of compensation, do not lead assistance to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has the locus standi to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in General Government Servants Housing Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Sh. Wahab Uddin (supra), it may be observed that in that case, the Supreme Court had found that the interest of the tenant who had filed the writ petition to challenge the acquisition proceedings had not ceased in the land inasmuch as his right to recover the land was not birred by limitation and his interest in the said land had not been extinguished under Section 45(b) of the U.P. Tenancy Act He was, therefore, a person having an interest in the land and for that reason, he was held to be a person entitled to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings. The said decision is, thus, not applicable to the present case, because, here, it cannot be said that the appellant has an interest in the land. The learned Single Judge was, in our opinion, right in taking the view that the appellant has no locus standi to challenge the impugned notifications (Annexures 3 and 4) relating to the acquisition of the land in dispute. 10. The learned Single Judge was, in our opinion, right in taking the view that the appellant has no locus standi to challenge the impugned notifications (Annexures 3 and 4) relating to the acquisition of the land in dispute. 10. Shri Tibrewal has next contended that the appellant has been in peaceful possession of the land in dispute and that she had acquired possessory title on the same and. that even if the sale deed executed in her favour is held to be void, the appellant has acquired an interest in the land in dispute by virtue of possessory title. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention In the absence of acquisition of title by prescription, possession, by itself, does not confer any title on the person in possession over the property in his possession. The expression "possessory title" is generally used to refer to the right of a person in peaceful possession to defend his possession till he is dispossessed from the same in accordance with law, and it does not mean that the person in possession has acquired an interest in the land which would give him the right to challenge the proceedings for the acquisition of the said land. 11. Shri Tibrewal has lastly submitted that by virtue of her uninterrupted possession over the plot of land purchased by her for a period exceeding 12 years, the appellant has acquired title over the said plot of land by prescription inasmuch as the possession over the land should be treated as adverse to that of the owner. In our view, the question as to whether the appellant has acquired title over the land in dispute by adverse possession is a matter involving investigation into facts which cannot be decided in these proceedings and in the absence of the real owner, we cannot proceed on the assumption that the appellant has acquired title over the plot of land in dispute by adverse possession for a period exceeding 12 years. In our view, therefore, the appellant cannot be said to be a person having an interest in the land in dispute and she has, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the validity of the proceedings for acquisition of the land in dispute. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order, passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. This special appeal is therefore, dismissed summarily.