JUDGMENT.- The first plaintiff is the appellant in the second appeal which arises out of O. S. No. 124 of 1977 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Tenkasi. He along with the second plaintiff filed the said suit for a declaration of his possession and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and enjoyment. 2. The plaint averments are as under: The plaint property along with some other properties originally belonged to the Vavasimithi Pillai alias Mohideen Mithi Pillai Rowther. They were gifted on 1st September, 1943, by Vavasimithi Pillai alias Mohideen Mithi Pillai Rowther in favour of the second plaintiff, who is none other than his daughter (Exhibit A-1). The second plaintiff accepted the gift. In fact, the patta was also transferred in her name. The first plaintiff is the husband of the second plaintiff. The second plaintiff executed a deed of gift in favour of the first plaintiff on 8th December, 1976 (Exhibit A-4). On and from the date of the gift deed, the first plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the properties. The defendants 1 and 2 are the sons of the plaintiffs. They sent a notice to the first plaintiff questioning the validity of Exhibit A-4 and stating that the alleged deed of gift in favour of the second plaintiff by Vavasimithi Pillai alias Mohideen Mithi Pillai Rowther was not an absolute gift, that on the contrary, it is a wakf under which they had been made the Huqdars and that, therefore, no title or interest could pass under Exhibit A-4. To this, a reply was issued by the first plaintiff on 19thApril, 1977, denying these allegations. The plaintiffs contended that in as much as a cloud was sought to be cast over the title of the first plaintiff, it had become necessary for him to prefer the suit, and since there was also a threat from the defendants to destroy the standing crops the prayer for injunction is asked for, 3. In the written statement, it was averred that the suit was not maintainable. The deed dated 1st September, 1943, viz., Exhibit A-1, is a wakf settlement. The first schedule property in Exhibit A-l is given for “Rasool Ulla Mavullah Sheriff Dharmam”. In the written statement, it was averred that the suit was not maintainable. The deed dated 1st September, 1943, viz., Exhibit A-1, is a wakf settlement. The first schedule property in Exhibit A-l is given for “Rasool Ulla Mavullah Sheriff Dharmam”. Out of the income from the first schedule property, the funeral ceremony of Vavasimithi Pillai and the annual ceremony of fateha should be performed permanently. Only the remaining income was to be taken by the Huqdars. The object of the wakf is a lawful one. The properties mentioned in the wakf have not been given by way of a gift. Apart from this, the deed of wakf also contained a restraint on alienation. Therefore, under Exhibit A-4, no title passed in favour of the first plaintiff. The said deed of gift is null and void. 4. An additional written statement was also filed stating that after the death of the second plaintiff on 21st August, 1978, the first plaintiff has no right to proceed with the suit. Hence, the suit abates. The right of succession did not subsist. The mode of devolution has been delineated in the deed of wakf, namely, Exhibit A-1. 5. The learned District Munsif, on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit the first plaintiff preferred an appeal in A. S. No. 122 of 1980 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tirunelveli. The learned Subordinate Judge, concurring with the findings of the trial court, dismissed the appeal. Hence, against this concurring judgment, the present second appeal has been preferred. 6. Mr. Abdul Hadi, the learned counsel for the appellant, urges the following points for my consideration: (1) If a careful reading of Exhibit A-4 is done, it is very clear that what has been stipulated under the terms of the document was only a Moulet. In the instant case, we are concerned with the property forming the first schedule to this document, and in so far as the Moulet would consist of recitation of Koran unaccompanied by any other. Shortly, it would not constitute a valid object of the wakf. Even otherwise, the wakf is illusory, having regard to the fact that only a sum of Rs. 25/- has been directed to be spent on the same. Shortly, it would not constitute a valid object of the wakf. Even otherwise, the wakf is illusory, having regard to the fact that only a sum of Rs. 25/- has been directed to be spent on the same. As a matter of fact, the founder of the wakf himself has contemplated such a situation and he was to enjoy the remaining income, and after his death, the income was to be taken over by the daughter, and thereafter by her heirs. Therefore, having regard to the dominant object of the author of the wakf, it made provision only for the maintenance of the members of his family. (2) Mere recitation of Koran would not constitute wakf is evident from a reading of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Kunhamutty v. Ahmad Mubaliah1. (3) The Mussalman Wakf Validating Act also cannot be of any assistance to the defendants, because of the proviso contained to section 3 of the Act. In similar circumstances, it was held so in- Mohiuddin Ahmed v. Sofia Khatun2, T. Mayil Ammal v. Pappa3 is a direct authority which goes a long way to help the appellant. In this case, it was stated there mere recitation of Koran over the tomb of a person would not amount to a valid object of the wakf The decision in Sukunthala v. Rasheedunnissa4, is an authority for the proposition that where the disposition for the benefit of the poor was to be operative after the extinction of all the heirs of the wakif's daughter, the disposition is too remote and in, therefore, not moved by section 4 of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913. Having regard to the above, the judgments of the Courts below, though concurrent, require to be set aside. 7. Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan, the learned counsel for the respondents, urges first and foremost that the deed or wakf Exhibit A-1 should be read as a whole. As far as the first schedule is concerned, apart from the moulet for which at least a minimum of Rs. 25/. has to be spent per year, there is also the requirement to perform fateha at the time of the death anniversary of the found. “Fateha”, as had been understood in Ramanathan Chettiar v. Vada Levvai Marak kayar1, would mean distribution of alms to the poor during the celebrations. 25/. has to be spent per year, there is also the requirement to perform fateha at the time of the death anniversary of the found. “Fateha”, as had been understood in Ramanathan Chettiar v. Vada Levvai Marak kayar1, would mean distribution of alms to the poor during the celebrations. Therefore, even though such a fateha has to be done after the death of the founder, having regard to the dominant intention and further having regard to the styling of the deed itself, clearly this is a deed of the wakf. In fact, in Abdul Sattar Ismail v. Abdul Hamid Sait2, this Court has taken the view after referring to Kunhamutty v. Ahmad Muballah3, that the recital of Koran is also a valid object of a wakf. The decision in V. M. Mohin v. Wakf Board, Madras4, is a clear authority on point. That was also a case of wakf-alal-aulad, and there was a prohibition against alienation. A similar term is found in Exhibit A-4. The deed is a styled as wakf. All this would clearly point out that it is only a wakf and not a deed of gift as is contended by the other side. In view of this, there cannot be any difficulty in uphelding the judgments of the Courts below. 8. Having regard to the above contentions, It is necessary to analyse the terms of Exhibit A-1 in some detail. (1) The first thing that would strike anyone is that it is styled as a deed of wakf settlement. Even thereafter, mentioning the purpose for which the document is written, it is again stated that it is a wakf settlement. It is true that the nomenclature by itself is not conclusive of the character of the deed. But I am only referring to it as one piece of evidence. Be that so. (2) Coming to the terms of the document, what is seen is, during his lifetime, the author of the wakf himself remained a Huqdar, and in the first schedule house, moulet has to performed. For that purpose a minimum sum of Rs. 25/- has to be spent. (3) the author of this document himself clearly says that this property shall not be encumbered or alienated by any person. For that purpose a minimum sum of Rs. 25/- has to be spent. (3) the author of this document himself clearly says that this property shall not be encumbered or alienated by any person. Likewise after his death, the daughter was required to be the Huqdar and she was to enjoy the property during her lifetime without erecting any encumbrance whatsoever and from out of the income, she has to perform moulet. (4) Then comes another important requirement, viz., that after the death of the author. Fateha has to be performed. There again, it is reiterated that as stipulated above, the property shall not be either alienated or encumbered in any manner. It is only the income that has to be spent for these purposes. (5) Lastly, it is stated in the document that in the event of there being no heirs to the daughter or there being no male heirs in the succeeding generations, it will be open to the female heirs or the descendants to be the huqdars and perform the above, viz., moulet as well as fateha. Therefore, by a reading of these clauses together and not in isolation, the only impression that could be gained is that the dominant idea of the deed was to create a wakf and not merely to make a provision for the heirs or the descendants as is sought to be contended by the appellant. 9. I will take up the question as to whether moulet would constitute a valid object of the wakf. In “Principles of Mahomedan Law ” by Mulla (Seventeenth Edition) section 178 (page 173), in cataloguing the valid objects of the wakf, it is stated at page 174 (item 11), “residing the Koran in public places, and also at private houses”. However, what is relied on, by Mr. Abdul Hadi, the learned counsel for the appellant, is a ruling of this Court in Kunhamutty v. Ahmad Musaliar5, That case was a decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Beasley, C. J. and King, J. holding that the dedication of certain properties for the purpose of reciting Koran over the tomb of a private person would not constitute a valid wakf. The learned Judges further held that though the proviso to section 3 of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act (VI of 1913), stated that the object must be considered as a religious, pious or charitable purpose of a permanent character, the words “or charitable” would not be a disjunctive clause, and ultimately, it is concluded at page 31: ‘In our view, it is quite clear that the dedication in question being merely for the purpose of reciting the Koran over a tomb of a private person did not create a valid wakf….” Certainly, in so far as it supports the case of the appellant, he is entitled to rely upon the said decision. The one important feature which cannot be lost sight of is that it did not remain with mentioning only moulet. As I said above, there is also a further requirement to perform fateha. The reason why I say that this constitutes an important point is that the very ruling cited above, refers to Kale Foula Sahib v. Nuseeruddin Sahib1, wherein fateha was also contemplated. That distinction is brought out at page 30 by the learned Judges. This apart,” Principles of Mohamedan Law “by Mulla (Seventeenth Edition), section 178 (page 174) itself refers to performance of annual fateha of the settlor and the members of his family as a valid object of the wakf. The direct case concerning this is Ramanathan Chettiar v. Vada Levvai Marakayar2, which is also a ruling of a Division Bench. There it was held that the performance of fateha (distribution of alms to the poor accompanied with prayers for the welfare of the soul of the deceased persons), which so far as it involves the expenditure of any money, consists in feeding the poor, is a valid object of wakf. When the learned counsel for the respondents strongly relied on this ruling, an attempt was made by the learned counsel for the appellant to contend that fateha does not invariably include the distribution of alms to the poor. This means I will have to ascertain the correct meaning of fateha. Wilsons Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms states as follows: “FATHIA, corruptly, FATTAHA, FATHEH and FATEEAH, an opening, commencement. This means I will have to ascertain the correct meaning of fateha. Wilsons Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms states as follows: “FATHIA, corruptly, FATTAHA, FATHEH and FATEEAH, an opening, commencement. The first SURA or chapter of the Koran, which being read for the benefit of dying Mohammadens, the word has come, in India, to signify prayers offered up for defunct persons on different days after their death, Accompanied by Alms and Distribution of Food as Fatiha-chaharam, on the twentieth, etc. also oblations and offerings to saints, and a variety of prayers and ceremonies used at marriages and funerals, including one observed by women in commemoration of Fatima, the daughter of Mohammed, called the Fatiha Sahnak, from Sahnak, a dish, sweatmenta in small vessels being distributed to the female assistants “(Italics supplied): Therefore, it is too late in the day to contend that Fateha is not accompanied by giving of alms to the poor. In fact, in one of the later decisions of this Court in Abdul Sattar Ismail v. Abdul Hamid Sait3, the question arose whether the reading of Koran in public places and, also at private houses would constitute a valid object of the wakf. The learned Judges held at page 100. “The fourth object is the reading of the Koren in public placed and also at private houses. Here the plaintiff relies on the judgment of Stanley, C. J., in Mozher Hussain Khan v. Abdul Hadi Khan4, and the judgment of this Court in Kunhankutty v. Ahmad Musallah5. In the former case, Banerji, J. held that where a substantial portion of the income of the property was devoted to the wakf expenses of burning lamps in a mosque and the salary of Hafiz and readers of the Koran the wakf was valid. Stanley, CJ. doubted the validity of such a foundation. In the second case this Court held that the dedication of property for the purpose of providing funds for the recitation of Koran over the tomb of a private person, although he be a descendant of the Prophet did not create a valid wakf. On the other hand, the defendants rely upon the provisions of the Wakf Validating Act and the following passage to be found in Ameer Ali's work on Mohammaden Law Vo. I. P. 273) 11. On the other hand, the defendants rely upon the provisions of the Wakf Validating Act and the following passage to be found in Ameer Ali's work on Mohammaden Law Vo. I. P. 273) 11. ‘The words ‘piety’ and ‘charity’ have a much wider significance in Mussalman Law and religion than in any other system. Khair, Bier, Ishan, etc., include every purpose which is recognised as good or pious under the Mussalman religion and the Mussalman Law, and the test of what is ‘good’ or ‘pious’ or ‘charitable’ is the approval of the ALMIGHTY. Every ‘good purpose’ (Wajshul-Khair) which God approves, or by which approach (Kurbet) is attained to the Deity, is a fitting purpose for a valid and lawful wakf or dedication. A provision for one's self, for one's children for one's relatives, is as good and pious an act as dedication for the support of the General Body of the poor’. 12. This is not a case of the founder of wakf merely directing the Koran to be read over his tomb and therefore does not fall within Kunhankutty v. Ahmad Musaliar1. The reading of the Koran in Public and private places can only be regarded as religious and pious and it seems to us that it must also be regarded as charitable, for the reading is for the benefit of all Mussalmans. The fact that money may be expended on the reading of the Koran in private places as well as in public “places does not detract from the religious, pious and charitable character of the object.” 13. Therefore, having regard to the above ruling, notwithstanding the observations made in Kunhankutty v. Ahmad Musaliar1, I have not the slightest hesitation in holding that the twin objects mentioned in Exhibit A-1 would clearly constitute vaild objects of the wakf. 14. I may now refer to T. Mayil Ammal v. Pappa2. That is a ruling of Subrahmanyam, J. in that case, the learned Judge states: “It is argued that, since the income other than the sum of Rs. 14. I may now refer to T. Mayil Ammal v. Pappa2. That is a ruling of Subrahmanyam, J. in that case, the learned Judge states: “It is argued that, since the income other than the sum of Rs. 5 directed to be spent on the performance of fate on the Prophet's birthday and the feeding of the poor on that day, is directed to be given not to the wakif's descendants as such but to the wakif's descendants in their capacity as Mutavallis, the object of that part of the instrument cannot be said to be the maintenance and support of the descendants of the founder of the wakf. I am unable to agree. The wakif's daughter and descendants were constituted trustees in order to prevent them effectively from alienating the properties. The document expressly states that subject to the obligation to spend Rs. 5 on the performances of the charity and to pay the kist, they might utilise the income for their own benefit without any power of alienation. They are described as trustees in order to make it clear that they have no power of alienation over the properties and are subject to the obligation of performing the charities described in the instrument. Otherwise, the purpose of the beneficial interest conferred on them is not to remunerate them for the services they render as trustees, but to provide for their maintenances and support because they are the descendants of the wakif. I find that the main purpose of the instrument was to provide for the maintenance and support of the plaintiff and her descendants and that it was a concurrent purpose that Rs. 5 a year should be spent on the charity specified in the instrument, namely, the performance of the fatis and the feeding of Fakirs on the Prophet's birthday.” 15. On this, it is argued that there the amount to be spent was only a sum of Rs. 5 for the performance of fateha, and in the instant case, it is equally a negligible sum and, therefore, the wakf is illusory. I am totally unable to accept this contention, because for moulet what has been ordained is an expenditure of a minimum of Rs. 25 per year. As regards fateha, no particular stipulation has been made. It would depend upon the largeness of the heart of the Huqdar. I am totally unable to accept this contention, because for moulet what has been ordained is an expenditure of a minimum of Rs. 25 per year. As regards fateha, no particular stipulation has been made. It would depend upon the largeness of the heart of the Huqdar. Therefore, this ruling is out helpful, and conse-qutly, I am not in a position to hold that the wakf is illusory. Once this position is arrived at. I do not think it is necessary for me to go into the larger aspect of the matter whether section 3 of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act would protect this wakf or not. Undoubtedly, these are valid objects of the wakf as recognised by the Mahomadan Law, concerning which I have already referred to the leading authorities. 16. In this view, I do not think it is necessary for us to refer to either Mohiddin Ahmed v. Sofia Khatun1, or Sakunthala v. Rasheedunnissa2. 17. The next decision that can be usefully referred to is that of Venkataraman, J., in M/s. V.M. Mohin v. Wakf Board, Madras3. In that case, the learned Judge was dealing with more or less a similar situation. The head note of that decision runs as follows: “The deed of wakf executed by a Muslim woman provided that she will be entitled to enjoy the income of certain properties and after her lifetime, son of her brother was to receive and enjoy the income, and was to perform in accordance with the family custom, a barisia and fathis of her father, and was also to feed a traveller every day, after his lifetime his descendants were to enjoy the income and conduct the above charities; in the absence of his issues his elder sister or her decendants were to enjoy the income and do the charities; the persons mentioned and their descendants were not entitled to alienate the properties: 18. It was held, that the deed was a valid wakf-alal-aulad. It was not correct to say that there was no transfer of ownership to God, and that only a charge was created for the charities. The deed was styled as a wakf deed and the term ‘wakf’ ‘implied a transfer of ownership to God. There was no transfer of ownership to the brother's son of the wakf but he was only to enjoy the income subject to the performance of the charities. The deed was styled as a wakf deed and the term ‘wakf’ ‘implied a transfer of ownership to God. There was no transfer of ownership to the brother's son of the wakf but he was only to enjoy the income subject to the performance of the charities. Further, the prohibition against alienation was consistent with wakf and was inconsistent with a transfer of ownership to the brother's son. The performance of the annual berssia and fathis for the father and the feeding of a traveller were valid objects of wakf”. 19. The analysis of the deed of wakf in this case conforms to each and every test propounded by the learned Judge in that case and, therefore, this is an added reason for holding that Exhibit A-l is only a deed of wakf, and it is not a deed of gift. I am unable to see any justification for interfering with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. 20. Hence, the second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. R.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.