JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal by the defendant-tenant is directed against the judgment and decree passed by Shri K. K. Samanta, learned Subordinate Judge. Additional court, Krishnagar, dismissing the appeal against the decision of learned munsif, Ranaghat in the suit for ejectment being Title Suit No. 325 of 1969. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 7 commenced a suit far ejectment against the defendant-appellant on the ground of reasonable requirement and of default. The tenancy was alleged to have been terminated by, a notice to quit dated 21. 4. 69 which, was alleged to have been served,on him on 25. 4. 69. During the pendency of the suit the suit premises had been transferred in favour of plaintiff No. 8 under a registered sale deed dated 14th august, 1972. On the prayer of Basanti bhowmick the transferee, she was brought on record as plaintiff No. 8 by an order dated 21. 6. 74. The suit was contested by the defendant. Defaults in payment of rent were denied. Reasonableness of requirement was also disputed. Validity of the notice to quit was questioned. Before the transfer in favour of plaintiff No. 8 the defence against ejectment was struck out under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 on 3. 3. 70. This Court was moved against that order in revision being Civil Revision Case No. 860 of 1970 which was rejected and the rule was discharged on 6. 11. 73. Be that as it may, the learned Munsif overruled all the defence contentions and passed a decree in favour of the landlord. 2. BEING aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the tenant defendant came up in appeal. This appeal was dismissed on 8. 6. 76 upholding the findings of the learned Munsif. Mr. Sudhis Das Gupta, learned Advocate for the appellant raises three points namely, 1)that the tenancy was not terminated by a valid notice; 2)that no decree could be passed on the ground of, default, and 3) that the transferee landlord cannot be added as a plaintiff in a composite suit on the grounds of reasonable requirement and default. As to the first point it is contended by him that previous to the notice to quit dated 21. 4. 69 the plaintiffs served another notice of ejectment on 4. 6. 68 (vide Ext. A ). It is said to have been sent under registered post on 4. 6. As to the first point it is contended by him that previous to the notice to quit dated 21. 4. 69 the plaintiffs served another notice of ejectment on 4. 6. 68 (vide Ext. A ). It is said to have been sent under registered post on 4. 6. 68 (vide acknowledgement receipt, ext. 3a ). It is argued by Mr. Das Gupta that earlier notice having not been withdrawn by the second notice it would operate and in that case the suit for ejectment on the subsequent notice (Ext. 1) was invalid. In order to find out so, it must be shown that the tenancy had been determined by an earlier valid notice. There is absolutely no evidence on record to show on what date the notice (Ext,. 1) had been served on the appellant. The appellant who examined himself as D. W. 1 was peculiarly silent on this point. In the above facts and circumstances this contention of Mr. Das Gupta cannot be accepted. 3. AS to the point that the plaintiff No. 8 would not be allowed to obtain a decree on the composite ground it appears that the cause of action for the suit arose at a time while the plaintiff Nos. 1 to 7 were landlords. They commenced a suit both on grounds of default and on reasonable requirement. The plaintiff No. 8 was brought on record under Order 22 Rule 10 C. P. C. on 21. 6. 74. Thereafter she did not pursue the ground of reasonable requirement for ejectment Thus she prayed for khas possession on the ground of default. There was no bar for a transferee-landlord to recover khas possession within three years of purchase on the ground of default. The suit might have been instituted initially on the composite grounds but one of the grounds having been given up there is no bar for proceeding the suit on the other ground. In this view of the matter I do mot find substance in the contention of mr. Das Gupta. 4. LASTLY it is contended by Mr. Das Gupta that there was no finding as to the actual default committed by the tenant-appellant. In this view of the matter I do mot find substance in the contention of mr. Das Gupta. 4. LASTLY it is contended by Mr. Das Gupta that there was no finding as to the actual default committed by the tenant-appellant. It is also argued by him that the transfer did not include arrears of rent and as such the transferee-landlord would not be entitled to take the benefit of the defaults which had taken place during the time when the transferors were the landlords. The learned trial Court found that the deposits made by the tenant-defendant were invalid and as such he was found to be a defaulter. The first Appellate Court was not addressed on this point. The only point canvassed before the first Appellate court was that the plaintiff No. 8 who was the transferee landlord could not tack the period of default in payment of rent for the suit premises by the defendant before the transfer of the suit premises in her favour as arrears of rent for the period before the transfer in her favour had not been transferred. In reiterating these arguments Mr. Das Gupta makes a reference to the decision in the case of Rameswar Chand alias Rameswar chandra Chand v. Sadhan Chandra Dey reported in 75 C. W. N. 479. He specially makes reliance on paragraph 14 of the report at page 487. It is stated therein that by a transfer of the premises by such landlord to the present landlord as here, there will not be with it an assignment of rent or a transfer of the benefit of default, or of the cause of action arising from default as even after transfer of the premises. The transferor-landlord will be entitled to the rent in default due to him under section 109 of the transfer of Property Act. Distinguishing this case it is pointed out by Mr. Saktinath mukherjee, learned Advocate for the respondent, that in this case the tenant defaulted in payment of rent for a certain period previous to the transfer. But according to him in this case the suit was commenced by the transfer or-landlords on a valid cause of action and thereafter during the pendency of the suit the transfer was made in favour of plaintiff No. 8. But according to him in this case the suit was commenced by the transfer or-landlords on a valid cause of action and thereafter during the pendency of the suit the transfer was made in favour of plaintiff No. 8. In such a case according to him there will be no bar for that transferee-landlord to take the benefit of defaults committed during the period when the transferors were the landlords. 5. WITH reference to Mulla on the transfer of Property Act, 1882, Filth Edition at page 725. Mr. Das feupta argues that under section 109 of the Transfer of property Act the assignee of the lessor has against the lessee all the rights that the lessor had and can enforce not only the covenants but conditions. But the points out that the section expressly enacts that he cannot sue for arrears of rent before his assignment and he cannot sue on breaches of covenant committed before the assignment. But the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act a special statute protects the tenant against eviction under section 13 of the Act notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law. Section 17 of the Act specifically lays down when a tenant can get the benefit of protection. It also lays down that if any of the provisions of Section 17 (1) is violated the tenant must suffer the consequence provided for in section 17 (3) of the Act. The question whether the transferee-landlord can take up the advantage of the defaults committed during the time of the previous landlord came up for decision also under the Calcutta House Rent Control Order and West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1950. In kanto M. Mullick v. Jyotish Chandra mukherjee- reported in 49 C. W. N. 433, justice Gentle at page 434 of the report observed that it is manifest that default by a tenant is not limited in its effect and to be available only to a person, who at the time of the default, was the landlord. It is clear that for a tenant to be able to avail himself of the benefit of the order in respect of a house, the occupancy of which he desires to retau, there must be at all times fulfilment of all the conditions of the tenancy, including payment of rent at the time prescribed in the order. 6. It is clear that for a tenant to be able to avail himself of the benefit of the order in respect of a house, the occupancy of which he desires to retau, there must be at all times fulfilment of all the conditions of the tenancy, including payment of rent at the time prescribed in the order. 6. SEBSEQUENTLY in the case of Charubala das v. Madhusudan Kundu, reported in 60 CW. N. at page 121 Justice P. N. Mookerjee held that the transferee-landlord can avail himself of default to the transferor landlord. The question whether defaults can be tagged came up for consideration in the case of Maya Singh vs. Mahammad Basir reported in 65 C. W. N. page 759. Justice chatterjee at page 763 and 764 of the report discussed the matter which would be very pertinent to quote. "the question is whether the co-sharer landlord to whom the properly was subsequently allowed exclusively can get an ejectment against a tenant who has committed acts of defaults during the time of previous landlord. As, in my opinion, there is no question of assignment of default, the only question is whether the default committed by the tenant can be taken into consideration in a suit for ejectment by the succeeding landlord. A suit, as I have already held, protects only a tenant who has not defaulted in payment of rent. There is no doubt that the defendant as the tenant of the co-sharer landlords defaulted in payment of rent. Therefore, as far as the defendant is concerned, he is not entilied to claim benefit. There is nothing under the West Bengal Rent Control Act which says that in case of a transfer of a landlord's interest. The defaults made by the tenant during the time of the last landlord should be wiped away. On the other hand, the Act itself is meant for protection of those tenants who pay rent diligently. The Act was never intended to protect persons who do not pay rent diligentiy. Therefore. I would say that the Act itself and the provisions under the sections do not support the view that in a suit for ejectment defaults made by the tenant during the time of a previous landlord should not he taken into account." 7. The Act was never intended to protect persons who do not pay rent diligentiy. Therefore. I would say that the Act itself and the provisions under the sections do not support the view that in a suit for ejectment defaults made by the tenant during the time of a previous landlord should not he taken into account." 7. THE question of tacking of defaults under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, 1956 came up for decision before the division Bench of this Court in the case of gordhanaas Jerambhai v. U. D. Baneerjee reported in 77 CWN page 70. In this case there was admitted default for four months though this default was in respect of payment of rent to the previous landlords with reference to the provisions of the Act under section 13 (1) and 17 (4) proviso, it is found that the tenant-appellant has forfeited his claim of protection against eviction. So far as the tenant is concerned there can be no room for doubt that rent was payable by him whether to the transferor landlord or to the transferee- landlord. If rent is payable and if rent is not paid, the default is a default in payment of rent and not merely a default in payment of money. This case is distinguished by Mr. Das Gupta on the footing that in this case the landlord's interest, was transferred along with the arrears of rent. So in that case the transferee landlord would be entitled to a decree for ejectment taking the default in payment of rent to the transfer or-landlord. 8. MR. Saktinath Mukherjee on behalf of the respondent on the other hand contends that in this case all arrears of rent might have been transferred along with the premises but Their Lordships laid down the principle which would govern every case of default and in every case the transfered landlord will be entitled to take advantage of the defaults committed during the time of the previous landlord. At page 79 of the report Their Lordships referred to the supreme Court decision in Rani Chandra's case at 1 SCWR 815 which lays down true criterion that the transferee landlord can take advantage of the default made to the transferor-landlord. At page 79 of the report Their Lordships referred to the supreme Court decision in Rani Chandra's case at 1 SCWR 815 which lays down true criterion that the transferee landlord can take advantage of the default made to the transferor-landlord. It is observed by Their lordships that it is true that the landlord in that case transfer led his interest during the pendency of the suit, but the decision rested on the wider ground whether the default of payment of rent due was available to the transferee-landlord for ejectment. Two conditions must be fulfilled before the suit for eviction of tenant on the ground of default can be validly maintained. First, the plaintiff must have the landlord's interest including the right of eviction on the ground of statutory default, and, secondly, there must be a default for the requisite period, no matter whether the default took place during the time of the transferee landlord or of the predecessors. According to Mr. Mukherjee this is the general principle, no matter whether the arrears of rent are transfened along with the promises or not. At the time of hearing before His lordship Salil Kumar Datta, J. in the case of Rameswar Chand (Supra), Hamchandra's pase was not reported. But we yet the reference of this case in paragraph 10 of the Report at page 484, 75 CWN Ramchandra case was a case for recovery of possession of a tenanted premises on eviction of the tenant on ground of default in respect of a tenancy governed by the House rent Control Act, 1947. The suit was instituted by the original landlord and during the pendency of the suit, he sold the suit premises to his wife who was impleaded as plaintiff No. 2. It was contended that as there was an assignment of the arrears of rent, these arrears ceases to be the rent and the outcome debt in law and there can be no question of paying the same or tendering them in Court as required by section 12 (3) (b ). Reliance was placed on the case of Daya Debi vs. Chapalj debi, 63 CWN 976, by the tenant which however, was not considered by the Count as the assignment there took place prior to the institution of the suit and it was observed. Reliance was placed on the case of Daya Debi vs. Chapalj debi, 63 CWN 976, by the tenant which however, was not considered by the Count as the assignment there took place prior to the institution of the suit and it was observed. Suffice it to say that on the faces of this case the Rule laid down in that case (Daya Debi) is not apposite. Herein admittedly on the date of the suit so instituted there was a valid cause of action for evicting the appellant. What the Court has to consider in every case is whether the suit is validly instituted. If a suit is vaiidly institute the decree must necessarily follow, unless the law prescribes otherwise. Undoubtedly the present suit is based on a valid cause of action. Therefore all that we have to see is whether any subsequent event has happened necessitating the denial of relsef asked for. Paying or tendering money under Section 12 (3) (b) is merely a concession granted to the tenant. He may awail of that concession or he may not If he avails of that concession then the relief of ejectment asked for will not be granted though the landlord will ordinarily be entitled to the cost of the suit. There is no denying the fact that at the time the suit was instituted the first respondent was the landlord as defined in the Act and at the time the decree came to be made the second plaintiff was the landlord. . . " 9. MR. Mukherjee argues that in this case the suit was also validly instituted and there was a valid cause of action for eviction. The plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 7 were landlords at the time of institution of the suit but plaintiff No 8 was added subsequently but before the decree came to be passed. Plaintiff No. 8 was then the landlord. So according to Mr. Mukherjee unless the defendant appellant could show something for his protection there would be no reason why a valid decree for ejectment would not be passed against him. The argument advanced by Mr. Mukherjee carries much force. In this case the written statement against ejectment was struck out before the transfer of the premises in favour of plaintiff no. 8. Again during the trial it was proved that the tenant defendant was a defaulter. The argument advanced by Mr. Mukherjee carries much force. In this case the written statement against ejectment was struck out before the transfer of the premises in favour of plaintiff no. 8. Again during the trial it was proved that the tenant defendant was a defaulter. In this view of the matter he was not entitled to protection against ejectment undersection 13 of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act. Plaintiff No. 8 was only added as plaintiff under Order 22 rule 10 on 25. 6. 74. By the transfer in her favour she stepped into the shoes of the previous landlords. Thus she would be entitled to take advantage of the defaults made previous to the transfer in her favour or in other words such defaults during the time of the previous landlords would enure to her benefit. Thus this point is also answered against Mr. Das Gupta. 10. IN the result, the appeal fails. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with cost. The judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are hereby affirmed. The oral prayer for stay of operation of this order is refused. Appeal dismissed with cost.