Judgment Shri Trijugi Narayan Misra and Ram Bharasa Misra were the sons of Brindaban Misra. The said Trijugi Narayan Misra died on or about 11th September, 1973, leaving behind him, his wife Bidya Debi, petitioner No.3, son Anup Kumar Misra, petitioner No.2, another son Gobinda Misra, petitioner No. 1 and three unmarried daughters. The petitioners have claimed to be governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. It has been stated that in or about 1954, Trijugi Narayan Misra and Ram Bharasa Misra amicably partitioned amongst themselves by a registered deed of partition, the ancestral properties as inherited from Brindaban Misra. The said Brindaban Misra died in or about 1937. It has also been stated that shortly after the said partition, Trijugi Narayan Misra effected partition, of the properties with his son, Anup Kumar Misra and Smt. Bidya Debi who are petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, by registered deed of partition and in terms thereof got the respective shares and allotments, demarcated. 2. It would appear from the statements in the petition that at the time of such partition, petitioner No. 1, Gobinda Misra was in his mother's womb. It has also been claimed, that the two sons of Trijugi Narayan Misra, being petitioner Nos. 1 and 2, in accordance with the texts of Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, since then became co-sharers with their father, Trijugi Narayan Misra in respect of the ancestral lands and properties as involved in this proceeding. 3. It would appear from the statements in the petition, that on or about 8th April, 1968, petitioner No.1, Gobinda Misra, filed Title Suit No. 34 of 1968 in the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, Coochbehar, against the father, Trijugi Narayan Misra as well as the other two petitioners herein for partition to the extent of his ¼ share in the 'B' Schedule properties to the plaint, and also claiming appropriate declaration. Such suit was decreed in preliminary from on or about 11th July, 1968 and thereafter, a final decree was passed upon compromise on or about 10th July, 1968. Such decree, it has been stated, was passed on the basis of a joint petition of compromise. The copies of the plaint and the said petition of compromise were produced by Mr. Motilal, appearing in support of the Rule, apart from producing the preliminary and final decrees. Such decree, it has been stated, was passed on the basis of a joint petition of compromise. The copies of the plaint and the said petition of compromise were produced by Mr. Motilal, appearing in support of the Rule, apart from producing the preliminary and final decrees. It has been pleaded in the plaint to the said Title Suit, that in respect of 8 annas share as in the 'B' Schedule properties of the plaint, the defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the suit viz., Trijugi Narayan Misra, Smt. Biday Debi and Shri Anup Kumar Misra, entered into a partition deed on 6th November, 1954, divided the said properties amongst themselves in three equal shares, while the plaintiff viz., Gobinda Misra, was in mother's womb without allotting any share to him and by the birth of the said Gobinda Misra, the partition as effected was liable to be reopened and the properties in question, would also be liable to further partition in between the parties to the suit. It has also been alleged, that plaintiff Gobinda Misra through his grand-mother had requested to the defendant in the concerned suit, whose particulars have been mentioned hereinbefore, to partition the properties in question, but they, not having done so, the plaintiff Gobinda Misra, would be entitled to partition of the properties as respective shares. In Clause IV of the terms of the settlement, which was the basis of the compromise decree, it was also stated that the partitions and divisions of the properties as envisaged were fair, equitable and lawful and beneficial to the minor plaintiff, Gobinda Misra and shall not be liable to be reopened on any ground whatsoever and that the particulars of the properties, as described in the concerned schedule to the plaint would be fully and wholly covered by the agreement as was presented. 4. It has been claimed by the petitioners now, that by such partition, the joint Mitakshara family was disrupted or came to an end and the petitioners as well as Trijugi Narayan Misra, since deceased, should be held and observed to have possessed the properties and lands as involved in this proceeding, separately and exclusively and also in demarcated allotments. Apart from above, it was also alleged that the parties enjoyed the usufructs of the lands or the properties in question, in separate shares. Apart from above, it was also alleged that the parties enjoyed the usufructs of the lands or the properties in question, in separate shares. It was the case of the petitioners that lands belonging to the petitioner No. 1, Gobind Misra, consists of 25.48 acres of agricultural lands, 2.84 of non-agricultural lands and .23 acres of orchards. That apart, it has been stated that the father, Trijugi Narayan Misra and the mother Bidya Debi also separately possessed and enjoyed their lands and the petitioner No. 2, viz., the other son, had lands in separate demarcated allotment and share. The petitioners have stated that in an appropriate proceeding, being Mutation Case No. 141 of 1970-71, the petitioner No. 1, Gobinda Misra, got his name mutated in respect of the lands in question in terms of the order dated 30th January, 1971, as passed by the Junior Land Reforms Officer, Mathabhanga. 5. Chapter IIB of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) consisting of sections 14J to 14Y was inserted by the Land Reforms (Amendment) Act of 1971 and then by virtue of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act of 1972 with retrospective effect from 15th February, 1971 and the petitioners have claimed that such retrospective effect of Chapter IIB, of the said Act, could or would not in any way assail or negative the partition decree, as made in Title Suit No. 34 of 1968, which according to petitioners put an end to the joint Mitakshara family with the conditions as mentioned above. It was further claimed by the petitioners that they do not come within the mischief of the definition of 'family' as in section 14K(c) of the said Act as there was complete severance of joint Mitakshara family of the petitioners, long before the coming into force of the said Chapter IIB. As such, it was claimed that the petitioner No.1, Gobinda Misra, became a raiyat by virtue of the concerned partition decree and which too was recognised and given effect to by the authorities concerned, in the concerned Mutation Case No. 141 of 1970-71. 6. The Revenue Officer, Mathabhanga, who is respondent No. 4 in this case, initiated a proceeding under section 14T(1) of the said Act, against petitioner No.1, Gobinda Misra, in Case No. 205 of 1976 and by orders dated 28th December. 6. The Revenue Officer, Mathabhanga, who is respondent No. 4 in this case, initiated a proceeding under section 14T(1) of the said Act, against petitioner No.1, Gobinda Misra, in Case No. 205 of 1976 and by orders dated 28th December. 1976 and 15th January, 1977, the said proceeding was disposed of along with the Case Nos. 634 and 634/1 of 1976. Such disposals or determination have been claimed by the petitioners to be invalid and improper as the claim of the petitioner No.1, Gobinda Misra, to the effect, that he was completely separate from the Mitakshara coparcenary, by virtue of the decree as mentioned above was not considered and looked into properly and rather since such claim was negatived irregularly. From such determinations the said Gobinda Misra, admittedly preferred Miscellaneous Appeal (L.R.) No.3 of 1977, which was also dismissed on 18th September, 1977, affirming thereby the determinations as made by respondent No. 4. 7. From such original and appellate orders, this Rule, with the corresponding interim order, was obtained on 23rd December, 1977 and Mr. Motilal appearing in support of the same, in his usual fairness stated, that in view of the determinations in the case of (1) Sasanka Sekhar Maity & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 522 wherein it has been observed that the Act is a piece of social legislation for agrarian reform. The object of the legislation is to break up the concentration of ownership and control of the material resources of the community and to so distribute the same as best to sub-serve the common good, as enjoined by Article 39(b). Having regard to the quantity of land available in the State of West Bengal, the ceiling limits appear to be reasonable and fair. For equitable distribution of the natural resources it was essential to design the Act as it is so that the surplus land is available for distribution to the landless peasentry. Having regard to the quantity of land available in the State of West Bengal, the ceiling limits appear to be reasonable and fair. For equitable distribution of the natural resources it was essential to design the Act as it is so that the surplus land is available for distribution to the landless peasentry. In order, therefore, to reconcile the fundamental rights of the community as a whole with the individual rights of the more fortunate section of the community it was fundamentally necessary to make the impugned legislation to secure to a certain extent the rights of that part of the community which is denied its legitimate share in the means of livelihood, apart from holding that the ceiling on agricultural holdings once fixed cannot be static, unalterable for all times. The expression "any law for the time being in force", appearing in the second proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution obviously refers to the law imposing a ceiling. Here it is the impugned Act which introduced Chapter IIB imposing a new ceiling on agricultural holding of raiyats. That is the law for the time being in force, and no land is being acquired by the State under section 14L within the ceiling limits prescribed therein and the second proviso to Article 31A(1) refers to the "ceiling limit applicable to him", which evidently refers to the law in question and not earlier law, that is section 6(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. Further, both section 4(3) and section 6(2) of the Act stood deleted by the (Amendment) Act and so also the findings that the ceiling limit introduced by section 14M of the impugned Act is "the ceiling limit under the law for the time being in force" within the meaning of the second proviso to Article 31A(1). That being so, the provisions of Chapter IIB have the constitutional immunity of Article 31A and cannot be challenged on the ground that they are inconsistent with, take away or abridge the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(f) or 31(2). Even if it were not so, they would be under the protective umbrella of Article 31B. Indubitably, the provisions of Chapter IIB are a law related to agrarian reform and thus protected, it would not be possible for the petitioners to challenge the validity or otherwise of Chapter IIB or the sections as incorporated therein. Even if it were not so, they would be under the protective umbrella of Article 31B. Indubitably, the provisions of Chapter IIB are a law related to agrarian reform and thus protected, it would not be possible for the petitioners to challenge the validity or otherwise of Chapter IIB or the sections as incorporated therein. But, he claimed that the submissions as would be mentioned hereinafter and in fact, which were made by him, would be available. It was contended by Mr. Motilal, that since the minor in the instant case, was entitled to maintain a suit for partition, so the provisions of section 14J of the said Act, which lay down that the provisions of Chapter IIB, would override other provisions of law or any other law for the time being in force and is silent about suits or such suits as in this case or in case of decrees as made in such suits, would have no application. In fact, it was sought to be contended by Mr. Motilal, that the overriding effect by the non-obstante clause, will not prevail or apply in this case. Since under section 14P of the said Act, which lays down that in determining the ceiling area, any land which was transferred, by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned, by a raiyat after the 7th day of August, 1969, but before the date of publication, in the Official Gazette, of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971, shall be taken into account as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned, as the case may be, lands transferred after 7th August, 1969 are to be taken into account for determing the ceiling limit, Mr. Motilal also claimed that as the final decree in this case was made on 10th July, 1968 i.e. not after or on 7th August, 1969, the transfer in this case, would not also be bit by Chapter IIB or the provisions as contained therein. It was further contended by Mr. Motilal, that the definition of family is in section 14K(c) of the said Act, would not be applicable or available in cases, where parties are governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. It was further contended by Mr. Motilal, that the definition of family is in section 14K(c) of the said Act, would not be applicable or available in cases, where parties are governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. Section 14M(2) of the said Act provides that if there are more raiyats than one in a family, return shall be submitted by the head of the family, section 14M(2) contemplates of the ceiling area in case of more raiyats than one. Relying on other sections and section 14M(3), Mr. Motilal claimed that jointness of properties cannot be ruled out under the said Act. He also referred to the provisions in Articles 303, 307, 308, 309 and 325 of the Hindu Law, for establishing that the concerned Title Suit for partition and necessary declaration was authorisedly filed by the petitioner No. 1, Gobinda Misra and really, to establish, that he was entitled to maintain the action for partition against the joint family and he claimed that the effect of the decree as made, was the due disruption of the joint family. 8. There was no return to the Rule, although directions were duly given on 21st July, 1981 and Mr. Panja, appeared for the answering respondents. He of course made his submissions on production of the Records. It should also be noted that the authorities below held and observed, in the facts of this case, that the parties to the concerned proceedings, belonged to the family of late Trijugi Narayan Misra and that too in terms of section l4K(c) of the said Act, and as such were correctly treated to be entitled to one unit and the corresponding ceiling limit. It had also been held that the death of Trijugi Narayan Misra occurred on 11th September, 1973 i.e. after Chapter IIB came into operation on 15th February, 1971. It was also observed that since both the sons, who are petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 in this case, were minors, they should be deemed to be belonging to the family of Trijugi Narayan Misra on 15th February. 1971. 9. The submissions of Mr. Motilal have been indicated hereinbefore and such submissions were specifically denied and contradicted by Mr. It was also observed that since both the sons, who are petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 in this case, were minors, they should be deemed to be belonging to the family of Trijugi Narayan Misra on 15th February. 1971. 9. The submissions of Mr. Motilal have been indicated hereinbefore and such submissions were specifically denied and contradicted by Mr. Panja and in his submissions, he relied on the reasonings of the Tribunals below and claimed that the orders as made were due, legal, proper, regular and justified in the facts of the case and furthermore, in making those orders, the authorities below, had also acted with jurisdiction and authority. 10. A Hindu coparcenary in the Mitakshara Law consists of a common male ancestor and the three generations next to the holder in an unbroken male descent i.e. sons, grand-sons and great grand-sons of the holder. A coparcenary is thus a narrower body than a joint Hindu family and includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property i.e. son, son's sons and son's son's son of the holder of the joint property. It should be noted that no female can be a coparcener. In Mitakshara Law, property inherited by a Hindu from his father, father's father or father's father's father is ancestral property, in which he acquires an interest by birth; and on the death of the father be takes the property by right of survivorship and not by succession. A coparcener is purely a creature of law and cannot be created by an act of parties, except in the case of adoption, where a stranger may be adopted and taken in as a member of a joint family. A Mitakshara coparcener which is a narrower body than a Hindu joint family, includes those persons, who acquire by birth an interest in the coparcenary property i.e. the sons, grand-sons and great grand-sons of the holder of the joint property. The foundations of a coparcenary in Mitakshara Law starts with the birth of a son, thus such a coparcenary has two essential characteristics, viz., (1) that three generations next to the holder in direct male descent take by birth an interest in the ancestral property. The foundations of a coparcenary in Mitakshara Law starts with the birth of a son, thus such a coparcenary has two essential characteristics, viz., (1) that three generations next to the holder in direct male descent take by birth an interest in the ancestral property. Property inherited by a person from his father, father's father or father's father's father is ancestral property, in which the sons, son's sons and son's son's son acquire an interest on birth. (2) Secondly, on the death of a coparcener his interest passes by survivorship to the entire body of surviving coparceners and not to his own heirs only as in succession and Mitakshara coparcenary is based upon the principles of unity of ownership as well as unity of possession under the Mitakshara Law, the father cannot alienate the coparcenary property, except in special circumstances, because sons acquire interest therein by birth. Coparcenary property is peculiar to Mitkshara School of Hindu Law and Mitakshara Law divides property into two classes, viz., (a) Apratibandha is Daya or unobustructed heritage that is ancestral property in which the son, grand-sons and great grand-sons acquire an interest by birth and (b) Sapratibandha Daya or obstructed heritage in which the son, grand-son and great grand-son do not acquire by birth, any interest in property. Mr. Motilal claimed that in view of the provisions of Hindu Law as indicated above, the concerned Title Suit by Gobinda Misra, was maintainable and since there were the decree as mentioned above, the petitioner No. 1, Gobinda Misra, could not helve been claimed or treated to be the member of the family of Trijugi Narayan Misra, in terms of section 14K(c) of the said Act. In fact, Mr. Motilal claimed that on due severence or disruption of Mitakshara coparcenary, as was the case here, all such coparceners, would be entitled to have separate holdings considering them to be raiyats separately and individually. Mr. Panja of course claimed that a Mitakshara coparcenary, would be entitled to one unit and corresponding ceiling and all the coparceners in terms of the definition of "family" as in section 14K(c) would be the members of the family and in any event, all the coparceners would not be entitled to separate holdings or as claimed in the facts of the present case. 11. 11. Thus the primary question to be decided in this case is about the character and qualification and the right to hold properties or ceiling by Mitakshara coparcener, on disruption of the coparcenary. Under section 14K(c) and the other provisions of the said Act, there is no provision for retaining and holding of lands by the coparceners or separate entitlement under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. Such fact, in terms of the determinations in the case of (2) Fatechand Maheshri & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1972 Cal 177 , which was of course under the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, established the intention of the Legislature, not to treat each coparcener as a raiyat under the said Act. A joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, following the determinations in the above case, I hold, would be a "person" in terms of the definition of the terms in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act and thus, a single coparcener, out of the coparceners constituting the coparcenary, cannot be held to be a person or a raiyat entitled to hold individually. In the case as cited above, the point for decision amongst others, was whether a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law should be treated as a single individual or a single unit for the purpose of retention of land and also for compensation under the provisions of West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. On the principles and analogy as enunciated in the Bench determinations referred to hereinbefore, it must also, in my view, be held that, a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, should be regarded as one unit for the purpose of ceiling under the said Act and such coparcenary should also come under or governed by the definition of "family" as in section 14K(c) of the said Act. 12. Above being the position and in terms of the determinations in the case of Sasanka Sekhar Maity & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 12. Above being the position and in terms of the determinations in the case of Sasanka Sekhar Maity & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (supra), when ceiling on agricultural holdings once fixed cannot be static, unalterable for all times and furthermore, when the expression "any law for the time being in force", appearing in the second proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution of India, obviously refers to the law imposing a ceiling and as it has also been observed that Chapter IIB, imposing a new ceiling on agricultural holdings of raiyats, to be intra vires and it has further been observed that the expression "ceiling limit applicable to him", in the second proviso to Article 31A(1), which evidently refers to the law in question and not any other earlier law. I hold that Chapter IIB, being the law, for the time being in force and the petitioners being members of the Joint Hindu family, governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, in view of the discussions as above, should be ordinarily considered as one unit, for determination of ceiling under the said Act and not separate units or entitled to have separate ceilings for each coparcener, on disruption of the Mitakshara family, after Chapter IIB has come into force. In view of the above, the submissions of Mr. Motilal on section 14P of the said Act and more particularly, the applicability of section 14P of the said Act, will have to be considered. In terms of the said section, in determining the ceiling area, any land which was transferred by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned by a raiyat after 7th August, 1969, but before the date of publication, in the Official Gazette, of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971, shall be taken into consideration, as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned as the case may be or rather, that all agricultural lands transferred after 7th August, 1969 but before the date of publication i.e. 8th February, 1971, shall be taken into account, in computing the ceiling area. Such ceiling area virtually imposed, treating the family as the unit in section 14M(2), was given retrospective effect from 7th August, 1969. Such ceiling area virtually imposed, treating the family as the unit in section 14M(2), was given retrospective effect from 7th August, 1969. It should be noted that on the date of incorporation of Chapter IIB, the Karta of the joint Mitakshara family viz., Trijugi Narayan Misra, was alive and as such, ceiling area, which was required to be determined in his case, must be made in relation to the lands held by him and ordinarily not taking into consideration the transfer effected by partition, prior to 7th August, 1969 and more particularly, which in this case was initially effected on 11th June, 1968 by the preliminary decree, and confirmed thereafter, by the final decree on 10th July, 1968 and that too when such suit was maintainable. For the views as above, the Rule is made absolute to the extent as indicated. There will be no order as to costs.