JUDGMENT A.R. Navkar, J. This judgment shall govern disposal of Criminal Appeal No. 284 of 1979 (Phool Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh) as well. This is an appeal under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arising out of the conviction and sentences passed on 3-8-1979, in Sessions Trial No. 820 of 1978, by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Guna, whereby all the accused appellants have been held guilty for an offence under section 399, Indian Penal Code read with section 402, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to three years' and three years' rigorous imprisonment each on each count respectively and appellants Nos. 1 and 2 have further been held guilty under section 25(1)(a) read with section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment each. All the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. Briefly stated, the facts out of which this appeal arises are asunder. On the night intervening 22nd and 23rd June, 1977, R. S. Tiwari (P. W. 6) received an information, on which he proceeded with Police force and Panch witnesses towards the forest, situated between Rahatwas and Hanwas villages. There, he found all the accused persons planning and preparing for committing a dacoity. On being challenged, three accused persons, namely, Mohansingh, Rajaramsingh and Gajendrasingh ran away from the place of the incident. Rest of the accused persons, namely, the appellants and one other, by name Phool Singh, were all apprehended. Two guns (Arts. A and B) and one sword (Art. C) were seized. The seven apprehended accused persons were taken to the Police Station, wherein, the first information report (Ex. P/l) was recorded by R. S. Tiwari (P. W. 6). Mohansingh, Rajaramsingh and Gajendrasingh were later arrested by the Police. Sanction for prosecution under sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act (Ex. P/6, P/7 and P/8) were obtained from the District Magistrate, Guna. After the investigation having been completed, Challans under section 399 read with section 402, Indian Penal Code and section 25 read with section 27 of the Arms Act were filed against the accused-appellants along with others. Pooransingh, accused appellant No. 2 was committed to the Court of Sessions, Guna in Sessions Trial No. 17 of 1978. After the investigation having been completed, Challans under section 399 read with section 402, Indian Penal Code and section 25 read with section 27 of the Arms Act were filed against the accused-appellants along with others. Pooransingh, accused appellant No. 2 was committed to the Court of Sessions, Guna in Sessions Trial No. 17 of 1978. Lalchand, accused-appellant No. 3 was committed to the Court of Sessions, Guna in Sessions Trial No. 18 of 1978 and the rest of the accused-persons were committed in Sessions Trial No. 20 of 1978. All the trials were consolidated into one and all accused have been tried and evidence recorded in Sessions Trial No. 20 of 1978. At trial, the prosecution examined about seven witnesses, who were the members of the raiding party. A clerk in the Arms Section of the Collectorate, Guna, was also examined to prove the sanctions for prosecution under the Arms Act. Mathura Prasad (P. W. 8) is a witness who prepared the site-plan, which is Ex. P/9. The accused denied the guilt and in defence, they examined about five witnesses. After taking into consideration the evidence, the learned trial Court held that Mohansingh, Rajaramsingh and Gajendrasingh are not proved to have committed any offence and hence they have been acquitted. For the rest, the learned trial Court believed the witnesses produced by the prosecution and held the accused guilty of offences mentioned above and passed the sentences against them. Aggrieved by this Judgment of conviction and sentences awarded, the present appeal is filed. After going through the evidence, there is no dispute that in-between the two villages mentioned above, there is a jungle. There is also no dispute that the accused did not have any house breaking implement or any instrument which can be said to be of use while committing dacoity, that is to say, an instrument to break open a lock or any instrument to break open any room or window. The only evidence against them is that they were having arms with them. The other evidence is that before they could be apprehended, some-one from the gang said in a loud voice that the time is up to commit dacoity and, therefore, we must proceed. Excepting this, there is nothing to show that the appellants, in any way, were preparing to commit dacoity. The other evidence is that before they could be apprehended, some-one from the gang said in a loud voice that the time is up to commit dacoity and, therefore, we must proceed. Excepting this, there is nothing to show that the appellants, in any way, were preparing to commit dacoity. As to the arms which they were having as alleged by the prosecution, it can safely be said that if a group of persons has to go crossing a jungle in the dead of night and if it carries a sword or a gun with it to defend itself against an attack by any wild animal, this circumstance will not be sufficient to hold that it was having the arms with an intention to commit dacoity or that will also not amount to preparation to commit dacoity. A dacoity is an act which is usually committed stealthily. No one will like to make it public affair by saying that now the time is up for committing dacoity and we must proceed. I had an occasion to decide a case under the similar circumstances in Veer Singh and three others. The State of Madhya Pradesh Criminal Appeal No. 142 of 1980 decided on 26-11-1980. In that case I have held that the facts of that case were not sufficient to hold the appellants guilty under section 399 and 402 Indian Penal Code. For coming to that conclusion, I relied on Chamariya v. State of M. P. 1976 WN (1) 306, and Chaturi Yadav v. State of Bihar 1979 SC (Cri) 502. In my opinion, the facts in the above case clearly apply to the present case in hand and as such, it is not possible to hold that the prosecution has proved an offence under section 399 or 402 Indian Penal Code against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The next point to be decided is whether the conviction under section 25 read with section 27 of the Arms Act can be maintained or not. From the evidence, it is clear that when the appellants were apprehended, they were asked to drop the arms they had with them and they did accordingly. After doing so, the Police Officer asked them to collect their individual arms from the arms which- were lying on the ground. From the evidence, it is clear that when the appellants were apprehended, they were asked to drop the arms they had with them and they did accordingly. After doing so, the Police Officer asked them to collect their individual arms from the arms which- were lying on the ground. When the appellants did so, the Investigating Officer prepared a memo on the basis of selection of arms made by the appellants saying that that particular arm belongs to the particular accused. The criticism levelled against this by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the statement made by the appellants to the Police Officer will not be admissible in evidence. Further, it is not clear as to which arm was recovered from which appellant. This fact is clear from the statement of Bhagwandas (P. W. 4). He has stated in his statement in para 1 (translated into English) that the miscreants were apprehended after encircling them by the Police party. Out of the miscreants, one had a Topidar Banduk, one had a sword, the other had a Ballam and some miscreants had Lohangis. But, in the Court he could not say as to which miscreants had which weapon. He has identified all the appellants who were present when they were apprehended. Further, he has stated in para 3 that the Police party could reach near the miscreants when they dropped their weapons on the ground. On asking them, they showed which weapon each of them had. In my opinion, this admission to the Police will not be admissible in evidence and if this piece of evidence is not taken into consideration, there is no evidence to convict appellants Pahalwansingh and Pooransingh under section 25(1)(a) read with section 27 of the Arms Act. Therefore, the result is that the appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside. They are already on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand discharged. Appeal allowed.